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(i) 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is the first detailed study of the British 
Council and British cultural diplomacy between 1939 and 1950. 
It attempt's to tell the story of the British Council in that 
period, of its organisation and relations with Government 
, 
Departments and of its worK overseas. These activities have 
been placed in the wider context of British foreign policy. The 
thesis is based mainly on unpublished and largely untapped 
primary sources, in particular the archives of the British Council 
and those Foreign Office Departments that dealt with its worK. 
I 
As this is a pioneering work, much background description has 
been necessary and a chronological framework has been chosen to 
simplify explanation. The thesis is divided into two parts, 
the war and the post-war period, and each chapter deals with a 
specific subject and extends over the timespan of the section 
it is in. Both parts begin with an analysis of, the Council's 
development at home and its interaction with Government Depprt- 
ments. (Chapters One and Eight) The first section includes a 
chapter on the work of the Council's technical divisions which 
were mostly absorbed by the Central Office of Information after 
the war. (Chapter Two) The remaining chppters deal with the 
British Council's work overseas: Chapter Three, with-its work 
in Europe and the European neutrals after the outbreak of war; 
Chapter Four, with the Council's activities in its largest area 
of operation during the war, the Middle East; Chapter Five, with 
the start of its work in the Commonwealth and Empire; Chapter 
Six, with operations in Latin America; Chapter Seven, with the 
reasons for the lack of Council activities in the United States and 
the Soviet Union and its unusual work in China. Organisational 
problems have created some anomalies; for example, the Council's 
work in Turkey is described in Chapter Three and. its work in 
Aden, Cyprus, Palestine and Malta in Chapter Five and not in 
the 6hapter on the Middle East, Chapter Four. In the second part, 
Chapter Nine in concerned with the Council's return to Europe and 
it, p enforced retreat from eastern Europe. Chapter Ten looks 
at its developing role in the Commonwealth and Empire and Chap: ter 
Eleven covers t'he changes in its work in the Middle East, Latin 
America, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. Appendices 
provide additional expýanation in the form of organisational charts 
(i i) 
details of annual expenditure and a list of important British 
Council figures. 
The main body of source material used in this thesis was 
taKen from the British Council's own voluminous reco. rds, which 
were deposited recently at the Public Record Office in London, 
and from the files of the Foreign Office Library Department and 
Cultural Relations Department. Additional material was found 
in the papers of the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office 
and other Government Departments. Private papers have also been 
studied and this thesis owes much to the Kindness and cooperation 
of the Council's former staff in supplying inýaluable information. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Everyýencount2r between two nations or two members of two 
nations is a cultural encounter. However, until approximately 
the First World War, foreign 'Policy decisions were made in their 
own largely self-contained and essentially European diplomatic 
culture. But the revolution in communications and travel, and 
the discredit earned by the old diplomacy after the war, altered 
this context, bringing a growing number of people into the 
process. The emergence of extra-European powers destroyed the 
unity of the pre-1914 diplomatic world. Furthermore, political, 
economic and military interdependence rendered all governments 
responsible to s. ome extent to an international. constituency. The 
promotion of national philosophies and achievements helped to 
gain support for national policies. Ideology played an increasing1ji 
important part in international relations as. an excuse and a 
justification for action. In 1939 the Allies went to war in 
defence of western civilisation and afterwards divided into two 
ideologically separate blocs. Between the two world wars every 
major European power embarked on a programme of national 
advertisement. France, Germany and Italy simply intensified the 
activities of bodies established in the nineteenth century. 
1 In 
1925 the Soviet Union established the All Union Society for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and in 1934 
Britain established the British Committee for Relations with Other 
Countries which became the British Council. 
2 
The foundation of the Council was symptomatic of the absolute 
and relative decline of Britain as 'a wcrld power. The foundation 
of similar bodies by other powers did not necessarily indicate 
the same fact, as this was also the start of the era of mass 
communications and increased Government intervention in, and 
control over, international communications. In propaganda, as in 
3 
other fields, 'laissez-faire is no longer regarded as good enough'. 
1. \ These were the Alliance Francaise, the Auslandsschulen and the 
Dante Alighieri Society. For further details see R. McMurray-and 
M. Lee, The Cultural Approach. Another Way in International 
Relations. (Chapal Hill 1947)- 
2. The Japanese also established a Society for the Promotion of 
International Cultural Relations in 1934 and Switzerland and 
CzechoslovaKia had similar bodios. For further information abour- 
VOKS see F. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: the Role of 
Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign_Policy. (New Jersey 1961) 
3. Minute by R. Frasor, 2 February 1944, T222/68 
2 
The arrival of the Council signalled Britain's recognition of the 
changing nature of international politics and the importance of 
prestige and influence where traditional political and economic 
power base, s are threatened. Foreign policies that can no longer 
be enforced by, other means have to rely heavily on influence; 
as Eden explained 
It is perfectly true, of course, that good cultural 
propaganda cannot remedy the damage done by a bad 
fore-ign policy, but it is no exaggeration to say 
that even the best of diplomatic policies may fail, 
if it neglects the task of interpretation and 
persuasion which modern conditions impose. 4 
The Council was established as a direct response to the 
virulent propaganda of the fascist powers. Until 1934 Britain's 
only means of reply was through the News Department of the Foreign 
Office whose response was limited to the dissemination of news 
and factual comment. 
5 The Council was desig, ned to meet the 
challenge of hostile propaganda to Bri: tish influence in the short- 
term and, in the long-term, to build up bodies of opinion in 
foreign countries favourable to Britain. In 1935 a statement of 
the Council's aims was drawn up that remains applicable to the 
present daY. 
To make the life and thought of the British peoples 
more widely known abroad; and to promote a mutual 
interchange of knowledge and ideas with other peoples. 
To encourage the study and use of the English language, 
both in foreign countries and the Crown Colonies and 
Dependencies; to assist overseas schools in equipping 
themselves for this purpose; to enable students from 
overseas to undertake courses of education or industrial 
training in the United Kingdom; to bring other peoples 
into closer touch with British ideals and practice in 
education, industry and Government; to make available 
to them the benefits of current British contributions 
to the sciences and technology; and to afford them 
opportunities of appreciating contemporary British work 
in literature, the fine arts, drama and music. To co- 
operate with the self-governing Dominions in strengthing 6 
the common cultural heritage of the British Commonwealth. 
4. Eden to Simon, 23 December 1937. T161/907 S35581/03/38/1 
5. The earliest mention of the need for British cultural propaganc)cL 
isin M. T. H. Sadler, 'The Meaning and Need of Cultural Propagana'. 
The New Europe, 23 May 1918, vol. 7, No. 84, p. 121-125 
6. Draft Memorandum and Articles of Association, 1935. BW2/121 
3 
In addition, the Council hoped to stimulate 'a return to sanity 
in international relations' 
7 
and later 'a peace of understanding 
by the peoples of the peoples of the world' 
8 by a wider 
appreciation of British culture and arts. 
From the outset the Council stood in striking contrast to its 
strident opponents. Its aims were essentially long-term, its 
message pro-British-rather than anti-foreign and its methods 
unobstrusive.. The. means by which British propaganda sought to 
conceal its purposewere tortuous. The Council was unique in 
seeking to avoid all activities suggestive oVVpropaganda or 
politics. This did not mean that it did not convey a political 
message but that it did not wish to appear to be propagandising 
or preaching politics. Such tactics were believed to be more 
effective in that a target's resistence to propaganda would not 
be aroused. In addition, if the target could be led to believe 
that he had reached his own conclusions, the ýdisguise would be 
complete and Britain would have acquired an unsuspecting propagan- 
dist. These tactics were especially necessary as the Council 
worked with the educational, cultural and governing elites of 
foreign countries. By influencing the opinion-formers it was 
hoped to reach a wider audience and again the source of the idea 
would be concealed. As these were un4ally well-informed 
individuals the Council's material had to be accurate and as 
truthful es possible. 
It was agreed that our portrayal of Britain must 
be the truth and nothing but the truth - though 
not necessarily the whole truth, especially 
where the demand ..... is not for the complete 
picture. 9 
There were initially no restrictions on the methods the Council 
could use and it could choose which aspects of Britain to promote 
to different audiences. The Council tended to seize every 
opportunity to expand its range of functions and became a 
repository for activities that did not specifically belong to any 
other body. 
"`The Council's work had been described as cultural propaganda, 
cultural diplomany and cultural relations. Definitions of 
propaganda are agreed on only one criterion for propaganda, that 
7. Lord Tyrrell to Sir Daniel Stevenson, 19 December 1934. E3W 2/79 
8. Executive Committee Minutes, 28 May 1945. BW 69/11 
9. Controllers Meeting Minutes, 22 May 1946. BW76/2 
4 
it should be motivated by a deliberate and calculated intent to 
persuade others to think or act in a particular way. The Council's 
activities were intended to reap political and economic benefits 
! for Britai. n by encouraging a pro-British outlook. The Council 
itself, in the period in question, most frequently described its 
work As cultural propaganda and that practice has been followed, 
although the Council also used a variety of other phrases to avoid 
the unpleasant associations of the word 'propaganda'. Although 
the Council'"s work was non-political in content it was political 
in purpose. The Council did not force otherý to 'think British' 
but hoped that its clients would do so after attending a Council 
institute or studying in Britain or taking part in any of the 
Council's other myriad activities. To be effective propaganda 
requires continuity, concentration of resources and the careful 
selection of targets. The Council rarely enjoyed all three and 
complained most frequently of being unable to, plan on a long-term 
financial basis. 
The Council was the brainchild of the Foreign Office News 
Department and that it was kept at one remove from Whitehall, 
reflects the circumstances of its foundation and the enormous 
reluctance of Britain to accept propaganda as a normal function 
of government. Reginald Leeper, who became head of the Foreign 
Office News Department in January 1935, was the father of the 
Council. It was through his effort and initiative that the 
Council was founded a nd evolved as it did. The Treasury's first 
grants to the Council were meagre by comparison with those enjoyed 
by its rivals and it was partly in order to attract funds from 
industry that the Council was established as a semi-official body 
Lord Tyrrell served as the first chairman of the Committee for 
Relations with Other Countries but he resigned in 1935 to become 
President of the Council, a post that he held until 1947. He was 
succeeded4by Lord Eustace Percy, a former Minister of Education 
and recently retired Minister Without Portfolio. Lord Lloyd, 
chairman of the Council's Near East Committee since 1935, took 
over from Percy in 1937. 
10. For an account o-P the dispute between commercial and cultural 
interests on the Council's Governing Board, see P. M. Taylor, 
Cultural Diplomacy and the British Council 1934-1939, 
Journal o-F International Studies, Vol. 4 1978, p. 244-265 
5 
Lloyd was a dynamic and authoritarian leader of deep religious 
conviction and devoted to the cause of the British Empire and 'Tory 
social reform, impatient of bureaucracy and officialdom and 
essentially always a one-man team,., The Council chairmanship 
was 'peculiarly congenial' to him. 
12 Maurice Peterson who 
served with Lloyd in Egypt"left this description: 
Small, dark, overflowing with nervous energy, he 
possessed a driving power which left but little 
respite for himself or those who worked for him. 13 He had a keen, almost feminine, intuition..... 
Lloyd's strong personality had earned enemies, as well as allies 
in the English political establishment. He had served as Governor 
of Bombay for five years from 1918 and as High Commissioner in 
Egypt from 1925 to 1929 when he had been forced to resign. During 
the 19301s, Lloyd stood firmly with the anti-a0peasers, had links 
with the German opposition to Hitler, advocated rearmament and 
was President of the Navy League from 1930. Stanley Unwin, 
chairman of the Council's Books and Periodicals Committee, was 
'aghast' when he learný,, of Lloyd's appointment but 'a complete 
14 
convert' after two meetings of the Executive Committee. More 
importantly, on becoming chairman Lloyd had secured the official 
recognition of the Council's status as a permanent institution. 
Lloyd recorded 
when he accepted the Prime Minister's invitation 
to assume the chairmanship of the Council, 
Mr Chamberlain had assured him that he regarded 
the British Council as a permanent body forming 
an integral part of the country's organisation 
for National Defence and that he accepted Lord- 
Lloyd's clearly expressed intention to demand 
from the Treasury annually increasing sums for 
the'development of the Council's programme. is 
With Chamberlain's approval Lloyd had repeated this agreement to 
Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had promised 
to record his concurrence to this arrangement in writing at the 
Treasury. The Foreign Office and the Treasury were frequently 
reminded of this agreement if either baulked at proposals for the 
Cotincil's expansion. 
11. E-Percy, Some Memories, (London 1958), P-195 
12. C. F. Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd, (London 1948), p. 272 
13. M. Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain, (London 1950), p. 64 
14. S. Unwin, The Truth About a Publisher, (London 1960). p. 422 
15. A. J. S. White toC. G. Sye'rs, ' 3 May 1940. BW 2/109 
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Lloyd believed fervently in the value of the Council's worK. 
In May 1939 he wrote to Halifax, 
I believe more and more, as I immerse myself in 
this strange but absolutely absorbing work, that 
it' is worth armies, battleships and aeroplanes 
and that its effects - unlike those agencies' is 
both lasting and beneficial. 
I could show you that for 1600 p. a. I could 
guarantee to get rid of hostile Italian influence 
in Malta and make the fortress permanently British 
in sentiment and so on da. apo. 16 
Lloyd's influence and personality gave the Co uncil an importance 
and purpose that enabled it to withstand attacks on its independence 
and adverse criticism. However, 'the deeply-rooted suspicion 
which underlay Lloyd's nature' 
17 
augmented difficulties with 
Government departments and especially the MOI,;, and his inability 
to delegate authority prevented cooperation with voluntary societief 
and participation in joint ventures. 
The staff and overseas contacts of the Council were regarded 
as an important nucleus for a wartime Ministry of Information. 
It was decided that the Council would be absorbed by the Ministry 
on the outbreak of war but that its name would be retained 'for 
use within certain limits in order to make it easy to resuscitate 
the Council after the war, assuming that to be the future policy 
of His Majesty's Government'. 
18 The propaganda activities of the 
Council - films, lectures and press articles - would be transferrej 
to the Ministry while the Council would continue its educational 
work under the controlý'of the Ministry. That the activities of 
the Council were not necessarily interchangeable with those of a 
MOI and that much of their success rested an their semi-official 
status had not been considered. 
Lloyd agreed to these arrangements, although the Executive 
Committee, the Council's governing body, was unaware of them owing 
to the secrecy surrounding these plans and because it was to be 
dissolved in the event of war. It was surprising nonetheless 
hat the British Council, which -for the last 
our and a half years has been engaged in 
s 
national propaganda of a cultural nature, 
should not have been consulted. 19 
16. Lloyd to Halifax, 25 May 1939. F0393/642 P1282/44/150 
17. Peterson, op. cit. p. 66 
18. Note on a Conference at the Treasury, 17 February 1939, 
T 161/907 S35581/06 
19. Lloyd to Halifax, 13 June 1939. F0800/322 H/XXX/4 
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In August 1939 Lloyd was offered a place on the proposed Advisory 
Committee to the Minister of Information and the post of Director 
of Propaganda in Foreign and Neutral Countries. His first 
reaction was to accept both but on reflection he accepted only 
the former with his own men from the Council placed at strategic 
points in the Ministry. Colonel Bridge, the Council's Secretary- 
General, would be head of the Foreign Publicity Division and his 
assistants would coordinate the Ministry's regional specialists. 
The Council'b employees abroad were 'Key men', Council teachers 
'the obvious people' to undertake propaganda in urgent situations, 
and the Council's institutes and Anglophile s6cieties the 'focal 
points of British influence' in an area. 
20 In every country 
where the Council operated its organisation would be used by the 
Ministry after war broke out: In Greece, the Council's staff and 
premises were to be the main outlets for the dissemination of 
British propaganda; a month before the outbreak of war the Council 
agreed to infiltrate six extra English teachers into-the Roumanian 
provinces to organise propaganda when war started. 
Lloyd's maxim was expansion wherever possible. The Council's 
grant rose -from 15,000 in 1935 to 115,000 in 1937 when Lloyd took 
over. In the next two years it quadrupled to 160,000. These 
sums, however, were trifling in comparison to those spent by 
Britain's enemies and represented, in Leeper's words, 'the minimum 
we must do if we do not wish to see our position irretrievably 
compromised'. 
21 The Council had a staff of two in 193S rising to 
forty in 1939. These pioneering days were nostalgically regarded 
as a golden era when everyone knew each other personally, staff 
morale was high and there were 'few regulations; no audit 
department; -no complicated budgeting'. 
22 
Lloyd deployed the 
limited funds at his disposal to create a cultural blockade of the 
Third Reich. In Scandinavia, France, south-eastern and southern 
Europe the Council rallied Britain's friends, whilst in the Middle 
East it bolstered Britain's position. 
This thesis takes up the Council's story at this point. 'The 
evQnts leading to the establishment of the Council and its life 
until the outbreak of war have been covered by Dr P. M. Taylor i. n 
The Projection of Britain. 
23 
The story ends in 1950, partly 
20. Minute by Everett, 13 September 1939, BW 2/363 
21. R. A. Leeper to G-Hale, 6 January 1939. T 161/1029 S35581/03/39 
22. A. J. S. White, The First Twenty-Five Years, (London 1965) p. 29 
23. P. M. Taylor, The Projection o-F Britain, (London 1981)Chapt. 4 
B 
because of the thirty-year rule and because the Council's future 
was reviewed again in that year. The Council's manifold 
activities between these dates cannot be comprehensively described 
and certain omissions have been necessary. The thesis 
concentrates on the development of the Council's organisation in 
London and its relationship with Government departments and its 
work overseas. The work of the Home Division and the output of 
the Production Division have not been examined in detail. The 
first forms a unique chapter in the Council's history arising from 
the extraordinary conditions of the war, and deserves lengthier 
treatment than could be allowed in this thesis. Pressures of time 
and space, and a lack of expertise in the critical judgment of 
celluloid, graphics and print, have prevented an adequate 
assessment of the Council's output in those areas. 
The thesis is based almost entirely on primary sources and 
in particular on the archives of the British'Council and the 
records of the Foreign Office Library Department and Cultural 
Relations Division. The Council was supervised initially by the 
Foreign Office News Department but in 1941 thi s responsibility 
was transferred to a special section of the Librarian's Office. 
In 1944 a Cultural Relations Division was created from this section 
to handle the increased volume of worK in the cultural field 
undertaKen by the Council and foreign organisations and the 
Government*s bilateral and international commitments. The Council', 5 
archives have been preserved haphazardly and reveal many gaps when 
read in conjunction with the Foreign Office material, which is 
full and detailed. Relevant files of other Government departments 
have also been consulted but these are relatively few. As an 
organisatioh on the periphery on Whitehall the Council did not 
concern many departments other than the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office. Most disappointing, however, is the 
disappearance of a once large collection of British Council files 
from the Colonial Office records for the war period. Searches 
by myself and the staff of the Public Records Office h, ýve failed 
to trace them. Unhappily, Lord Lloyd's papers remain closed. 
However, former Council staff and their relatives have been 
generous in providing interviews and material'. In addition, t he 
private papers of the Council's employees held in university and 
other libraries have been studied. The most useful published 
sources have been the Council's Annual Reports and publications 
and the memoirs of Couhcil staff. 
9 
As the Council is Britain's chief cultural arm overseas an 
examination of its work offers new insights into the role of 
cultural propaganda in British foreign policy and into the 
perceivedistrengths and weaknesses of Britain's position overseas. 
In Britain's case cultural propaganda has been used more often 
to bolster a weakening position and to mitigate political, 
economic and military shortcomings, than to reinforce an already 
strong position. This is inevitable for a declining power whose 
predicament - is worsened by the fact that its propaganda becomes 
less attractive as its other forms of influenge wane. It would 
therefore be foolhardy to seek to replace political power with 
influence alone; but in Britain, at least, the potential of 
propaganda has never been overrated. 
**** 
10 
CHAPTER ONE 
Cýý 
STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 
The outbreak of war threatened to end the British Council's 
short life. This chapter describes the Council's struggle for 
survival, its institutional development and its relationship 
with Government departments during the war. 
1 On 3 September 
the Council had become a part of the MOI. 
I ', Abroad, Council 
staff assumed additional duties as Press Attaches and naval 
and military intelligence gatherers. In Roumania a Council 
employee was sent to remote areas in the summer and autumn by 
the British Military, Attache in Bucharest with instructions 
to observe and report troop movements. In Greece a Council 
teacher undertook naval intelligence work for the British 
Consul in Samos. 2 There are probably other un recorded 
instances of Council staff engaging in extra activities in 
their often remote posts, but there is no available evidence 
to show that they were involved in subversive or black 
propaganda operations. Indeed, Julian Amery, working for 
Section D in the Balkans, recorded that in Yugoslavia the 
Council served as a decoy as 'the Italians were busily shadowing 
the innocent and unsuspecting Representative o-F the British 
Council '. 3 
Relations between the Council and the MOI were stormy from 
the outset. Just before hostilities broke out Lloyd rejected 
integration with the Ministry on the grounds that the two 
organisations were fundamentally different. Unlike the 
Ministry the Council was a permanent body, yielding results 
in the long-term and using distinctive methods and targets. 
Moreover, the mechanics of combining the two had been 
inadequately considered. The experience of the Press 
Oepartment was probably sufficient to convince Lloyd that 
the Council would fare better outside the Ministry. 
1. The Council's relations with the Colonial, Dominions 
and India Offices are described in Chapter Five. 
2. Both instances are recorded in C. A. F. Dundas to M. A. 
Robertson, 7 October 1942, BW29/13. 
3. J. Amery, Approach March, (London 1973), p. 165- 
11 
Suspended on the outbreak of war, its staff seconded to the 
Ministry, it was soon discovered that the Council's Press 
Department's contacts and methods were incompatible with 
those of, the Ministry and that association with the Ministry 
positively harmed the work that had been previously undertaken 
with success. In discussions in September with Lord Macmillan, 
the Minister of Information, Lloyd agreed to the transfer of 
films, broadcasting, lectures and visual propaganda to the 
Ministry. - The Council's-educational and books departments 
and the Press and Receptions Division would remain outside the 
Ministry together with activities in the fields of music, 
drama and the fine arts. 
The Foreign Office, similarly dissatisfied with the 
Ministry and campaigning for the return of enemy propaganda 
to its control, urged a larger and more independent role for 
the Council. The desultory nature of the early months of 
the war offered a continuing role for the Council in the vital 
countries of Europe and the Mediterranean. On 21 September 
Lloyd informed the Executive Committee that the Foreign Dffice 
no longer wanted the Council placed in cold storage for the 
duration of the war. 
Since then the Foreign Office had shown a keen 
anxiety, after receiving a considerable number 
of messages from Missions all over the world, 
that the Council should go ahead in practically 
every field that was feasible..... A strong case 
had been made out for cultural propaganda in 
wartime. The Council should be particularly 
careful in no way to become involved with political 
propagandaý 
The Treasury, on the other hand, argued that cultural 
propaganda was not related directly to the war effort and that 
the need for economy dictated that these activities should be 
suspended. Furthermore, if any work was continued it should 
be performed by the Ministry to eliminate overlapping and 
waste. 
The MOI was vulnerable and faced widespread attack. A 
d ivision of responsibility in the conduct of propaganda had 
already been conceded by the establishment of Section D and 
Electra House for the disseinination of propaganda to the enemy. 
4. Executive Committee Minutes, 21 September 1939, BW68/3. 
12 
On 28 September the War Cabinet decided to return responsibility 
for the issuing of news to the departments concerned)thereby 
reversing the basis on which the Ministry had been founded. 
Thus emasculated'the Ministry was unable to prevent the 
secession of the Council to the Foreign Office in mid-October. 
The MOI's loss of cultural propaganda was symptomatic of its 
weaKness at the start of the war and the Foreign Office could 
congratulate itself as it had also regained control of 
propaganda"'to enemy countries. 
To gain greater security the Council's EV xecutive Committee 
had considered applying for a Royal Charter before the war. 
The Treasury, in particular, opposed this course after the 
outbreaK of war. In September 1939, Edward Hale, principal 
assistant secretary at the Treasury, wrote to Eric Bamford, 
seconded from the Treasury to the MOI as administrative 
controller, concerning the Council's application for a Royal 
Charter. 
I am not particularly anxious to proceed with this 
now, in order not to commit ourselves further than 
we already are to the continuance of the British 
Council in its present form after the war ..... 
5 
The Treasury was determined to 'stonewall' on the issue and 
argued that the Council risked rejection of its application by 
the Privy Council bec-, ause it was a subject of controversy in 
the Press and did not need a Charter to function efficiently. 
6 
The Treasury also suggested that a Charter would undermine 
rather than safeguard the Council's independence as it would 
'be regarded as a public mark of Government endorsement and 
protection'. 
7 The Foreign Office attributed the Treasury's 
attitude 'to a fear that the Council's activities might overlap 
with those of the MOI and to a feeling that cultural propaganda 
was not necessary in wartime'. 
8 
5. E. Hale to E. Bamford, 29 September 1939. T161/981 
S355B1/06/39/1 
6. Minute by C. Cr. Syers, 4 March 1940. T161/1029 S35581/03/39 
7. Minute by Sir Alan Barlow, 5 March 1940. T161/1029 
S35581/03/39 
a- Exocutive CominitLoo MinuLos, 9 January 1040. DWGO/3 
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In January 1940 the Executive Committee learnt that the 
Foreign Office were unwilling to pursue the matter in view 
of the Council's difficulties in settling relations with the 
MOI. These disputes with the Ministry were to Lloyd's mind 
a reason for continuing with the application as he suspected 
that some people in the Ministry desire 
to taKe the opportunity of the war to suppress 
or curtail the Council, and he thinKs that a 
Charter would fortify his position. 9 
Despite Lloyd's perseverence, however, by March 1940 the 
Foreign Office, preoccupied by events in Scdndinavia and 
increasing tension in Europe, capitulated to the Treasury 
'in view of the difficulties involved in such a step in 
wartiiýe'. 
10 
Lloyd was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies 
in Churchill's Cabinet formed after Chamber lain's downfall 
following the debacle in Norway. He remained the Council's 
chairman and almost immediately declared his intention to 
'return to the attacK' on the question of the Charter. 
11 
By August the Treasury had withdrawn its objections and in 
October the Council's Royal Charter was signed by the King. 
The Times said the act established 
that body as a permanent institution of the 
realm and sets a seal upon the labours of the 
pioneers who have carried it from small 
beginnings to its present wide sphere of 
influence. 12 
The Charter conferred greater security if only because the 
Council's abolition would require its revocation. In 
addition, it laid down aims and rules of organisation that 
placed the Council on a firmer footing. The Charter declared 
that the Council had been formed 
9. Minute by Sir Alan Barlow, 5 March 1940. T161/1029 
S35581/03/39 
1,0. Halifax to Simon, 14 March 1940. T161/1029 
S3SS81 /03/39 
11. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 7 May 1940. BW69/6 
12. The Times, 11 October 1940. p. 5. col. 3. 
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for the purpose of promoting a wider knowledge of 
Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the English language abroad and 
developing closer cultural relations between Our 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and other countries for the purpose of benefiting 
the British Commonwealth of Nations. 13 
In the Council's first annual report its purpose was stated 
less formally 
Thp Council's aim is to create in a country overseas 
a basis of friendly Knowledge and understanding of 
the people of this country, of their philosophy and 
way of life, which will lead to a sý, mpathetic 
appreciation of British foreign policy, whatever for 
the moment that policy may be and from whatever 
political conviction it may spring. 14 
That British foreign policy in future required a broader basis 
of support than in the past, suggests that Britain no longer 
had sufficient power in other forms to secure her objectives 
and that her opponents had become more numerousýand more 
vociferous. The Council's work was also directly related to 
the successful outcome of the war, the annual report argued, 
as the spread of British ideals and principles would help to 
ensure the preservation of western civilisation. The Council 
was not averse to claiming short-term benefits from its worK 
and at the end of 1940 claimed 'a definite part' in creating 
a steady Anglophile spirit in Greece and buttressing a 
delicate situation in Egypt, Iraq and Palestine. 
15 
The encouragement of reciprocal cultural relations was 
fundamental to -the Council's work. Sir Eugen Millington-DraKe, 
the Council-s Chief Representative in Latin America, contributed 
funds for, the establishment of a Latin America House in London 
and wrote in March 1942 that 
Experience has shown that just as in international 
commerce some balance of trade is essential, so it 
is also in the cultural "Commerce of Ideas ........ 
and that it is impossible to maKe forced exports 
of "culture" even into a well-disposed count. ry 
unless that country feels that reciprocal interest 16 is being taKen in its own traditions and culture. 
13. Charter 
14. British 
15. Finance 
16. Memoran 
of Incorporation granted by His Majesty. 
October 1980. (London 1948) 
Council Annual Report, 1940/41. p. 2. 
and Agonda Committee Minutes, 7 January 1941 
BW69/6 
dum by Sir Eugen Millington-OraKe, March 1942, 
BW2/10 
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European culture coul d no longer assume superiority and had 
to be mindful of the differing cultures of the new actors 
emerging on the international stage. 
An earlier proposal to incorporate the Council as a 
company limited by guarantee had resulted in the accumulation 
of members who would have acted as shareholders. The members 
were a large amorphous body with no executive powers or 
obligations 'confined to persons of distinction in those 
aspects of the national life with which the Council finds 
itself concerned'. 
17 Members of the Counciý, l were elected by 
the Executive Committee. Initially, all members of Advisory 
Committees, except representatives of government departments, 
became members but this practice lapsed, as did the rule that 
official nominees could, not be members of the Council. 
Composed of not less than fifteen and not more than thirty 
members, of which nine were government nominees, the Executive 
Comittee met quarterly to consider issues o. f policy and finance 
18 
Its composition was designed to ensure a balanced range of 
opinion. In 1939 it included members of Parliament and the 
general public, civil servants and representatives of the three 
main political parties. From the Conservative Party there 
were Sir John Power and Sir Eugene Ramsden; representing the 
Liberal Party, Sir Archibald Sinclair. and from the Labour Party, 
Attlee, Alexander and Lord Snell. In the House of Commons the 
Council was described as 
as all-party body; it does not exist for any 
political reason, nor has it any political 
bias whatsoever. 19 
However, the Council was frequently criticised for its 
traditional cast, for being too narrow in outlooK and composition 
and unrepresentative of 'British democracy and progress in 
social and democratic experiment'. 
20 
17. Charter of Incorporation. op. cit. 
18. These Departments were: the Lord President's office, 
the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Colonial office, 
the Dominions Office, the Home Office, the Boards of 
Trade and Education and the Scottish Office. 
19. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, Vol. 369, 
18 February 1941. Col-80. 
20. Ibid. Col. 75. 
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In 1941 Sir Stanley Unwin, Chairman of the BooRs and 
Periodicals Department and a member of the Executive and 
Finance and Agenda Committees, suggested that greater 
participation from members of the left of British politics 
should be encouraged because the public 'rightly or wrongly 
thinK there is too much class bias in the British Council's 
activities'. 
21 LiKewise, Harold LasKi regretted that the 
Council had 'so small a representation of liberal views in 
its memberýhip'. 
22 
Executive Committee meetings were seldom, fully attended 
and a sub-committee, the Finance and Agenda Committee, was 
appointed to deal with routine financial matters. Consisting 
of the chairman and seven active members of the Executive 
Committee, it met monthly and became more influential than its 
parent body. The conclusions of the Finance and Agenda 
Committee were seldom overturned by the Executive Committee 
which tended to 'merely rubber stamp the policy'of the 
permanent officials'. 
23 To assist the Executive Committee 
there were ten Advisory Committees in 1939 providing expert 
advice on cultural and technical subjects. A Science Advisory 
Committee was added in 1941 and a Humanities Advisory Committee 
in 1944. The Advisory Committees worked closely with their 
corresponding Council departments and were represented by their 
chairman on the Executive Committee. 
The chairman of the Council was also the chairman of the 
Executive Committee and therefore the administrative head of 
the Council. The post was unpaia until 1939 and held at the 
discretion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The 
Council was organised in divisions under a Secretary General 
assisted by deputies. The divisions were divided into 
geographical departments, eventually four dealing with worK 
in Britain (the Home Division), in the Empire (the Empire 
Division), in the Middle East (Foreign Division A), and in 
Latin America (Foreign Division B), 24 and functional departments 
pty, oducing material for the Council's activities. 
21. S. Unwin to A. J. S. White, 11 July 1941 E3W2/ 55 
22. Ibid. 
23. Minute by J. L. D. WinniTrith, 11 January 1945. T219/2 
24 A Tifth was added in 1944, Foreign Division C. to deal 
with liberated Europe 
17 
In 1939 one officer could be responsible for a region and a 
production department but as the Council grow liaison was 
provided by we eKly Heads of Division meetings which submitted 
projects to the Executive and Finance and Agenda Committees. 
These meetings in pra'6'tice controlled the policy of the Council 
as the two main committees were 'insufficiently informed, too 
25 big, and meeting too infrequently' to exercise proper control. 
As a precaution against the destruction of the Council's London 
office some-. departments were transferred to premises at South 
Leigh in October 1940. In 1944 the booKs, periodicals and 
export departments were moved to larger premises at Oriel 
College, Oxford. This dispersal of the London organisation 
increased problems of coordination. 
Excluding particular cases arising from local factors, 
such as the cne-party system in TurKey, the Council's worK 
overseas was based on three models institutes, Anglophile 
societies and offices. The first were foundedýextensively 
in educationally-undeveloped areas, particularly the Middle 
East and the BalKans. Anglophile societies predominated in 
Latin America while in educationally-advanced countries, for 
example in Scandinavia, the Council operated through local 
institutions fed by a central Council office. Institutes 
were controlled directly by the Council whereas Anglophile 
societies, although subsidised and supplied with teaching staff 
by the Council, were administered by boards of local nationals. 
The Council had to respect the autonomous status of these 
societies and was often frustrated by the limited influence it 
could exert. In the third model the Council worKed with such 
bodies as the worKers educational association, extra-mural 
departments of universities and anglophile groups where they 
existed. Institutes were the most costly form of operation 
and offices the least expensive. The Institutes and societies 
attracted mainly lower and middle class students, businessmen 
and some professional people seeking to advance their careers 
by learning English. In Latin America expecially, women 
outnumbered men. Distinguished social and political figures 
were. attracted by CUItUral events organised by the Council atid 
a wider audience was reached through the distribution of 
Council material outside the Institutes and societies. 
25. Anonymous mnmorandum, probably by R. navies, 194S. T219/3 
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The Council preferred to have its own staff in each country, 
ideally a Representative assisted by an administrative deputy 
and specialist officers dealing with the distribution of 
material. The Representative was responsible for policy and 
the development of the Council's worK and acted in close 
consultation with the British Mission. 
By the nature of its worK the Council's success depended 
on the quality of its staf-F. Lloyd had laid down as a 
condition of his chairmanship that 
When engaging additional staff for t1his purpose 
he should be able to give them a personal 
assurance that if they were taken into the 
permanent est3blishment of the Council, they 
would be no less sure of a permanent career 
than if they were civil servants ...... 
26 
In practice this meant that even if the Council was suspended 
for the duration of the war, as had been planned, its staff, 
whether seconded to the MOI, the Forces or elsewhere, were 
guaranteed salaries at the level they had received at the 
Council and 'the right to be readmitted to the Council as soon 
as demobilisation took place'. 
27 This agreement aroused 
considerable anxiety at the Treasury and the Overseas Emergency 
Publicity Expenditure Committee decided in September 1939 that 
no further recruitment to the permanent staff of the Council 
should take place for the duration of the war. 
26 However, a 
Permanent Overseas Service was established in 1940 in order 
that the Council's work could continue abroad. A scheme for 
a Home Service was presented to the Treasury in 1943 but nothing 
came of it. The Council's newly-recruited London staff there- 
fore had no security of tenure, pensions or fixed pay scales. 
The unattractiveness of the Council's contracts, even in 
the Permanent Overseas Service, caused problems with recruitment, 
especially to the lower posts. The Council was too young to 
draw on its own service and had to look for the increasingly 
rare individual not already engaged on war work. 
26. OEPEC Meeting, 29 August 1939. T162/858 E39140/3 
27. Minute by C. Bridge, 30 August 1939. BW2/109 
28. OEPEC Meeting, 12 September 1939 T162/858 E39140/4 
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Insistence on teaching qualifications, languages or cultural 
affinities was a luxury that the Council could not afford, 
29 
resulting in 'the influence of the amateur'. Moreover, 
'the selection machinery was often makeshift' and appointments 
were made abroad without the candidate being interviewed. 
30 
Security vetting of senior appointments seems likely in view 
of evidence that applicants for teaching posts in Spain and 
Turkey were referýed to M. I. S. 
31 To attract good staff the 
Council raised salaries to compete with those offered by 
rival bodies, such as the Universities and the Army Education 
Corps, a practice that was deplored by the ýoreign Service. 
The Embassy at Ankara complained that 
The British Council had apparently adopted the easy 
but expensive expedient of bribing people to leave 
other jobs by offering enormous salaries. 32 
Council staff also faced charges of cowardice, laziness and 
unorthodoxy from hostile commentators. The Ankara Embassy 
again reported that 
Both Consuls-General, however, express some doubt 
as to whether the salaries paid, the hours worked 
and the length of the holidays are entirely in 
conformity with British official standards and 
with what might be. expected in wartime. 33 
However, service pers. innel seconded to the Council frequently 
protested at the drop in salary they had sustained and at the 
inadequate allowances provided for inflation and entertainment. 
In the chaotic financial conditions of the war, salaries often 
failed to keep pace with rising prices and most of the Council's 
staff in Turkey at the end of the war were nearly bankrupt. 
A heavy degree of responsibility was delegated to the 
Council's Representatives, nine of whom were appointed to the 
Middle East alone during the war. Difficulties of communication 
and the Council's reliance on personal. contacts for the 
development of its work, made this inevitable. The Council's 
staff in the Middle East were not visited from London until 1942 
qnd opportunities for travel to England were limited. 
29. Memorandum by T-P-Tunnard-Moore, 1945. 
30. White, op. cit. p. 46. 
31. See Ifor Evans report on a visit to Sp 
GW2/145, and a MinuLo by I-for Evans, 4 
32. Memorandum by C. Busk, October 1944. 
33. A. K. Helm to Eden, 3 October 1944, FO 
T219/3 
ain and Portugal, 1942 
April 1042. OW56/12 
FO 924/11 L1084/387/45 
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After visiting Spain and Portugal in 1942 Ifor Evans, the 
Council's Education Director, reported on the isolation 
suffered by the Council's employees and the desirability of 
regular tours by senior Council officials 'if a just balance 
of authority between London and our offices overseas is to 
be maintained'. 
34 The Council was fortunate to secure the 
services of distinguished individuals, some from the academic 
world, for the duration of the war, including Professors Boase, 
Macmillan, 'Roxby and StarKie. 
35 
At home senior staff tended 
to be recruited from the ranKs of retired Government officials. 
The Secretary-General, White, came from the Indian Civial 
Service, Gillan, Davies and Kennedy-CooKe from the Sudan 
Political Service and Hussey and Ward Price from the Nigerian 
Service. 36 
Wherever possible the Council tried to persuade its staff 
that their duty lay in remaining at their posts and not in 
joining the Forces. In March 1942 Council teachers at schools 
in Istanbul were told in a telegram signed by the Foreign 
Secretary that their worK was 'as essential as any other 
undertaKen anywhere in the common cause'. 
37 However, the 
Council suffered throughout the war from a shortage of staff 
and the threat of defections to the Forces. A Council 
official in Palestine in 1941 described the trials of his post. 
We must have men of the very best type, who are 
adaptable to the highest degree so that they can 
teach stupid pupils, drink endless coffees with 
officials, stand constant rebuffs and scorn from 
the type of E- nglishman abroad whom one finds in 
these parts, step over dead camels on their way 
to work, go without cultural amenities for weeks 
at a stretch, Keep away fromexcessive drink and 
foreign women and still retain their sense of 
proportion and remain English. 38 
34. Report by Sir Angus Gillan on a tour of the Middle East, 
1945. Gillan Papers 
3.5. See Appendix A 
36. See Appendix A 
37. Eden to English High Schools in Istanbul, 16 March 1942. 
BW29/13 
38. L. Hollyer to M. BlaKe, 25 November 1941. BW47/5 
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At the end of 1942 Britain reached a manpower crisis and 
was forced to cut the estimates of the armed services for 1943. 
The Council's staff at home and overseas had been exempted from 
military : service 
in 1940 'the national importance of the 
39 
Council's work having been recognised by the Government'. 
In November 1942, however, the Ministry of Labour ruled that 
all Council male employees under the age of thirty should be 
released 'if the military authorities have real need of their 
services..; ý.. '. 
40 This order threatened to paralyse the 
Council's work, particularly in the Middle East where new 
demands for the Council's services from the'Minister of State's 
Office had placed additional burdens on the Council's over- 
stretched staff. 
41 A meeting at the British Embassy in Cairo 
in December 1942 resolved that no Council staff could be 
spared and Sir Miles Lampson, the British Ambassador, warned 
that 
a few more men pruned from the Council would surely 
not help to solve the manpower problem at home..... 
On the other hand I assure you most seriously again 
that it would definitely put a stop to our work out 
here. 42 
Short-term military requirements threatened to endanger 
Britain's long-term interests in the Middle East. Protests 
also reached London from Richard Casey, the Minister of State 
in the Middle East, and from the Military authorities. Bevin 
argued that the Council could not escape the cuts and Eden was 
inclined initially to agree with him. However, pressure from 
its epresentatives in the Middle East forced the Foreign 
Office to endorse Lampson's request in February 1943. In 
April the situation was reversed and, with the support of Sir 
Henry Wilson, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, the Council began 
to recruit from the services whose position had been eased by 
the collapse of Axis resistance in North Africa. In June 
Casey 'arranged that G. H. Q. should take a firm line and not let 
unit commanders impede the release of personnel'. 
43 
39. Lloyd to Sir Miles Lampson, 24 January 1940. BW29/13 
40. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 5 February 1943. FO370/733 
41. See Chapter Four. L603/178/410 
42. Lampson to Eden, 24 January 1943. FO370/733 L513/178/410 
43. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 28 June 1943. FO370/718 L3336/41/410 
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In February 1941 Lloyd died at the age of sixty-one after 
a short illness. His death came as a severe blow to the 
Council and was mourned in its Institutes and societies 
overseas 
i. 
The Council had grown considerably under his 
leadership and had withstood attacks on its independence by 
the MOI, which are dealt with below. Approximately half of 
the total staff now numbering 333 were based overseas. The 
search for Lloyd's successor had begun when Lloyd was appointed 
to the Colonial Office. Halifax, with Lloyd's Knowledge, had 
offered the post temporarily to William Wedgwood Benn, a Labour 
M. P. and former Secretary of State for India , until Lloyd could 
resume his duties at the Council. Wedgwood Bonn had declined 
the offer wishing to remain in active service. 
44 
Lloyd had 
agreed to continue as chairman until Lord Harlech, then High 
Commissioner, in South Africa could take over. However, 
Harlech did not return from South Africa and Lloyd remained 
chairman, as he did not expect to serve in a pe, acetime 
government and wanted to be the Council's chairman after the 
war. From the Colonial Office Lloyd Kept a close watch on the 
Council, instructing his secretary that 'no matters concerning 
the British Council should be dealt with by him or any other 
department without prior reference to me'. 
45 Sir John 
Chancellor, a vice-chairman of the Council, was appointed 
assistant chairman but this arrangement was not successful 
'for Lord Lloyd did not allow Sir John to exercise any 
authority and dealt direct, as was his way, with Council staff 
at various levels'. 
46 
For the Council's staff this meant 
being summoned to the Colonial Office at any hour of the day 
or night during the worst of the blitz. 
The Council's staff abroad speculated whether the death 
of Lloyd would mean the end of the Council. Leeper, now in 
charge of subversivecoropaganda at Woburn Abbey, was also 
apprehensive and warned Eden against appointing a caretaker 
chairman as 'a long interregnum works havoc with any institutionI 
44. Halifax t'a Benn, 29 May 1940, and Benn to Halifax, 2 June 
1940, Halifax Papers FO 800/322 H/XXX/30 & 31 
45. Lloyd to S. Sabine, undated, BW2/88 
46. White, op. cit. p. 48 
47. R. A. Leeper to Eden, 9 February 1941, F0370/634 
LI 722/1404/410 
23 
Leeper did not think that either Chancellor or Lord Riverdale, 
the Council's. other vice-chairman, had sufficient authority 
to lead the Council and urged that it 'should not be allowed 
to slackenor fail for lack of direction'. 
48 R. A. Butler, 
Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, sounded the 
Executive Committee and found that Chancellor was willing 
'to continue to do the donkey work' and that Riverdale aspired 
49 to the post of acting chairman for the duration of the war. 
In Chancellor's view Lloyd's choice would have been for 
Riverdale, with Chancellor to mind the Council until the and 
of the war when Harlech would be available. Chancellor left 
a note to this effect with Brendan Bracken for Churchill's 
consideration. 50 The Council's president, Lord Tyrrell, 
nominated, in order of preference, the Duke of Devonshire, 
Lord de la Warr and Lord Crawford. Attlee nominated Wedgwood 
Benn for the post and this choice was appro 
I 
ved by Eden. 
51 
Churchill, however, anticipated discontent in týhe Conservative 
Party 'if one post after another of this kind goes to our 
Socialist Colleagues' and asked James Stewart, the Conservative 
Party Chief Whip, to find 'a good Conservative'. 
52 Stewart 
suggested Sir Malcolm Robertson 'who has great foreign 
experience and energy', Sir Francis Lindley, a former 
Ambassador, and Lord Kennet. 
53 
The Minister of Information, Duff Cooper, suggested that 
he should be ex-officio chairman of the Council on the grounds 
that control of the Council and the MOI should be unified. 
Duff Cooper did not recognize any distinction between the 
Council's and the Ministry's work. 
The supposition is that the British Council exists 
only for culture, and not for political propaganda, 
but this at the best of times was mere camouflage 
since no country would be justified in spending 
public money on cultural propagandaunless it had 
also a political or commercia'l significance. 54 
, 18. Ibid. 49. Minute by R. A. Butler, 8 February 1941 F0370/634 L1722/1404/ 
410 
50. Minute by Sir John Chancellor, 14 March 1941. 
Chancellor Papers, Box 27/4 p-6. 
51. Minute by J. Seal, 15 February 1941. PREM 4 20/3 p. 76 
52. Minute by Churchill, 1S February 1941. PREM 4 20/3 p. 7S. 
53. Minute by J. Stewart, 17 February 1941. PREM 4 20/3 p. 72 
54. Duff Cooper to Churchill, 7 February 1941. PREM 4 20/3 p. 80 
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The Secretary of State for India, Leo Amery, maintained that 
Lloyd had wanted Ronald Storrs to be his successor. Storrs' 
claim was strong as he had been a close friend of Lloyd, knew 
the Council well and believed that Lloyd had wished to have 
him as his deputy while he was at the Colonial Office 'but 
was frustrated by the opposition of certain members of the 
Council who preferred Chancellorlý5 Other candidates were 
Sir Percy Loraine and General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter. In 
March the ýinance and Agenda Committee resolved that the 
chairman should have 
sufficient prestige to be able to deal on an equal 
footing with Government Departments and to be 
received by rulers of foreign states when he went 
abroad and that he should be able to give his time 
daily to the work of the Council. 56 ý 
The decision was suspended until Eden's return from the 
Middle East. In May, after the fall of Greece, Eden informed 
Churchill that the Executive Committee had chosen the Duke of 
Devonshire and that he and Attlee concurred with this choice. 
The personal minute from Churchill to Eden in reply gives a 
rare indication of Churchill's attitude to the Council. 
There are however several important matters about 
the British Council which must be settled before 
we can maKe these appointments. First, is it to 
go on ? Many people consider that now we are at 
war and have a MOI it is redundant. It certainly 
very expensive and apart from junKetings in South 
American states, there are few countries open to 
it. There are no doubt a number of influential 
people who have ensconsced themselves in this 
organisation. Full justification will have to be 
shown to the Cabinet by defining and explaining 
the reality of its worK in the immediate future. 
On the whole I am inclined to thinK that its 57 
usefulness ended with the death of Lord Lloyd. 
From this it seems clear that Churchill was unconvinced of 
the value of cultural propaganda in wartime, sceptical of the 
Council's organisation and did not see a role for it in the 
war zone of the Middle East or in the Commonwealth and Empire. 
55. Leo Amery to Duff Cooper, 10 February 1941. INF 1/445 
56. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 11 March 1941. BW69/3 
57. Minute by Churchill, 18 May 1941. FO370/634 L1407/105/410 
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In addition, Churchill was no doubt exasperated by the 
continuing disputes between the Ministries of Information and 
Economic Warfare over the control of propaganda and between 
the MOI and the British Council which were shortly to be aired 
in the Cabinet. 58 The disappearance of the Council would 
remove one source of argument. 
The Foreign Office rallied to the support of the Council, 
the control of which it did not share, unlike the other 
I Cý 
channels of propaganda. Eden replied personally to Churchill. 
I attach great importance to the woA of the 
British Council. I was responsible for the early 
development of its worK when I was last Foreign 
Secretary. In my view it would be a grave error 
to close it down now after all the effort that 
has been put into it. 59 
The Foreign Office emphasised the distinction between the 
Council and the MOI, the coordination between the two 
organisations and the improbability of any savings in 
expenditure if they were merged. Eden also stressed that 
the existence of the Royal Charter would hinder a quiet 
dissolution of the Council. The Foreign Office were also 
quicK to poi-nt out that the German expenditure on cultural 
propaganda in 1937/8 was officially estimated at E3 million 
whereas the Council in 1941/2 was only spending E50,000. 
Churchill's reaction was to propose a new canditate. for the 
post of chairman. 
But the name of Malcolm Robertson has been brought 
to my notice. He is certainly a far more able and 
more experienced man; has great energy and is 
doing nothing; whereas the Duke of Devonshire is 
already employed. 60 
The Foreign Office pressed the candidature of the Duke of 
Devonshire but Churchill insisted on Robertson and dropped 
his suggestion that the existence of the Council should be 
justified to the War Cabinet, observing that, 
All that is required is someone who works in loyal 
accord with the Foreign Office, and I am sure Sir 
Malcolm Robertson would do this. 61 
58. For an account of relations between the MOI and the MEW 
see C. Cruikshank, The Fourth Arm, (London 19783 
59. Eden to Churchill, 20 May 1941. FO370/634 L1407/105/410 
60. Minute by Churchill, 20 May 1941. FO370/634 L1407/105/410 
The Duke of, Devonshire was Parliamentary Secretary of State 
for Tndfa nnd nurme, . 61. Churchill to Eden, 3 June 1941. F0370/634 L1407/105/410 
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Churchill's view prevailed and Lord Snell replaced Chancellor 
as vice chairman to balance the appointment of a Conservative 
as Chairman. A postscript was provided by an article in the 
Press, which the Council believed to have been inspired by 
Duff Cooper, asserting that the appointment of a Council 
chairman required the approval of the Ministry of Information. 
Eden-had to reassure the now chairman and Riverdale that he 
was 'entirely opposed' to any move by the MOI to take over the 
Council. 
62-ý 
Robertson described himself as a 'British diplomat of the 
Old School' yet his ideas on the need to extýend Britain's 
representation abroad were Tar from traditional and were 
reflected to some extent in the Eden reforms of the Foreign 
63 Office of 1943 which were based on Robertsonl, s recommendations. 
Robertson had joined the Foreign Office in 1898 and had served 
in Europe and North and South America. Inlaccepting the post 
of British Minister to the Argentine Republic i'n 1925 Robertson 
recorded that 
I should not only have a chance of pushing our 
trade, but of endeavouring to make Britain better 
known culturally, an ambition that I had nurtured 
for many years. 64 
In 1926 he founded the Anglo-Argentine Association of English 
Culture which was the prototype for all other Anglophile 
societies and as Ambassador was instrumental in securing the 
despatch of the D'Abernon Mission in 1929. At that time 
Robertson had little faith in 'the Foreign Office pundits' 
sharing his views on the extension of contacts abroad. 
It was obvious that the permanent officials at 
home had not yet attuned their minds to the idea 
that activity on behalf of British trade, industry 
and culture might be of value to Diplomacy and the 
conduct of Foreign Affairs generally. 65 
He resigned as Ambassador in 1929 and returned to England 
becoming chairman of Spillers Limited in 1930. 
62. Eden to Riverdale, 16 June 1941. BW82/8 
63. See Lord Avon, The Reckoning (London 1964) p. 257 
64.0raft autobiography, Sir Malcolm Robertson, Private Papers. 
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The formation of the Council in 1934 came as 'a very great 
relief' 
66 to Robertson who was by then a member of the Ibero- 
American Institute which was placed at the disposal of the 
newly formed Council. 
Lady Blanche Lloyd congratulated Robertson on his 
appointment and wrote that there wasImuch sympathy and identity 
of outlook about main principles between you and him'. 
67 Leeper, 
too, approved of Churchill's choice and wrote to Roberts(an that 
Your appointment comes at a particularly suitable 
moment in connection with the Foreign Office reform. 
You will be in a good position to li'nK the work of 
the Council and the Diplomatic Service and to see 
that the latter understands and assists the work of 
the former..... I remember the talk we had together 
in the Foreign Office before the war when we found 
that our views on Germany coincided. 6,8 
**** 
THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION 
After the Council left the MOI in October 1939 the question 
of its precise role and -functions remained to be settled. In 
December 19ý9, Sir P. Waterfield, Deputy Secretary at the MOI, 
proposed that the Ministry should take over all disputed areas 
and those Council departments that were duplicated in the 
Ministry. This left the Council only its purely educational 
and cultural work which the Treasury regarded as a luxury in 
wartime. Bridge and Leeper, however, declared that there was 
scope for both organisations and that overlapping could be 
avoided by the conclusion of demarcation agreements. 
Considerable confusion reigned as to where responsibility lay 
for particular activities and as to what each body was planning. 
The Council was extensively involved in the fields of Press 
articles, photographs and films whereas the new Ministry had 
to establish contacts and accumulate supplies. In the 
Colonies both organisations distributed all three types of 
material but the Council was able to correspond with the 
Colonial Information Offices directly while the MOI had to go 
through the Colonial Office. An exasperated MOI official 
66. Ibid. 
67. Lady Blanche Lloyd to Robortson, 12 June 1941. 
Robertson Papers 
68. Leeper to Robertson, 12 June 1941. Robertson Papers. 
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minuted in December 
The definition of their activities as being, 
cultural, while ours are political, does not 
seem to worK well in practice. 69 
In January 1940 it was decided that failing a solution 
arising from direct negotiation between Lloyd and the new 
Minister of Information, John Reith, the issue would be 
submitted to the War Cabinet by Halifax and Reith. The crux 
of the m atfer was 
whether "culture" is to be interpretýed in such a 
way as to include everything which i, s not directly 
political, or whether it should not be interpreted 
strictly so that the whole of no-man's land ..... 
falls within our (MOI) province. 70 
Reith, who 'set out to recover all that had been lost in 
, 71 September and gain even more . was the most formidable and 
intransigent opponent that the Council had yet faced. His 
appointment had been greeted with trepidation and Reith later 
recorded that 
I had, stupidly perhaps, imagined that that body 
had been absorbed by the Ministry when war broke 
out. Not at all..... Another loose end; another 
absurdity. Come inside, I suggested. Oh no. 
Lloyd said that the duty of the British Council 
was the propagation of British culture; and it 
would never do to have the taint of propaganda 
about it. And where, I asked, does the propagation 
of culture end and the propagation of propaganda 
begin ? 72 
Reith's first plan was to mount 'a frontal attack on all 
the outlying centres of propagandist activity, including the 
British Council, by means of a letter to the Prime Minister' 
ý3 
This was abandoned in favour of a meeting with Lloyd. To pave 
the way Leeper was approached with a list of proposals that 
the Ministry hoped he would persuade Lloyd to accept. Leeper 
was unsuccessful and when Reith and Lloyd met the gulf between 
them was wide. Lloyd complained to Halifax that Reith 
wanted to absorb the Council completely and display, -Aa pure- 
69. Minute by H. V. Hodson, 8 December 1939. INF 1/443 
70. Minute by M. Balfour, 15 January 1940. INF 1/443 
71. M. Balfour, Propaganda in War (London 1979) p. 161 
72. J. Reith, Into The Wind, (London 1949) p. 366-7 
73. A. P. Waterfield to S, lloo d, 10 January 1 940. INF 1/433 
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un-understanding' of the necessity for the Council to steer 
clear of political propaganda. 
74. Moreover, the Treasury 
supported Reith's stand and agreed that 'as propaganda is 
inevitable and culture can be postponed, the Ministry should 
have responsibility in all borderline cases. 
75 
Reith's proposals entailed the loss of most Of the Council's 
technical departments to the MOI, with the Council acting as 
the Ministry's agent in remaining fields. The Ministry also 
wanted better representation within the Council's Organisation 
although it offered no reciprocal facilities. Above all, 
Reith wanted Lloyd to 'accept the fundamental principle that 
responsibility for propaganda in foreign countries rests with 
this Ministry alone'. 
76 Lloyd attributed their differences 
to 'a misconception of the exact nature of th. e Council's 
functions' and, although he accepted that the Council's worK 
remained propaganda, he insisted that its separation from 
political propaganda was essential. 
But it is a fundamental paradox that the political 
effect-of cultural propaganda increases in proportion 
to its detachment from political propaganda, no 
matter how honestly and candidly the latter is 
conducted. 77 
Lloyd maintained that the Council's contacts overseas desired 
knowledge of Britain but would not tolerate political 
propaganda and the Council's business was 
To encourage their sympathy for this country so 
that when British political propaganda comes to 
them from other sources they are predisposed to 
receive it. 78 
The only departments the Council was willing tosurrender were 
films and broadcasting. The Council, however, would Keep its 
own films committee and distribution network and indent on the 
Ministry's vote for its film work. The remainder, Lloyd 
argued, formed an interdependent whole. 
The Ministry was, therefore, deeply at variance with the 
qouncil not only in matters of detail but also in principle. 
74. Lloyd to Halifax, 31 January 1940. BW82/7 
7S. Barlow to Waterfield, 8 February 1940. INF 1/443 
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Simultaneously, Rbith was fighting for the return of news and 
censorship to the Ministry's control and for greater influence 
in the conduct of propaganda to the enemy. In February Lloyd 
reassured, a nervous Finance and Agenda Committee that Halifax 
'had promised his support to resist any attempt to circumscribe 
or to 'absorb the functions at present carried out by the 
Council'. 79 Further di 
I 
scussions in March and April at 
ministerial and official level brought no agreement and it 
was finally'*Reith who lost his enthusiasm for the fight. In 
April the Finance and Agenda Committee was told that Reith 
had even offered to hand over to the Council the 
control of all propaganda work in foreign countries 
- an offer that had been declined as likely to 80 
endanger the propaganda activities of the Council. 
Victory went substantially to the Council. No definitions 
of function or real changes had resulted from nearly four months 
of negotiations and the Council's relationsýwith the Ministry 
reverted to the old formula: 
That with goodwill and a real intention to maKe 
things worK, particularly to avoid overlapping, 
the cultural versus political propaganda criterion 
should be satisfactory. 81 
On another front Reith was more successful. In April the 
Press and Censorship Bureau returned to the Ministry but Reith 
was unable to regain more before the fall of the Chamberlain 
Cabinet in May 1940. Reith was succeeded by Duff Cooper who 
took up his new post 'with a lack of enthusiasm which his 
experience in office did nothing to diminish'. 82 In June the 
control of propaganda to enemy countries was transferred from 
the Foreign Office to the MOI but in July the newly-created 
Special Operations Exib"Cutive for the conduct of subversive 
propaganda and sabotage was given to the Minister of Economic 
Warfare, Hugh Dalton. Overt propaganda to enemy and enemy- 
occupied countries stayed at the MOI, providing a source for 
considerable disagreement as Oalton argued that all forms of 
propaganda to these countries should be under the control of 
a\single minister - himself. In the summer of 1940, as 
79. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 13 February 1940. BW69/5 
80. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 April 1940. BW69/6 
81. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 7 May 1940. BW69/6 
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Britain faced the threat of invasion. the MOI made another 
bid for the control of cultural propaganda on the grounds 
that the Council had contravened the Reith-Lloyd agreement. 
Duff Cooper was also trying to frustrate the transfer to 
Dalton of open propaganda to enemy countries and was in 
difficulties with the Press at home. Lloyd attributed Duff 
Cooper's attacK to machinations by the Council's declared 
enemy, Lord BeaverbrooK, who had joined the War Cabinet as 
Minister of Aircraft Production in August. Lloyd mobilized 
the Council's supporters, whom he identified as Attlee, 
Greenwood and Sinclair, and protested to Haiifax 
I wish the Ministers of Information would leave 
us alone and mind their own Department. 8 1he present Ministry needs a lot of minding. 
I In preparation for the coming battle with the Ministry, Lloyd 
rehearsed the Council's staff in their defence. 
It is important never to admit ...... tha ,t 
it is 
not possible to distinguish the borderline 
between cultural and political propaganda in 
wartime - that has always been their contention 
on which they based their attack on the Council, 
and we have always denied it with the result 
that we are distinct. 
Waterfield, at the Ministry, favoured a Cabinet ruling to 
defeat Lloyd but Colonel Scorgie, deputy Director General and 
formerly head of the Stationery Office, warned that 'Lord Lloyd 
and the British Council are persuasive in discussion' . 
There is a lot of Hitler diplomacy about the Council's 
methods. They make swaggering, impossible claims 
and proposals in the hope that something will be 
conceded. Whenever we have disputed directly with 85 the Council we have lost something in the settlement. 
Duff Cooper, however, believed he held a strong hand. The 
Ministry had r ecently prevented the Council from receiving any 
of the Ministry's pap the Treasury had supported the ,, 
pr quota, 
Ministry on the issue of newsreels, 86 and the Council risked 
trouble with the Dominions and India Offices if it pursued its 
film distribution plans. 
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Moreover, with the intensification of the war 
the Council's cultural ambit is narrowing. 
That, I think, is what they instinctively 
recognise. Unless they can poach from us they 
have little to do, and sooner or later public 
opinion will recognise that their large and 
expensive organisation is not justified in 
this war. 87 
Duff Cooper postponed a planned meeting with Lloyd 'owing 
to a reluctance to iG-itiate what might prove to be a disagreeable 
conversation' and mistakenly assumed that a, 'mere hint' to the 
Council that if they did not behave the Ministry would recommend 
to the War Cabinet that the Council's independence should be 
ended would bring Lloyd into line. 
88 Duff Cooper declared 
that the Council's case was 'so weak that it ought to be easy 
, 89 to convince the Cabinet. In January 1941 Duff Cooper wrote 
to Eden that 
There is no real division between cUltural and 
political propaganda since the ultimate' object 
and, indeed the sole justification for cultural 
propaganda, must be political and commercial. 90 
The issue of the Council was peripheral to Duff Cooper's 
main battle with Dalton for the control of overt propaganda to 
Nazi-occupied Europe. In May, with the Lord President, Sir 
John Anderson, acting as mediator, Eden, Duff Cooper and Dalton 
agreed to form a triumvirate to improve liaison and coordin- 
ation while leaving existing responsibilities as they stood. 
Duff Cooper was 'never happy' at the Ministry and later 
recommended that all 'foreign propaganda should be under the 
direct control of the Foreign Office'. 
91 In June he voiced 
his dissatisfaction to Churchill, laying claim again to the 
control of all forms of propaganda. Churchill called on 
BeaverbrooK to put an end to the ceaseless squabbles. In his 
report to the War Cabinet, Beaverbrook outlined two choices 
in regard to the Council: absorption by the MOI or the 
restriction of the Council 'to cultural activities, entertain- 
ments, scholarships and systems of education'. 
92 On the 
question of overseas publicity Beaverbrook reaffirmed that the 
Foreign Office must be responsible for the strategy and the - 
87. Minute by Lt. Col. N. G. Scorgie, 10 November 1940. INF 1/443 
88. Minute by Duff Cooper, 14 December 1940. INF 1/443 
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MOI for the execution and endorsed the Ministerial Committee 
of three for the coordination of black propaganda. In reply 
Duff Cooper insisted that the MOI 
should have charge of secret as well as overt, 
of cultural as well as political propaganda, in 
order to ensure complete coordination through 
unity of command. 93 
Unless such a course was adopted Duff Cooper maintained that 
the Ministry should'disintegrate into its component parts'. 
94 
A week later Churchill presented his own paper on information 
and propaganda to the War Cabinet in which 
ý, 
e wrote concerning 
the Council that 'general agreement had been expressed with 
the second suggestion in Lord Beaverbrook's previous paper'. 
95 
In a paper prepared for the War Cabinet by the Foreign Office 
and the Treasury it was explained that 
The Council claims that the cultural nature of 
its activities distinguishes it from the MOI, 
whose function is the dissemination of propaganda. 
Publicity being the essence of the Council's work 
it does not indulge in underground activities, 
and thus claims to be distinguished from the 
organisation now working under the MEW. 96 
The War Cabinet had no desire to change the Council's status 
or, perhaps, to stir another hornets' nest, despite the 
pleadings of Duff Cooper. The established formula was 
perpetuated: 
namely, that the functions of the Council should 
be divided - propaganda activities of the Council 
falling under the MOI, while the educational and 
strictly cultural activities would remain with the 
Council. 97 
At a meeting in the Lord President's Office on I July it 
was agreed that educational and cultural work would remain the 
Council's prerogative while all its propaganda activities 
should be carried out only with the prior approval of the MOI. 
98 
A special post was created within the Ministry for liaison with 
the Council. This was held briefly by Harold Nicolson, 
P, qrliamentary Secretary to the Minister, who was replaced by 
Eric Bamford, deputy Director-General, when Brendan Bracken 
succeeded Duff Cooper as Minister. Nicolson, however, continued 
93. Memorandum by Duff Cooper, 24 June 1941. CAB65/20 WP(41)139 
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to be the Minister's personal representative on the 
Executive Committee of the Council. Duff Cooper left the 
Ministry 'with a sigh of relief' at the end of July. 
99 
Bracken was a close friend of the Prime Minister and had 
been Churchill's Parliamentary Private Secretary. As a 
newspaper proprietor himself Bracken was able to disarm press 
criticism of the Ministry and win its confidence. He over- 
hauled the Ministry's structure and 'moved through the Ministry 
during thai opening week like a dose of salts'100 Cyril 
Radcliffe replaced Walter Monckton as Director-General and 
Bamford replaced Scorgie as his deputy. Bracken believed 
'that foreign publicity was a waste of time' and 'affected a 
disinterest in the overseas information services' which he was 
content to leave in the hands of the capable Kenneth Grubb who 
was on good terms with the Council. 
101 Inst 
I 
ead of challenging 
the Service Departmentsý4 control of military news directly as 
Duff Cooper had done, Bracken concentrated on keeping those 
Departments to the letter of the agreement that they should 
keep the Ministry fully informed. Bracken adopted a 
similarly pragmatic approach in his dealings with the Council. 
He sought to improve existing arrangements with the Council 
rather than attack its independence. Bracken's first step was 
to invite Robertson to a meeting 'to try to bring order into 
our singularly ill-contrived world'. 
102 At that meeting 
Bracken, clearly unaware of past battles with the Council, 
encouraged Robertson to expand its operations, especially in 
the United States and in bringing visitors to Britain. Bracken's 
largesse caused consternation among some Ministry officials but 
it nevertheless signalled the start of a new and more 
harmonious era in relations between the two organisations. The 
Ministry had overcome its teething troubles and Hitler's 
invasion of the Soviet Union that summer offered Britain a 
breathing space once it became clear that the Red Army would 
not be defeated as quickly as had been feared. In addition, 
Bracken won, the battle for the control of all overt propaganda. 
fn September the Political Warfare Executive, consisting of 
Eden, Dalton and Bracken working through their officials, was 
created to conduct all forms of such warfare to enemy, occupied 
and satellite countries. In March 1942 Dalton went to the 
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Board of Trade and his sý! (I 
, 
cýcgýs-so_r did not inherit the same 
responsibilitles for propaganda. 
Overseas, the Council and the MOI acted so closely 
together; in some areas that they became almost indistinguishable. 
In Iraq, the CouncilcRepresentative Information Officer worked 
'hand in glove' and stocks and films, photographs and 
periodicals for the Middle East were pooled in Cairo. 
103 In 
Latin America, the Ministry's Press Attach6 undertook most of 
the Council's film and press distribution while the Council 
acted as the Ministry's agent in bringing visitors to Britain. 
In the United States, the Council's output waschanneled through 
the Ministry's British Library of Information in New York. As 
the war progressed it was impossible for the Council to avoid 
all mention of it, as stipulated in agreements with the 
Ministry, as it was undesirable to restrict the Ministry 
war material to the exclusion of general themes. With the 
approach of Allied victory the need for war prd paganda 
diminished and was replaced by a growing clamour for 
information about Britain. Increasing overlapping between 
the two organisations prompted Radcliffe to ask Bracken 'to 
consider whether for post-war purposes the two organisations- 
should not be one for overseas work'. 
104 At a meeting at the 
Treasury in July 1943 to discuss the Council's application 
for a supplementary grant, Bamford suggested 
that the Council and the MOI could supplement each 
other's worK and the right course was to have 
closer integration and join planning and execution 
of the worK of the Ministry and the Council in each 
regional field. 105 
The Ministry's friendly overtures alarmed the Council as 
much as its hostility had done. The Foreign Office agreed 
that the Council should not become too closely identified with 
the Ministry for 
the worK of the British Council will continue and 
must be strongly developed in the post war period, 
whereas the MOI was not a permanent Department and 
its worK and its Press Attach6s would be absorbed 
in the Foreign Office. 106 
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The Council was even more concerned at the entry of the PWE 
into the field it considered to be its own, especially PWE 
broadcasts to occupied Europe. In December 1942 a PWE paper 
outlined, the main themes to be used in convincing Europe that 
Britain would play aý'leading role in the post war world. 
In projecting Britain, we have, broadly speaking 
two main tasks to perform - to make known firstly, 
what the British are like and how they think and 
secondly, what they have created and how they live 
together in society..... curiosity about the 
character of the British people must be stimulated 
if interest in the British way of lilfe is to be 
aroused. But an appetite once stimu'lated must be 
fed, and in British social and intellectual 
achievements we can find an almost inexaustible 
supply of nourishing and palatable food. 107 
This memorandum would not have been out of pilace at the 
Council. Therefore, although relations with the MOI improved 
considerably in the last two years of the war, the Council 
faced a new danger, namely, that of being swamped by its more 
powerful neighbours in the propaganda field and irretrievably 
compromised by the similarities of general themes used. 
**** 
THE FOREIGN OFFICE 
The Council was 'an annex and dependency' of the Foreign Office 
log 
The Foreign Office appointed the Council's chairman and 
monitored its activities through representatives on the 
Executive, Finance and Agenda and other important committees. 
Until 1940 the Council's Secretaries General were seconded from 
the Foreign Office which gave 
general guidance to the British Council regarding 
their activities in foreign countries. They do 
not issue to the British Council any detailed 
instructions as to the programme they should adopt, 
but have made the following arrangements, which 
while leaving the Council reasonable latitude and 
initiative in framing their own plans, ensure that 
an adequate check is Kept on the Council's policy 
and expenditure ..... 
109 
The arrangements referred to provided for close consultation 
between Council and Foreign Office staff abroad. 
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In December 1939 Leeper, then with the Department of 
Propaganda to Enemy Countries, resumed supervision of Council 
affairs in the Foreign Office from Charles PeaKe, head of the 
News Department, who 'never really found time to deal with it' 
110 
At the beginning of 1940 Leeper was replaced by Stephen Gaselee, 
Foreign Office Librarian, who had neither Leeper's interest nor 
his influence in the Council. White recorded that 'the 
Council missed during the war the day to day guidance in its 
affairs on-. which it had to rely so much in Mr. Leeper's day'. 
In May 1941 Kenneth Gurney, who had no previous Knowledge of 
the Council or of propaganda, tooK over fromý Gaselee. The 
pressure of wartime diplomacy enabled the Council to escape 
close Foreign Office scrutiny in London. Abroad, the Council's 
activities were developed in cooperation with British Missions 
and, in Spain, China and the Soviet Union, Council staff were 
attached to the Embassy. In Spain, the Council's Representative, 
Professor StarKie, was regarded as Britain's official Cultural 
Attach4 by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs although 
not by the British Embassy itself. At the Embassy in 
ChungKing Dr. Needham and Professor Roxby, Council Representative 
held the title of Counsellor and in the Soviet Union the Council 
was only able to worK through the Embassy's Press Office. 
Liaison between Council staff and the local British Mission was 
generally close and continuous, the Mission being ultimately 
responsible for all the Council's activities. His Majesty's 
Representatives corresponded directly with the Council, sat on 
the mixed committees appointed to select students for Council 
scholarships and were expected to attend Council funcýions. 
As a Foreign Office official minuted on the Council's activities 
abroad, 'the "machinery" may be independant as long as the 
policy is not'. 
112 
However, with the establishment of Representatives 
overseas, corresponding directly with the Council, the Foreign 
Office found that their ability to control the Council diminished 
as information became scarce. A Foreign Office official 
examining the Council's budget in 1944 noted that 
C) 
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If the British Council follow the practice 
they have come to adopt in other countries 
once they are established, they will consult 
us about new proposals which need Treasury 
sanction, about small isolated problems on 
which they cannot maKe uý their own minds, 
and about little else. 11 
In disputes with Government Departments the Foreign Office 
invariably supported the Council. At the beginning of the 
war Halifax dismissed the suggestion that cultural propaganda 
was a luxuiy in wartime. 
To. my mind the Council's Cultural worK is just 
as important as the political propaýanda of the 
MOI. our cultural assets are one of our greatest 
assets in presenting our case against Nazi Germany 
and it is surely vital that we should Keep them 
constantly in evidence in neutral countries, so 
that they can see that we are able to. maintain, 
and even to extend, our cultural influence in 
spite of the strain of war. 114 
I 
Eden too, who had been instrumental in the Council's birth 
and had presided over its infancy, was ready to bacK the 
Council when its independence was threatened. No doubt the 
Foreign Office's loyalty was due in part to the fact that it 
did not have to share the Council and was able to control 
exclusively at least one part of Britain's overseas publicity. 
Senior MOI and Treasy, ry officials complained frequently about 
the Foreign Office's support of the Council's proposals. 
Moreover, it was often pressure from the Foreign Office and 
its Representatives from abroad that led the Council to expand 
its activities more rapidly than might otherwise have been the 
ase. 
**** 
THE TREASURY 
Relations with the Treasury revolved chiefly around the 
an. nual wrangle over the level of the Council's grant. After 
receiving estimates from its Representatives overseas, drawn 
yp in consultation with the British Mission or, where there 
were no Council staff, by the Mission, the figures were 
scrutinised by the Council and the Foreign Office. The 
113. Minute by H. Hedley, 5th January 1944. F0370/641 L3901/462/ 
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estimates were compiled a year 
expended and tended to include 
the Representative flexibility 
might arise at short notice. 
a considerable unallocated res 
expenditure. When a total had 
were submitted to the Treasury 
or more before the funds were 
all desirable items to give 
to carry out projects which 
In the overall grant there was 
erve fund for unforeseen 
been agreed the full estimates 
by the Foreign Office. 
The Council's estimates for 1939/40 were conditioned by 
the recommendations if the Vansittart Committee 
115 
which 
included an extra E100,000 for publicity in, 1939. The Council's 
estimated expenditure from Government sources was E295,000, a 
sum in excess of the Council's ration of the additional funds 
and bringing the total proposed expenditure on propaganda, 
including the BBC, to E500,000. This figure seemed 
exorbitant to the Treasury which, in March 1939, suggested a 
20% cut in the Council's budget amongst other economies. A 
deputation from the Executive Committee protest'ed to Halifax, 
Attlee remarking 'that the amount involved seemed small in 
relation to the Government's huge expenditure on armaments' 
116 
Lloyd reminded Halifax that the Council was 'as big or bigger 
a contribution(sic) to peace as any which the Prime Minister 
or yourself are to-day so earnestly striving to achieve'. 
117 
Halifax forwarded the Council's objections to the Chancellor, 
arguing that the cut would have 'effects adverse to the 
reputation of this country out of all proportion to the 
relatively small sum involved'.. 
118 In May 1939, faced with a 
deteriorating international situation, the Treasury not only 
restored the grant to its original level but promised an 
additional, E100,000, if satisfactory proposals for expenditure 
were made. After consultations with the Foreign OfficejLloyd 
proposed to use the extra funds to counter Axis propaganda in 
the Balkans, the Middle East, Spain and Turkey. The Treasury 
released the promised funds. 
115. The Vansittart Committee for the Coordination of British 
Publicity Abroad was set up in January 1936 and met three 
times between January and May. Vansittart's far reaching 
and ambitious proposals were reduced by the Treasury. but a 
promise of incroased -funds in 1038 and 1939 was gained for 
British propaganda overseas. For further details see 
P. M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain, (London 1981)chapt. 6. 
110. Exocutive CommitLoe Minutus, 14 March 1939. OW68/3 
117. Halifax to Simon, 27 February 1939. T161/1029 
118. Ibid. 
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The outbreaK of war in Europe in September resulted in a 
downwards revision of the Council's grant and a suspension of 
further funds until the Council's relations with the MOI had 
been settled. The Council was thus placed in serious 
financial difficulties, compounded by the length of the 
negotiations with the Ministry. The Treasury was disappointed 
at the outcome and, as a result, looKed closely at existing 
controls on Council expenditure, particularly after receiving 
its estima. tes for 1940/41 which totalled over E500,000. The 
Treasury was sceptical of the Foreign Office's vigilance as 
the Council's accounting department and fou'nd it difficult to 
query individual items of expenditure or to weigh their 
relative merits. Its critical role was confined to the 
general scale of the Council's operations and its relationship 
with 
ihe MOI. The Treasury regarded the Library Department 
of the Foreign Office, with some accuracy, as a rubber stamp 
for the Council's proposals. It therefore sought greater 
controls over the Council's freedom to spend its grant and 
detailed explanations of the estimates. 
The Treasury's misgivings were justified, for the Council's 
accounting and auditing departments had not developed to keep. 
pace with the grant. Treasury control had been applied . 
through the examination of the estimates and through specific 
rulings, such as the ban on capital outlay abroad after the 
outbreak of war. The indirect influence of the Treasury is 
illustrated by the case of the British Institute in Bucharest. 
The Council wished to construct a building on a si, te donated 
by King Carol and was strongly supported by the Foreign Office. 
The Treasury pointed to the British guarantee to Roumania and 
claimed that propaganda would not prevent a Soviet or Nazi 
invasion. In March 1940 Halifax personally asked Simon to 
reconsider as 'the success of the British Council activities 
is so important a factor in maintaining our position in 
Roumania". 
119 Barlow was unmoved. 
This is the usual demand that because Germany 
and Italy have got palaces we must provide a 
mansion. 120 
119. Halifax to Simon, 7 March 1940. BW2/131 
120. Minute by Barlow, 10 May 1939. T161Q029 S35581/03/39 
0 
41 
To gain a full grant for the Council in 1940)Leeper was 
forced to concede a number of conditions in his negotiations 
with the Treasury. An informal gentleman's agreement was 
reached on the understanding that the Foreign Office would 
watch the Council more closely in future. The main points 
were that the Council should not ask for a supplementary grant, 
save in exceptional circumstances, that the Council would not 
divert funds allocated for one country to another, as in the 
event of a6 invasion, before consultation with the Treasury 
and that specific Treasury sanction was required for all large 
projects, including new services, staff appo'intments and 
capital expenditure. These conditions became permanent and 
the Council agreed to consult the Foreign Office as well on 
new senior staff appointments. 
The rapid German advance westwards in the summer of 1940 
forced a further reduction of the Council'sigrant. But the 
disappearance of British influence in Western Europe 'only 
re-emphasised the necessity for its rapid development in others' 
particularly the Balkans, Spain, the Middle East and Latin 
America. 121 In February 1941 the Council received a 
supplementary grant of E200,000, restoring the total for 
1940/41 to E500,000. 
The Council's swiftly expanding grant and the uncertain 
conditions in which future spending was planned placed an 
intolerable strain on budgetary arrangements. In its early 
years the Council was able to obtain supplementary grants with 
relative ease and, in the first two years of the war, to finance 
growth in one area from contraction in another. By 1942 
both these factors had ceased to operate and the established 
financial procedures broKe down. In December, the Council 
was forced by the increased activities of the Home Division 
and escalating prices in the Middle East to asK the Treasury, 
with Foreign Office support, for a supplementary allocation 
of E100,000. The Council blamed the Treasury for arbitrarily 
K. educing its budget estimates whilst the Treasury believed 
that the over-spending was 'due to the absence at the time of 
any effective system of financial control within the Council' 
122 
121. O. Sargent to Barlow, 14 February 1940. 
122. Barlow to S. Gaselee, 27 January 1943. BW2/'341 
T 161/1029 
S35581/03/40 
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The Council's recently appointed Finance Officer, Reginald 
Davies, had to agree with the Treasury 'as each Department 
(was) going ahead incurring commitments without consulting 
anyone e; se'. 
123 
Working in collusion with the Treasury, Davies placed the 
Council's finances on a, sounder basis using budgetary 
procedures adopted by the E3BC. 
124 In February 1943 the 
Council was awarded a supplementary grant of 180,000 and the 
Treasury to ok up its right to appoint representatives to the 
Council's Executive and Finance and Agenda C, ommittees. 
Stricter controls were put on the unallocated reserve fund, all 
projects costing more than 15,000 requiring specific Treasury 
approval. The Council's estimates for 1943/4, although 
reduced by i100,000, had risen dramatically to Z1,875,000. 
The Chancellor warned that it would be unwise for the Council 
to continue planning 'on the assumption that the expansion of 
their activities which has been taking place in the last few 
years will continue indefinitely'. 
125 
Oespite these additional safeguards, however, by May 1943 
the Council was in serious financial difficulty. New claims 
from the Middle East amounted to half the unallocated reserve 
fund and ten months of the financial year remained. Tours by 
the chairman and other senior officers had resulted in 
commitments to expený-iture authorised neither by the Council 
in London or by the Treasury or Foreign Office. This loophole 
was closed to the chagrin of Robertson who regarded the power 
to sanction spending when abroad as one of the few remaining 
privileges of the chairman. At a stormy meeting of the 
Finance and Agenda Committee in May, Robertson argued that it 
was not possible 
for a body like the British Council which was 
expanding very fast to stick to a definite 
budget, even with an unallocated reserve of 
E200,000.126 
1.23. Minute by C. G. L. Syers, 23 July 1940. TIBI/1104 S35581/03/41 
124. Minute by C. H. M. Wilcox, 10 September 1942. T161/1233 S3ssai/9 
This meant that the Council's budget would be calculated in 
terms of the Council's rate of expenditure at the and of 
the year rather than the total of the previous year. 
125. K. Wood to Lord Riverdale, 3 March 1943. BW2/342 
126. Finance and Agonda Committoo Minutos, 11 May 1943 BW69/9 
43 
Gaselee, for the Foreign Office, expressed only sympathy for 
the Council's plight and Sir John Power, honorary Treasurer, 
suggested that 
as the Treasury had taken over the whole of the 
Council's financial affairs the decision (on cuts) 
should rest with them. 127 
Megan Lloyd George, Power and Snell proposed seeking a decision 
from the War Cabinet, but Riverdale objected that such a move 
might endahger the Council's unofficial status. The Committee 
resolved to approach the Foreign Secretary a nd the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer directly. Meanwhile, the Council's staff 
abroad were instructed not to begin new projects and in June 
Davies called a halt to all new expenditure. 
At the end of May Robertson saw Eden at the House of Commons 
while Riverdale tackled Cadogan. Richard Law, Parliamentary 
Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, raised the issue with 
the Treasury on Eden's behalf but Kingsley Wood the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, was adamant that the Council could not have 
a supplementary grant and suggested that the Council could find 
funds needed for the Middle East by pruning activities else- 
where. In a letter from Eden to Wood at the end of June, the 
Foreign Office argued that the Council was 'a major instrument 
of policy' and that the Foreign Office was under pressure from 
its representatives overseas to expand its activities because 
they were 
the best means of affecting the attitude of 
Governments and peoples in areas vitally 
important to us, and of bolstering the moral 
of Allied troops and civilians who are refugees 
in'this country and in the Middle East. 128 
In July the Foreign Office rebuffed Wood's proposal that the 
Council could find the extra funds from its existing budget: 
For the strengthing of our position and prestige 
the Council's activities are very necessary, 
especially in the Middle East, South America and 
China, and we feel that any money spent there now 
would be returned a hundred fold. Expenditure in 
the areas which we regard as of less importance 
from the political point of view is negligible and 
thus no pruning is possible there. We should like 
to see the Council operating in all areas an a large 
scale, but there is not enough money to go round. 129 
127. Ibid. 
128. Eden to K. Wood, 27 June 1943. BW2/342. See below, P-116-117 
129. Eden to K. Wood, 5 July 1943. T161/1153 S35581/03/43 
44 
After a further exchange of views, the Treasury reluctantly 
approved an extra grant of Z100,000 for the Council, chiefly 
for projects in the Middle East. Wood warned that the Council 
must not. be regarded as 'a fairy godmother with a bottomless 
purse' and that liaison between the Council and the MOI must 
be improved. 130 In September a Budget Committee was formed 
under Riverdale's leadership to ensure the framing of more 
accurate estimates of future expenditure. 
The Council also received funds from non-governmental 
sources and in October 1942 Davies suggested that to relieve 
the Council's financial position, corporations based overseas 
'might be invited to contribute towards specific activities by 
the Council in the countries concerned'. 
131 The Council's 
accounts for-that year showed a number of donations for the 
Middle East made by British companies- the Dunlop Rubber Company, 
British Celanese Limited, the Morgan Crucib, le Company and the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Finance and 
Agenda Committee, however, decided that the Council could not 
undertaKe more than its existing indirect industrial propaganda. 
In the following year the Foreign Office ruled that the Council 
could accept private donations only if the money was used in 
conformity with the policy laid down by the Foreign Office and 
not to further the specific interests of the donors. 
132 
Pressure on the Council's budget eased considerably at the 
end of 1943 to the extent that it was underspent by almost the 
amount of the extra funds granted in July. The difficulties 
of finding staff accounted for most of the shortfall as many 
projects had been postponed, such as the opening of an 
institute in Persia. The surplus led to public criticism but 
illustrated the impossibility of forecasting expenditure 
eighteen months in advance. The Council's grant for 1944/5 
was underspent by nearly 11 million because of more stable 
prices than had been anticipated and the conti nuing manpower 
shortage. An investigation by the Public Accounts Committee 
ýn July 1944 revealed 'serious defects in the control of the 
F. oreign Office and of the Council over its own organisation'_. 
133 
130. K. Wood to Eden, 10 July 1943. BW2/342 
131. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 10 November 1942. BW69/8 
132. M. Palairet to Robertson, 11 September 1943. BW2/79 
133. Minutes of evidence taKen before the Committee Of Public 
Accounts, 13 July 1944. para 4810. 
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The Treasury, however, assured the Committee that improved 
procedures gave it 'fairly watertight' control over the Council' 
expenditure. 
134 Indeed, the Treasury conceded that, financial] 
at least, the Council was de facto an agency of the Government. 
By the end of the war it was clear that the planning of long 
term activities on a short term financial basis was impossible. 
Moreover, the Council's administrative structure had not 
developed to deal with the increasing grant. The Budget 
Committee had been formed on Riverdale's insistence that the 
existing organisation did not provide adequate safeguards and 
Riverdale had also suggested the appointment of a managing 
director to take over the Council's administration leaving the 
chairman responsible only for policy. Barlo'w reported that 
Riverdale, Snell and others within the Council were 'throughly 
dissatisfied with the present position'. 
135, Robertson's views 
are unknown. At the end of 1943 Davies, in consultation with 
Sir Angus Gillan, director of the Empire Division, suggested 
to the Treasury, but not to Robertson, White or the Foreign 
office, a similar scheme for a full-time administrative head. 
Davies advised the Treasury to propose 
a strong Commission of Enquiry to looK into the 
organisation of the Council and see whether it 
was really fitted to discharge the wider and 
extended funq-_ýions it was now undertaKing. 
"36 
In March 1944 the Treasury tooK UP Davies'suggestion. Robertson 
agreed and insisted that the enquiry 'should be at Cabinet level 
so that the Council could receive a directive at to its place 
in the Government scheme'. 
137 
Robertson's discontent stemmed from the increasing 
restriction that had been placed on his powers as chairman. In 
addition, he objected to having to refer to the Executive 
Committee which he regarded as peopled with Government nominees 
and individuals 'not really qualified to direct propaganda or 
138 
ikýdvise on policy'. The chairman's power to approve projects 
134. Ibid. para. 4816. 
135. Minute by Barlow, 10 September 1943. T161/1153 S355BI/03/43 
136. Minute by C. H. M. Wilcox, I September 1943. T161/1153 
ý35581/03/43 
137. Executive Committee Minutes, 14 March 1944. BW68/3 
138. Minute by K. T. Gurney, undated. F0924/1 LC724/724/4S1 
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without reference to London whilst on tour was removed in 1944 
and Riverdale opposed Robertson's suggestion that his financial 
authority should be increased to cover items up to Z5no unless 
a question of principle was involved. The limit of E100 
remained. Moreover, the Council had grown to such a size by 
the end of the war, with a staff of approximately one thousand 
five hundred, that it was impossible for one man to controllas 
Robertson had attempted, with the result that long term planning 
was sacrificed to the demands of daily decision making. 
Although dedicated to the Council's cause, Robertson 
did not, or could not, spare enough time from 
the House of Commons to carry out the day-to-day 
direction of the Council's work and his constant 
failures to keep important appointments in Hanover 
Street led to difficulties. 139 
This meant that Robertson himself was often uninformed about 
the Council. In 1943 he complained that h, e heard first from 
his colleagues inthe House of Commons about Parliamentary 
Questions concerning the Council 
140 In 1944 Robertson minuted I 
on a paper discussing operations in East Africa 
here is another case ..... When we are opening up 
in new territories or changing our policy, 1 141 
really must be consulted be-Fore action is taKen. 
Robertson did not have sufficient administrative experience to 
deal with the Council's structural. problems or to fight the 
Council's Whitehall battles. In wartime the Council could be 
allowed a certain leeway but the size of its budget by the end 
of the war. demanded that, in future, the Council would have to 
be a more profession&'l body. 
LacKing a central policy-maKing department the Council's 
structure 
contained no provision for coordination between 
the requirements of the various Divisions at a 
high level and the result had been that expenditure 
had grown haphazard, without any system of priorities 
and without any real consideration of the overall 
value of the work attempted. 142 
139. White, 0p. cit. p. 49 
140. Minute by Robertson, 7 June 1943. BW2/114 
141. Minute by Robertson, 1 April 1944. BW7/1 
142. Anonymous memorandum, possibly by R. Oavies, 1945. T219/3 
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In 1943 regional officers were given greater authority in 
the territorial distribution of functional expenditure to 
prevent functional officers from diverting funds from one 
country to another without reference to the regional officer. 
Personal ambitions and influence, in one council official's 
view, weighed more than relative merit. in the growth of the 
CD Council's divisions. In general, the overseas departments 
were overshawdowed by the technical divisions, and were often 
headed by officers who were ignorant of their areas and over- 
burdened by detail. This resulted in the absurd situation of 
a regional officer being unaware of the mat6rial being 
distributed in his area by the production divisions. In 1945 
Davies complained that each division was promoting its own 
activities without reference to the others and that the Council 
lacked alsense of solidarity'. 
There is no leadership; there is noisense of 
loyalty; there is no inspiration; there is a 
feeling of frustration, of muddle and above all 
of planlessness. 143 
Liaison should have been Possible through weeKly heads of 
division meetings, but the Cultural Relations Department of the 
Foreign Office described these as 
a kind of Soviet at which decisions appear to be 
taken, not a result of any considered planning, 
so much as of an armistice reached at the end of 
a battle between competing regional and functional 
interests. 144 
Criticism was levelled at the Council's staff. The 
Council's director of appointments explained that due to the 
difficulty of finding staff in wartime there had been 'an 
unduly large recruitment of the 6picene, the intellectual (in 
its bad sense), the d6racin6 and the failure'. 
145 The Council's 
senior staff were also found wanting. In 1943 Samford took 
the view that 
Especially since the death of Lord Lloyd the Council 
had had no one to coordinate their activities or to 
attempt to, assess the relative priority that ought 
to attach to different projects. Neither ýir Malcolm 
Robertson nor Mr. White has the qualities for pulling 
the Council together in this way. 146 
143. Ibid. 
144. Memorandum by the Cultural Relations Department, undated 
T219/3 
14S. Memorandum by T. P. Tunnard-Moore, March 1945. T219/3 
146. Minute by C. H. M. Wilcox, 26 June 1943. T161/1153 
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Within the Council it was also 'felt by many that the control 
of the Council is primarily in the hands of a small group of 
people which does not include the Chairman or the Secretary 
General'. 
147 
The Foreign Office regarded Robertson's judgement 
as 'not necessarily irý, oeccable' and believed that there were 
, too many ignorami at headquarters at present' 
14 8 The Treasury 
liKewise had 'seen and heard enough to appreciate that not all 
of Malcolm Robertson's brood are swans'. 
149 
Similari'y, the Council was not satisfied with the officials 
appointed by the Foreign Office for liaison ýith the Council. 
Gillan attributed many of the Council's problems to 'the 
absence of a strong interested organisation with the Foreign 
Office machine to deal with Council matters'. 
150 Oavies agreed, 
pointing to the fact that the Foreign Office ý 
were content to leave British Council affairs 
in the hands of a man like Mr. Gurney who ..... 
had not really the remotest idea of how the 
administration of the Council's business was 
in fact carried out. 151 
Robertson, too, complained that the Foreign Office never 'had 
anything but parting contact with us' 
IS2 The Treasury concurred 
that the Foreign Office had failed to provide adequate 
guidance and had too often left the Council 'at the mercy of 
enthusiastic ambassadors ...... 
153 
In a minute for Eden written in November 1944, Churchill, 
too, expressed concern at the Council's inability to control 
its budget and concluded that 
I think their expenditure and enterprises should 
be strictly scrutinised now. They are certainly 
one' of the objects ripe for retrenchment when the 
War come to an end. We must be very careful this 
does not grow on us. 154 
147. Memorandum by T. P. Tunnard-Moore, March 1945. T219/3 
148. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 9 October 1944. FO924/4 LC901/532/410 
149. C. H. M. Wilcox to K. T. Gurney, 24 June 1944. F0924/5 
LC378/784/410 
150. Minute by Sir Angus Gillan, 17 October 1944. BW2/151 
1ý11. Minute by C. H. M. Wilcox, 1 September 1943. T161/1153 
S35581/03/43 
152. Executive Committee Minutes, 2B May 1944. BW69/11 
153. J. A. Draw to J. L. D. Winnifrith, 2 December 1944. T 219/2 
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It is interesting to speculate that Churchill, had he been 
returned as Prime Minister after the war, would have been less 
willing than Attlee to allow the Council to continue much as 
it had in wartime. Attlee had a close working knowledge of 
the Council having served on its Executive Committee before 
the war and was regarded by the Council as an ally. 
Another problem needing investigation was overlapping 
between the Council and the MOI. In subject matter duplication 
was 'nearly 
. total'. 155 A memorandum on the, question prepared 
for Radcliffe explainýýd that 
The area of overlap is all the larger because it 
has been brought about not by one-sided invasion 
on the part of either, but by a simultaneous 
converging movement of the two organi, sations into 
what is now the largest subject of overseas 
publicity - namely, the British "way of life", or, 
in other words, the British achievement in political, 
social and economic organisation. 15P 
One of the Council's chief critics at the Dominion's Office 
summarised the hostile view of the Council. 
the Council is run by faded aristocrats who seek 
to placate by fantastic and extravagent gestures 
countries whose political ideas are out of harmony 
with our own and that the Council as a whole is 
unwilling to set bounds to its ambitions but that 
it eagerly seizes new responsibilities which are 
adequately (and indeed more effectively) covered 
by other arganisations. 157 
Therefore, there were considerable grounds for investigation 
into the Council. Ndbonly was the headquarters'organisation 
J unable to cope with the Council's vastly increased functions 
but more fundamental issues were raised concerning the role 
of cultura 1 propaganda in British foreign policy and the 
Council's right to conduct it. At the suggestion of Robertson 
and Tyrrell, Sir Findlater Stewart, wartime head of the Home 
Defence Executive and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State 
at the India Office, was appointed to carry out the enquiry. At 
Stewart's request the investigation was treated as a confidential 
i,, nter-departmental enquiry. The Council's future looked as 
uncertain as it had on the outbreak of war. 
155. Minute by K. Grubb, 11 November 1944. INF 1/445 
156. Minute by R. Fraser, 17 October 1945. INF 1/961 
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CHAP-TER TWO 
INVISIBLE EXPORTS 
Preferring the phrase 'national interpretation' to cultural 
propaganda in its 1940/1 report, the Council explained that it 
exported Britain's cultural resources: 
ali achievements of the nation past and present 
in the spheres of intellect, art, science, 
government, education and invention, ý,, and that 
intangible but powerful force, the national 
personality, as manifested in a country's past 
history and present way of life. 1 
In the following year's report, 'the life and, thought of the 
ordinary British citizen' were added, as natibnal interpretation 
did not mean 
solely a recitation of the past but also an 
interpret ation of the present. Tradition unrelated 
to life is like history unrelated to politics. 2 
0 The Council's output was uncontroversial, pro-British rather 
than anti-foreign and the same from 'Dictator-ruled Portugal 
to Popular-Front Chile'. 
3 
Its English language teaching 
courses were based on existing methods and the contents of its 
libraries and reading rooms were as wide as funds and space 
allowed. The criterion for supply was demand, which prevented 
waste and satisfied the specific desires of audiences. Demand 
was also the most effective yardstick as it is on subjects that 
, people desire to be informed that they will be most receptive'ý 
The chief weakness of the Council's material was its lack of 
regional specialisation: the same material was sent to every 
area. In the case of Latin America, this resulted in lecturers 
on social welfare arriving to expand a 'Kind of gospel' that did 
not appeal 'to all the powers that be' and in a Walter Raleigh 
exhibition being sent to Venezuela. 
5 
It was the task of the London Departments, known as 
ý-unctional departments, to provide the information and material 
required by the Council's institutes, offices and Anglophile 
societies overseas. Their output was also distributed by 
1. British Council Annual Report, 1940/1. P-16 
2. British Council Annual Report, 1941/2. p. 13 
3. Mnuto hy WhItn, 24 Auguot 1042, OW2/94 
4. British Council Annual Report, 1941/2. p. 14 
5. J V. Per owne to W hI to, 12 MaV 1 94 2 FfJ37fI, / Rf! I 1_1 R7 IIJ4 71A4 
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commercial and private channels and through the MOI and other 
official agencies. To provide expert guidance on selection, 
editing and production, each department, with the exception of 
Press and Receptions, had an Advisory Committee. The regional 
departme nts dealt with the establishment of Representatives, 
offices and institutes overseas and received only intermitt nt 
guidance from the Foreign Office. The functional departments 
could supply material wherever demand arose but the regional 
department. p needed Foreign Office and Treasury approval before 
embarking on work in a country. It is possible, therefore, 
to argue that the Council did operate in the United States, 
the Soviet Union and most of the Commonwealth and Empire during 
the war although it was not physically represented and did not 
have specific Foreign Office and Treasury approval for work in 
these areas. Large amounts of material were supplied to the 
British Information Services in the United States, to 
commercial distributors and to the British Library in New York. 
Likewise, in the Soviet Union, extensive links were established 
with scientific institutions and with VOKS. Similarly, a 
great many books, periodicals and films were despatched to the 
Dominions and India. It was with the functional departments 
that the MOI mostly clashed. 
Educational activities were the foundation of the Council's 
work. The Education Division was created in 1940 from two 
pre-war departments, Students and Teaching Appointments. 
Professor Ifor Evans, of London University and formerly at the 
MOI, was appointed Educational Director in December 1940, and 
had four main tasks: the creation of a permanent overseas 
teaching service; the provision of the most effective system 
for teaching English as a foreign language; the encouragement 
of other English studies abroad; and the introduction of 
foreign students to Britain. The first task had to wait until 
the war was over. 
To find the best means of teaching English as a foreign 
language a committee was set up under Professor Gilbert Murray. 
Its report, submitted in 1942)concluded that it would be 
premature to choose a particular method and that further 
investigation was necessary. Professor F. Clarke, Director 
of the Institute of Education at the University of London. 
undertook to supervise the analysis and collection of evidence 
from the Council's and other staff overseas. The committee 
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also made recommendations on the selection and training of 
teachers and on examinations overseas. It was disbanded in 
1944 after failing to find an existing method of teaching 
English as a foreign language that was more effective than any 
other. 
The Tilley Report in 1920 argued that the Government had 
a moral duty to provide for the educational and cultural welfare 
of its nationals resident overseas. The Council's institutes 
and the schools it supported abroad were designed to meet this 
responsibility and to raise standards of English teaching. 
Llord cherished schemes for the provision oý a British 
education for all children of United Kingdom birth and for the 
numerous Maltese, Cypriot and other British communities in the 
Middle East. Although the Treasury had subs , 
idised some 
British schools in the Middle East on the advice of the Foreign 
Office, there were many more Italian, French and German schools. 
The Council tooK over the administration of all'grants to 
British schools overseas in 1937. Support for these schools 
was designed to prevent British subjects from being absorbed 
in the local population, to enable them to retain a British 
outlooK and to spread British influence through the native 
pupils that attended them. As the Foreign Office explained 
to the Ministry of EQycation, 
We value highly on political grounds the worK 
that this school (Victoria College] has done 
and is still doing, in inculcating our own 
ideas of loyalty, sportsmanship, decent living 
and the value of learning upon boys who will 
later exercise a considerable influence upon 
the affairs of their own countries. 6 
The support of British schools was advocated strongly by British 
Missions overseas. At the end of the war Britain's ambassador 
in Turkey argued that 'to support efficiently managed schools 
of a British pattern abroad is certainly the most useful 
enterprise that the British Council can undertake'. 
7 It was, 
however, a costly enterprise and one the Treasury did not accept 
Oas the duty of the British Government. 
6. Eden to R. A. Butler, 28 August 1942. FO370/664 L2949/8/410 V"U Wn &OW 
7. H. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Eden, 14 August 1944. F0924/35 
LC1447/15/452 
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The Council was discouraged -from subsidising British 
teachers and lecturers at foreign schools and universities by 
the Treasury in an attempt to force foreign governments to 
pay adequate salaries. Nevertheless, in Egypt, Iraq and 
other areas, the Council supplemented salaries to attract good 
applicants. A considerable number of appointments were made 
despite the difficulties of recruitment. In 1942/3 three 
professors and two lecturers were appointed to the University 
of Istanbul, two professors went to Cairo University, fourteen 
lecturers and three school mistresses were ýent to Turkey and 
twenty-three lecturers and three teachers were found for 
Anglophile societies and schools in Latin America. In 1943/4 
the Council filled two chairs at the Universities of Istanbul 
and Cairo and appointed twenty-six lecturers, 
* 
and teachers to 
nine schools in Spain, Portugal, the Middle E'ast and Latin 
America. 
In 1935/6 the Council spent E350 on bringin'g foreign 
students to Britain; this sum had risen a hundredfold by 1938/9 
to E35,000.8 The students were selected by British Missions 
in consultation with local educational authorities and came 
mainly from Europe with the exception of Germany. The outbreaK 
of war severely restricted numbers and increased the proportion 
from the Middle East. In the summer of 1940, when German 
invasion seemed imminent, the Council ceased bringing students 
to Britain and returned as many as possible of those that had 
completed their studies to their own countries. One hundred 
and three Council students remained in Britain. At the end 
of 1940 the danger from Germany receded and the Foreign Office 
instructed the Council to resume bringing students to Britain, 
particularly from the United States, TurKey and Latin America. 
In 1942/3 seventy students came to Britain and a residental 
course at Somerville College, Oxford, attracted one hundred and 
fifteen students from twenty-one countries. The greatest 
number came from TurKey; in 1943, twenty-six engineering 
students, twenty naval engineering students, seventeen English 
ýtudents and five others. A high proportion also came from 
China despite the hazards of the Journey. In 1943 grants were 
awarded to fifty Chinese post-graduate students. By Oecemb er 
1944 there were one hundred and sixty-one Council students in 
Great Britain. 
B. For a history of the introduction of foreign students to 
Europe - see F. Dunlop, Europes Guests (Strassburg 1966) 
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The value to British trade from the training of foreign 
students in Britain was recognised from the outset. The Council 
cooperated with British indu*stry in arranging apprenticeships 
and training schemes and made a substantial contribution to a 
Federation of BritisfPIndustry scheme for bringing Chinese 
engineers to Britain. They numbered thirty-one by 1944. The 
Department of Overseas Trade stated that 
It seems equally reasonable to infer that by 
beginning such training under British auspices, 
the students so trained would have a natural 
predisposition towards the United Kingdom 
commercial methods and United Kingdom goods. 
The Education Division also provided an information service 
for students overseas. -In 1944 the Council calculated that 
it was in contact with approximately four hundred and fifty 
students a year, drawn from thirty-four foreign countries and 
eleven regions of the Empire. Their ages ranged between 
twenty-two and fifty, the average being thirty. ý To assist in 
placing students in British universities the Council maintained 
close links with those universities. In 1942 a Committee of 
the Hebdomadal Council at Oxford, comprising the Vice-Chancellor 
and a number of heads of houses, was founded to examine matters 
of common concern. Similar committees were established later 
at Cambridge and London. The Council also enjoyed good 
relations with other universities and the Vice-Chancellors' 
committee. 
Following the outbreak of war the Council faced a new 
problem, namely students stranded in Britain either by enemy 
occupation of their own countries or by the difficulties of 
communicat-ion which prevented funds reaching them and their 
return home. In correspondence with Nancy Parkinson of the 
National Union of Students, firstly in connection with Polish 
students, the Council sought to alleviate their plight. It 
emerged that not only foreign students but also Allied and 
Dominion personnel required welfare services and educational 
provision. In October 1939 the Board of Education persuaded 
týhe Council that it had a valuable role to play among foreign 
communities in Britain and a Resident Foreigners Committee was 
formed. In August 1940, in cooperation with the Home Office, 
9. Students Committee Minutes, 10 March 193S. BW2/19 
55 , 
the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry, the 
Council undertook to provide educational and cultural facilities 
for the nationals of occupied countries resident in Britain. 
Subsequently, added to these were merchant seamen, members of 
the Allied armed forces, internees, evacuees from Gibraltar, 
colonial subjects engaged on war work and the armed forces of 
the Dominions. An Advisory Committee on Foreigners in Britain 
was created which became the Home Division, organised through 
regional offices in Britain. Granted a separate vote for the 
purpose, fhe work of the Home Division became a unique feature 
of the Council during the war. 
10 
The supply of books and periodicals closely followed the 
development of educational facilities. The Books and 
Periodicals Committd-e led one of the most powerful departments 
in the Council's organisation. Its prominence was due to the 
energy and influence of its chairman from 1936, Stanley Unwin. 
In his capacity as President of the Publisýersl Association, 
Unwin had been associated with the Council from its inception 
as 'the foremost, if not the only, expert on the distribution 
of English books abroad'. 
11 Unwin joined the Executive 
Committee in April 1935 and became chairman of the Books and 
, 
Periodicals Committee in Oecember 1936 on the resignation of 
John Mase-field, the Poet Laureate. Through Unwin the Council 
gained the cooperation of publishers and booksellers in 
Britain and overseas. Unwin recognised 
that booKs would play a vital role in the Kind 
of worK the British Council contemplated, and 
that it was essential that the Council should 
be entitled to buy on trade terms. 12 
Unwin secured the supply of newspapers and periodicals returned 
from newsagents for the Council free of charge to distributý 
Ie 
overseas, and arranged for the Council to pay only half thel 
retail price on books and some periodicals. By 1943 the 
i 
expansion of the Books and Periodicals Department necessita 
I 
ted 
separation into four new divisions - books, periodicals, 
export and publications. 
The Books Department supplied institutes, Anglophile 
societies, libraries, universities, schools and made 
presentations to distinguished individuals. The Council was 
10. The work of the Home Division is not being examined in this thesis. See I. Hay, Peaceful Invasion (London 1946) 
11. R-Kenny to C. Bridge, 10 April 1935. BW2T5 
12. S. Unwin., The Truth About a Publisher (London 1960) n. 419 
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anxious that it should not be associated with any particular 
viewpoint; at a meeting of the Books Committee in March 1940 
Lloyd was 
very insistent upon the necessity for giving 
I foreigners an adequate view of British life, 
i. e. by maKing sure that they received publications 
expressing the Labour, Liberal and Conservative 
viewpoints, and, not those expressing the ideas of 
one political group alone. 13 
The Council. cooperated closely with the MOI in the distribution 
of books. John Hampden was employed by both the Ministry and 
the Council to direct this work and was the 
i 
ýeditor of a series 
of Council brochures. 
The. Periodicals Department distributed a wide variety of 
magazines to institutes, Anglophile societies, and mailing lists. 
Where transport facilities permitted, daily ýewspapers were 
despatched, as well as periodicala ranging from Nature to Flight 
and Vogue. Newspapers and magazines were carefully balanced 
to avoid accusations of political bias. 
The excellence of the arrangements devised by the Council 
forced the MOI to concede the major responsibility for the 
distribution of books and periodicals abroad to the Council. 
In December 1939 the Ministry asked the Council to take over 
the distribution of periodicals in the Middle East 'with the 
eventual possibility of the entire distribution of periodicals 
on behalf of the MOI being in the hands of the British Council' 
?4 
which eventually became the case. The most notable exception 
was the circulation. 6-f religious periodicals which the Council 
decided would involve it in controversy. 
15 
In 1942 an important exchange of periodicals was initiated 
between the Soviet Acadamy of Sciences and the Lenin Library 
and institutions in Britain. In 1943 ninety micro-filmed 
periodicals were sent to China. In the Empire, educational 
and general publications and women's and health magazines 
were most popular. In India, in 1944, the Council supplied 
ýeriodicals to three hundred and ninety-six universities, 
c olleges and libraries. By 1944 the Periodicals Oepartment. 
distributed nearly nine hundred different publications, 
13. Books and Periodicals Committee Minutes, 19 March 1940 BW70/1 
14. Books and Periodicals Committee Minutes, 18 December 1939 
BW70/1 
15. Minutes o-f Controllers Meeting, 27 January 1948 BW76/4 The Council started distributing religious periodicals a-Fter the war.. 
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and the most popular was The Geographical Magazine, with a 
circulation of three thousand, five hundred, followed by 
Country Life and The Manchester Guardian Weekly. 
The commercial and legal aspects of this worK were dealt 
with in the Export Department. This included negotiations on 
copyright and translation rights, the organisation of reviews 
and exhibitions, and, most importantly, the administration of 
the BooK Export Scheme. This scheme was devised by Unwin and 
incorporatý? d as a subsidiary company of the Council. Its 
objective was to facilitate the sale of British booKs abroad 
by providing a general stimulus to the trade and a measure of 
official encouragement by reducing the risks carried by 
booksellers and publishers to a calculable minimum. Since 
the outbreak of war the reluctance of publishers to supply books 
on a 'sale or return' basis, fluctuating exchange rates and the 
inability of foreign customers to obtain sterling, had hampered 
seriously the sale of British books abroad. ' In cooperation 
with the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Export Credit 
Guarantees Department of the Board of Trade, the Publishers' 
Association and the National Book Council, the Book Export 
Scheme Limited was established and administered by the Council. 
Through Britain's Diplomatic Missions overseas suitable book- 
sellers were supplied with catalogues of books for which the 
BES Ltd. would arrange initial currency and transport and 
guarantee to take over unsold copies up to a certain limit. 
Under this arrangement British publishers were entitled to 
certain benefits extended by the Export Credit Guarantees 
Department and were assured of payment. The widespread 
shortage of books and paper as the war progressed meant that 
books unsold in one country would be purchased elsewhere and, 
where currency difficulties prevented the operation of BES Ltd., 
as in the case of Turkey, the provision of a special subsidy 
by the Treasury enabled British books to be circulated. The 
Scheme was devised 
as an attempt to develop the export trade of 
Great Britain, which in many politically 16 important areas is in danger of extinction. 
It was applied at first in key areas, South East Europe, the 
Middle East, the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America. 
16. Ibid. 
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The export of books was the only industry in which the 
Council took a direct interest for it was regarded as an 
integral part of its work and more than just a commercial 
venture. 
The maintenance of quality, variety and quantity 
(of British books and periodicals overseas) is 
of direct interest to everyone concerned with 
the maintenance of British prestige abroad. 17 
When BES Ltd. was liquidated after the war it was estimated 
that the published price of books sold under the scheme, that 
that could not be sold privately, was E458,6179. 
The Publications Department commissioned, edited, designed 
and produced all Council publications. Sales to the book 
trade and wider commercial distribution was u, ndertaKen by the 
publishers Longmans, Green and Company Limite'd and by the 
British Publishers' Guild to ensure that the Council's name 
did not appear on any. publication. 
Britain Today was the most widely circulated of the 
Council's publication-s. The first issue appeared in March 
1939, under the editorship of E. L. Woodward, and was immediately 
successful overseas, especially in Eastern Europe. It was . 
printed fortnightly and distributed free to carefully selected 
mailing lists. Demands soon outstripped its first edition of 
five thousand copies and this print run was soon trebled. 
Britain Today was initially a modest publication, with no 
illustrations, but contained articles by Leeper and others on 
British policy. In August 1939 the Council had to apply to 
the Overseas Emergency Publicity Expenditure Committee for an 
extra E3,0.00 to upgrade its format and increase its circulation. 
In the same month A. P. Ashley of The Times replaced Woodward as 
editor. When the Council moved to the MOI on the outbreak of 
war, Britain Today was transferred to the Foreign Office. In 
November it moved to the Ministry and in December returned to 
the Council, 'but at the request of the Ministry it pursued 
its previous policy and did not confine itself exclusively to 
cýultural subjects'. 
18 
In July 1940 Ashley was called, up and 
his place was taken by R-Scott-James who remained editor 
throughout the war. 
17. British Council Annual Report, 1941/2. p. 70 
18. Monthly Oversea Bulletin, 3 January 1946. BW2/148 
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From March 1939 to the outbreak of war Britain Today was 
an overtly propagandist magazine. It aimed 'to get at key 
people ..... those in fact, who in every country influence others' 
19 
Its first edition on 17 March argued that democracy or 'ordered 
liberty' was equal to modern conditions and worth fighting for 
and that a desire for peace was 'a sign not of fear but of 
wisdom' but Britain was''not prepared to buy this peace at too 
great a sacrifice'. 
20 The mood of the British people, Britain 
Today decla. red, was one of grim determination to protect their 
freedom and preparations for local defence were proceeding with 
21 $astonishing rapidity'. At the end of Manch B_ritain Today 
desc. ribed the depth of resources in the Empire and announced 
that 'there will be no reluctance to meet the cost of defending 
22 
our liberties and those of our friends'. Considerable 
attention was devoted to the policy of appeas'ement, described 
as 'a characteristically English policy', to explaining that 
the British people unanimously recognised tkat it had failed 
and to stressing that 'the sure consequence of treaty-breaking 
is war on the same scale as in 1914'. 
23 The invasion of 
Poland was taken as 'the final proof of the bad faith of the 
German National-Socialist Government'. 
24 After its removal to 
the MOI and return to the Council, Britain Today modified Lts 
tone and although comments on the progress of the war and its 
effects on Britain were included, the magazine increasingly 
concerned itself with preparations for peace, reconstruction 
and the arts and sciences. 
By 1940 the circulation of Britain Today had reached 27,000 
and it was published in English, French, Greek, Italian, 
Spanish an, d Portuguese. The French and Italian editions were 
discontinued after the defeat of France and the entry of Italy 
into the war. Nevertheless, its circulation continued to 
rise and reached 68,000 by 1941. The despatch of a few copies 
to the New YorK World Fair resulted in a distribution of 
26,000 copies in the United States. Portugal was the next 
largest consumer and, until the end of 1941, a thousand copies 
&f each issue were sent to Japan. Britain Today was so 
19. OEPEC Meeting, 
20. Brita in Tod ay, 
21. Ibide p. 8 
22. Britain Today, 
23. Britain Today, 
24. Britain Today, 
3 August 
No. 1,17 
No. 2,31 
No. 4,28 
No. 11,2 
1939. 
March 
March 
April 
9 Sept 
T162/858 E39140/2 
1939, p. 1 &7 
1039, p. a 
1939, p. 2 
ember 1939, p. 1 
60 
successful in Portugal that the Germans produced bogus copies 
containing anti-British propaganda. It was enlarged and 
printed monthly in 1941 and consisted of twenty-eight pages of 
text and eight of illustration. 
The Council was often embar, rassed by the propagandist 
nature of Britai_n__Todayj it was banned in Greece and in 
Portugal, the British Embassy complained about its political 
content. The Council 'always concealed the fact that Britain 
Today had iny connection with it'. 
25 
and its publication 
'caused much controversy and many heart-burrlings within the 
Council' resulting in regular proposals to a\ bolish it. 
26 
However, Council staff and British Missions abroad supported 
the periodical and it was published throughout the war. Britain 
Today's circulation reached 100,000 in the early part of 1942, 
due largely to new readers in North and South America. The 
British Library of Information in New York had a mailing list 
of 40,000 and in Argentina, it was the only, British official 
publication that did not come under a ban placed on.. the 
distribution of propagandist literature. In the same year 
the paper shortage at home and the hazards of supply across 
the Atlantic, resulted in arrangements for the printing of 
Britain Today in Toronto, Buenos Air s, Rio de Janiero and 
Panama. To offset some costs Britain Today was sold in 
Canada, Australia, th United States and French North Africa 
in January 1944, a nd was not distributed free in liberated 
Europe, although free distribution was continued in Latin 
America, Africa and the Middle East. By the end of the war, the 
monthly circulation stood at 130,000. 
In connection with BES Ltd., but for a wider audience, 
the National Book Council published for the Council British 
Book News. This was a monthly list of new publications and was 
sent free to any applicant outside the British Empire. In 1940 
it had a monthly circulation of 16,000 and an additional 2,300 
copies were printed in Cairo for the Middle East. 
\. The British Life and Thought series, which first appeared 
in 1940, was created by Unwin. It consisted of educational 
and factual essays, distributed singly or in volume form. 
25. White to Riverdale, 22 May 1941. BW82/8 
26. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 7 July 1944. FO924/4 LC497/7/410 
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Titles in the series included The British Commonwealth, The 
British System of Government and British Justice. The series 
was widely approved and laid particular emphasis on Britain's 
contribution to politics and administration, in the form of 
the parliamentary system and the Judiciary. For the Allied 
communities in Britain a multi-lingual publication entitled 
International Guild Books was produced which reprinted many of 
the articles in the British Life and Thought series. 
A new series called Britain Advances was introduced in 1943 
designed 'to give examples of socially valua, ble progress on 
various subjects and to depict a progressive, up-to-date 
community'. 
27 These pamphlets, of which twelve were produced, 
contained many photographs and were described as 'accurate 
but popular'. 
28 They included Landmarks giv6n to the People, 
about the National Trust, Machines on the Farm, an Britain's 
success with mechanised agriculture, and London Calling the 
World, an the BBC's overseas broadcasts. 
The Council also published a British Contributions series, 
on Britain's contributions to Persian and Indian studies, and 
Science in Britain, aimed at specialist audiences. In addition, 
the Council commissioned some booKs, including A. L. Rowse's 
Spirit of English History, which was published in 1943. 
The chief function of the Press and Receptions Division 
was to supply articles and feature materials for the Empire 
and foreign Press on all subjects not specifically connected 
with the military and political course of the war, to arrange 
visits of, journalists and distinguished guests to Britain, and 
to provide information for the national, provincial and 
periodical Press in Britain on the Council. The Press Department 
was established in April 1938 under the direction of Toby 
O"Brien. Although transferred to the MOI on the outbreak of 
war it was returned to the Council in October to preserve the 
valuable and independent contacts and machinery that the 
Council had built up and because the Ministry was in 'bad odour 
.\ 29 
with the neutral press' Moreover, 
27. British Council Annual Report, 1943/4. p. 114 
28. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 27 January 194S. FO924/112 LC160/19/4SI 
29. Minute by E. B. O'Brien. 10 October 1939. BW82/7 
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We must remember that the name of the British 
Council is established and that it may be a 
good cover for activities parallel to those 
of the MOI. 30 
The distinction between the two Press departments was slight 
at the outset and both provided information on subjects that 
fell between the political-cultural dividing line. Furthermore, 
O'Brien said that he could not be confined to cultural subjects 
'simply because his contacts would not be prepared to accept 
31 
such subjects exclusively' . 
C) 
A daily London Letter was compiled with'ýspecial Empire and 
South African editions and French and Spanish translations. 
Articles and weekly features, such as Facts About Britain, 
Theatre and Films in Britain, Wartime Sport and British Women's 
Newsletter, w, ere distributed in English Spanish and French to 
the overseas Press through over two hundred centres. The 
Council's Press material being less overtly, 'propagandist than 
the Ministry's, often secured publication where the Ministry's 
did not. The Information Officer to the Government of India, 
J. Hennessy, asked for as many articles as the Council could 
supply. 
I consider that the most efficacious type of 
propaganda is that which is intrinsically 
interesting and which does not looK liKe 
propaganda: such Is the value of your British 
cultural articles that newspapers - even hostile 
ones - snap them up eagerly, because they are 
intrinsically interesting to their readers. 32 
In February 1940, Hennessy reported that 'the British Council 
material reaches every English-printed and Indian-language 
newspaperýof any importance throughout the country'. 
33 
The Press Department was reorganised on the resignation 
of O'Brien in 1944. Public relations were transferred to the 
Home Division, the photographic section was reconstituted as 
a separate department, and the remainder became the overseas Pres6 
Department. In 1940 the photographic section consisted of 
Rnly one man, L. W. ForsdicK, who had joined the Council after 
t hirteen years with a Fleet Street photographic agency. Under 
his guidance it developed into a full department, with its own 
photographers and equipment, supplying all the Council's 
30. H. V. Hodson to White, 4 October 1030, E3W82/7 
31. White to Lloyd, 19 March 1940. BW82/7 
32. J. Hennessy to A. H. Joyce, 25 September 1939. India Office Papers 
INF LI/1/63 12ý1/39 
33. A. H. Joyce to E-B-O'Brien, 14 February 1940. I. O. Papers 
_INF__LI_/1/63 
614/40 
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photographic needs at home and abroad. 
The Receptions Department was founded in March 1939 to 
organise hospitality to visitors to Britain. As Leeper 
explained! to the Treasury 
We are increasingly convinced that one of the 
best forms of propaganda is to pay appropriate 
attention to influential foreigners who visit 
this country and to help them see things which 
interest them and maKe a good impression. 34 
As in the case of the Press, it was found that the Council's 
organisation for the entertainment of foreigý guests was too 
valuable to be transferred to the Ministry. 
The Council had facilities for "bear-leading" 
which we had not got, and in the beginning the 
Council's facilities and experience were not 
otherwise employed. It was also in o6r. minds 
that, on occasion, the outward sponsorship of 
the British Council might afford better cover 
for Ministry sponsorship for the more ti, mid 
neutrals. 35 
Therefore, the Council acted for the MOI and Foreign Office in 
entertaining distinguished guests and important delegations. 
The approval and consent of the Foreign Office and the Security 
Executive had to be given before the Council could issue 
invitations. The Security Executive was especially wary of 
visitors from neutral countries, particularly Argentina, Spain 
and Sweden, and regarded technical and scientific representatives 
from countries other than the Allies or Turkey as 'highly 
undesirable'. 
36 
In 1940 the Council entertained Press delegations from 
France, Cyprus, Turkey, Yugoslavia a'nd Greece, in 1941 from 
Iceland, Canada and the West Indies, in 1942 from Sweden and 
Brazil and in 1943 from Spain and West Africa. Regular 
receptions were also organised in London for the ambassadors 
of countries in which the Council worked and for visiting 
societies. In connection with the delegation from Turkey in 
1 940, Lloyd claimed that 
The visit of the Turkish editors to this country 
last summer, through its subsequent influence an 
public opinion in that country, has no doubt 
contributed to establishing an attitude sympathetic 
to the Allied cause. 37 
34. Leeper to Hale, 1 April 1939. T161/1105 S35581/07 
35. E. Bamford to M. Palairet, 24 December 1943. INF 1/446 
36. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 23 April 1943. FO370/772 L854/62/410 
37. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 7 January 1941. BW69/6 
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In December 1943 the MOI took over the entertainment of 
foreign journalists but from February 1944, preparations for 
the invasion of Europe temporarily halted the arrival of all 
foreign guests in Britain, However, the ensuing Allied 
victory opened the flood gates to a new tide of visitors from 
Europe. 
The Council subsidised a number of newspapers abroad that 
might otherwise have disappeared. In June 1938 O'Brien 
argued that 
When the next war breaks out we shal I have to 
swallow our British pride and "buy" a large 
number o-F neutral papers. 38 
The most important and costly of these were the Anglo-Portuguese 
News and Cyprus Post. Both were entirely owned and financed 
by the Council and were the only English language newspapers 
in their areas. The Anglo-Portuguese News was the only English 
journal in Europe after May 1941. Cyprus 
ýost!. 
was the only 
English daily in the island and the Council supported it at the 
request of the Colonial Office. Similar considerations led 
to the support of other papers. 
39 
The Council was a reluctant newspaper proprietor and learnt 
by experience that it could not control the views expressed in 
these papers. In Cyprus frequent criticism of the Colonial 
Government and local authorities in the columns of the Cyprus 
Post landed the Council in great difficulties. In Portugal 
and Turkey local laws forced the Council to place nominal 
ownership in the hands of nationals of the country in which the 
paper was published. Moreover, the Council feared that the low 
standard of some of the newspapers would bring discredit to 
its other activities. After a visit to Portugal in December 
1941, Ifor Evans advocated a radical improvement in. Anglo-_ 
Portuguese News and described the Cyprus Post as a 'festering 
sore', after a visit to the island in 1943.40 The latter had 
become increasingly a paper for the British forces in the 
island whom O'Brien diagnosed to be 
less interested in "blue-prints for brave new 
worlds" than in pictures of cottages with 41 thatched roofs, churches or rolling downland. 
38. Minute by E. B. O'Brien, 7 June 1938, BW14/1 
39. See Appendix E 
40. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 November 1943. BW69/9 
41, Exncutivs COmmittOO Minuton, 29 Juno 1943. BW60/9 
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In evidence to the Public Accounts Committee in July 1944, 
White explained that the Council hoped to be rid of its 
newspaper responsibilities soon 'because we do not liKe 
running newspapers'. 
i 
We are not quite certain that it fits into our 
system, and our experience in the last few 
years has shown, that it is an extremely 
embarrassing thing to do. 42 
There was little difference between those papers supported 
by the Coun oil and those supported by the MOI. The Council 
subsidised publications that were essentiall, y political while 
the Ministry supported purely cultural magazines, such as the 
Arabic Quarterly and the Persian Quarterly, for the good 
reason that the Ministry had had the money at the time to do so. 
Both these periodicals were offered to the Co, uncil'at the end of 
the war but by that time the Council had decided against the 
subsidy of foreign journals and was liquidating all its 
commitments in this -iýý-ield. 
In October 1939 the film work and staff of the Travel 
Association were transferred to the Council. The pre-war Joint 
Film Committee 43 became a committee of the Council under the 
chairmanship of Philip Guedalla. The Film Department was 
strengthened and reorganised under the direction of Neville 
Kearney, appointed in January 1940. The Joint Film Committee's 
activities had been limited to the selection of films, made by 
other bodies, for distribution abroad until 1939 when it was 
given responsibility for providing films for the British 
Pavilion at the New York World Fair. The committee was not 
concerned'with feature films and concentrated on documentaries 
and, to a limited extent, newsreels. Immediately prior to the 
outbreak of war the committee commissioned films about the 
Navy, Airforce and Parliament and supplied projectors to the 
Council's principal institutes and Anglophile societies. 
42. Minutes of evidence taken before the Public Accounts 
Committee, 13 July 1944. p. 4933 and 4976 
43. The Joint Film Committee consisted of representatives from 
the British. Film Institute, the Post Office, the Foreign 
Office, the Department of Trade, and, after December 1939, 
the Dominions Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office 
and the Government Cinematograph Advisor as well as the 
Council and Travel Association. 
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The disappearance of the Travel Association's official role 
in the committee hastened the supersession of trade films by 
cultural films, a process which had begun before the war. For 
the Fair the committee chose mainly prestige films, pageantry 
being 'týe hallmarK of the entire Pavilion'. 
44 Under the 
Council's influence this trend continued, for it was believed 
that as the Councills'role was to influence elitesýin foreign 
countties its films should illustrate loftier topics than 
manufacturing industry. Moreover, the committee feared that 
bald trade publicity, however artistically presented, would 
undermine the Council's claim to be a purelylýeducational and 
cultural body. 
In January 1940 the committee examined its stock of films 
and found that they had been designed mainly 
for a, dvertisement, for interest, education or 
entertainment, but not with a view to their 
being seen almost exclusively by foreign 
audiences. 45 
Kearney recommended more films covering the people of Britain, 
British culture, Parliament and local Government, education and 
more educational and teaching strips. Defence subjects were 
no longer the Council's concern. He argued that the Council's 
films should show the diversity of race, creed and countryside 
in Britain and the unity of the British people. 
They should show the finer qualities of the 
British character, its courage and humour; how 
the struggle to win a living from the soil or 
from the sea has helped to form iti how 
independence and tolerence ...... have led to 
the democratic freedom which we enjoy; they 
should try to explain our cultural and economic 
ideals and show the way we are trying to attain 
them. 46 
The general films produced by the Council followed these 
guidelines, portraying British towns and villages and her social 
system. In addition, scientific and educational, films. were 
made in a growing proportion. The production of industrial 
films was suspended in 1941 and resumed in 1944, concentrating 
0n export industries suggested by the Board of Trade. 
44. P. Swann, The British Documentary Film Movement (PhD. Thesis, 
University of Leeds, 1979) p. 226 
45. Film Committee Minutes, 31 January 1040. BW2/33 
46. Film Committee Minutes, 31 January 1940. BW2/33 
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In March 1945 A. F. Primrose, secretary of the Film Department, 
wrote to E. L. Mercier at the Department of Overseas Trade, 
If we can be of any assistance to the Department 
of Overseas Trade in helping to stimulate the 
export trade, do not hesitate to let us know. 
This is what we have in mind in producing films 
relating to industries and ..... it is certainly 
not outside the province of the Council to 47 
stimulate intere'st in British products if we can. 
In 1940 the Council began its film production programme, 
completing ten new films and a special batch of six industrial 
films made in cooperation with the Board of Trade. By 1942 
it was commissioning an average of twenty fiýms a year on 
general and educational subjects and in the latter category, 
particularly historical and geographical treatments of the 
Empire. In 1942,497 prints of documentaries were distributed 
for theatrical exhibition in seventy territories and 1,773 
prints were distributed for non-theatrical screening in fifty- 
two territories. The audiences were large. -' between September 
1942 and March 1943 the National Film Society of Canada 
arranged 2,402 screenings to a total audience, of 417,663. In 
Portugal, Queen Cotton was shown to 13,500 people in seven 
cinemas while' G'r'een Girdle was seen by 26,900 people in twenty- 
four cinemas. In 1943 over two thousand prints were sent to 
more than seventy countries. The number of documentary films 
distributed in 1944 fell to six hundred in eighty-four countries 
but the number of. prints sent to education authorities and other 
institutions for non-theatrical distribution doubled. 
Commentaries in twentj-two languages were recorded for use with 
these films. The Council's films were designed to be part of 
a theatrical programme, were mainly short and were sold to 
commercial distributors and not distributed free as the MOI's 
were. 
48 In '1943 the Council opened its own pre-view theatre 
with cutting rooms and editing facilities, in Hanover Square. 
All the Council's films were viewed by representatives of the 
Ministry's Foreign and Empire Publicity Divisions before being 
sent abroad. 
Until March 1940, when the general relationship between the 
Council and the Ministry was reviewed, the two film departments 
collaborated closely as the Ministry had few films of its own 
47. A. F. Primrose to E. L. Mercier, 4 March 1945. BT60/37/5 
48. For a description of the Council's films see F. Thorpe and 
N.. Pronay, Pritish i1mc; in the Secgnd World War. 
(Oxford 1980) 
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and was dependent partly on the Council's overseas distribution 
network. In January 1940 Sir Kenneth Clark was appointed head 
of the Ministry's Film Oivision and began to develop an 
independent distribution network for the Ministry's films and 
to sever links with the Council. In an agreement with 
Guedalla in May, Clark confined the Council to cultural 
subjects, so that the Council was not allowed to show a picture 
of a soldier, and secured MOI representation in the Council's 
film committee and department. The Council had no similar 
representative in the Ministry and the Ministry proposed that 
it should indent on the Ministry's vote forýits film work. 
This proposal was defeated eventually and the Council's own 
grant for, film activities was restored. 
Conflict between the Ministry and the Council in the sphere 
of films continued throughout the war. The Ministry complained 
of 'the predatory activities of the British, Council Film 
Committee' 
49 
and tried to absorb it completely. ', Differences 
on technical and administrative details were aggravated by 
personal antipathies. Both Kearney and Guedalla intensely 
disliked and ridiculed the documentary film movement; sentiments 
that were warmly reciprocated. The documentary movement had 
been represented on the Joint Film Committee but disputes over 
the selection of films for the British Pavilion ended their 
cooperation. 
so The documentarists arranged an independent 
display of their own films at the Fair. A reshuffle at the 
MOI in May 1940 brought the documentary movement in the Ministry's 
film unit. From that moment Kearney saw a conspiracy led by 
the documentarists at the MOI to secure control of all British 
official fAlm production and distribution, including the 
Council's. The documentarists were certainly hostile towards 
the Council and in 1942, Robertson appealed to Bracken in vain. 
If you would instruct your Film Division to 
cease from their persistent and wearisome efforts, 
chiefly foul and pernickety, to have mine suppressed, 
though their knowledge of foreign countries is quite 
clearly elementary. if indeed it can be rated so 
high, we might be able to start doing some real 51 good between us. For Heaven's sake let us try I 
49, Minute by H. V. Hodson, 8 October 1940. INF 1/444 
50. See P. Rotha, Documentary Diary, (New York 1973) 
51. Robertson to Bracken, 1 January 1942. BW63/4 
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Criticism of the Council's films by the Ministry and by 
such publications as Documentary Newsletter and Now Statesman 
centred on what was described as the Council's 'thatched 
cottage' approach. 
Their mirror of Britain is a mirror that reflects 
Lards, Wimbledon, the Derby, the Old English Inn, 
the beautiful countryside, our glorious old 
buildings - the heritage of the past, and all's 
right with the world. 52 
Censure of-'the rosy view of English society presented in the 
Council's film, also stemmed from the belief that they were 
poor propaganda and might do 'definite harm to the Britrsh 
democratic cause'. 
53 Conversely, the same critics called for 
the transfer of the Council's film department to the MOI on the 
grounds that it produced blatant propaganda no different 
ýom 
the. 
Ministry's. Documentary Newsletter argued 
If we are fighting the war for the preservation 
of our way of life, and the British'Council says 
that it is their job to hold a mirror to that 
way of life, then surely they are engaged in 
political propaganda. 54 
Indeed, there was little to choose between the Council's Sailors 
Without Uniform and the Ministry's Merchant Seaman. Moreover, 
the Ministry and the Council sometimes found themselves bidding 
against each other for the same film, for example, The Mastery 
of the Seas, which was described as 'essentially from start 
to finish a prestige propaganda film'. 
55 The Council's 
Executive Committee regreted that the Ministry 'failed to 
appreciate the purposj of the Council's films' 
56 
while the 
Ministry, maintained that 'for overseas purposes even the Council's 
57 
scientific'and educational films are really prestige propaganda'. 
Guedalla's and Kearney's disliKe of the documentary movement 
sprang partly from their use of film to maKe what Kearney and 
Guedalla regarded as left-wing propaganda. Guedalla preferred 
films on 
ordinary life and thought in Britain rather than 
a strained and pretentious concentration on "blue-prints" 
of a non-existant future half-way between J. B. Priestly 
and Moscow. 58 
52. Documentary Newsletter, vol. 2, No. 7, July 1941 
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However, the Council was not deaf to its critics which included 
its staff overseas. Eric Church in Brazil argued for 
interesting instead of purely patriotic film propaganda and that 
we must attempt to do more than wave a Union 
JacK in the eyes of our friends. It does not 
dazzle them; it bores them. 59 
White agreed that 
what the people there want to know about Britain 
is-' whether we are moving with the times and we 
should be careful not to dwell too much on our 
past achievements or our old traditions. 60 
As the war progressed the Council produced less films on 
traditional themes and more on industry, education and social 
development in Britain and a greater proportion of scientific, 
instructional and medical films. It was per. haps inevitable 
that the Council's films were so heavily criticised in the 
early part of the war as it had agreed not to portray the war 
which resulted in such films as Western Waterway, a film about 
Bristol made in 1941, that showed the town in norm al peacetime 
activity, ignoring completely the heavy bombing that it had 
suffered. As Gerald Campbell, head of the British Information 
Services in the United States, explained to Kearney, 
the Council wishes to develop knowledge of our 
cultural life both now and after the war, 
ironically enough, the somewhat bloody-minded 
Americans, who expect to see pictures of ruined 
houses and bodies, remark with disgust when they 
see a "tranquilising picture", Don't these people 
Know there is a war on ? 61 
Towards the end of the war, however, overseas demand turned to 
educational, instructional and reconstruction films, such as 
the Council was producing. The MOI moved into these fie lds 
and the output of the two film departments became very close 
in content. Between 1940 and 1945 the Council made eighty 
documentary films, distributed to eighty-four territories in 
twentyý-two languages. 
The Council also produced British News which had been seen 
first at, the New York World Fair where it was judged one of 
the successes of the British Pavilion. It was a special 
compilation of the ten issue produced weeklý by the five 
59. E. Church to E. L. N. Sturt, 1 August 1943. BW16/1 
60. Minute by White, 13 April 1942. BW16/1 
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British newsreel companies, made on a rotating basis by those 
companies. British News was revived in May 1940 for the re- 
opening of the Fair in June and, at the request of the Colonial 
office, a weeKly service of British News was introduced into 
twenty-eight colonies and mandated territories. The Council's 
success in securing this important field for its newsreel was 
due to Lloyd's appointment to the Colonial Office in May. The 
Select Committee on National Expenditure recommended in 
September that. British News ahould be the official British 
newsreel overseas in preference to the Ministry's newsreels. 
62 
Predictably, the Ministry vigorously opposeq the implementation 
of this recommendation, arguing that an official newsreel would 
be 'inevitably suspect' and that the Ministry's own arrangements 
would be more effective. 
63 As elsewhere a compromise was reached 
and it was agreed that there was scope for the newsreel of both 
organisations. British News was confined to the Colonial 
Empire, Portugal and Panama. The MOI unde'rtook the commercial 
production and distribution of newsreels and agreed to consult 
the Council on non-theatrical distribution. 
At the beginning of the war the Council surrendered its 
broadcasting activities to the MOI and this was confirmed in 
the Reith-Lloyd concordat of May 1940.64 The Council's 
involvement in broadcasting before the war had been minimal. 
A Joint Broadcasting Committee of the Council and Travel 
Association was founded in 1936 and distributed a small amount 
of material. With the suspension of the Travel Association 
for the duration of the war the Council's Press Department took 
over responsibility for broadcasting and the Joint Committee 
was dissolved. Confusingly, an identically named committee was 
set up-by Leeper in the spring of 1939 to supply material to 
foreign broadcasting stations. This committee, however, had 
both black and white propaganda purposes and after September 
1939 its overt activities passed to the MOI and its covert work 
to Section D at the War Office. 
62. Twelfth Report of the Select Committee an National 
Expenditure, 10 September 1940. 
63. Ibid. 
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At the Ministry Leepdr's committee increasingly undertooK 
cultural propaganda and in December 1939 the Council was 
approached with proposals for cooperation. The Council 
responded cautiously in view of the political aspects of the 
I 
committee's worK, even though much of its subject matter fell 
within its scope. In January 1940 Leeper advised the Council 
to leave cultural broa, dcasting to the committee with suitable 
arrangements for liaison. 
65 In future the Council's regional 
officers at-tended committee meetings, the Council supplied 
material and speaKers in the form of British Council scholars 
in Britain and the committee advertised Couýcil activities in 
its recorded programmes. The committee was misplaced at the 
Ministry and in July 1940, with the support of the BBC, the 
Ministry considered dissolving'it. The Forei gn Office, however, 
was anxious that the Committee's work should be continued and 
suggested that it might go to the Council. The Council was 
reluctant to be saddled with a body that was likely to lead to 
further troubles with the MOI and demanded additional funds if 
cultural broadcasting was to become its responsibility. The 
committee continued to function until 1941 when it seems to 
have disappeared. 
By 1943 the Council was involvedagain in broadcasting, as 
demand overseas for general background material about Britain 
grew as Allied victory approached. Either directly, by 
providing speakers or arranging programmes, or indirectly, by 
providing material, especially music, the Council participated 
in broadcasting in twenty-one countries. In ten of these, 
66 
broadcasting formed a major part of the Council's work. In 
1943 the Council, the MOI and the BBC agreed to cooperate in 
cultural broadcasting and a circular to this effect was sent 
to their agents in Latin America. 
It was generally agreed that the certainty of 
victory makes it possible for us to decrease to 
a certain extent, war and political propaganda, 
and to increase to a similar extent projection of 
Britain and things British from the long-term 
angle. 67 
65. R. A. Leeper to C. Bridge, 18 January 1940. BW2/183 
66. The Belgian Congo, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Malta, 
Paraguay, Persia, Spain, Turkey and Uruguay. 
67. Momorandum to Proas Attachda, DF3C and Oritiah Council 
Representatives in Latin America, July 1943. BW2/182 
74 
In February 1944 the MOI agreed to the Council resuming 
broadcasting activities and in 1945 the Council entered into 
discussions with the BBC on the broadcasting of English lessons 
and other matters. 
After its films and, broadcasting committees with the 
Council had become wholly Council affairs, the Travel Association 
was placed on a 'care and maintenance' basis with an annual 
grant of 12,500 for the duration of the war. The chairman of 
the Travel Association, Lord Derby, continued as a vice-chairman 
of the Council and a member of its Executive Committee. In 
January 1942 Derby raised the question of the Travel Associationjs 
future with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Treasury's 
view was that the Council and the Travel Association were two 
distinct organisations that could not be merged. 
The sharp distinction between the cbmmercial 
nature of the Association and the political 
nature of the Council suggests that the emphasis 
should be laid on a demarcation of function, not 
an amalgamation. 
68 
This difference accounted for the widely varying levels. of 
Government subsidy. If the Council absorbed the Association 
the Treasury would be financing commercial publicity which, 
believed, should be funded by those industries benefiting from 
it. Moreover, the Council's grant was already large and a 
separation of the two organisations might result in a reduction 
of the Council'-s work. On the other hand, 
The Council's terms of reference are already 
nebulous enough and it is difficult to see 
how to set 1ýýOits to its expenditure. The 
difficulty might be greatly increased if it 
were allowed to enter the field of commercial 
publicity. 69 
In February 1942 an inter-departmental committee was formed 
to consider the matter'. The Travel Association had three 
options: integration with the Council; the transfer of its 
rant to the Council and the maintenance of its separate 
identity; a separate grant and cooperation with the Council 
through standing committees. Collusion between the Treasury 
and the Department of Overseas Trade and assertions of 
68. Minute by C. G. L. Syers, February 1942. T 219/51 
69. Ibid. 
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independence by both organisations ensured that the third 
option would be chosen. A standing committee of the Council 
and the Association was established in May to allocate functions 
common to both bodies. The Travel Association's grant 
continued to be carried on the Department of Overseas Trade 
vote and the Treasury reserved its position on the question of 
funds for the Association after the war. The future of,. tourist 
and commercial publicity became caught up in the discussions on 
the future. of the MOI and the Council. Although Findlater 
Stewart was not asked to look into this que'stion, in his report 
he declared the work of the Travel Association to be 
inconsistent with the Council's functions. 
The sponsorship of lecture tours by distinguished speaKers 'was 
one of the Council's main activities before the war. In June 
1939 the Lectures Committee considered its! progress to date 
and concluded that the Council must avoid giving the impression 
that it only sponsored titled or upper-class lecturers. 
Lectures fell into two groups, achievement and cultural. The 
former were designed to combat a view that Britain was decadent 
and the latter to counter the belief that Britain was a nation 
of shopKeepers and sportsman; the committee felt that examples 
of British humour must be avoided at all costs. The European 
lecture programme was maintained until May 1940, with lectures 
by Wedgwood Benn in the Low Countries, and by Herbert Morrison 
and WicKham Steed in France, amongst others. The escalation of 
the war in that month resulted in the cancellation of many more, 
including engagements for Leo Amery in France and a tour of 
Italy by Y. S. Eliot and Osbert Sitwell. 
Nevertheless, the supply of lecturers to the Council's 
institutes and societies remained an important function. In 1940 
Sir Harold Gillies. a leading pioneer of plastic surgery under- 
tooK a six weeKs tour of South America as did Professor J. 
Entwistle, an expert in Spanish and Portuguese studies. James 
R. urves-Stewart, a distinguished neurological physician, 
lectured in Spain and Portugal and in April 1941 a delegation 
from the University of Oxford, sponsored by the Council, gav e 
a series of popular lecturers -after conferring the-degree of 
Doctor of Civil Law on Dr. Salazar, the President of Portugal. 
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In 1942, the easing of transport problems, enabled the Council 
to send four lecturers to Sweden, including T. S. Eliot and 
W. G. Holfod, Professor of Civic Design at Liverpool University. 
The Iberian peninsula was the other main area of activity in 1942. 
receiving Sir Ronald Storrs, Father M. C. D'Arcy, Master of 
Campion Hall at Oxford, and Brigadier H. W. B. Cairs, Nuffield 
Professor of Surgery at Oxford. Medical and technical subjects 
dominated the Council's lecture programme in 1943/4, with 
Sweden, Spain and Portugal again receiving the lion's share. An 
exception was a highly successful tour of Spain and Portugal by 
Leslie Howard, ending in tragedy when his plýane was shot down 
returning to'England. 
The Visual Propaganda Department prepared small exhibitions 
and provided material for the Council's offides and institutes, 
such as flags, posters, sports cups and medals. Small displays 
were assembled consisting of pictorial, wripten and other 
material on a particular subject. These inclu ded British 
Industry and the Everyday Life of the British People, Modern 
British Architecture, British Social Achievements, Post-War 
Planning and a wide range of other topics. The Department 
also responded to individual requests for material. The 
Venezuelan Society of National Sciences was presented with four 
rare maps of Venezuela and the Caribbean and children's 
libraries in British Guiana and Ecuador received collections of 
historical and geographical pictures. 
It was anticipated that the Council's Orama, Music and 
Fine Arts Departments would disappear or be drastically reduced 
70 
after war broke out, for they were considered to be a 
luxury and unnecessary in wartime, especially by the Treasury. 
Despite the difficulties posed by the war, the Council continued 
these activities as far as circumstances would allow. In 
October 1939 a Drama Advisory Committee was formed tolsafeguard 
the Council from embarking on any venture that did not command 
the approval of the theatrical profession as a whole'. 
71 The 
. ýetter of-invitation to its members stated that the need 
70. E. Hale to A. P. Water-Field, 6 January 1940. T 161/1029 
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for this purelý cultural form of propaganda 
is greater now than it has ever been. During 
the last war the finest talent of the German 
theatre was sent to neutral countries where 
some surprise was felt that England did not 
, 
follow suit. Today enemy propaganda of this 
Kind is already at work and the Council are 
desirous of taking steps to counter it. 72 
In wartime it was not possible to mount drama tours overseas 
and so the Drama Department concentrated on distributing play 
scripts and negotiated for the translation and performance of 
British plays in Allied and neutral countries. It was 
represented also on the International AdvisO'ry Committee of 
ENSA. 
Likewise, the Music Department was forced to abandon the 
sponsorship of tours by British artists and orchestras overseas 
and focused instead on sending scores, song books and records 
to societies, institutes, schools, the Armed Forces and 
broadcasting stations. A distinguished Advisory Committee, 
counting among its members Arthur Bliss, Sir Adrian Boult, 
Ralph Vaughan-Williams and Dr. William Walton, provided 
practical help and guidance. In 1942 the Council entered the 
field of recording and sponsored among others, recordings of 
Walton's Belshazzar's Feast and Bliss's Pianoforte Concerto. 
In the same year Kathleen Long, the pianist, toured Iceland 
and Malcolm Sargent visited Spain and Portugal. Music was 
exchanged with the Soviet Union and material sent by the Council 
enabled the Services Choral Society to perform The Messiah in 
Cairo Cathedral on the eve of the Alamein offensive. In 1943 
Sargent toured Sweden and the Council sponsored performances 
of British music by indigenous orchestras abroad. In the 
British West Indies and in Latin America music officers were 
appointed to supervise the development of musical societies and 
performances of British music and to establish British music 
libraries. 
The Council's Fine Arts Department was responsible for all 
British fine arts exhibitions abroad, -both official and semi- 
official. It had provided the Fine Art Section for the 
E3ritish Pavilion at the New YorK World Fair and parts of this 
were displayed subsequently in Canada and the United States. 
Two other exhibitions were assembled in the United States in 
1940, including an exhibition of British Arts and Crafts that 
72. Ibid. 
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was shown also in Canada and, South America. In the United 
States the Council was careful not to appear frivolous by its 
exhibitions and Sir Eric Maclagan, chairman of the Advisory 
Committee, expressed 
a fear that the anti-British element in the 
United States might feel that raw materials 
which had been sent over for war purposes 
under the terMs'of the Lend Lease Bills war .a 73 '-'the production of exhibitions. being used in 
Exhibitions. of Art by British Children and collections of 
British Contemporary Art were widely shown in all neutral and 
most Allied countries. 
The dissemination of scientific information and the 
promotion of scientific contacts were not tho, ught at first to 
be functions of culture or publicity. With the outbreak of 
war, however, normal channels of communication within the 
international scientific world were interruptedýand steps had 
to be taken to restore contacts and stimulate research as well 
as to publicise Britain's contribution and to explain the 
implications of scientific discoveries. The fact that science, 
in its many forms, was increasingly permeating every aspect of 
society made it 'potentially one of the strongest foundations 
74 
on which to build closer cultural relations between nations!. 
This became an important feature of the Council's worK. 
In January 1941 Sir John Chancellor informed Lord Hankey, 
chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the War Cabinet, 
that the Council intended to form a Science Department. 
The foxmation of such a committee by the Council had arisen 
from suggestions from the British Medical Association and the 
Royal Society of Medicine that the Council should help in the 
organisation of British medical propaganda in South America. 
At its first meeting in'January, the Science Advisory Committee 
invited Sir William Bragg to represent it on the Council's 
committee and entrusted the responsibility for scientific 
75 ýropaganda to the Council. In July 1941 the British Medical 
Information Service, representing the British Medical 
Association and the MOI, moved from the Ministry to the Council. 
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The Science Committee worked through a triumvirate of 
panels; general science under Bragg; medicine under Sir 
Edward Mellanby; engineering under Sir William Larke. In 1944 
an agricultural panel was added under the direction of Mr. Scott 
Watson. Bragg was also chairman'of the Science Committee; he 
was succeeded by Sir Henry Dale in 1942. A Science Department 
was established under James Crowther who held strong left-wing 
views and was an admirer of the Soviet Union, which he had 
visited seven times between 1929 and 1935, becoming senior 
advisor on technical education to the Supreme Economic Council 
in 1930. Crowther maintained that the sci6ntific world had a 
social duty to explain itself to governing elites and to the 
general public in order to ensure the scientific planning and 
development of society. In 1941 Crowther wrote 
I the English governing classes, as typified by 
the Cabinet, are non scientific, whereas,.... 
the most important part of the popullation the 
skilled artisans are roughly scient'ifid.. This 
split with regard to science is but one of the 
social fissures which will destroy the social 
structure if they are not removed. 76 
The Science Department had three main aims: to present and 
interpret Britain's contribution to science; to provide 
in-Formation on science and its organisation in Britainj and 
to develop closer cultural relations between scientists of all 
nations. The Council was not concerned with the commercial 
aspects of science and did not advertise British products or 
enter into negotiations for their sale. It was involved only 
with scientific contacts between learned, professional and 
educational groups. 
The Science Department produced a number of publications, 
mostly for sale overseas. Monthly Science News, first issued 
in August 1941, provided a current record of British contribu- 
tions to science. It was a popular newsletter of four 
illustrated sheets for the general reader, published in English, 
Arabic, French, Portuguese and Spanish and printed in six 
qountries. By 1945 its total circulation had reached 65, OPO. 
With the support of the War Cabinet Scientific Advisory 
Committee the Council secured an extra allocation of paper in 
December 1941 so that Monthly Science News could be distributed 
76. J. Crowther, The Social Relations of Science, (London 1941) 
p. 636 
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at home. In addition, extracts from the magazine were 
reprinted regularly in the foreigri and British Press. 
A series of pamphlets entitled Science in Britain was also 
producedidescribing the life and work of distinguished British 
scientists and engineers for the specialist reader. Science 
Comment was a monthly compilation of abstracts and reviews of 
scientific books and films. The British Medical Bulletin, 
first produced in 1943 as an, abstracting journal, developed 
into a fouiý hundred page volume reviewing advances in British 
medicine and written by medical experts. It was published in 
English, . Spanish, Portuguese and Turkish aný reprinted in 
Sweden with a total circulation of 10,000 copies by 1945. In 
addition, it was supplied to the Ministry of Health and the 
War Office. 
The Science Department provided. the secretariat of the 
Anglo-Soviet Scientific Collaboration Committee, and, arising 
from this committee, formed a section to deal With the exchange 
of scientific information with the Soviet Union. Through the 
committee, Soviet scicLntific publications were collected at a 
Science Library at South Kensington, a comprehensive scientific 
and technical Russian-English dictionary was produced and 
Soviet scientific papers were tr ' 
anslated. The Science Depart- 
ment acted as the intermediary between British scientific 
institutions and the Acadamy of Sciences in Moscow and maintained 
contacts with the Science Bureau of VOKS. A Science Information 
Department was founded in 1944 to deal with this work and with 
the provision of general scientific information. 
The Film Department was advised by the Science Department 
on the production of scientific and technical films. Medical 
films especially, were successful, particularly Surgery in Chest 
Disease and Accident Service. Scientific broadcasts were 
arranged, including a series, recorded by thirteen eminent 
scientists, called Science Lifts the Veil, on the conquest of 
the sub-visible universe. Exhibitions and lecture tours were 
, ýrranged and a Society for Visiting Scientists was opened in 
London in 1944 in cooperation with the Royal Society. In the 
field of engineering the Council played a valuable role in 
making known abroad British Standards Specifications. In 
collabration with the British Standards Institute they were 
translated into Spanish and Turkish. Sets of specifications 
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were presented to suitable centres abroad. 
The output of the Council's functional departments 
supplemented and comple-mented that of the MOI. In many 
fields - books, periodicals, visitors and science - the 
Council outstripped the, Ministry, whilst in others, notably 
broadcasting, the Council surrendered-, most of its activities. 
In the fields of film and the Pressthe two organisations 
competed and frequently clashed. The work, of the smaller, 
purely cultural depaFtments - drama, music ýnd fine arts - 
was reduced while the war continued. The films, books and 
periodicals and the Press departments had the largest grants. 
Educational activities were entirely outside the Ministry's 
sphere and remained the basis of the Councill-s other work; 
many of the books, periodicals, films and similar items sent 
overseas were for educational use in the Co, ýjnci. lls institutes 
and schools. However, the Council had to-subordinate its 
educational purpose in the national interest to influence a 
wider audience by producing and distributing material 
publicising the British viewpoint and organising prestige 
events. The Council's functional departments made a 
significant contribution to Britain-'s total propaganda output 
during the second world war. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
i CULTURAL BLOCKADE 
Europe was the Council's main concern before, and in the 
early stagibs of the war. By showing the Union Jack in 
northern and southern Europe Britain hoped to steady the nerve 
of her friends while not provoking her enem es. In the Far East 
Britain was as impotent in the field of propaganda as she was 
to prove to be initially in the field of combat. Somewhat 
belatedly in April 1939, the Council was urged to send English 
teachers to Tokyo and in November it took ovýr the British 
Library of Information and Culture in Tokyo. The Council's 
efforts were described by the director of the Library as 'a 
heroic last-minute rearguard action on unfamiliar terrain 
against a carefully prepared and skillýfully delivered attack'. 
The Council preferred, instead, to concentrate its resources 
in Europe and, after the spring of 1941, in those countries 
that remained accessible. 
After Hitler's Balkan campaigns Britain, and the Council, 
were forced to Europe's extremities - Spain, Portugal, Sweden 
and Turkey. The Council formed an important, and in Spain and 
Turkey, the most important, part of Britain's propaganda counter- 
attack. Neither the Council or the MOI operated in Eire and 
the Council did not work in Switzerland either. Cordial 
relations-with the neutrals were essential. to Britain's war 
effort and the extent of the Council's activities in them is a 
measure of their prit',, acy. Turkey was the largest single consumer 
of the Council's budget and the other three European neutrals 
came next after Egypt, Palestine and Argentina. But first the 
Council had to mount a blockade of the Third Reich itself. 
\ Petreat From Europe 1939-1941. 
After attending a meeting of the Strategical Appreciation 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence in March 1939, 
Leeper reported that the Chiefs of Staff expected propaganda 
F. Hawley, Notes on British cultural policy in Japan, 
1 June 1944. BW2/9S 
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to be Britain's principal offensive weapon in the early s, tages 
of the war. 
2 
The chief organ for overt propaganda at that 
time, excluding the BBC, was the British Council and its overseas 
contacts. It was planned that the Council should be absorbed 
by the MOI on the outbreak of war and, therefore, the'build up 
of its operations during peacetime would provide the Ministry 
with a ready-made network for the dissemination of propaganda. 
Moreover, a cultural blockade of Hitler's Germany would augment 
the economic, diplomatic and military blockade designed to 
encourage the internal collapse of the Third Reich. Hitler was 
to be isolated from his friends and sources,, of supply and black 
and white propaganda would provoke a revolt a-gainst his 
leadership. 
The Council did not operate on a significant scale within 
Nazi Germany, partly because of the difficulties of so doing 
in a totalitarian state and partly because of resistance from 
the Embassy in Berlin, from within the Councilland from the 
Foreign Office. Between 1935 and 1938 the Council received 
various suggestions from Germany for the development of cultural 
relations, principally for the distribution of material and the 
provision of scholarships and lecturers. Sir E. Phipps, British 
ambassador in Berlin, opposed an extensive propaganda campaign 
on the grounds that Geermany might demand reciprocal facilities 
in Britain which would give Or Goebbels an advantage in view of 
the comparative accessibility of information channels in Britain. ' 
Phipps recommended that the Council should meet only specific 
demands for material and subsidise the occasional cultural event. 
Colonel Bridge, the Council's Secretary General, minuted on the 
numerous requests the Council received from Germany, 
In my opinion the effect of anything we can do 
in Germany at present would be so small and 
relatively so unimportant to the work we have to 
do in other countries, that it is useless 
entering into any activity in that country until 
the suggestion that we should do so comes from 
the Embassy. 4 
ýurthermore, there was Opposition on the Council's Executive 
C ommittee to any demonstrations of friendship towards bgrman. y. 
2. Minute by R. A. Leeper, 3 March 1939. F0395/647B P1402/105/150 
3. Sir E. Phipps to Eden, 7 February 1936. BW32/1 
4. Minute by C. Bridge, 23 September 1937. BW32/1 
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The question was reconsidered after 
in the belief that Germany might ndw be 
Britain and that many Germans were out 
Nazi Party. Kenneth Johnstone, Deputy 
agreed that the Council could cultivate 
I 
attitudes in Germany: 
the Munich conference 
more friendly towards 
of sympathy with the 
Secretary General, 
liberal and pro-British 
How far that feeling would be allowed to develop 
by the Nazi authorities I do not Know, but I 
believe that they would have serious difficulty 
in-'stopping the wave, if once we could start it 
..... this would not only do the Council's cause 
but also the Council itself some goqd. We do 
not want to get the reputation of being a purely 
anti-German organisation. 5 
Johnstone added that any activities would have to be started 
immediately and on a lavish scale to maKe. aný, impression and 
suggested bringing young Germans to Britain, perhaps on 
'Chamberlain Scholarships'. 
6 Bridge and Lepper agreed in 
principle with these proposals, although Le'eper ;! warned Lloyd 
that the Council's worK in Germany would have to be restrained 
to avoid antagonising public opinion in Britain. 
7 
Leeper 
continued: 
But I do want to say this, whatever atrocities 
the Nazi regime may commit, it is important that 
we should 
' 
do everything in our power to keep 
in contact with such elements as we can who are 
capable of appreciating the British outlook on 
life and are anxious to learn more than they can 
get from their own newspapers and broadcasts.. 8 
Bridge discussed these proposals with the Embassy in Berlin 
in November 1938. Recommendations arising fron these discussions, 
including the institution of a daily wireless service, the 
formation of a British Library of Information, professional and 
academic exchanges and the supply of. British books, films and 
lecturers, were presented to the Cabinet in December? The 
Cabinet referred the proposals to the departments concerned for 
detailed consideration. Bridge in-formed the Council that the 
Prime Minister wantecý)to mount an intensive propaganda campaign 
t. n Germany and that the Council would receive a generous subsidy 
for this extra worK. 10 Nothing came of these plans, however, 
as after March 1939 all matters concerning Germany were taKen 
5. Minute by K. 4ohnstone, 3 October 1938. BW32/1 
0. Ibid. 
7. Leeper to Lloyd, 21 November 193a E3W 32 /1 
8. Ibid. 
9. CAB 23/96 CP(38)284 8 December 1938. 
10. Minute by K-Lindsay, 6 December 1938. BW32/2 
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out of the Council's hands and controlled by the Foreign Office. 
On Germany's borders the Council could do little more than 
encourage Britain's friends. In the east the Council's 
activities were concentrated in Poland and were stepped up 
after Munich. No worK was undertaKen in CzechoslovaKia before 
she was dismembered by her neighbours. In January 1939, new 
premises for the Anglo-Polish society and a British school. were 
opened in Warsaw. A service of news and feature articles was 
provided fýr the Polish Press and the local, Council representativE 
edited The Warsaw Wee, ýly, jointly subsidised by the Council and 
the Polish Government with a circulation of 2,000 to Govermment 
offices, Anglophile societies and educational institutions. 
Scholarships, exhibitions and film shows were organised and 
four English Chairs were sponsored at Polish 'universities. 
In February 1939 Sir H. Kennard reported an improvement in the 
attitude of the Polish authorities towards Britain since Munich 
which was 'marked by a fortunate and conspi6uou .s development of 
British propaganda activities in Poland under the auspices of 
the British Council'. 11 Kennard continued that the Council 
had done 
considerable service to the maintenance of 
British prestige and interests in a country 
where propaganda by foreign states - notably 
France and Germany - is active and successful 
and where the ordinary citizen is too frequently 
prevented by lacK of information or its suppression 
and distortion in high quarters, from forming an 
accurate judgement of British ways and policy. 
..... the value of these activities can hardly be 
overestimated. 12 
The Council continued worKing in Poland until the German 
invasion in September. During the war the Home Division 
established close contacts with Polish airmen, soldiers and 
civilians in Britain and the Middle East. 
To the north Of Poland the Council actively promoted pro- 
British sentiment in the Baltic States, Finland and Scandinavia. 
In January 1939 there were sixteen Anglophile clubs in Sweden, 
six in Denmark, five in Finland, three in Norway and Latvia, 
two in Estonia and one in Lithuania. The Council offered 
scholar ships, distributed British books and pdriodicals and 
supported The Baltic Times which was published in Tallin. 
11. Sir H. Kennard to Halifax, 8 February 1939. FO395/662 
12. Ibid. P456/456/150 
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Although the Baltic States had declared their neutrality on 
the outbreaK of war the Nazi-Soviet Pact had sealad their fate. 
Increasing Soviet pressure after the German invasion of Poland 
resulted in the signature of treaties of mutual assistance I in 
October that gave the Soviet Union effective control. The 
Council continued its modest activities until August 1940 when 
German victories in the west were echoed in the east by the 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. 
In Fin7land the Council had supported the Finnish-British 
Society since 1935 and had founded a reading room and library 
in Helsinki in the same year. Scholarships for Finnish 
students and material for the branches of the Society absorbed 
most of the Council's Finnish budget. As the threat of war 
with the Soviet Union grew in October 1939, the Finnish 
populution was mobilised, a large part of the British community 
was evacuated to Sweden and the Anglophilelsocieties were 
suspended. The Council resumed its contacts after the Russo- 
Finnish war but they were suspended again in September 1941 
when relations were broken off with Finland following her 
alliance with Germany in June. 
DenmarK, Norway and Holland received comparatively little 
attention from the Council although Anglophile societies were 
supported where they existed and some material was distributed. 
The German invasion in the spring of 1940 forced a hurried 
evacuation of Council staff and the Sadler's Wells Ballet 
Company, which was almost trapped in Arnhem on a tour. sponsored 
by the Council, by the rapid German advance. In Sweden the 
Council's activities were on a larger scale and centred on local 
Anglophild groups. Oifficulties of communication hampered 
Council worK until the end of 1941.13 
A British Institute existed in Paris before the Council was 
founded and the Travel Association also had offices there. The 
Council embarked on an extensive programme of activities in 
France in 1939. Noble Hall acted as Council and Travel 
Association Representative. The Council subsidised the independen, 
Paris Institute, sponsored a large number of lecture tours, 
organised film shows and offered scholarships. A considerable 
amount of material was prepared for the French Press by the 
Council, particularly on British rearmament and readiness for war. 
Activities continued until the summer of 1940. 
13. The development of the Council's work in Sweden. is dealt 
with below, p. 104-105 
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Th. e most important areas for the Council in the early stages 
of the war, however, were Italy and the Balkans. In the first 
years of the Council's life Anglo-Italian relations stood at 
their low, est after Britain had led the imposition of sanctions 
against Italy following Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia. An 
institute had been founded in Florence in 1918 by British 
residents, but the Council had none of its own. The Italian 
Government decided against unprovoked war on France and Britain 
in August 1-939 and on 1 September, Britain's ambassador, Sir 
Percy Loraine, advised that the Italians 'wi'll be sensitive to 
attention as well as to slights'. 
14 
Italy d eclared herself 
non-belligerent after the German invasion of Poland and Britain 
took steps to improve Anglo-Italian relations in'the hope of 
weaning Mussolini from the Axis. Britain was, careful not to 
provoke Mussolini in the Balkans but the Council had continued to 
support the Herbert Bri - tish Institute in Tirana, the Albanian 
capital, after the Italian invasion in the spring of 1939. Its 
activities, were modest and unobtrusive and 'the Council sought 
to ensure that it did'not fall foul of the Italian authorities. 
In Italy the Council's activities increased dramatically in 1939. 
Lloyd told the Executive Committee in September that both 'the 
Foreign Office and the Ambassador wanted the Council to push 
ahead there'. 
15 
In the summer before the outbreak of war in Europe the 
Council took over an institute in Milan that had been founded 
by the Florence Institute and opened a centre in Palermo in 
July. An institute was established in Naples in November and 
at Rome and Genoa the following month, marking 'the official 
inauguration of the British Council's forward policy of promoting 
British culture in Italy'. 
16 
This was achieved with the support 
of Loraine and the connivance of the Italian authorities. ' White 
explained in November that 
I Signor Musso]Hni has let it be known through 
Count Ciano that he approved the extension of the British Council's work in Italy, which 
included the opening of new institutes at Genoa, Milan- Naples and Palermo. 17 
14. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939,3rd Series TLondon 1954) Vol. -8, -p. 494 
15. Executive Comittee Minutes, 21 September 1939. BW68/3 
16. Sir P. Loraine to Halifax, 27 December 1939. BW40/9 17. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 14 November 1939. 
BW69/5 
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However, in December Loraine reported to Halifax that 
The attitude of the Itlian Government seems to 
be that while they view the British Council's 
initiative in this direction with favour, we 
can not at this stage look for their open 
cooperation or expect to make any propaganda 
capital out of the venture. 18 
The Council kept a low profile and its unofficial status 
was clearly of value to its work in Italy. The possibility of 
an Anglo-Italian cultural agreement was rejected finally in 
February 1940 and the Council was forced to, work within the rules 
of a fascist state, including the banning 0ý Jews from its 
institutes. Likewise, a Jewish teacher sent to Genoa had to be 
recalled hurriedly. Germany's invasion of the Low Countries in 
May 1940 offered Italy the opportunity of cheap gains at the 
expense of the Allies. The position of thetouncil's institutes 
deteriorated rapidly. An outburst of anti-British feeling 
resulted in the capture of the Milan Instit, Ute by rioters in May, 
while demonstrators gathered regularly outside the institutes 
at Palermo, Naples and Genoa. The Council's staff was evacuated 
a week before Italy entered the war. When Italy declared war 
in June there were one thousand students at the Rome Institute, 
four hundred and fifty at Milan, three hundred at Palermo and 
two hundred at Genoa and Naples. The numbers were a small but 
significant testimony to the Council's work in, Italy in the last 
year before she joined Britain's enemies. 
British propaganda faced a daunting task in the Balkans. 
After the Anschluss and the collapse of the Little Entente and 
French influence, in south-eastern Europe became the 'main 
battlegrou 
, 
nd between British and foreign, chiefly German, 
influences'. 
19 
Britain had few cards to play; she was unable to 
compete with German economic penetration or supply the arms and 
other material demanded by the Balkan states. Moreover, British 
diplomacy was hampered by Britain's weak military position and 
by the territorial disputes of the area. In. April 1939 Britain 
and France offered unilateral guarantees to Greece and Roumania. 
When war broke out Britain sought to resurrect a Balkan bloc 
but Germany's victories in the west in the summer of 1940 
shattered that fragile structure. Roumania was forced to concede 
large areas to her neighbours and denounced the British guarantee 
(D 
18. I. Greenlees to C. Bridge, 2 February 1940. BW2/87 
19. Memorandum by Leeper, September 1938. FO 395/647A 
P450/105/150 
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A general desire to offer Germany no provocation and a fear q- 
Soviet and Italian designs undermined all British attempts to 
unite the Balkans against the Axis powers and restricted the 
field for British propaganda. 
Before war had broken out Lloyd had been anxious to rival 
the political, economic and cultural agreements offered by 
Germany and Italy in. the Balkans. In October 1938 Alec Cadogan 
recorded in his diary: 
Geo rge Lloyd at 6.30 about Roumanian wheat. 
Says. we must at once: buy 60,000 tons of 
Roumanian wheat. But. we don't want-ý, he 
damned stuff ..... 
19 
After a tour of the Balkans in 1938, Kenneth Johnstone 
argued that 
the results of our cultural propaganda, however 
energetically conducted and however well 
supported financially, will fade unlesss we 
are prepared to rescue the Balkan states from 
complete economic domination. 
20 
Nevertheless, despite the absence of support in the economic 
and political fields, the Council pressed ahead with the 
development of widescale activities in the Balkans. In 1939 
the Council prepared for the opening of institutes in Roumania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia and the extension of its work 
in Greece. In October 1939 the Roumanian Minister in Londdn 
suggested that Lloyd should visit Bucharest I to strengthen 
9 21 the will of the Roumanian Government in present circumstances 
Lloyd's trip was extended to all the Balkan capitals and from 
Roumania he reported to Orme Sargent, Oeputy Under Secretary of 
State at the Foreign Office, 
They are in an awful flutter here over the 
Russians and you trip over Germans every- 
where you walk. 22 
In Roumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, however, the Council was only 
able to make a superficial impression, but in Yugoslavia and 
Greece it found more promising soil. 
19. Ed. D. DilKs, The Diairies of Sir Alexander Cadogan 19384-1945 
(London 1971 ) p. 121 
20. Executive Commitee Minutes, 14 March 1939. BW58/3 
21. Foreign Office telegram to Bucharest, 10 October 1939. 
FO 800/278 Ro/39/4 
22. Lloyd to O. Sargent, 16 November 1939. FO 800/278 Ro/39/7 
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An English club was founded in Roumania in 1936 but 
disputes between the Club, the Anglo-Roumanian Society and the 
Roumanian authorities and the Treasury's parsimony prevented 
the foundation of an institute, even though a site had been 
23 
donated by King Carol. English classes were organisedby 
the Anglo-Roumanian Society for one thousand five hundred 
students in September 1939, rising to three thousand by November. 
but increasing German pressure forestalled the initiation of 
further activities. After the humiliating cessions of 
territory in June and August 1940, King Carol was forced to 
abdicate in September and the Council's freýdom of action was 
severel-. y. gurtailed by his successors, General Antonescu and the 
fascist-style Iron Guard. As part of an anti-British campaign 
instituted by the Iron Guard, the Council was asked to leave 
Roumania in September and did so in the following month with 
other British subjects. In November Roumania acceded to the 
Tripartite Pact. 
Likewise, in Bulgaria and Hungary the Council's work was 
modest. Both fell into Germany's sphere of influence, having 
fought with her in the earlier world war and harboured the 
same revisionist grievances against the treaties that had ended 
it. King Boris' indicision allowed Britain some leeway and 
the Council was able to maintain a small institute in Sofia 
in 1940 and to support the English Speaking League. 
The staff were swiftly evacuated in February 1941 before the 
arrival of the German army. In Hungary an English Chair and 
lectureships were subsidised at Budapest University and 
lecturers were sent to the Anglophile societies. Writing in 
The Contemporary Review in January 1939 a Hungarian appealed 
for increasing contacts with Britain: 
The reward will indeed be rich, because it would 
lift Hungary from her isolated position in the 
Danube Valley, from the embrace of Slavs and 
Germans, and bring her nearer the British Empire. 
Cultural ties that may yet be forged in the future 
will contradict the principle of geopolitical 
materialism, which holds that the intellectual 
attitude of a nation must be definsd and limited 
by her geographical surroundings. 25 
But the Nazi embrace was soon tightened and before the Council 
could find premises for an institute, Hungary had joined the Axis. 
23. See above p. 40 
24 See M. Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain, (London 1950)p. 128 
25 Dr. J. Balogh, 'Anglo-Hungarian Cultural Relations'. Contemporary 
Review, Vol. CLV, January 1939, p. 88 
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Following Johnstone's visit to Yugoslavia in 1938, the 
Council planned the foundation of institutes'and societies 
throughout the country. After war broKe out, mindful of 
Yugoslavia's fear of incurring German or Italian displeasure, 
I 
the Legation advised the Council to concentrate on existing 
Anglophile societies and schools. Julian Amery, assistant 
Press Attachg'and Section D's agent in Belgrade, also experienced 
the Legation's cautious attitude to propaganda in Yugoslavia. 
My-duty as Press Attache was to try to influence 
opinion in favour of the Allies. But the Legation 
policy was to keep the temperature 1,0w, to support 
Prince Paul, and at all costs to avolid provoking 
the Germans. To reconcile these two aims was a 
difficult and frustrating business. 26 
The Council found similar difficulties but decided to proceed 
with the opening of institutes at Belgrade an 
Id 
Zagreb 'to show 
that we are not losing our heads' in the war of nerves in the 
Balkans. 
27 
In December 1939, an ostensiblyiindependent but 
officially-controlled newsagancy, Britanova', wa 
!s founded in 
Belgrade with branches in other Balkan capitals and Turkey and 
the Council supplied it with a large amount of material. A 
Yugoslav-British Institute was formally opened in Belgrade in 
May 1940 with five hundred students and a director of studies 
was appointed in ZagPeb. 
After the fall of France, Yugoslavia stood isolated in the 
Balkans, with the exception of Greece, and the German Legation 
and Axis-controlled media became the dominant influences in 
Belgrade. Amery's press office was suppressed and only the 
Council remained to present the Allied view. Enrolments at 
the Institute continued after the Italian attack on Greece in 
October 1940 and by March 1941 it had one thousand students on 
its books. In the same month, bowing to Axis pressure, 
Yugoslavia joined the Tripartite Pact, but a political coup in 
Belgrade reversed this action and Yugoslavia declared neutrality. 
The Council's work continued throughout these events and it 
was not until German troops began pouring into Yugoslavia in 
'April that the Council's staff left with the Legation party, 
which escaped to Lisbon. Unfortunately, the Council's direqtor 
of studies at Zagreb was captured. In April 1941, Stephen Childs, 
26. J. Amery, Approach March, (London 1973) p. 157 
27. Minute by K. Johns: F-one, 18 October 1939. BW66/1 
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the former Press Attache in Belgrade, wrote to the Council 
to congratulate it on the success of its work in Yugoslavia. 
It must be a great satisfaction to the Council 
as it was to me - to realise that the arduous 
and patient work of the Council ..... has played 
a great part in creating the Yugoslav will to 
fight and suffer for the ideals of Freedom and 
Democracy. 28 
In south-eastern Europe, the Council spent the most, and 
was the chief organ for British propaganda in Greece. Before 
war broke out the Council supported the Anglo-Hellenic League 
in which it had 'a nucleus of devoted Greek 'supporters on whose 
independent collaboration we can rely' 
29 
and in 1938 esteiblished 
an Institute of English Studies at Athens. This was 
administered by the Byron Professor of Engli, sh Literature at 
Athens University, a post subsidised by the C ouncil. The first 
Byron professor was H. V. Routh, appointed in January 1938. In 
addition, the Council appointed a British headmpster to Spetsai 
College and was invited by the Greek authorities to take over 
the athletic training of the Greek Youth Movement. Problems 
arose for the Council in January 1939 from new laws providing 
for the surveillance of all foreign cultural organisations, 
unless they were registered by cultural agreements such as the 
Germans, Italians and French had. Moreover, the Greek Govern- 
ment insisted on nominating candidates for Council bursaries. 
Lloyd visited Athens in March 1939 and saw the King and General 
Metaxas. He persuaded Metaxas to conclude a cultural agreement 
and to compromise on the bursaries question. The Foreign Office 
agreed reluctantly to a cultural treaty, having had no previous 
experience 
, 
of one but recognising that it was'necessary to 
guarantee the continuation of Council activities in Greece. The 
c. uli-urml Anglo- Greek A treaty was signed on the entry of Greece into the 
war and set an important precedent. 
On the outbreak of war the Institute in Athens was entrusted 
with the conduct of all British publicity and related activities 
in Greece, for it possessed both'suitable staff and premises'. 
30 
ýhe Athens Embassy had planned that the Council's centres would 
be 'the principal channels for the dissemination of information 
throughout Greece'. 31 Professor Routh doubled as Council 
Representative and Press Attache and liaised between the Embassy 
28. S. Childs to White, 7 April 1941. BW66/2 
29- Executive Committee Minutes, 14 March 1939. BW68/3 
30: A. Waterlow to C. Warner, 10 April 1939. FI5395/647BpP13I/1O5/15f 31. MOI Publicity Planning Section, Report on Greece, JulY 1939. 
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and the Council. As the Embassy explained to the MOI planners 
with reference to_the Council, 
Existing publicity is almost entirely in 
its hands and its worK in Greece has been 
I specially fruitful. 32 
British propaganda in Greece aimed to encourage the conclusion 
of an Anglo-Greek alliance or at least Greek neutra lity and to 
counter insinuations that Britain was not prepared to fight. 
The Council. 's organisation was 
available for use in all three stage', 
\s 
and no 
better nucleus could be wished for. At present 
it spends about 120,000 a year in Greece and 
that amount could be profitably increased. 33 
Through the Athens Institute and its branches and the Anglo- 
Hellenic League, 'the cultural purpose was a cover for the 
publicity purpose' ahý-Q enabled the deployment of personnel to 
areas 'where opinion most needs steadying'. 
ý4 
These were 
i-Aentified as being on the Italian border ýand in the Dodecanese. 
The Co'uncil's work expanded rapidly in 1940 with the development 
of institutes at Salonika.. Samos, Patras and Calamata. At the 
start of the autumn session the Athens Institute was beseiged 
by eight thousand applicants. 
After the Italian attacK in October the Councills, institutes 
were closed by a Government decree in November that forbade the 
operation of foreign cultural organisations. The defence of 
Greece became for Britain as much a moral obligation as a 
political and military necessity. Churchill wrote to Eden, then 
in the Middle East, on 2 November 
GreeK situation dominates others now ..... 
Aid to Greece must be attentively studied 
lest whole TurKish position is lost through 
proof that England never tries to Keep her 
guarantees. 35 
While Eden sought a way to save Greece the Council redoubled its 
efforts there. For the next four months private classes and 
mettings were arranged wherever possible and the Institute turned 
iýts attention to more overtly propagandist activities. Working 
in cooperation with the Greek Propaganda Ministry, the Council's 
staff assisted in the preparation and translation of leaflets, 
broadcast a daily English lesson, provided material for the 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid... 
34. Ibid 
35. w. S. ehurchill, T_he Second World War, (London 1949)Vol. 2 P. 474 
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Greek Press, published English books, supervised the distribution 
of National Defence Weekly, described as a Greek Illustrated 
News, and ran a large Anglo-Greek social club. In January 1941, 
Lloyd claimed the credit for the Council in Greece in 'creating 
an Anglop'hile spirit which has defied the blandishments and 
threats of the Axis powers'. 
36 
In the new year, however, the Council's work we .s severely 
curtailed by the war and on the day before the signature of an 
armistice with Germany on 23 April, the Council's staff was 
evacuated. At the Council's Annual General Meeting in June, 
Riverdale spoke of the Council's success inýGreece: 
He referred to a message sent by General Metaxas 
shortly be-Fore his death in which he said that 
the worK of the British Council in Greece had 
contributed largely to the Anglophile spirit of 
the GreeK people. 3 I 
The Council was successful in Greece because its work had been 
conducted against a favourable political and mi: litary background. 
Britain had been able to honour her guarantee, at least in part, 
and, as Churchill explained to Eden in March, 
in any event to have fought and suffered in 
Greece would be less damaging to us than to 
have left Greece go her fate.. ... 
38 
The European Neutrals 1939-1945. 
In the Mediterranean the neutrality of Spain at one end 
and Turkey at the other was vital to Britain's war effort. An 
Anglo-Franco-TurKish Treaty Of mutual, assistance was signed 
on the out. breaK of war but Turkey's obligations were strictly 
limited. Caution and a delicate balancing of the demands of 
the European powers were the hallmarks of Turkish policy during 
the war. Her pivotal position in*. the eastern Mediterranean 
and military unpreparedness meant that Turkish neutrality was 
itself of great strategic value to Britain. If Turkey gave 
way to, or was defeated by the Axis powers, the way to the Suez 
&anal and the oilfields of Iraq, Iran and the whole Arabian 
peninsula would be open. On the other hand, Turkey's entryý 
into the war on the Lilied side would demand supplies and 
equipment that Britain could not spare. After the fall of 
36. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 7 January 1941. Bw69/6 
37. The Times, 12 June 1941, p. 9, col. 7. The message was transmittec 
orally to Lloyd through the Greek Embassy in London. 
38. Churchill, OP-cit. vol. 3 p. 93 
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France, TurKish belligerency would have invited German, Italian 
or possibly Soviet attacK, which Britain would have found 
impossible to resist. TurKish neutrality, therefore, was vital 
and attempts to gain her more active cooperation during the 
German invasion of the BalKans failed. After Italy's entry 
Into the war, TurKey declared the tripartite treaty invalid and 
limited herself to the status of a non-belligerent. 
Turkish independence 'and favourable neutrality were 
the esentig'l background to British policy in the Middle East 
and the Council's efforts were directed towa rds securing these 
objectives. The nationalist Republican People's Party of 
AtaturK, which still controlled Turkey, made impossible the 
development of conventional Council work, but the Council's 
unofficial status and flexibility enabled itý to penetrate to 
a remarkable 'degree a xenophobic nation. Its first contacts 
were in connection with British schools in Turkey and the 
provision of English teachers. Ataturk's visio: n of a truly 
Turkish nation meant that these schools catered mainly for 
British pupils as Turkish children under the age of twelve were 
forbidden to attend foreign schools. Therefore, the Council 
sought to place Englshmen within the Turkish educational system. 
In November 1940 Michael Grant was sent from the Cairo Office 
to organise this work. Before joining the Council, Grant had 
pursued a distinguished academic career, Joining the army on 
the outbreak of war. In Turkey he established close personal 
contacts the Minister of Education and with university and state 
educational bodies. 
Grant began by organising English classes at private 
schools and technical, agricultural and military colleges. At 
the request of the Minister of Education, candidates for posts 
at the University of Istanbul were found, four in 1940, and an 
Adviser on Technical Education to the Turkish Government was 
appointed. Grant's outstanding success was in arranging for 
Council teachers to give tuition in English in the HalKelevis. 
In 1941 there were three hundred and thirty Halkelevis throughout 
turkey, acting as 
the Headquarters of the People's Party through 
which the political views of the Government 
radiate and where Political like and information 
are centred. 39 
39. Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Oiplomat in Peace and War, (London 
1949) p. 139-40. 
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They were run by volunteers responsible to the provincial Party 
President. The Council's teachers were supplied free and 
English sections were donated to the Halkelevi libraries. 
Through the. Halkelevi the Council was the only foreign body ih 
40 
Turkey in direct contact with the People's Party organisation. 
From September to December 1941 the Council's staff taught two 
thousand nine hundred pupils, of which approximately half were 
taught at institutions belonging to the Ministry of Education, 
one thousand were taught at Halkelevis and the remainder were 
members of Government Departments or the Armed Forces. Included 
amongst the last were the Chief of the Air Staff, the Under 
Secretary of State for Air, students at Robert College and air 
force detachments in Smyrna. The expansion of this work was 
only limited by staff numbers. In 1942 the President of the 
Administrative Council of the People's Party'informed Grant that 
the Halkelevis would take all the English teachers the Council 
cuold provide. By June the Council was in, contact with three 
and a half thousand Turks. 
41 
In addition, "the Council offered 
private tuition to prominent citizens, including the son of 
the President. and the Ministers of Education and Commerce and 
their families. All branches of the Council's work in Turkey 
grew by fifty per cent in 1942 and the Council's Finance Officer 
noted approvingly that ' money spent in Turkey gave a greater 
return than money spent anywhere else'. 
42 
At the end of the 
year Grant's success was acknowledged in The Times. 
Only quite recently, through the British Council, 
some interest has been taken in educational 
matters, and it must be admitted that, thanks to 
the tact and understanding shown by its represent- 
atives who are working in close cooperation with 
local authorities, the result has been extremely 
satisfactory and encouraging and gained the -full 
appreciation of all Turks who have been folowing 
the progress made. 43 
As the military position of the Allies improved in 1943, 
increasing pressure was placed on TurKey to enter the war. 
Although she refused(Dto do so until February 1945, the TurKish 
J. eaders actively encouraged the development of the Council's 
worK. This was, after all, a field in which Britain did have 
recources to spare. In 1943 the programme of the People's Party 
40. Sir P. Loraine to Sir J. Chancellor, 12 April 1941. BW61/9 
41. Of which 37% were in Halkelevis, 27% in secondary schools, 
22% in higher education and 9% in the Armed Forces. 
42. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 11 August i94I. Bw69/8 
qes, 9 December 1941, p. 3, col. 4. 43. Tim 
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F-romoted education fr i 
om f'ifth to third place and stressed the 
importance of technic al education. The programme omitted 
the principle that education should be free from foreign 
influence -for the first time and referred to Halkelevis'ptimary 
role a'nd'th6 Council'ýs help in building up their libraries. 
Grant was again asked, for as many teachers as the Council could 
provide, a request th I 
6t'he described as 
an offer of wholehearted collaboration amounting 
to-, the perman I ent,, exclusive and ubiquitous 
establishment: of British influence in the whole 
vast system of 600 HelKelevis. 44 
The Council estimated that by 1945 it taught 10,000 students. 
In addition there wer e nine British professors at Turkish 
universities and colleges and English bulletins on medicine, 
agriculture and engineering and British novel, s and plays. were 
translated, printed and distributed locally. A Turkish 
Education Attache wasýappointed to the Embassy in London to 
deal with the large number of Turkish students 'brought over 
under the auspices of the Council. The Council's success was 
due largely to Grant's efforts and to the fact that he was 
'on exceptionally good terms with the leaders of the Turkish 
People's Party' which enabled the Council to secure a position 
of exclusive influence within the organs of the Turkish 
Republic. 
45 A reception in Ankara in 1944 to celebrate the 
fourth anniversary of the Council's work in Turkey was attended 
by the. Prime Minister and six Cabinet Ministers as well as the 
British ambassador and other members of the diplomatic corps. 
President Ionu, who had attended a number of functions organised 
by the Council, sent a personal message of-goodwill. In November 
1944-the Foreign Office commended the Council's work in Turkey 
and agreed with the Ankara Embassy that 
no single branch of our activities in Turkey can 
can at present give better returns than the 
British Council. 46 
Spanish neutrality was vital to the Allied position in the 
Mediterranean and to the security of Gibraltar. The triumph 
o. f fascism under Franco had seriously damaged Anglo-Spanish 
relations and the opposition of Labour Party representatives 
on the Council's Executive Committee had prevented the 
44. M. Grant to T-P-Tunnard-Moore, 28 January 1943. BW61/4 
45. Minute by A. M. B. Schofield, l November 1943. FO371/37435 
R10432/22/44 
46. M. Palairet to White, 30 November 1944. FO924/11 LC1126/15/452 
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development of Council activities in Spain. , In 1938 Lloyd 
held discussions with the Spanish ambassador in London and 
reported to the Treasury in May 1939 that the Duke of Alba was 
anxious that Britain should counter Axis propaganda in Spain. 
47 
Lloyd ap6roached Snell in an effort to overcome Labour 
opposition, and especially that of Attlee, to Council operations 
in fascist Spain. Lloyd argued that it was 
sheer folly for us to lie back and do nothing 
and let the Germans and Italians get all the 
Keý'positions, culturally as well as economically 
and politically. 48 
Lloyd told Snell of the Portuguese le ader's 'grave anxiety' that 
as a result of the civil war Franco would be unable to rid Spain 
of German personnel. In Dr. Salazar's opinion, Lloyd explained, 
Franco would welcome help to counter the grow, th of German and 
Italian influence. Attlee, however, was unmoved and Leeper 
argued that propaganda would be ineffective in a country 
preoccupied with internal reconstruction. 
Attlee resigned from the Executive Committee after the 
outbreak of war in Europe to concentrate on his other duties. 
Although there was no immediate danger of Spanish intervention, 
the improvement of Anglo-Spanish relations was. essential. Lloyd'. 
persistence secured an interview with Franco in October against 
the wishes of the British ambassador who had himself only 
recently arrived in Madrid. 
so 
Franco gave 'guarded assurances 
of his support in pri hciple' 
51 
to the start of Council 
activities but the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Relations when 
'apprised of General Franco's decision', was 'less than forth- 
coming. 
52 
The Times commented favourably on the purpose of 
Lloyd's vi: sit. 
Apart from the question of news, however, the 
principal requirement of the moment is to provide 
Spanish Nationalist opinion, which was warped during the civil war, with the means of acquiring 
the fundamental facts concerning British institutions 
and aims, because the desired friendship between 53 Great Britain: and Spain can best be based on Knowledge. 
4.7. Minute by E. Hale. 6 May 1939. TI61/1029 S35581/03/39 
48. Lloyd to Snell, 4 January 1939. FO395/657 P163/163/150 
49. Ibid. 
50. M. Peterson, Both Sides of the Curtain. (London 1950) p. 215 51. Digest of Teachi ng Work O-Nerseas, March 1941. BW82/10 
52. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 14 November 1939. 
I BW69/5 
53. The Times, 28 October 1939, p. 5, col. 2. 
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The implementation of the Council's plans, tooK longer than 
Lloyd anticipated. Sir Maurice Paterson, Britain's ambassador 
in Madrid, recorded that 
For six months we fought a weary battle over 
the payment and religion of the British Council's 
employees, the control to be exercised by the 
Spanish Government, the reciprocal facilities to 
be given Spain., Even Beigbeder's goodwill'had 
seemed unequal to the task of shortening this 
Sisphyean labour which was carried on to the 
accompaniment of impatient interventions by 54 L, loyd in London. 
Finally, in April 1940, Peterson advised that the Council should 
accept the Spanish conditions,. which included a requirement that 
Council staff should be Roman Catholic, that Council lecturers 
had to be approved and that lists of students at the Council's 
Institute should be submitted in triplicate týo the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The delicacy of the Council's operations in 
Spain had repercussions elsewhere, particulýrly, in Latin 
America. In Mexico, for example, the Council decided that it 
could not provide books to a club used by Spanish refugees. 
55 
The director for the proposed Madrid Institute had to be 
lunequivocably pro-Franco...., Roman Catholic and ..... an Hispanic 
scholar of distinction'. 
56 In June, Pro . fessor Walter Starkie 
of Dublin University, an authority on Spain was appointed 
Representative and director of the Institute. Starkie was a 
flamboyant and dominating figure who had travelled widely in 
Spain. * He was a personal friend of the Duke of Alba and 
acceptable to Franco, whom he had supported in the civil war. 
At the end of 1938 Julian Amery met Starkie at Burgos and 
described him as 
a stout middle-aged gentleman of florid 
complexion ..... (carrying) ..... a gladstone 
bag and a violin case. 57 
StarKie's personality and extensive contacts in Spain were to 
cause difficulties with Peterson's successor, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
whose own acquaintance with Spain was limited by comparison. 
ktarKie accepted Lloyd's invitation as 'an answer to a prayer' 
to be able to join Britain's side in the war and to return to 
his beloved Spain. 
58 
54. Peterson, op. cit. p. 216 
55. K. Grubb to White, 24 January 1940. BW2/85 
56. Digest of Teaching Overseas, March 1941. BW82/10 
57. Amery, op. cit. p. 104-5 
58. W. StarKie, In Sara's Tents, (London 1953), p. 7. 
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The Council -faced an uphill task, for a French Institute 
had been established for 25 years and twelve German and seventeen 
Italian institutes were already flourishing. Nazi influence 
in the Spanish Press was paramount and Allied propaganda, 
virtually banned. Moreover, the rapid advance of the German 
armies across France had convinced 'nine Spaniards out of ten 
..... that Hitler will win the war'. 
59 
After the collapse of 
France and the entry of Italy into the war the balance between 
interventionists and non-interventionists was precarious. The 
atmosphere in which the first British Institute opened in. 
Madrid in October was dangerous and hostileýand its start was 
necessarily unobtrusive. In the same month Franco met Hitler 
on the Spanish frontier and, although he refused Hitler's 
demands, Spanish resistance was in danger of, being undermined 
by increasing German penetration. The Forei 'gn Office was 
anxious to assure Franco of British support if he remained 
relatively independent of the Axis. Hoare, 'recommended in 
November that Britain should continue its policy of generous 
support for Spain in the ecomonic sphere on condition that 
Spain did not assist Britain's enemies and gave full publicity 
to the goods that Britain supplied. 
The normal activities of the MOI were impossible in Spain 
and personal contacts and 'conversation had an exceptionally 
strong influence in the making of opinion ..... 1.60 To the 
Institute in Madrid StarKie added two schools, for infants and 
juniors, and a chapel for Catholic services. To attract 
social members entertainment was on a lavish scale. Starkie 
was on good terms with Falangists, Monarchists and Tradition- 
alists and 'had been at the front during the civil war and had 
written in favour of Franco's cause'. 
61 Ex-Republicans who 
were friends of Britain also attended as well as 'writers, 
artists, musicians, clerics and members of the diplomatic corps 
- with the exception of the German and Italian. Friendly co- 
operation was established with the French Institut and Lycee 
and the American ambassador lectured at the Institute in June 
ý. 941. On the educational side the Institute provided English 
lessons and courses Tor teachers and ex-servicemen wishing to 
join the Spanish diplomatic service. In its first Tull term 
in the Tirst quarter of 1941, the Institute had 180 students. 
59. Lord Templewood, Ambassedor on a Special Mission. (London 1946) 60. Ibid. p. 135. p. 31. 61. W-Starkie to Robertson, 2 July 1941. DW56/3 
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The success of Hitler's Balkan campaigns in the spring led 
to renewed nervousness about a possible German invasion and 
attendance declined. Nevertheless, the Institute stayed open 
throughout the summer vacation and organised holiday courses 
in response to the opening of a large, new German cultural 
Institute. The hostility of the Axis powers to the British 
Institute was demonstrated by ceaseless Spanish Gestapo 
surveillance and harassment of staff to the extent that by the 
end of 1941 Starkie dare not leave the Institute lest one of 
his staff should make a false move. The secret police sought 
evidence to close the Institute and succeed4d in frightening 
away some members. Despite their efforts, however, numbers 
continued to rise and by the end of 1942 there were more than 
one thousand students and five hundred members. 
The British Embassy was initially cautiou s in its attitude 
towards the British Institute but in March 1941, Hoare. lectured 
there and became a convert to its activities. - However, Hoare 
opposed the expansion of its activities to the provinces until 
1943 on the grounds that such a request to the Spanish 
authorities might have unfortunate repprcussions on the Madrid 
Institute by drawing attention to its success. In the summer 
of 1943, with the tide of the war turning in the Allies' favour, 
Hoare agreed to the opening of an Institute in Barcelona on the 
same conditions as Madrid. In December he recommended the 
foundation of institutes in Bilbao, Valencia and Seville and 
the coordination of private English educational activities in 
Spain. In October 1943, the institute in Barcelona was opened 
and a year later at Bilbao; the Valencia Institute was opened in 
March 1945 and one at Seville in January 1946. The Madrid, Bilbao 
and Seville Institute buildings were owned by the Council, the 
latter being a seventeenth century palace. 
62 
In September 1944 
after discussions between StarKie and the Spanish Ministry of 
Education, English was placed on an equal footing with French 
and German in Spanish schools. By the end of the war the 
Council had a considerable organisation in Spain despite the 
attitude of cold reserve adopted by the British Government to 
Franco's regime in the diplomatic sphere. At Potsdam it was 
agreed that Spain would not be invited to join the United Nations 
62. For a fuller description of the British Institutes in Spain, 
see W. Starkie vj, ýe British Council in Spain", Bulletin of 
Spanish Studi e s, Vol. 24, October 1948, p. 270-5. 
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and Franco became increasingly -isolated. Through the 
activities of the Council, Britain was able to maintain contacts 
unacceptable at an official level against the establishment of 
a more acceptable regime in Spain in the future. 
i 
In marKed contrast to the other European neutrals, Portugal 
appeared a favourable field for the Council. A long tradition 
of common interest was represented by the Anglo-Portuguese 
allianceland the Nazi-Saviet-pact and the invasion of Catholic 
Poland had-. undermined German propaganda. But the collapse of 
France and the pro-Axis stance of Spain posed grave threats 
and in the first years of the war, British 
ýropaganda 
had the 
difficult tasK of persuading the Portuguese to believe in the 
ultimate victory of the Allies despite overwhelming enemy. 
triumphs. 
The Council had 'from the beginning regarded Portugal as 
a Key country', 
63 
and it had been the inroads of German, Italian 
and, later, Falangist propaganda that had 1ed ilit to support 
English Rooms and lectureships at universities, scholars in 
Britain and the export of British booKs to Portugal. In 1936 
the Council subsidised the salary of George West, secretary of 
the English Room at Coimbra University, which became an 
institute in June. An English Room was also opened at the 
Technical University in Lisbon and, in November 1938 the Lisbon 
Institute was formerly by Lloyd. He met Salazar, who was 
concerned chiefly about Axis activities in Spain, in October 
1939, and in Decemberthe British ambassador reported that 
There remains no doubt as to the good worK which 
is being done by the British Institute under 
Mr. West's direction. Portuguese applications 
to join'the Institute are on the increase, and 
the foundations are being laid for that intensification 
of Anglo-Portuguese relations which it is the declared 
policy of H. M. G. to achieve. 64 
By March 1940 the Lisbon Institute had over one thousand 
students and in December a third institute was opened at Opporto. 
West was appointed a Recognised Official of Public Instruction 
by the Portuguese, a distinction held by the directors of the 
German and Italian Institutes. 
63. Digest of Teaching Work Overseas, March 1941. BW82/10 
64. R. W. Selby to Halifax, 31 December 1939. F0371/24491 
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The roll-call of German victories continued into 1941. 
Ronald Tree was in Lisbon when Yugoslavia was overrun and 
German troops stood poised on the borders of Greece. Tree 
commented on the visual display in the capital: 
Everywhere there were pictures of healthy young 
Germans encased in the newest form of helmet, 
sitting on the latest form of tank, armoured 
car or aeroplane, smilingly acknowledging the 
plaudits of the countries they had just overrun. 
We. on the other hand, had little or nothing 
to-. show: pictures of pre-war cricket matches 
and village greens were relied on to convey the 
British way of life, which looked to the 65 
Portuguese as if it were to disappeýr. forsver. 
In May 1941 the Foreign Office asked the Council to expand in 
Portugal 'in any way possible' to offset the effect of Permany's 
victories. 
66 Ifor Evans visited Lisbon at the end of 1941 and 
recommended an increase in staff, the elevatio n of West to 
Representative and the consolidation of the, Councills work at 
the three centres. In Lisbon, Ifor Evans 'advised the 
Institute to be more selective and to aim at the official and 
professional classes. At Coimbra he argued that the Council 
should concentrate on the university, 'for there is the training 
ground of future officials, secretaries, directors of education, 
1 67 perhaps of a future Salazar . 
The Council's worK in Portugal expanded steadily in the 
last three years of the war. New, larger institutes were 
opened in Lisbon and Opporto in 1943. At the beginning of 
1945 the Lisbon Institute had fifteen hundred members and 
students and a waiting list of eighteen-hundred., Opporto, had 
five hundred and Coinbra had two hundred. After a visit to 
Portugal in May 1945 W. H. Montagu-PollocK and George Hall 
reported that 
Dr. Salazar expressed his satisfaction with 
the Council's work in Portugal, drawing 
attention to its importance for the furtherance 
of Anglo-Portuguese relations, and added that 
he shortly hoped to make English the first 
foreign 
6 
language in the Portuguese educ ation 
system. 8 
65. R. Treej When the Moon was High, (London 1975) p-160. 
66. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 6 May 1941. BW69/7 
67. Report by Ifor Evans, January 1942. BW2/145. 
68. Foreign Office Report on a visit to Council Institutes 
abroad, 1945. BW2/111 
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Salazar stressed the value of the Council's unofficial status, 
which had enabled his Government to permit its expansion 
without granting reciprocal facilities to the Axis powers. 
69 
Hall warned Salazar that economic problems might force the 
Council to contract its activities and that Portugal should not 
rely too heavily on British help for the teaching of English. 
It was equally important that the British case'should be 
presented in Portugal's colon. ies 'since a growth in anti-British 
sentiment t. here would inevitably react unfavourably upon 
opinion in the mother country... '. 
70 
A Council Representative 
arrived in Angola in May 1943 and began EngLsh lessons at the 
Clube Luso Britanico de Angola at Loanda in July. A small sum 
was provided for equipment, books and a broadcast English lesson. 
Although Britain's ambassador in Portugal supýpcrted the 
continuation. of these activities after the war, other calls on 
the Council's grant forced withdrawal in March 1946. The 
British vice-consul took over the work previously undertaken by 
the Council. 
Sweden's policy of strict neutrality and the problem of 
communication between Britain and Sweden in the first two years 
of the war, prevented the establishment of direct activities. 
After the German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, 
Sweden was cut off from Allied assistance and, after June, was 
dependent on Germany for essential supplies. In this position, 
Sweden was forced to make concessions to German demands and 
could not allow the expansion of British representation in 
Stockholm. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, 
however, the route to Sweden was reopened. The Council's 
first Representative arrived in Stockholm in October 1941. 
Ronald Bottrall, was a distinguished poet and an English lecturer 
who had worked in Finland, the United States, Singapore 
Florence before the war. A Council office was open ed in 
Stockholm by the Brit3sh anbassador in December, in the presence 
of the Swedish Minister of Education and representatives of 
Swedish arts, sciences and education. The office's chief 
-F\uhction was to fill the gap left by the qnavailability of 
British newspapers, books and periodicals and a reading room' 
and printing facilities were installed. Bottrall successfully 
established contacts with Swedigh professional, snientific and 
69. Ibid. 
70. OEPEC Meeting, 23 June 1941. T162/858 E39140/13 
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education'al bodies and the Swedish-British Society. English 
courses and lectureships at universities and summer schools 
were sponsored and Council staff taught in secondar y schools 
and contributed to the School Radio English programme. Through 
tours conducted by the Council and Legation staff, the number 
of Anglophile societies rose from fifteen in 1942 to fifty-four 
at the end of the war, with a total membership of eight 
thousand four hundred. The societies met once a month from 
September fo April and Bottrall recruited lecturers from the 
71 
British Legation and British residents in SW' eden. Distinguished 
lecturers also arrived from England: in 1941 Sir Kenneth Clark, 
and Malcolm Sargent; T. S. Eliot in 1942; in 1943 Sir Lawrence 
Bragg and Harold Nicolson. As the tide of war turned in the 
Allied favour from mid-1943 onwards, the Council's work 
expanded as fast as staff and supplies would permit. The 
Stockholm Office and its operations through 
I 
Swedish agencies 
became a model for Council work in post-war; Euro'pe. At the end 
of 1944 Bottrall returned to the London office to help plan the 
Council's return to liberated Europe and his place was taken 
briefly by Professor Roberts, former Professor of History at 
Rhodes College. 
Iceland was low in the Council's priorities until March 1939 
when the Executive Committee, on Lloyd's recommendation, decided 
to expand activities to combat German penetration of this 
strategically vital island. 
72 
Support for the Anglia Society 
was increased, scholarships were offered to Icelandic students 
for study in. Britain and a lecturer was appointed to Rejyavik 
University. British forces occupied Iceland in April 1940 
after the'German invasion of Oenmark and the Cou. ncil's attention 
turned to easing friction between the Icelanders and their 
British occupiers. The work of the Anglia Society was extended 
to encourage fraternisation. Social functions dominated 
cultural events and at monthly meetings 'the preliminary lecture 
on some cultural subject was tolerated for the sake of the 
dancing that followed'. 
73 
This trend intensified after the 
71. For an account of Bottrall's activities, see E. Butler, 
Amateur Agent, (London 1963) p. 221 
72. Although 1celan6)was not strictly neutral. it has been 
placed in this section for convenience. 
73 . Repo-rt by C. Jackson, 28 August 1944 BW 37/1 
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arrival of American troops on the island in June 1941. The 
Council now had to ensure that British influence was not 
eclipsed by the large American presence on the island. Its 
worK was concentrated in the capital at the University and 
the Anglia Society. 
1011KA 
ýJth hindsight the most striking feature of the, attempted 
Lblockade of Germany was that it was undertaken at all in the 
face of such overwhelming odd's, especially in south-eastern 
Europe. TRe encouragement of Britain's friends on Germany's 
borders would delay at best the spread to erman power, as in 
Yugoslavia and Greece, for Britain had little of practical 
value to offer. Cultural propag-anda salved Britain's conscience 
and showed that she had not forgotten her interests entirely. 
As in the case of Greece, it was Britain's duý, ty to act where 
she could and in the British Council she had acquired a new 
instrument. Without support from the other arms of*British 
power, however, the Council could do little'mor; e than offer 
a token gesture. It was more successful on the'fringe of 
Europe where it had "litical and economic backing and where 
a more fluid situation allowed influence to be a factor at the 
margin. Particularly after the fall of France, the die was 
cast in Europe, excluding the Iberian peninsula, but there were 
still high stakes to be won in the neutral countries. In these, 
the Council attracted local support and presented Britain's case 
effectively. In Turkey and Spain its work was especially 
valuable as the MOI was unable to function normally in these 
countries. In Turkey, under the guise of independence, Grant 
was able to 'secure a hearing in places where the MOI cannot 
got74 andin Spain 
Spanish opinion does draw a distinction between 
the Council, which they regard as objective and 
inpartial, and the Govt. or Ministry; and that 
the Council can therefore do effectively in that 
country things which we (the MOI) could not hope 
to do. 7S 
These two examples alone underline the value of the Council's 
gemi-official status. Moreover, the Council's work in the 
neutrals demonstrates that it would be mistaken, when considering 
the impact of British propaganda overseas during the war, to 
disregard the Council's contribution. 
74. Minute by E. Monroe, 8 July 1943. INFI/446 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
i DESERT SWANSONG 
Britain was the dominant imperial power in the Middle East 
and after Lloyd became chairman he placed special emphasis on 
the Council's work in this region. The Council's first 
Representative, C. A. F. Dundas, was appointed to Cairo in 1938 
to implement projects arising from Lloyd's 
ýour 
of the area 
in 1939. Dundas recorded that 
Lord Lloyd believed that Great Britain's control 
of the eastern and of the Mediterranean was a 
vital linK in Imperial communications and that 
any action which the Council could taKe to 
strengthen British influence in that area was 
of fundamental importance in prepar, ing for war 
and for the ensuing peace. 11 
British influence was threatened not only by Arab nationalism 
and hostility towards British endorsement of the settlement of 
Jews in Palestine, but also by Italian propaganda and German 
activities in Iraq and TurKey. Moreover, as Lloyd wrote to 
Percy after his tour in 1937, Britain had neglected her position. 
C 
When one reflects that for at least half a 
century the French and, for a lesser time, 
though in that time most energetically, the 
Italians, have both been fostering their 
cultural interests while we have done nothing 
or little at all, it is not surprising that 
we should find a hunger for our help which is 
almost overwhelming. 2 
As war approached Britain tried to safeguard her position by 
adopting a pro-Arab policy in Palestine and limiting Jewish 
immigration in a White Paper published in May 1939. In 1938 
the BBC began broadcasting in Arabic, the first of its foreign 
language programmes, and the Council opened its first 
institutes in Egypt. 
\ The Council's operations in the Middle East during the war 
fall into two phases. When war broke out its organisation 
was embryonic and its main task was to establish contacts and 
centres wherever possible. After the cessation of Axis 
1. C. A. F. Dundas, Notes on the Council's policy in the Middle 
East, 7 June 1941. E3W2/85 
2. Lloyd to E. Percy, 14 April 1937, BW2/58 
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resistance in May 1943 its worK tooK on a new importance and, 
with strong support Trom British diplomatic and military 
representatives, developed rapidly. From the German invasion 
oT Poland to the Tall oT France, British propaganda sought to 
counter Axis subversion and propaganda and secure the cooper- 
ation of Arab governments. The events of the summer of 1940 
severely undermined Britain's prestige and raised doUbts about 
her ability to survive. The entry of Italy into the war turned 
the Middle-. East into an active theatre of operation and German 
propaganda now had a base in the Levant. Lloyd was appointed 
by Churchill to a Standing Ministerial CommIttee od the war in 
the Middle East and the Council's efforts were redoubled. 
General Wavell's victories at the end of the year and the 
liquidation of the short-4lived Italian empire in Africa brought 
only a short. respite. As Hitler swept through the Balkans in 
the spring of 1941, General Rommel forced the British army back 
in Libya. Rebellion in Iraq, fighting in'Syria and the joint 
accupation of Iran stretched Britain's res ources still further. 
In Egypt and Palestine, too, Britain's enemies stood poised and 
the whole of Britain's position in the Middle East was in 
jeopardy. The Council's budget grew rapidly as Britain tried 
to mitigate it military and political shortcomings. 
The Council's C6iro Office covered Egypt, Palestine, Cyprus, 
TurKey, Transjordan, Iraq, Aden, the Persian Gulf and Saudi 
3 Arabia. By 1942 the Council had nineteen institutes in these 
areas. In March of that year, Turkey and Aden were given 
independent representatives, reporting directly to London, but 
dependent on Cairo for publicity material, and representatives 
responsibýe to the Cairo Office were appointed to Irqq, Iran, 
Cyprus and Palestine in the summer. 
The Council's-first interest in the Middle East was . 
educational and was focused on Egypt, the linchpin of British 
influence in the area. Britain's ambassador in Egypt was 
advised by an Advisory Committee on Education in Egypt, 
established in 1934 by Sir Miles Lampson, on the advice of his 
p. redecessor as High Commissioner, Sir Percy Loraine. Dundas 
was a member of this committee and it planned the Council's. 
annual estimated expenditure in Egypt. In 1937 the Council 
took over the administration of all grants to British schools. 
3. Turkey, Aden, Cyprus and Palestine are dealt with in 
chapters 3 and 5. 
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In Egypt, It entirely ran three schools and supported eleven 
others. 
4 The most famous of them was Victoria College, 
attended by eminent Arabs, including the Regent of Iraq in 
1940, Emir Abdullah Ilah. In a letter attached to the Anglo- 
Egyptian Treaty of 1936, it had been agreed that posts in 
Egyptian universities should be offered first to British 
candidates. 
5 Writing to Eden in 1942, Lampson asked that 
every effort should be made to find British staff for two 
vacant professorships at Cairo Universitity where the Council 
supported an English Department. 
I need not emphasise the importance to British 
influence on the future of Egyptian education, 
and thus on the whole future of Egyptian 
relations with Great Britain, of good appointments 
to these posts. 6 
The chairs were filled eventually by British candidates 
nominated by the Council. 
By 1941 the Council had institutes at Cairo, Alexandria, 
Port Said, and five other centres, providing English lessons 
leading to degrees from the University of London and a meeting 
ground for Egyptians and Englishmen. Members often had a 
good grasp of English and the institutes were : '. much more 
engrossed with worKing as centres of Anglo-Egyptian friendship 
than as language-teaching institutes., 
7 In addition, they 
provided hospitality for British and Oominion personnel 
stationed in the Middle East. Social contacts were promoted 
further by the Anglo-Egyptian Union, jointly financed by the 
Council and the Egyptian Government. Its worK was supported 
strongly by Lampson: 
In post-treaty conditions, when our influence 
here depends to a growing extent upon the 
personal influence individual Englishmen can 
exercise over Egyptian minds, and on a close 
understanding between the two peoples, this 
work has a value that it might not have had in 
earlier days..... There is much goodwill about 
and the Anglo-Egyptian Union is one of the 
instruments by which we can harness it. 8 
4. The three schools owned by the Council were the St. Paul"s 
Boys School and the Ma'adi and Gezira Preparatory Schools 
in Alexandria. 
5. Lord Killearn to the Egyptian Governme nt, 30 June 1944 
F0924/38 LC89/28/452. Cmd. 5360 (London 1936) 
6. Lampson to Eden, I May 1942. F 0370/663 L1808/8/410 
7. Advisory Committee on English Overseas Minutes, June 1941 
8. Lampson to Eden, 3 July 1939. F0395/65 9 P3142/2569YW1 
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Guests of honour at functions organised by the Union in 1941 
included Anthony Eden, General Wavell, Air Chief Marshall Sir 
Arthur Longmore and Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. 
The qouncil offered only advice and specialist services in 
the Sudan, as Lloyd 
felt that the country was comparatively rich 
and that its own Government officials would 
see to the type of worK which the Council was 
organising elsewhere. 9 
Iraq was bound to Britain by the treatyý of 1930 which 
provided that each sKý6uld come to the aid of"ýthe other in the 
event of war. For Britain, Iraq's importance lay in its 
strategic position at the head of the Persian Gulf and in its 
ailfields and pipelines. Indeed, 
At the outbreaK of war Iraq was hardly less 
important than Egypt to the security of the 
British position in the Middle East,. 10 
However, Iraq's wholehearted cooperation was not assured. 
German propaganda had made substantial inroads on Iraqi opinion, 
especially among the intelligentsia and army officers, and had 
a firm hold over Iraqi education. In 1939, Sir Basil Newton, 
the British ambassador in Baghdad, urged that the Iraqi 
Government's request for teachers for its technical schools 
should be met as 
apart from the general advantage of establishing 
and increasing British influence in technical 
education in this country, these men will be 
valuable as a check to the undesirable influence 
which it is feared will be brought into the 
technical schools by a number of studTnts who 
have-recently returned from Germany. 
A Council Representative arrived in November 1939 and an 
Institute was opened in Baghdad in February 1940 to act as 
'a rallying-point for whatever pro-British sentiment there 
might be there'. 
12 The Institute was designed to 
widen the Iraqi's knowledge and to show him that 
Great Britain is not as grasping as she is made 
out to be and that Iraq can gain by cooperation 
with other countries. 13 
9. Oundas, Notes on the Council's policy in the Middle East, 
7 June 1941. BW2/85 
10. E. L. Woodward. British Foreign Policy in the Sbcond,. WorldýWar, 
'(London 1970) Vol. 1, p. 571 11, Sir B. 'Newton to Eden, 19 Aprlý 1939. F0371/23199 E6706/40/93 
12. Oundas, Notes on the Council#s"policy, 7 June 1941. BW2/85 
13. Advisory Committee an English OverseaG; * June 1941. BW71/1 
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The Institute's social club attracted equal numbers of Iraqis 
and Englishmen, numbering one hundred in all. The Regent of 
Iraq became its patron and the Prime Minister, Nuri Said, and 
the British ambassador, its vice-patron and president respectivelN 
In March 1940 Rashid Ali replaced Nuri Said and refused to 
break off diplomatic relations with Italy in June. Unable to 
halt Iraq's drift away from the alliance by military means, the 
Foreign Office sought to influence the Iraqi Government with 
offers of economic aid. The Council, for its part, extended 
its English classes to the Staff College and the Royal Military 
College in Baghdad and Council teachers were appointed to the 
Law College and Technical School. In February 1941, R. A. Butler, 
Parliamentary Under Sýecretary at the Foreign Office, was able 
to assure the House of Commons that 'there is now an Englisman 
teaching English in every school' in Iraq. 
14ý1 
Although Rashid Ali 
was forced to resign in January 1941, he returned to power in 
a coup in March and strong military measure! s p ýoved necessary 
to bring Iraq into line. On 2 May British forces from Palestine 
and Transjordan entered Iraq and Baghdad was relieved at the 
end of the month. Du ring the rebellion the Council's staff 
retired to the safety of the British embassy with other members 
of the British community. In June the Press Office in 
Baghdad was strengthened and the Council's Institute was reopened 
on 1 July. In a demonstration of solidarity, the Prime Minister 
and his Cabinet, the British ambassador, the United States 
Minister and other members of the diplomatic corps attended 
the ceremony. An Institute was opened at Mosul in January 1942, 
in an area of strong Axis influence. A year later Iraq 
declared war on the Axis and signed the United Nations 
declaration, becoming the first Middle Eastern State to do so. 
The Council's activities in the Persian Gulf and Aýabi6ý 
peninsula were restricted. Educational advisers were appointed 
tb the Governments of Beirut and Kuwait to improve educational 
facilities and stop students going to Iraq. Plans were 
drawn up for a Gulf School and Technical College but in Saudi 
\Arabia the Council's proposals met with a rebuff. 
Ibn Saud was unwilling to allow any extension of 
contacts between his peoples and the European 
countries. Lord Lloyd was not prepared to do 
anything to force Council activities onto the 
Saudi Arabians. 15 
14. Parliamentary Debates(Commons), 5th Series, Vol. 369, 
18 February 1941, col. 83 
1.5. Dundas, Notes on Council policy in the Middle East, 7 June 1941, E3W2/85 
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In 1943 British and American armies drove the Africa Corps 
out of North Africa and the political pendulum in the Middle 
East swung bacK towards the Allies. The Middle East War Council 
recommended to the War Cabinet in June that the Council's worK 
should be strengthened both during and after the war. 
There is a widespread and deep-seated desire in 
the Middle East'for further opportunities for 
education. The comparative failure of Great 
Britain to meet this need, and the active 
-prQpaganda of the Axis countries, combined in 
the pre-war years to dispose the younger Arab 
educated classes towards sympathy with Fascist 
ideas. In the future, assistance 6y British 
agencies in the cultural field would be both 
welcomed locally and beneficial to all concerned, 
by fostering goodwill and encouraging the 
development of Arab thought on lines in harmony 
with Western civilisation. 16 
The Council was urged to consider 'the best means of bringing 
British influence to bear upon this development'! 
ý The Middle 
East War Council advocated the improvement 'of sýecondary and 
higher education, the stimulation of agricultural and technical 
education, the appointment of British personnel to educational 
posts, the establishment of an Academy of Higher Studies and 
the development of Arab studies in Britain. In supporting'these 
proposals, Richard Casey, Minister of State in the Middle'East, 
argued that 
the organisation and development of British 
enterprises in the cultural field should be 
regarded as an important part of British 
policy in the Middle East. 18 
Robin Hankey, in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, 
minuted on this material, 
it is really essential for our long-term interests 
that we should stand well with Arab opinion and 
be r egarded by them as'their main hope among the 
Great Powers. These proposals for cultural 
assistance and interest ..... may prove a useful 
alternative line of approach to the Arabs ..... 
19 
While the issue of the war had remained in the balance, the 
-ýouncil had sold the merits of the British way of life against 
16. Resolutions of the Middle East War Council on the Political 
Situation in. the Middle East, 17 June I943. CAB65/40 WP(43)24 
17. Ibid. 
18. R. Casey to Eden, 15. July 1943. FO370//ýB L3935/7/410 
19. Minute by R. M. A. Hankey, 17 June 1943, /. FO370/708 L3935/7/410 
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those of the other European powers. As the scales tipped in 
the Allies' favour attention turned to the future and to the 
maintenance of stability and liberal institutions in an area 
where democratic ideals were known only to a small educated 
I 
61ite and where the gap between the latter and the majority was 
enormous. A Council officer in Cairo maintained that Britain 
should no longer be concerned merely with telling 
the Arab world how good, capable and powerful the 
British people are: our purpose should be to try 
to"get inside the mind of the educated Arab and 
encourage him to develop for himself an orderly, 
responsible, liberal outlook on lifq in general, 
so that he can use and not mis-use the scientific 
and technological resources which are now available 
to him. It is only in that way that he will 
become a good neighbour. 20 
Once the urgency of providing publicity to su. it military. 
requirements had disappeared, Britain was able to looK to her 
long term interests in the Middle East and cultural propaganda 
came into its own. The Council's role in futu're was not simply 
to persuade the Arab world of the superiority of the British 
cause but also to build up a body of educated democratic 
opinion that would looK'. to Britain for guidance. Official 
contacts had to be supplemented and educational systems reformed 
so that the resources of the Middle East could be developed with 
the minimum of foreign interference and in cooperation with 
Britain. Elizabeth Monroe, head of the MOI's Middle Eastern 
Division, identified three main propaganda aims for Britain in 
the Middle East; the combatting of apathy and the satisfaction. 
of a demand to learn English and a curiosity as to the nature 
of British institutions. The first was a tasK for the MOI, 
the second for the Council and the third for both organisations. 
Monroe recommended that the Council's teaching grant should be 
expanded 'as much as is humanely possible'. 21 
Support for the Council by British military and civilian 
authorities increased marKedly in the last two years of the war. 
This was due partly to the contacts established and interest 
stimulated by Robertson and Ifor Evans during tours, of the region 
i'n the first half of 1943. In Egypt, Robertson met Nahas Pasha, 
the Prime Minister, who was suspicious of the Council because 
of its connection with Lord Lloyd, with whom Nahas Pasha 'had 
20, J. 'Hadfield to White, 27 September 1943. BW29/6- 
21. Minute by E. Monroe., 8 July 1943. INF 1/446 ' 
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many quarrels'. 22 Robertson allayed Nahas Pasha's fears and 
reported to his wife that he had 'seldom seen a man's whole 
attitude change so much as his did during the course of our 
0 23 interview In TurKey Robertson was a guest of the People's 
Party and he found the military authorities to be generally 
sympathetic towards the Council's aims, especially General Sir 
Henry Maitland Wilson and General Macreary, who both promised 
24 
support for the Council in fi. nding staff from the services. 
In his repqrt on the tour Robertson stated that 
The military view seems to be that ur worK 
if extended and properly carried out, will 
be worth several divisions. 25 
Robertson also gained the goodwill of Lampson and Casey,. Who'-haid 
'previously looked upon the British Council And its work as a 
long-term Policy*and now realised 'that they were playing a 
vital role in current affairs 
: 26 In June Casey supported the 
Council's request for a supplementary grant' arg uing that 'the 
work of the British Council is essential'. 
27 A month later the 
Service Departments agreed to the release of twenty-five men 
for service with the Council in the Middle East. 
Robertson was impressed by the development of the Council's 
worK in Iraq and encountered 
A widely-held view that if the British Council 
had been worKing in Iraq for fifteen or twenty 
years instead of three or four, German anti- 
British propaganda would not have had the success 
it did in fact have. 28 
The expectation of an eruption of Arab and Jewish hostility in 
Palestine, as soon as the war was over, dominated Robertson's 
discussions there. Robertson predicted that 
The Ai7ab world and notably Iraq will turn definitely 
hostile and again become a happy hunting-ground 
for intrigues against the British Empire. Our 
whole strategic position would be seriously 
compromised, more especially if Egypt, in its 
ambition to lead the Moslem and Arab world, were 
also to show hostility towards us. 29 
22.. Robertson to Mrs Robertson, 20 January I943. Robertson Papers 
23. Ibid. 
24. Report by Robertson, March 1943. BW2/227 
25. Ibid. 
26. W-J-Makin to White, 10 May 1943. BW29/8 
27. R. Casey to K. Wood, 27 June 1943. T161/1153 S35581/303/43 
28. Report by Robortson, March 1943. BW2/227 29. Ibid. 
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Robertson urged the necessity for coordinating British policy 
in the Middle East and rapidly expanding the Council's activities 
to secure a base for British influence against future upheavals. 
Robertson reported that the British ambassador in Tehran, Sir 
Reader Bullard, was 'clamouring for the immediate extension of 
British Council work in Persia'. 
30 
Bullard maintained that the 
war offered a good opportunity to establish British influence in 
Iran before Arab hostility and Soviet encroachment -revived with' 
thb return. '-of peacd and that 
It is to be supposed that the old sýheres of ýj influence, as applied to Persia, is dead, and 31 it suits us well to make use of cultural influence. 
Ifor Evans met a similar response to. the Council's work 
during his tour of the Middle East in May. It was clear that 
Britain's position in the Middle East after the war would have 
to rest on new foundations. 
The time when our interests could be protected 
by force has disappeared. We can remain an 
influence in the Middle East only if we have the 
goodwill of the effective parts of the 
populations concerned. 32 
The Council's structure in the Middle East was reorganised 
in 1943. Tll-health forced Dundas to resign at the end of 1942 
and Ifor Evans became temporarily Representative for the Middle 
East. In November, Professor T. S. R. Boase, fellow of Magdalen 
College, Oxford. was appointed the new Representative. His beat 
included Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf, Syria 
and Afghanistan and he was responsible for liaison with the 
Minister of State's Office, the Services and other bodies. 
At am eeting of Council staff in Cairo in May 1943 priorities 
were established for new projects. On the advice of the 
military authorities and the Minister of State's Offi, ce, which 
had impressed on Ifor Evans 'the necessity of elaborate action 
33 
on a generous scale' in Iran, that country was placed first. 
Next in importance came Egypt and then Iraq and Palestine. 
Tn view of French susceptibilities, it was predicted that Syria 
and the Lebanon would not be a fruitful field for British 
cultural propaganda in the near future. The highest priority, 
30. Sir R. Bullard to Robertson, 22 February 1943, OW2/227 
31. Sir R. Bullard to Robertson, 22 February 1943. BW2/227 
32. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 November I943. BW69/9 
33. Ibid. 
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however, was accorded to a new project, the establishment of 
the Allied Liaison Division to provide educational and cultural 
facilities for Allied servicemen and refugees in the Middle East. 
The Treasury had ruled in August 1940 that such work was the 
responsibility of the Service Departments concerned, the Council'! 
Home Division catering for Allied servicemen'on leave and Allied 
civilians. This procedure had worked in Britain but had led 
to 'complications and confusions' in the Middle East. 
34 
Special 
educational facilities had to be devised for the Allied troops, 
and in December 1942, the Allied Liaison Suý-Committee of the 
Middle East War Council asked the Council t6 undertake this work, 
in cooperation with the Army Education Corps and with the aid 
of a grant from the War Office. In recommending this proposal, 
Casey stated that 
Quite apart from its obvious long-term propaganda 
value for the post-war period it will be of 
immediate importance in increasing! the usefulness 
of personnel whose present knowledge of English 
is inadequate for service needs. (there are for 
example some one thousand two hundred Polish 
Officers at present idle, more than half of whom 
might be employed if they knew English). 35 
Moreover, as the war moved away from the Middle East, 'national 
political factions began to surface among the troops left in 
the Middle East'. 36 Casey hoped that the Council might improve 
conditions among the various groups 'which may otherwise prove 
a dangerous breeding ground for discontent and political 
dissensions ....... 
36 
Failure to act in this direction, Casey 
warned, would 'reduce their already low morale to a point 
where the units would cease to be of political or military 
37 
value'. 
0 
The Council contributed E25,000 to start these activities 
in July 1943 with the help of staff seconded fron the Services. 
Majors McNab and Bidwell were appointed Director and Assistant 
Director respectively. The Allied Liaison Division organised 
English classes, English centres, welfare huts, reading rooms, 
, libraries and the distribution of Council material. It worked 
mainly in Polish, Greek, Yugoslav, Albanian and Italian camps 
in Egypt and Palestine and had established eighty-three centres 
by 1944. These camps contained a wider cross-section of 
, 
34, Eden to K. Wood, 22'june 1943.13W2/342 
35 
, 1. R. Casay to Eden, 17 March 1,943. FO 370/708 L1670/7/410 36. R. Casey, Personal Experience, (London"1962) p. 131 
37. R. Casey to Eden, 17 March 1-943. F0370/708 L1870/7/410 
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society than the Council usually dealt with as there was no 
selection of students or members. The Division had contacts 
with British and Allied services headquarters, with relief 
organisations and with the Political Warfare Bureau and the 
Office of War Information. In 1944 it had a London-appointed 
staff of fourteen and nineteen locally-appointed and fifty 
voluntary teachers. Its field of operations expanded as the 
Division followed Yugoslav Partisans and Royalists to camps in 
Italy and Albania and Polish army and air force units to centres 
in Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy. The Division estimated in 1945 
that it was in contact with two hundred tho6, sand persons. The 
Council looked forward to using these links when it returned 
to Europe. 
it is desired that every Allied Forces unit and 
every camp of refugees shall come solto depend 
on Brýitish Council cultural services that, on 
return to their countries they may desire to 
resume studies and contacts at the ýearliest 
possible moment 38 
Unfortunately, the problems that accompanied the end of the war 
in Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland prevented the Council from 
benefiting from these wartime contacts. 
After the Allied Liaison Divison. the development of 
activities in Iran claimed the Council's attention. Iran was 
jointly occupied by British and Soviet forces. in August 1941. 
The Tripartite Treaty of January 1942 acknowledged Iranian 
independence and stipulated that the occupying powers would 
withdraw not later than six months after the end of the war. 
German activities inýý-Iran and the failure of the Shah to suppress 
them had led to the occupation. Immediately, Germans in Iran 
were imprisoned but the Iranian public remained pro-German and 
the Iranian Government did not ban Axis propaganda. It was 
clear that 'great efforts would be necessary to reconcile the 
various sect ý8 ns of the population to the British and Russian 
occupation'. In May 1942 it was agreed that the Council's work 
should be developed quickly in Iran and that an Institute should 
be established in Tehran. The possibility of a Russian collapse 
on the south-eastern front towards the end of 1942 resulted in 
an upsurge of Axis activity. British demands on, and .-- 
38. Allied Liaison Oivision Report, November 1944. Bw29/2 0 
39. OEPEC Meating, 14 January 1942. T162/858 E39140/16 
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difficulties with, the Iranian authorities persisted and serious 
rioting broke out in Tehran in December. Most Iranian resent- 
ment was directed towards Britain and in May 1943 the Foreign 
Office suggested that propaganda activities should be stepped 
up even 'at the risk of offending the Russians. 
40 A month 
earlier Freya Stark, a leading British propagandist in the 
Middle East, had reached the same conclusion and recommended 
that 
The British Institute could be got going with 
no difficulty and at once, and its'influence 
if it were started everywhere, in big towns and 
small, could be felt within three m6nths or so 
of its starting. 41 
A Representative was appointed in March 1943 and an office 
was opened in Tehran. An Institute and Club were founded in 
May and were soon turning away applicants for lack of space. 
Institute membership reached six hundred in 1943 and a branch 
was opened at Alborz College to provide tuition for another 
eight hundred students. An Institute was opened in Isfahan in 
December for four hundred students and special classes were 
provided for the Iranian Air Force. After a visit to Tehran 
in December a Council official reported that the Council's work 
was warmly appreciated and that the Shah had 'paid a high 
tribute to the work of the British Council, and said he hoped 
to see young Iranians sent to Britain for training'. 
42 In 1944 
a third institute was opened at Shiraz and the Tehran Institute 
had three branches providing evening classes for nearly one 
thousand students in different parts of the city. The Council 
also taught English in institutions under the control of the 
Ministry of Education and appointed an Educational Adviser to 
advise the Iranian Government on the development of education. 
The total number of students learning English under Council 
supervision was more than four thousand. 
In 1943 Egypt was given its own Representative, R. W. G. Reed, 
formerly headmaster of Victoria College for twenty-five years. 
The improvement. -of conditions for British staff engaged. by. 
ýgyptian scoools an6)universities and appeals from the Egyptian 
Government for more British staff dominated thei Cpuncil's work. 
40. E. L. Woodward, BrrLtish Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 
41 . F. Stark, Du. ýL III LII8 LIU11b rdW, LI-Oncion -1 96,11 7' P-150 N01.4) 
42. W. J. Makin to 010rien, 8 January 1944. E3W49/1 
119 
Failure to deal with these problems, the ambassador warned, 
betrayed 
a certain lack of appreciation of the political 
issues at stake. If we fail to fill at least 
a certain number of these key university posts 
we will have lost the opportunity of making 
Egyptian higher education predominantly British 
in tone, with all that this implies for our hold 
on a country where our future influence must 
largely depend on indirect means. 43 
As if to highlight the lesson, the Council 's relations with the 
Egyptian authorities improved after the appointment of Amin 
Oman Pasha as Minister of Finance in 1944, 
ý, 
a pupil and friend 
of Reed for thirty years. The Treasury, however, was reluctant 
to allow the Council to subsidise the salaries of teachers in 
other government's employ and even the Foreign Office's staunch 
bacKing for some of Reed's proposals did not'persuade the 
Treasury. 
Reed's experience of English schools in Egypt led to an 
emphasis on this aspect of the Council's worK at the expens. e 
of the institutes and clubs established by Lloyd and Dundas. 
Reed concentrated on the extension of existing English schools 
and the reform of English-teaching in Government schools by the 
creation of a British Overseas Teaching Service. However, the 
institutes and the Anglo-Egyptian Union were less expensive 
and reached a more influential level in society. The Cairo 
and Alexandria Institutes membership of the Union stood at 
1,200 in 1944 and a new branch was opened at Port Said with the 
active support of the Egyptian MJlitary Governor of the Canal 
Zone who acted at the chairman of its committee. 
In Iraq the Council's work continued to expand with the 
foundation of joint institutes and clubs in the stratýegically 
important towns of Basra and Kirkuk in 1944. The total number 
of club and institute members rose from 777 in 1943 to more 
than 2,000 in 1945.. The Council also subsidised British 
teachers in Iraqi schools and Council teachers taught English 
n military, medical and teacher's colleges. Six annual 
scholarships to the American university in Beirut were awarded 
and a Junior Institute and Kindergarten were opened in Baghdad. 
43. Lord Killearn to Eden, 21 July 1943. BW29/6 
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Children from the Iraqi Royal Family and the Government were 
pupils at the Kindergarten. 
After the Joint Anglo-Free French invasion of Vichy Syria 
and Lebanon in June 1941 the administration of the Levant States 
became a source of constant friction for British and Free French 
officials in the Middle East and in London. A declaration 
of independence for Syria and Lebanon had accompanied the Allied 
attack but General de Gaulle'sought to preserve French influence 
and was susýpicious of British motives in regard to the Levant. 
The Foreign Office wish to avoid anything li kely to suggest that 
Britain intended to replace French influence and was willing 
to recognise French predominance. However, Britain also had 
to satisfy Arab opinion that the grant of independence was 
genuine and keep final control of policy in t, he Levant for the 
duration of the war. In February 1942, Sir E. Spears became 
British Minister in the Levant States and head of the British 
Mission to the Free French. The Free French authorities widely 
believed that Spears deliberately attempted to subvert French 
influence in the Levant and relations between Spears and General 
Catroux, leader of the Free French in the Middle East, were poor. 
Hostility to French control ran deep in Syria and the 
Lebanon. In January 1942 Oundas reported proposals for the 
propagation of British culture in the Levant which, it later 
emerged, had originated with the Spears Mission. 
44 In London 
the Foreign Office was wary of provoking French suspicions by 
agreeing to an exploratory tour by a Council official. However, 
the Minister of State, Oliver Lyttleton, was consulted and 
approved, the proposals. In March, Simon Butlin, Educational 
Advisor to the Council's Middle East Office, travelled to the 
Levant, ostensibly for a holiday. He returned with modest 
proposals for the distribution of material to the sum of 1500 
because of French nervousness 'at the possibility of losing 
perhaps their last hold - that of French culture - in the 
Lebanon and Syria'. 
45 It was essential, in Butlin's opinion, 
, 
that the Council should not appear to be embarking on a cultural 
drive even though there was a wide demand for its services. 
44. O. Lyttleton to Eden, 20 February 1942. F0370/676 
L51 6/435/410 
45. Report by S. Butlin, May 1942. FO370/676 L2606/435/410 
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Butlin concluded: 
I gained the impression that since the British 
occupation of Syria, those who chafed under 
French rule would welcome an increase of Anglo- 
Saxon influence. In the Lebanon of course, 
ýhis feeling is especially strong among the 
large non-Moslem population, who fear the rule 
of the desert and looK to us for protection ' 
France, they feel, will not be in a position 
to assure their independence after the war. 46 
Butlin's recommendations were supported by Casey and some 
material, mainly booKs, was distributed in Syria and the 
Lebanon. 
With Spears' approval, Butlin proposed a dramatic increase 
in the Council's expenditure in Syria and the Lebanon in 1943/4 
to E3,000, to be spent chiefly on the selecti on and subsidy 
of staff andýstudents for the American Univer'sity at Beirut 
and the establishment of a British hostel. The American 
University was highly esteemed and Butlin recorded that 'it 
was impossible to go anywhere in Syria and Lebanon without 
meeting the influence of the American University'. 
47 L. S. Pearson 
arrived in 1943 to taKe up a post at the University and to act 
as principal for a hostel for British Council scholars at the 
University. Butlin was appointed Representative at the end of 
the year, and reported in May 1944 that 
It had been evident from the beginning that 
any work to be done by the Council would have 
to be done with the approval and support of 
the Americans. That support has been given 
most generously and the work seemed to fall 
into two parts, first, work to be done with 
the Americans for the sake of Anglo-American 
cooperation and secondly, work for the Syrians 
and Leban6se for its own sake. 48 
Butlin and Boase both reported on Spears' desire to see 
the Council's activities considerably expanded. In a meeting 
with Boase in Cairo in December 1943, Spears had been anxious 
to offer Council assistance to the Syrian and Lebanese 
education authorities and wished to announce publicly the 
presence of the Council in the Levant, which had not been 
publicised previously. 
49 
Boase and Spears had agreed that a 
reading room or centre should be opened in Damascus as soon as 
possible. Elections for legislatures in Syria and Lebanon 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 May 1944. BW69/10 
49. Boase to M. BlaKe, 18 December 1943, BW59/3 
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were held in the summer of 1943 but the French had been 
unwilling to cede control. In November, the Lebanese Cabinet 
had been arrested but a general strike and anti-French riots 
had forced the French to give way. Catroux agreed to 
withdraw French control in December and Syria and the 
Lebanon became independent in January 1944. In these 
circumstances the development of British cultural propaganda 
Wasmore easily undertaken. Gurney informad the Council in 
that month-. that the Foreign Office shared 
the opinion of Sir E. Spears and Boase that the 
activities of the Council should be 
ýexpanded 
in order that we may pull our weight with Arab 
opinion in these areas. We cannot afford to 
create a false impression, in such an important 
part of the world. of our attitude towards Arabs 
and Arab feeling, nor to leave solely'ý, to the 
French and the Americans the presentation of the 
European case. 50 
I Butlin was recalled to London for instructions and 146,000 
was alloted for the Levant in 1944/5, although it was still to 
be given no publicity and did not appear in the Council's 
Annual Report. The Council's plans were disrupted by Butlin's 
inability to leave England until after the Allied invasion of 
France and the outbreak of fighting between Syrian and French 
troops inMay and June delayed further the foundation of a 
Council centre. Nevertheless, a start had been made and 
valuable contacts with the American University in Beirut and 
with the Syrian and Lebanese education authorities had been 
established. 
Following the successful invasion of Ethiopia and Eritrea 
by Allied 'forces in 19411the Council was invited to begin work 
in both areas. The British military authorities occupying 
Eritrea requested the foundation of a British institute at 
Asmara to teach English to Italians. 51 Oundas surveyed the 
field in 1942 and recommended this proposal to the Council but 
staffing difficulties prevented it from meeting this request. 
Instead. only a small amount of material was distributed by the 
British Minister. 
50. K. T. Gurney to. M. Blake, 12 January 1944. BW59/1 
51. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutoo, 9 November 1941. BW69/7 
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The Council's resources in East Africa were concentrated 
in Ethiopia where Ita3ian influence was strong. Immediately 
after its liberation the Council received a similar request 
from the military authorities for the tuition of Italians in 
English ýo assist the administration of the country. In its 
1942/3 estimates the Council provided E6,000 for a Representative 
and the foundation of an institute but'the shortageýof staff 
delayed the arrival of a Representative until August 1942 
despite thq Foreign Office's impatience. In' April, Dundas 
had been told that the Foreign Office attached 
importance and some urgency to appoi ntment of 
representative in Ababa as H. M. Minister has 
telegraphed that Emperor has welcomed proposed 
activities in the near future. 52 
The Representative, H. L. Littler, had ser'Yed with the 
Council in Bulgaria and TurKey and had considerable experience 
with foreign students in Britain and overseas. Ethiopia was 
a primitive country and Littler concentrated on'the development 
of educational facilities on British lines, a policy that was 
warmly supported by the Emperor. Littler had an audience 
with Haile Selassie in Oecember 1942 and he agreed to open the 
new British Institute and Anglo-Ethiopian Club in Addis Ababa 
in January 1943. English classes were organised at the 
Institute and in Ethiopian military, police and medical 
acadamies. In 1944 new institutes were opened at Dessie, Harar, 
and Jimmia and a number of Council staff were employed in 
Ethiopian schools. The Emperor encouraged the Council's worK 
and attended the anniversaries of the foundation of the Addis 
Ababa Institute and some of its functions. The institutes, 
in their turn, celebrated the anniversaries of Haile Selassie's 
coronation and return to Ethiopia. 
After discussions with the British Minister in Saudi Arabia 
in January 1944, Boase proposed the despatch of a Representative 
to Riyad to develop educational facilities., 
Considerable anxiety at the moment is being 
felt! ý, ovler the lacK of any eductional system 
in Saudi Arabia capable of producing administrators 
or leaders. Anything we could do in Saudi Arabia 
would. be welcomed by the Minister of State's 
Office and by all concerned. 53 
52. K. T urneyýto Dundas, 29 April 1942. FO370/677 L1454/444/410 
53. Boas to M. BlaKe, 9 January 1944. F0370/917 L646/646/410 
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However, the probability that retrenchments would have to be 
made after the war, restricted the development of Council 
activities in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf to the 
distribution of a SM811 amount of material. 
The political difficulties of conducting propaganda for 
Britain in Afghanistan prevented the Council from working there 
before 1939. Thelnervousnesslof the Afghan authorities 
forestalled any Council proposals even though Afghanistan, 
Isituated Between the North-West Frontier of India, Russia, 
54 
Central Asia and Persia-', was an important pýopaganda field. 
Instead, France and, to a greater extent, Germany had penetrated 
the country; in the 1920's, of all the Afghan students overseas 
only one was in Britain whereas there had been forty-eight in 
Germany. Lloyd raised the question of operations in Afghanistan 
with the India Office at the end of 1940 bOt it was decided that 
the Council would have to wait until a favourable opportunity 
persented itself. The Council's Representativeý in Iran, T. W. Morraý 
visited Kabul in 1941 and reported that the French and Germans. 
were far ahead of Britain in the field of propaganda. 
Afghanistan's traditional dislike of Britain and fear that 
concessions to Britain would lead to demands for reciprocal 
facilities from the Soviet Union, ruled out-direct Council 
operations. Moreover, foreign propaganda had been banned 
officially and social contacts were virtually impossible. 
However, Morray did see the Afghan Minister of Education and a 
small library and some other material was supplied to the 
British Legation. 
After the expulsion of Axis forces from North Africa and 
the invasion of Italy in the summer of 1943, the Council was 
advised to prepare f0'r activities in Afghanistan in the 
expectation that the Afghan Government would now be. willint'to 
come more openly over to the Allies. In October the Foreign 
Office endorsed the view of the British Minister in Kabul, 
Sir Gi les Squire: 
In Afghanistan, where our chances of exercising 
direct Political ýnfluence will always be 
limited, the cultural approach is important 
and may be increasingly useful. 55 
54. Minute by Sir Trenchard Fowle, 11 Oecember 1939. BW6/1 
55. K. T. Gurney to White, 1 October 1943. BW6/3 
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Squire argued that it was in the field of cultural relations 
'that our greatest task and our chief opportunity seems to be'. 
56 
The Council budgeted for the establishment of an institute in 
Kabul in 1944. 
In January 1944 the Afghan Government requested the 
secondment of three British professors for Ghazi College in Kabul 
The Foreign Office and India Office saw this as symptomatic of 
a change of attitude on the part of the Afghan authorities and 
the Council was urged to make every effort to meet this request. 
Morray visited Kabul and recommended that the Council should 
concentrate on filling teaching posts and pýstpone the foundation 
of an institute for 
while great interest was shown in the many 
services which the British Council has to offer, 
the policy of s. trict neutrality even, in matters 
cultural and the old fear of Russian reciprocity 
still precluded and is liKely to preclude for 
some time any direct British Counci, I ac tivity. 57 
The removal of German nationals from teaching posts later in 
the year offered a chance to establish British influence. 
However, the difficulties of finding suitable candidates hampered 
the Council and only two of the three posts had been filled by 
the end of the war. 
The Middle East was the most important area for the Council 
during the-'war in terms of staff and bxpenditure, which were 
approximately three times greater than the resources devoted to 
Latin America, the next largest area of activity. British 
diplomatic and military representatives encouraged the Council 
to expand further and Freya Stark argued that the Council was 
'the ideaLinstrument for holding a friendly Middle East in times 
of peace'. 
58 Stark was 
in favour of putting all the weight: it can 
possibly carry upon this institution - chiefly 
because it has the advantage of being purely 
cultural and offending no nationalist susceptibilities 
When A. L O. s, political officers, occupying armies, 
etc. are forced to withdraw there is every chance 59 that the British Institutes will ýemain and flourish. 
However. a lack of finance and manpower after the war dictated 
that the wartime development of the Council's work in the Middle 
East should be the high-water mark of its organisation there. 
56. Sir G. Squire to Eden, 11 November 1943. BW6/3 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPERIAL REMEDIES 
The British Empire was more than just an expression of 
political, economic and strategic interests. From the nineteenth 
century onwards it contained an evangelical mission to 
'civilisel backward peoples. Unlike the French, who sought 
direct cultural assimilation, the British co, nverted by example 
and were content to leave untouched native practices. It was 
not until the empire was disintegrating that Britain realised 
that its foundations were shallow. Cultural penetration had 
not automatically followed political dominatil. on. In an effort 
to underpin the unity of the Empire and Commonwealth, steps 
were taken during the war to explain Britain's purpose and 
strengthen links. These measures were slow to take root 
because they. also implied a recognition of the fact that the 
allegiance and support of the Dominions and even the Colonies 
could not be guaranteed without positive action. Even then, 
there was a danger that the canker of nationalism might destroy 
the fragile imperial structure. 
The Council had to overcome many obstacles before cultural 
propaganda was accept ed as a normal part of imperial policy. 
As a Foreign Office inspired and controlled organisation, the 
Council was primary concerned with foreign countries and the 
Foreign Office did not want the Council's meagre budget spread 
more thinly. Moreover, the Dominions Office argued that in 
peacetime 'anything in the nature of propaganda for Britain 
might be suspected and resented in the Dominions', whilst there 
was no room for cultural activities in wartime. 
1 For its part 
the MOI claimed a monopoly of activities in the Dominions and 
Colonies and was supported by the Treasury. Furthermore, the 
Treasury maintained that, at least in the Colonies, activities 
$. uch as those of the Council's were the responsibility of the 
Colonial Office, Hale defined the Council's area thus: 
Dominions Office memorandum, 22 January 1945.0035/1212 
WN 420/2 
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The object of the grant to the Council is to 
obtain political advantage for this country 
by work in the cultural field, and the present 
fina 
' 
ncial stringency makes it necessary to 
confine our main efforts to countries in which 
our position is threatened by rival powers. 2 
By this criterion the Council had operated on a significant 
scale before 1939 in the Colonies of Malta, Cyprus*and Aden and 
the Mandated Territories of Palestine and Transjordan. 
The Cooncil, on the other hand, believed it had a mandate 
for wider operations in the Commonwealth and Empire. Its Draft 
Memorandum of Articles and Association of 1935 had included 
amongst its, aims 
To cooperate with the self-governing Dominions 
in strengthening the common cultural, tradition 
of the British Commonwealth. 3 1, 
Moreover, when the Council was founded the Dominions Office had 
agreed to the inclusion of the Dominions in-the, Council's sphere 
and had appointed a liaison officer. 4 The Colonial Office had 
nominated a representative to the Council's Executive and 
Students Committees. Furthermore, in its Charter the Council's 
work was held to be 'for the purpose of benefiting the British 
Commonwealth of Nations I. Ironically it was discovered later 
that this phrase had been inserted by the Treasury's solicitor 
after consultations with the Inland Revenue 'merely to avoid 
liability to tax by introducing a charitable object'. 
5 The 
Council'was aware that its failure to act in the Commonwealth 
and Empire 'provides a convenient line of attack for our 
detractors'. 6 but disputes with the Dominions Office, the MOI 
and the Treasury continuing throughout the war, hampered the 
development of operations. 
The Council's tasks were outlined by K. Johnstone in 1939: 
firstly, the presentation of the Empire to foreign opinion to 
counter misleading propaganda and, secondly, the development 
of intra-Commonwealth and Colonial cultural relations. 
7 
E. Hale to H. Eastwood, 29 January 1939. BW2/109 
3. Draft Articles of Association, 1935. BW2/121 
4. Tait to PicKthall, 22 November 1934. India Office, Papers 
L/I/1/70 104662/41 
5. Minute by R. Seymour, 29 November 1941. BW2/89 
6. Minute by White, 15 August 1939. BW17/5 
7. Memorandum by K. Johnstone, I January 1940. BW2/88 
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The Secretary of State for the Dominions, Sir Thomas Inskip, 
was cautious and discouraging-when approached by the Council 
in July 1939. Inskip pointed to the 'formidable difficulties' 
to be encountered in any plan 'for representing through a 
United Kingdom organisation the interests of the Dominions', 
or for 'the conduct by the British Council of anything in the 
nature of centralised Empire propaganda'. 
8 On the other hand, 
the Dominion High Commissioners in interviews with Lloyd in 
August proved more enthusiastic. On Australia's behalf, 
Bruce was especially concerned with 
the necessity of checking the growth of American 
influence and in particular of presenting to 
Australia a true picture of this country; at the 
moment there was a certain tendency there to 
consider Great Britain in danger of becoming 
impotent and out of date. 9' 
Massey, for Canada, was optimist 
would have to worK indirectly in 
not be officially connected with 
Ppromised that behind the scenes 
possible support'. 
10 Lloyd told 
September that 
ic but warned that the Council 
Canada. ýith ough he could 
the Council's work, Massey 
he would give it every 
the Executive Committee in 
The Canadian Government were anxious that the 
Council should not work as the British Council 
but under the name of some other well-known 
organisation. 11 
Massey had recommended Major Ney of the Canadian National Council 
of Education and the Overseas Education League, who had already 
undertaken some work for the Council, but Lloyd was reluctant 
to delegate control. The proximity of Canada to the United 
States created additional problems; all overt propaganda 
activities were banned in the United States and there was a 
danger that 'anything suggestive of propaganda there (Canada) 
would arouse suspicion in the entire continent'. 
12 
Malcolm MacDonald at the Colonial Office proved more 
receptive than Inskip had been, declaring that 
My mind too has been working along parallel lines 
and I have been going into the question of the 
best means of disseminating a wider knowledge, 
both in this country and abroad, of the Colonial 13 Empire and what we stand for in relation to it. 
8. Minute by Lloyd, 17 July 1939. BW2/88 
9. Minute by K. Johnstone, 15 August 1939. BW2/88 
10. Minute by K. Johnstone, 20 August 1939. BW2/88 
11, Executive Committee Minutes, 21 September 1939. BW68/3 
12. Minute by R-, B-Stevens, 18 August 1939. FO395/649A P3354/105/15; 
13. M. MacDonald to Lloyd, 17 July 1939. BW2/88 
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On the second question of cultural relations within the 
Empire, however, Johnstone complained that the Colonial Office 
was both sceptical and complacent. 
They did not, I feel, quite see the utility of 
the cultural work in its positive sense, that 
is to say as a means of satisfying the desire 
for self-expression and developing a sense of 
connection with'this country. 14 
In his, African Survey, published in 1938, Lord Hailey had urged 
the desirability of developing educational, cultural and 
information agencies within the Colonies: 
the provision of facilities in British territories 
for the study of British political and social aims, 
and for the exchange of ideas between the two races 
is a matter which appears to need more consideration 
than has been given to it in the past. 15 
The outbreak of war in Europe temporarily upset the Council's 
plans. The new MOI refused to concede a role for the Council 
in the Dominions and Colonies even though L'loydi had secured the 
approval of the Dominions before they had become Britain's Allies 
In April 1940, MacDonald and Eden, at the Colonial Office and 
Dominiom Office respectively, agreed to the continuation of 
existing activities on condition that expansion required the 
approval of each Department. Lloyd's appointment to the 
Colonial Office in the following month marked the turning point 
in the Council's history. Lloyd believed fervently in 
Britain's imperial mission and in the Empire as a force for 
peace and stability in the world. At thd opening of the 
Valletta Institute in May 1939, he had asserted that 
Not the least)of the function of an Imperial 
Gbvermment is to maKe available to all those 
to whom it is responsible the full wealth of 
their common inheritance in the things of the 
mind no less than material things. 16 
As Secretary of State, Lloyd was able to remove obstacles to 
the establishment of the Council in the Colonies. He wrote 
to Stanley Unwin in December 1940 that he had 
from the beginning of my work in the British 
Council longed for the opportunity of developing 
the Council's work in the Crown Colonies, but 
have-never seen the opportunity before me until 
now. 17 
14. Minute by K. Johnstone, 20 August 1939. BW2/89 
15. Lord Hailey, African Survey, (London 1938) p. 1304. 
16. Text of Opening Speech by Lloyd, 6 May 1939. BW43/2 
17. Lloyd to S. Unwin, 6 December 1940. BW2/91 
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Lloyd argued that the Council was equipped for worK that could 
be undertaKen more effectively by an unofficial body and that 
could only be developed by private initiative with the help 
of the Council. As Sir Charles Jeffries, Assistant Under- 
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office in 1940, later 
recorded: 
During the war, when people came to realise 
the importance of the ', 'projection of Britain" 
to-' the Colonial and other territories, it 
became apparent that in the British, Coundil 
there existed a ready made organisation which 
only needed to be developed and expAInded elong 
its own established lines to suit admirably 
the purpose in view-18 
The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of July 1940 was 
a landmark in the evolution of British Coloni;, al policy. 
Discontent in the West Indies had called attention to the need 
for greater expenditure on social services and in this Act, 
the concept of welfare became the formal cqýcomýitant of 
development. Moreover, unlike its 1929 predecessor, the 1940 
Act contained an explicit emphasis on education that was 
significant for the Council. Lord Hailey's comment on the 
Act was apposite. 
You cannot build up policical liberties on 
dwarf bodies and stunted intelligences. 19 
Economic and social developments are the sine qua non of 
responsible democratic government and cannot be undertaken in 
a vacuum: education in its broadest sense must be their partner. 
The Council's task complimented that of the Welfare Fund, 
namely, 'filling the minds of those who standards of life are 
to be impr'oved materially'. 
20 
The problem of idle intelligences 
preoccupied the Council. 
Certainly culture is not a cure for malnutrition, 
tropical disease, or economic distress and the 
effects of maladminstration: but even when they 
have been rectified there will still be ag ap to 
be filled unless the mind is t o be left 
dangerously unoccupied. 21 
18. C. Jeffries, The Colonial Office, (London 1956) P. -189 19. Parliamentary Debates (Lords) Vol . 
119,9 July 1941, Col. 721 
20. Minute by'White, 1S August 1941. BW17/5 
21. Minute by K. Johnstone, 11 August 1939. BW2/89 
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One of the obstacles to Council work in the Colonies had 
been the inability of many colonies, and especially those in 
most need, to pay -for cultural services. The Development Act 
provided iS million per annum for social services and general 
development. Nevertheless, facilities above basic 
educational requirements remained beyond the Colonial 
Governments' purses and'the overriding demands: of the war 
prevented the implementation. of many schemes made financially 
viable by týhe Act. The Colonial Office was anxious, therefore, 
to secure as much hel. o from the Council as it could, arguing 
that local funds were not sufficient to provide 
the kind of amenities which the Council could 
offer, and that, even if these (CDWA) funds 
were less adequate, it would be argued that the 
provision of the Council's services,, although 
very valuable to the Colony, were an'Amperial 
rather than a local interest. 22 
The passing of the Development Act also made necessary the 
improvement of communications between the Colon'ial Governments 
and their subjects in order to carry out the new projects. 
During the war the MOI's machinery was used. 
The fall of France, Belgium and the Netherlands in the summer 
of 1940 destroyed the traditional political balance between 
Europe and her dependencies. It was impossible to contain the 
consequences of a struggle between freedom and totalitarianism 
to Europe once the support of the Colonies had been enlisted. 
The entry of Italy into the war and the threat of a German 
invasion endangered the traditional lifeline of the Empire. 
In the Far East, where Britain's weakness was most apparent, 
new regional responsibilities had to be assumed by the 
Dominions, establishing a precedent for future changes in the 
Commonwealth balance of power. In the Middle East Britain's 
imperial past provided bases from which to attack the Axis and 
the Council's activities in the area expanded rapidly. 
Responsibility for operations in Malta, Cyprus,, Aden, Palestine 
and Transjordan remained with the Council's Cairo office whilst 
aýt home steps were taken to develop the Council's work in other 
parts of the Empire. 
22. Minute by T. Hardie, 4 February 1942. T161/1153 
S35581/63/42 
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A committee representing the Colonial, Dominions and India 
Offices and the Council was formed in December 1940 to deal 
with the distribution and production of films. Proposals to 
extend this collaboration in the Dominions foundered on the 
vexed quextions of authority and responsibility for publicity 
and the anticipated sensitivity of the Dominion Governments. 
These factors persuaded Lloyd 'to deal first with work in ýhe 
Colonies and to leave for the present the more difficult meeting 
about work in the Dominions'. 
23 
A lack of expert staff in this 
area was another reason for the Council's sl ow start. In early 
1941, Angus Gillan wiýs appointed head of the new Empire Division. 
A member of the Sudan Political Service for thirty years, Gillan 
was an administrator of long experience with special Knowledge 
of the Middle East. He brought enthusiasm, ýability and 
conviction to the new Division and had instigated the foundation 
of the Khartoum Cultural Institute while in, the Sudan. In 
contrast to Lloyd, Gillan believed that whe, 
ýeveý possible the 
Council should work with indigenous bodies and local committees 
Lloyd's successor at the Colonial Office, Lord Moyne, had been 
chairman of the Royal Commission on the West Indies and an 
advocate on increased social and cultural services in the Empire. 
Moyne was 'anxious to have the Council's cooperation in the 
cultural' field and proposed the establishment of a joint 
committee. 
24 
The events of the summer were to underling the 
need to improve the condition and unity of the Empire. 
Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June and the signing 
of the Atlantic Charter in August, the month in which the Empire 
Division was formally constituted, were important events for 
the Colonies. The Atlantic Charter, asserting the right of 
all peoples to choose their governments, acquired universal 
significance, despite Churchill's qualifications. American 
distaste for imperial rule was re-echoed by Britain's new ally, 
increasing the pressure to raise social, economic and educational 
standards as the prerequisite of eventual self-government. 
The Development Act signalled the end of a laissez-faire 
attitude t6 the Empire; tHe maelstrom of war created new 
political re6liýi6s that were to have an even more profound 
23. Minute by White, 6 January 1941. BW2/88 
24. F. R. Cowell to White, 18 April 1941. BW2/313 
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effect. For Britain, decentralisation and self-goVernment 
remained the goal but for her two major allies the perpetuation 
of the Colonial system as it had existed was anathema. 
Interdepartmental discussions in the summer established that 
although the Dominions, India and Burma Offices wished existing 
Council activities continued, they did not favour their expansion 
in wartime. The Colonial Office, however, believed that there 
was a 'tremendous field' for'the Council in the Colonies and 
were'whole-", heartedlv in favour'of the Council's olans. 'not 
25 
merely as a wartime measure but as a permanant arrangement'o 
The Foreign Office was concerned only that funds should not be 
diverted fron its area, while the MOI agreed to a Council drive 
in the Colonies in exchange for its exclusion from the Dominions, 
where the MOI wished to preserve its monopoly,. A Joint Standing 
Committee of'the Council and the Colonial Office was formed 
in December 1941 and the Council joined the Advisory Committee 
on Education in the Colonies. 
The Council's relationship with the Colonial Office 
differed from that with the Foreign Office; Anthe Colonies the 
Council acted as an agent of the Colonial Office and its 
activities were controlled more effectively. The Colonial 
Governments were responsible for basic educational services and 
the Council for providing facilities above this minimum standard. 
Where necessary the Council was empowered to provide services 
properly belonging to the Colonial authorities, on an agency 
basis for a limited period. Colonial Governors and Chief 
Secretaries were involved closely in the planning of Council 
expenditure, and the Colonial Office participat3d in recruitment 
and appoin'tment to posts in the Colonies. 
26 
Two factors made the Council's worK in the Empire fundamentall 23 
different worK in foreign countriesi it was not operating 
on foreign soil and it did not teach English. The former 
implied #a pre-existing sympathy with British traditions and 
culture, even though accompanied in some cases by a suspicion 
27 
Qýf British policy'. But Britain's influence over the organs 
of publicity in the Empire imposed additional burdens. 
25. Minutes of a meeting at the Treasury, 17 October 1941. 
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It is as if we were dealing not as in the case 
of neutral and allied but inddpendent states 
with a full-grow'n man and an equal whose opinions 
we are attempting to influence in certain limited 
respects, but with a youth who has been entrusted 
to our care, and who is dependent on us for his ýntire view of life, including his attitude to 
his own domestic issues. 28 
The Colonial audiencEý)w6s unsophisticated, illiterate and lacking 
in 'propaganda resistance' and the propagandists'task was more 
often one of adult education. 
29 
In conformity with the spirit of declared British policy, the 
Council sought to develop the Colonial peopi es' own identities 
as well. The foundation of British institutes was inappropriate 
and the Council aimed instead for local centres, managed by 
local committe 
- 
es. Besides encouraging suppo,, rt this would be 
in consonance with the principle of democracy, 
will point to the fact that the institute is 
something belonging to the people thems 
, 
elves 
and not an extraneous(even British), impo'sition. 
And it will be a useful training ground for 30 the eventual assumption of more real responsibility. 
Above all, institutes supported by the Council must not appear 
to be under the control of the native administration. Gillan 
instructed that 
everything should be done to avoid giving 
any impression that the centres are a means 
of extending government control over a 
potentially "difficult" class. 31 
The power of the Council's purse, Gillan calculated, would be 
sufficient to bring an erring, nominally independent institute 
into line. The Council's role, therefore, was not only the 
projection of Britain to the Colonies, but also to help to 
prepare them for self-government and rehabilitate the functions 
of an imperial power. 
The loss o-f Malaya, Singapore and Burma in early 1942, closel 
followed by Rommel's victories in North Africa, dealt a severe 
blow to Britai n's morale and prestige. '. One result was the 
ýxposure of imperial policy to searching challenge. The Japanese 
had achieved not only a military but also a psychologocal 
victory 'all the more momentous in its consequences because it 
28. Overseas Planning Committee: Plan of Propaganda for the Colonies, 12 August 1942. INF I/SSS 
29. Ibid. 
30. Gillan, Memorandum on Administrative Policy in the Empire, 
28 January 1942. BW2/313 31. Ibid. 
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undermined the faith of the English people themselves in the 
Colonial system'. 
32 
It was the manner as well as the magnitude 
of the defeats in the Far east that had shocked British opinion. 
The Times called for a -'radical revision of traditional notions 
and practices' and Margery Perham, in the same publication, 
advocated a 'new and more intimate and generous relationship' 
33 
with the Colonies. Adjustments in colonial administration and 
social, economic and' educational poliiies were demanded. The fact 
that the rqcapture of these territories and their future rested 
on the cooperation of the United States, augmented the pressure 
for change. American opinion was criticalýof Britain's colonial 
record, especially in India, which was threatened externally by 
Japan and internally by political discontent. Japan's victories 
exploded the myth of western superiority and., encouraged the 
nationalist aspirations of the peoples of sodth-east Asia. 
A return to the status quo ante bellum was impossible. After 
a battle withý the M(TI, the Council was con'fined to removing 
the causes for hostile comment and barred from answering that 
criticism directly in the United States. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, 
declared in Parliament in July 1943, during the Allied invasion 
of Sicily, that, in future, British colonial policy would 
combine the principles of trusteeship and partnership. Solid 
social and economic foundations were to be the basis for 
political evolution and 
it is up to us to see that circumstances as 
soon as possible justify political advances 
and to ensure as quickly as possible peopI3 35 are trained and equipped for self-government. 
To this end educational progress in the Colonies should be 
directed towards 'education by life for life' and not just 
towards literary achievement. 
36 
This entailed education through 
community effort, local government, trade unions and cooperative 
32 N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 
(London 1968)p. 143-4 
ý3. The Times, 14 March 1942. p. 5, col. 2&6 
34. This long---running dispute between the Council and the MOI 
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societies and the recruitment of native personnel into the 
Colonial service. Higher education was to be improved by 
strengthening links between British and Colonial universities, 
'intellectual lend-lease', as Stanley termed the proposals. A 
Commission of Enquiry was entrusted with the task of improving 
collaboration between the universities and the Council was 
invited to attend. In West Africa, the Council's Representative 
gave evidence to the Elliot Commission on education in the 
four colonies. 
I 
The Council's first sorties into the Col onies, however, were 
motivated by the threat posed to Mediterranean colonies by Nazi 
and fascist propaganda. The pattern of work established-in 
foreign countries was transferred to these colonies,.. but. with 
the resources then available, Gillan describedý 
I the'task as 'trying 
to dam Niagra'with an Upper Thames Weir,. 37 TI he strategic 
outposts of Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Adpn were vital to 
Britain's position in the Mediterranean and'PerýSian Gulf. The 
first three were targets for hostile Axis. propaganda and Aden 
stood isolated and open to anti-British Arab propaganda. The 
Council did not work in Gibraltar until 1944, a year after the 
danger of invasion from Spain had passed, and provided instead 
educational facilities for the Gibraltean community evacuated 
to Britain. The Governor agreed to the start of activities in 
November 1943 and the Gibraltar Society was revived and rehoused 
by the Council in a building Known as the Calpe Institute. it 
was opened by the Governor in November 1944 and offered a Wide 
range of cultural, social and sporting facilities. 
In Malta, Britain faced large-scale and 'violently 
subversive" Italian propaganda. 
38 
To counter this preparat . ions 
were begun in Oecember 1938 for the opening of an institute in 
Valletta. The Council hoped that 
a really elaborate and luxuriously equipppd 
Institute will show the Maltese quite plainly 
that we intend to stay in Malta and to push our 
own point of view and that no amount of opposition 
will deter us. 39 
The Institute was opened by Lloyd in May 1939 and W. R. L. Wickham, 
formerly at the University of Egypt and director of the Angla- 
Egyptian Union, was appointed director and Representative. 
37. A. Gillan, *The Projection of Britain on the Colonial Empire', British Commonwealth Objectives, 1946, p. 144 38. Executive Committee MCn-utes 13 June 1939 BW 68/3 
39. Minute by H-P. Croom-jOhnson, 
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Wickham steered a delicate course between the different factions 
1h Malta and stressed the Institute's independence of the 
Maltese Government. -The Institute was primarily a social centre, 
holding lectures, concerts and debates, that were occasionally 
broadcast. Lectures on The Progress of the War were started 
in October 1939 and in April 1940 a joint Maltese-English 
production of The Gondoliers was staged at the Royal Opera House. 
By March 1940 the Institute had over one thousand members and 
Wickham described its aims thus: 
The dual function of the Institute has been to 
try tch give the Maltese some knowleo,, ge of English 
life and ways and to attempt to eliminate the 
distinctions and differences between the Maltese 
and the English by providing a place where they 
could meet on an equal footing of absolute equality 
and in an atmosph WE e calculated to st, imulate 
mutual interests. 
A British officer in Malta during the war left a less charitable 
impression of the Institute. 
Later we would discover other strata of society 
including those who kept a stiff upper lip by 
continuing to attend concerts and other social 
gatherings organised by the British Institute. 
This was run by the British Council and did a 
good job - although some felt in rather a snooty 
or haughty fashion - by remaining open in Valletta 
and continuing to hold functions even in the 41 
craziest, noisiest days of blitz and bombardment. 
After June 1940, Malta lay in a dangerously exposed position 
and on 26 June, Wickham was instructed to keep the Institute 
open throughout the summer 'providing all distraction and 
entertainment possible' 
ý2 
The cellar was strengthened to provide 
shelter during air raids and the Institute remained open, 
although normal activities were suspended because of the 
evacuation of Valletta and the surrounding area. A full 
programme was resumed in September 1940 with one thousand five 
hundred members registeredat the Institute, despite the curfew 
and the danger of air raids. It was closed temporarily in 
March 1941 for repairs but by April had two thousand members. 
ýalta's ordeal continued-and in May 1942 the Council applied 
successfully to the Air Ministry and the Admiralty for increased 
fabilities for the transportation of material to the Institute. 
40. W. R. L. Wickham to G-Ogier, 7 May 1940. BW43/3 
41. G. Hogan, Malta: The Triumphant Years. (London 1978)p. 35-6 
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Much of the Institute's popularity lay in the up to date news 
and information it could supply. There is no doubt that it 
played''no insignificant part in sustaining the morale of the 
defenders' of Malta in its darkest days. 
43 
1 
In 1943 an Institute was opened on Gozo; and Wickham, as a 
member of the Maltese Board of Education, travelled-to Tripoli 
and Tunis to advise the Military administration on education. 
He returned to London in 1944. By the end, of the war there 
were over four thousand members at the Valletta institute.. 
roughly half of which'were Maltese, nearly f our hundred at Gozo, 
the majority being Maltese, and the Council staff only numbered 
eight. 
In Cyprus the Council 
to supplement the 
Government and to 
their standard of 
the population of 
of belonging to t 
attempted 
resources of the Cyprus 
. 
help the Cypriots to raise 
living and to bring home to 
the islands the advantages 
he British Empire. ',. 44 , 
The Council anticipated opposition from Greek nationalists and 
the Church and sought. to ensure that its work 'should be 
outwardly haphazard and not present the appearance of a deliberatE 
945 cultural drive ..... , The Cypriot Government had spent little 
money on promoting Britain or teaching English, leaving the 
Council a daunting task in view of the majority Greek population'. c. 
desire for union with Greece. In the absence of institutions 
of higher education, Greek and Turkish students attended 
universities in their own countries and had little loyalty to 
the British Empire. The Council began by trying to improve- 
secondary education but the inability of Greek students to 
study in Greece during the German occupation, offered a chance 
to begin more advanced studies. However, lack of funds and the 
Cypriot Government's refusal to take over any of the Council's 
ýD 
educational work, forestalled the founda-tion of centres for 
higher education. 
In 1940 the Council opened institutes at Nicosia. 
K yrenia, Larnaca and Famagusta and at Limassol in 1941. 'They 
mainly taught English but were used as social clubs by members 
43. British Council Annual Report, 1941/2, p. 7 
44. C. A. F. Dundas, Notes on the Council's Policy in the Middle 
East, 7 June 1941 BW2/85 
45. Ibid. 
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and Allied troops during the summer when. no tuition was offered. 
The total number of students and club members stood at more 
than one thousand by 1943 and the only limitations to expansion 
were shortages of staff and space. Ifor Evans visited Cyprus 
in 1943 and recommended a complete review of the Council's 
policy in the island. He attributed the Council's large 
expenditure in Cyprus to an attempt by Lloyd to encouragea 
lethargic Government to improve facilities but this had failed. 
Ifor Evans concluded that it was 'a record of improvisation, 
partially s uccessful and partly-unjustifiable' and advocated 
46 
either planned expansion or complete withdra, wl. In London, 
these alternatives were considered too drastic and it was 
agreed that there should be a 'steady toning up' of services 
47 
butrno expansion. The Colonial Office declared that it 
would 'strenously oppose' any proposals to withdraw but conceded 
that the Cypriot Government would have to take over some of the 
educational work done by the Council. 48 In 1945 total member- 
ships of the institutes stood at one thousand f'ive hundred and 
the Council had thirteen full-time staff in the island. 
Aden was Britain's newest colony in the Middle East and 
Lloyd was anxious to develop contacts with the colony and 
transform it into the future educational and cultural centre 
of southern Arabia. A teacher and some material were sent to 
Aden in 1940 and Lieutenant-Colonel M. C. LaKe was appointed 
Representative. After discussions with the Acting Govenor, 
LaKe proposed the foundation of an institute incorporating the 
MOI's library and reading room. The institute was opened in 
1941 and a women's branch was added in 1942. In July 1943 the 
Governor announced the Council's intention to establish and 
maintain a college for post-elementary pupils from Aden and the 
surrounding territories, to be Known as the Lord Ll I oyd College. 
A temporary preparatory school would be founded to feed the 
College until the Protectorate's own schools could do so. The 
Council also provided scholarships for teacher training courses 
in the Sudan. 
\ After reviewing the Council's policy in Aden in 1943. Ifor 
Evans recommended that although the colony was not as politically 
important as other areas in the Middle East, the institute 5 hould 
Q: j be maintained as it was the only sýmbol of British culture in 
46. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 November 1943. BW69/9 
47. Minutes of a Meeting at the Council, 18 January 1944. BW26/1 
48h Ibid. 
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southern Arabia. Gillan agreed that the Council's expenditure 
in Aden should not increase but pointed out that it was morally 
committed to the Lord Lloyd College project. Fortunately, 
difficulties in finding a suitable site delayed expenditure 
until afier the war. Gillan concurred with Ifor EvansIview 
that Aden was relatively unimportant and 'unliKely to assume 
the importance as a Council base in the Middle East which Lord 
Lloyd appears to have visualised'. 
49 
PalestIne was ripe territory for anti-British propaganda, 
Hitler's anti-semitic tirades and Britainlsýand France's 
failure to checK Mussolini in Ethiopia, encýuraged the 
Palestinian Arabs to looK to the fascist powers to defeat 
Zionism. Arabic broadcasts from Berlin exacerbated Britain's 
difficulties and in 1937 the Council began supplying material 
to the Palestine Broadcasting Service. With the approach of 
war Britain tried to safeguard her position by adopting a pro- 
Arab policy in Palestine. A White Paper plUbli. shed in May 1939 
50 
proposed strict limits on Jewish immigration and assured Arabs 
that further immigration would be subject to their consent. It 
also promised the establishment, within ten years, of a state 
jointly governed by Arabs and Jews. In September 1939 the 
communal conflict in Palestine was suspended but the British 
authorities expected the fighting to be resumed as soon as the 
war was over. 
The war offered an opportunity to break down barriers 
between Arabs and Jews and to improve contacts between moderate 
leaders. Lloyd was particularly interested in raising Arab 
educational standards and in providing a British education for 
the children of Br itish personnel stationed in Palestine. In 
1940 institutes were opened at Nablus and Jaffa and in May, 
Dundas visited Palestine to discuss the extension of the Council'4 
work to Jewish settlements. On the advice of the High 
Commissioner, the Council acquired the School of English Studies 
at Tel Aviv and opened an institute at Haifa. Dundas 
recommended to Lloyd in September 1940 
immediate opLhing at Haifa on the grounds that 
repeated air raids have led to more and closer 
friendliness between Jews and Arabs than ever 
before. This favourable situation is likely to 
deteriorate if air raids cease, and the High 
49. Minute by Gillan, 27 October 1943. BW2/313 
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Commissioner is anxious that before the opportunity 
is passed a start should be made on the work which 
may help to mitigate the deterioration in communal 
relationships. 51 
In 1941 the Council extended the social side of its work 
in Palestine to attract leading Jews and Arabs who had avoided 
the mainly educational institutes. Clubs were designed to 
stimulate indigenous cultural activities and were founded 
mainly in the Arab areas of Palestineý2 In addition to the 
three institutes at Haifa, Jaffa and Nablus, new centres were 
opened at Tel Aviv and Nazareth in 1942 and ýa library and 
cultural events were organised in Jerusalem. Reverses in the 
desert before El Alamein brought a slump in attendances at the 
Nablus and Nazareth institutes. A special department in the 
Representative's office was created in 1943 tý, o organise 
activities in the Jewish settlements and material was presented 
to the Hebrew Universitity and to Hebrew schools. The Council 
also supported schools for the British comm6nity and worked 
among Greek and Polish refugees in Palestine. 
By 1943 it was clear to the opposing factions in Palestine 
that the Axis powers would be defeated. The issues of Jewish 
immigration and the future of the -Palestinian state re-emerged. 
Ifor Evans reported during a tour of Palestine in May, that 
It has been urged upon us by high and competent 
authority that the Council's work in Palestine 
is one of the few methods by which the grave 
dangers of rebellion in the post-war period may 
be avoided. 53ý, 
Referring to Zionist extremists, the Representative argued that 
'contact between these deluded elements and ordinary British 
opinion mu'st be what we must aim to bring about'. 
54 The tasK 
was monumental and toýsome in the Council, including Evans, 
hopeless unless expenditure was on an heroic scale. The 
Council faced serious cut-bacKs in its budget and many schemes 
in Palestine, including a multi-racial institute at Haifa, were 
threatened. On his return to London Evans advised that 
Activity on our present very meagre scale cannot 
be effective given the gravity of the present 
Palestinian crisis. It is almost as it one were 5.5 to give an asprin to a man'who was dying of cancer ... 
51. Dundas to Lloyd, 27 September 1940. BW47/2 
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Conversely, the Council considered that withdrawal would 
discourage Britain's frie 
, 
nds and reduce all hope of 
reconciliation. The Council's activities continued and 
proved popular, especially in Haifa and Tel Aviv where students 
had to be turned away. Controversy about Palestine's future 
coupled to the Council's own uncertain future, allowed the 
Council's work to continue until terrorist activities threatened 
the safety of the Council's staff. Palestine absorbed the 
largest number of the staff in the Colonial Empire, enjoying 
a complement of seventy-eightýby September 1' 945. 
In neighbouring Transjorden the Council's, work developed 
slowly and, until 1942, centred on two schools in Amman. In 
that yearýan Anglo-Arab club was founded at Azraq and the 
Council sponsored the King Hussein Club in Amman in the following 
year. These clubs were valuable meeting grounds for Arabs and 
British officials and were chiefly social and cultural. 
The chief threat to the British West Indiesýlay in internal 
discontent and unrest that had erupted into violence before the 
war and led to the establishment of a Royal Commission. The 
Council had offered prizes for proficioncy in English since 1936 
and two years later entered discussions to improve the supply 
of British books and films to the West Indies. Further work was 
suspended pending the recommendations of the Royal Commission, 
to which the Council submitted a memorandum. Low standards 
of education in the West Indies handicapped normal Council work, 
and adult and higher education were 'so deplorable that British 
prestige not only in the islands but elsewhere in the world 
56 
suffers considerably'. Cultural centres established in each 
of the main islands would serve as 'a permanent basis for 
higher education in the West Indies'. 
57 The Council argued 
that a rise in material standards of living in the islands would 
not solve the problem of unrest which stemmed from spiritual 
deprivation: 
the germ of discontent and unrest at present 
affecting thoir community can be seen to be 
by origin and nature cultural frustration 
born of an inadequate and premature education 
system rathar than discontent with material 
circumstances . 
56 
56, T. Lewes, Memorandum on British Cultural Propaganda in the 
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The Council took over the supply of documentary films to 
the West Indies in September 1940, also the selection and 
purchase of books for West Indian libraries. In the same month 
as bases in the Caribbean were leased to the United States, 
Hugh Ruttledge, the Everest explorer, toured the West Indies 
for the Council and found a general demand for its services. 
In Jamaica, Ruttledge saw an island 'divided against itself' 
but in the Janý@: LcaInstitute there was a meeting ground for 
59 black, white and official groups. W. Minshall, Information 
Officer for Trinidad and Tobago, regretted that the Council had 
not come to the West Indies twenty years earýlier and was 
concerned about the strong American influence in the isla nds 
and the 'internal problems of racial and class prejudices which 
are among the reasons for encouraging free as I 
sociation in 
cultural pursuits'. 
60 A similar picture eme 
I 'rged f. rom the 
other islands for each of which, despite local misgivings. 
Ruttledge proposed an institute. Barbados, 
lhe felt, should 
have the first institute, the Welfare Fund paying for the 
building while the Council met the running costs. Through the 
'medium of cultural experiment' Ruttledge hoped to 'succeed 
in removing the reproach of neglect by the Mother Country 
61 
The Joint-Standing Committee did not approve the foundation of 
institutes in each island fearing that it would raise too many 
delicate issues, such as that of the colour bar. It recommended 
instead that the Council operate through existing bodies, such 
as the Jamaica Institute, believing that this would arouse less 
suspicion and hostility and also be less costly. 
The Carnegie Corporation decided to suspend financial aid 
to projects in the British Empire in August 1942 for the 
duration of the war. The Corporation's support for libraries 
in Africa and the West Indies had been an important element in 
the Council's plans. In the West Indies, negotiations with 
the Comptroller for Development and Welfare resulted in the 
consignment of libraries and. the training of librarians to the 
Council. Its worK in the West Indies was officially described 
ýs 'public library and allied cultural services. 
6-2 It was 
59. H. Ruttledge, Report on a tour of the West Indies, Septemb er 
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entrusted with the maintenance and exhibition of the historical 
archives of the islands. A similar agreement was reached later 
in West Africa. 
F. D. Gray was appointed administrative Representative in the 
West Indies and he was Joined by Harold Stannard of the Advisory 
Committee on Education in the Colonies as Cultural Advisor. In 
June 1943 Sir Harry LuKe, a former Governor of Malta and High 
Commissioner in the Western Pacific, was appointed-Chief Council 
Representative in the West Indies. In the following year 
Representatives were sent to Barbados, Jamaic a and British 
Guiana. ' Luke picked Trinidad for his headquarters and travelled 
so extensively in the next three years that he did not spend 
more than one consecutive week in any colony. Luke was 
greatly helped by the fact that several of the 
West Indian Governors and the Comptrolier for 
Development and Welfare had been friends in the 
Colonial Service, or, in the case ofiseveral 
other Government officials, had actu6llyiserved 
under me elsewhere. 63 
In Jamaica, which had a new constitution in 1944, providing for 
the first elections under universal suffrage, Council activities 
flourished. The Council's official, J. Paget, was a member of 
the Board of Governors of the Jamaica Institute and Council 
material and finance enabled the Institute to extend its scope 
and develop a junior Centre to bring in 500 new members. A 
Committee was established by the Oirector of Education in 
Jamaica under the chairmanship 6f Paget', following a visit by the 
Irvine Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, to draw 
up a five year plan for adult education. In Trinidad the 
Council took over the administration of the Eastern Caribbean 
Regional Library Scheme from the Carnegie Corporation, which 
included the development of libraries in British Guiana, Barbados 
and the Leeward and Windward Islands. In Barbados the Council 
cooperated closely with the Erdiston Cultural Institute, a local 
government project. In each of the islands the Council's 
technical services were extended and six scholarships were 
off. ered in 1944 for study at British universities. By September 
1945 the Council had thirty-one full-time staff in the West Indies. 
63. H. LuKa, Cities and Men, (London 1056) vol. 3$ p. 147 
Sir Harry Luke's diaries for his time with the Council can 
not be traced; they are not with his other papers at the 
Middle East Library, St. Anthoney's colloge, oxford or at the 
Rhodes House Library. Oxford. 
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E3ritain's Colonies in Africa were the next area of 
exploration. Following the defeat of Mussolini's forces in 
East Africa in mid-1941, consultations with the Colonial Office 
and the Conference of East African Governors secured an i 
agreementlin principle to the extension of the Council's work 
to these territories. In October the Council's opportunity 
bccurred in the form of Malcolm Guthrie of the Schoo'l of African 
and Oriental Studies,, who was willing to undertake a survey for 
the Council in conjunction with the pursuit of his own studies. 
Guthrie'.. s comprehensiv, e report revealed the inadequacies of 
education in East Afri'--Na and the problems arVping from, inter- 
racialhostility. He proposed that the Council could mitigate 
both by the foundation of a large number of locally organi. sed 
64 
institutes and the distribution of its material. Guthrie's 
survey was not completed until October 1.943 b, V'l which timejover- 
riding demands on the Council's resources following the Allied 
landings in North Africa in November, prevented-the implementation 
of his proposals. When a Representative was appointed in 1947 
the field had to be surveyed again and until then the Council . 
only distributed some material through the Colony's Information 
Officers. 
The West African Colonies were more fortunate than their 
eastern counterparts. Strategically and economically vital 
to the war effort, expecially after Italy had entered the war, 
they were vulnerable to Nazi propaganda emitting from the Vichy 
French territories on their borders. The Free French attacK 
on DaKar in September 1940 and the threat of retaliation had 
brought the war uncomfortably close. In July 1941 the agreement 
of the West African Governors to the operation of the Council in 
their territories was announced and, in November, Dundas embarKed 
on a tour of the Colonies. He returned convinced of the vital 
need for the Council's services 'Particularly from a war point 
of view'6'5 Dundas stressed the urgency of the situation. 
There is a great deal of friction between white 
and black already occurring and this is increasing. 
Practically nothing is being done to improve relations. 
There is also immense inertia and the Information officers 
are very badly placed to deal with this for they are 
Government and that means automatically suspect. 
6 6ý 
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In Oundas' view the Council's unofficial status was a great 
advantage. He envisaged three main areas for the Council: the 
guidance and informing of Africans through newspapers and 
institutes; educational and cultural worK useful to all the 
Colonies, such as the production of special films and textbooKs, 
that they could not afford individually; the provision of 
neutral meeting points. ', He recommended that educat6d Africans 
were the best channel, s through. which British ideas could reach 
the rest and, the indigenous press offered the most effective 
means of reaching them. However, the West African newspapers 
were uniformly critical of Britain and the Colonial Governments 
andýfailing the publication of newspapers under the Council's 
auspices to redress the balance, Oundas advised the establishment 
of a news agency in Accra. The manipulation 
I 
of the Press was 
the Key to the, success of his proposals as Dundas. believed that 
no single factor can assist more in obtaining the 
maximum war cooperation from the African, and no 
single factor could be more valuable,, in 'assisting 
after the war in maintaining friendly relations 67 between Great Britain and the African people. 
To help in 'the guidance and formation of local public opinion, 
68 
Dundas advocated institutes in all the larger towns run by local 
committees. These would also answer charges that Britain sought 
to hold back the African, prepare African5 better for employment 
and instil 'some kind of political sense' and weaken the 
influence of radical ideas in the urban areas. 
69 The need to 
present the case for Britain and western democracy was central 
to his report. 
Recent labour difficulties aired in the press 
(in, Nigeria) show the way the wind is blowing, 
and many senior British officials believe that 
unless immediate action is taken to neutralise 
this tendency, there may be created a young, 
intelligent group of educated Africans, primed 
with half-baked communist theories, believing 
in agitation as a means to gaining their ends, 
and acquiring an ever-growing political conviction 
that the British are retarding the political, 
social and economic development of the black races 
in Africa. 70 
67-C. A. F. Dundas, Report on a Tour of West Africa, November 
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The Governor of the Gambia broadly agreed with Dundas' 
proposals but was sceptical of the benefits anticipated from 
the Council's unofficial status. 
II forsee considerable difficulties in keeping 
a clear distinction in the African mind between 
the activities of the British Council and of the 
Imperial, or local Colonial, Government. Public 
criticism by the'Cou, ncil would, in African 
circumstances, be impossible. The absence of 
criticism would be interpreted as a tacit 
agrRement with Government policy. 71 
I 
Dundas' advocacy of Council-sponsored newspapers in West Africa, 
although strongly supported by the Governor of Nigeria, was 
rejected in London on the grounds of finance and control over 
policy. The Council decided that it 'might be able to do better 
work by influencing editors rather than by com'peting against them? 
2 
Dundas' other proposals, however, were accepted. 
In December 1942 the attention of the War Cabinet was drawn 
to the need to assert British interests in West Africa for more 
immediate reasons. Lord Swinton, the 
JResident 
Minister, was 
concerned by rumours, following the Allied invasion of North 
Africa, that the United States would supplant Britain in West 
Africa, arising from the apparent subordination of British 
interests to American control in French West Africa. The 
desirability of stating clearly the traditional goals of British 
colonial policy in answer to American proposals for international 
trusteeship was urged by Stanley, Attlee, Eden and Cranborne in 
a paper for the War Cabinet. 
73 Roosevelt's visit to British and 
French colonies in Africa on his way to Casablanca only confirmed 
his dislike of imperialism. However, Churchill's determination 
to hold the-imperial line hardened as the Allied successes 
mounted. 
Professor W. M. Macmillan was appointed senior Representative 
in West Africa in May 1943. His headquarters were at Accra in 
the Gold Coast, the most politically advanced of the four 
colonies and the first to have an elected majority in the 
Leýislative Council. A former Rhodes scholar, historian of 
wide repute and founding member of the Fabian'Colonial Bureau 
specialising in African affairs, Macmillan was also a member of 
the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies and of the 
71 . Sir H. Blood to C. Jeffries, 7 November 1942. BW8/3 
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Empire Intelligence Section of the BBC. In Democratise the 
Empire, published in 1941, Macmillan argued that the development 
of the Colonies towards full production and political freedom 
required greater educational and social services for the native 
peo-ples. Macmillan hoped that a careful policy of practical 
help and investment in the Colonies would enable Britain to tap 
a fund of goodwill to establish democratic traditions. He was 
critical of Britain's inclination to 'soft-pedal on any suggestion 
of political. advance' and warned that, 
It we fail, the peoples concerned wil, 1 sooner 
or later take control into their own hands, under 
some 
' 
form which may be much less desirable both 74 for our own future and the harmony of the world. 
Education, Macmillan believed, was the Key to advance. The 
Council could contribute by improving adult ed ucation facilities, 
by providing libraries and reading rooms, and by offering 
cultural and social amenities to universitY-educated Africans. 
In West African conditions, Macmillan argued,, cultural relations 
could only be conducted in the 'upper strata'. The cooperation 
of the white community was essential and they would frequent 
centres 'Knowing they wi. 11 bump into a share of Africans' only 
if those centres maintained high standards! 
5 Moreover, equal 
social status had to be assured and Macmillan believed that 
senior civil servants would not mix freely with their clerKs. 
We must conserve our energy if we are to serve 
efficiently the smallest and hitherto most 
neglected, but also most important class - the 
really "educated" Africans and British. administratorsZ6 
Membership of institutes was restricted by charging fees. 
Macmillan's, approach aroused controversy within the Council. 
Gillan was interested chiefly in the education and development 
of Africans to assist the transition to self-government, while 
Ward-Price, formerly of the Nigerian Service and then director 
of the Colonial Division of the Empire Division, minuted, 
in my view we should deal entirely with Africans 
that is the young, educated Africans, which are 
the only ones which'w6 would be able to mould 
nearer our heart's desire. 77 
. 
74. W. M. Macmillan, Democratise the Empire, (London 1941) p. 44 
75. Minutes of the Joint Standing Committee, 12 May 1944. 
BW77/1 
76. W. M. Macmillan to Gillan, 7 February 1944, BW8/2 
77. Minute by Ward-Price, 30 May 1944. BW8ý5 
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Macmillan's-first task, however, was the development of 
libraries in West Africa. He aimed to found one national 
library in each Colony with a second tier of reading rooms, 
supported by local agencies with the Council's help, open to 
the less 
literate. 
The former would provide 'any book any 78 
intelligent student might reasonably ask for in any field', 
whilst the latter would enable the national librarie's to 
concentrate onthe 'bighbrowl-T. wo officers arrived in 1944 to 
supervise tb, e development of the libraries and the training of 
African librarians at the Cbuncills school of, Librarianship at 
Achimota College. In addition a travellingýbook service was 
started for each Colony. 
. The Council's work in West Africa was hampered considerably 
by an influx of service and civilian personnel'ý 
I 
which placed an 
intolerable strain on the coloniesresources. The Council's 
staff had to contend with problems of accommodation, transport, 
supplies and communications with London as well as a debilitating 
climate. Macmillan had assistants in Freetown and Lagos and an 
administrative assistant, who arrived in 1944. In 1943 reading 
rooms were opened in Lagos and Freetown and an Institute in 
Freetown. A British Council House was opened in Accra in 1944, 
followed by institutes in Bathurst and Lagos in 1945.. The 
institutes were run by local committees on which the Council and 
the Colonial Education Department were represented. By December 
1945 the Council had thirty-four full-time staff in West Africa. 
The Council had little success in the Dominions and India 
during the war. Contrary to pre-war pronouncements, the 
Dominion High Commissioners argued that the expansion of the 
0 
Council's activities in wartime would be inappropriate and liable 
to criticism in the Dominions as an unnecessary luxury. As with 
the Colonies, the uniqueness of the Dominions' relationship to 
Britain called for different methods of operationý--those 
employed in foreign countries. It was Gillan's policy to 
encourage the development of sister councils in each Dominion 
instead of appointing Representatives. These councils would 
adVise the Council and execute its plans. 
78. Mona Macmillan, The British Council in West Africa, 1943-45, 
Chapter 6 of unpublished draft biography, p. 161. 
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The eventual picture might be a series of 
collateral councils in the United Kingdom and 
the Dominions 
' which 
in addition to the primary 
objective of interpreting their own countries 
abroad might each form a real Commonwealth 
cultural clearing house. 79 
Robertson favoured greater cooperation between Britain and the 
Dominions and Colonies in improving knowledge within the Empire 
of its component parts and in projecting a united front overseas. 
Indeed, Robe rtson 
would like the British Council ultimately to 
develop into a British Empire Council' i so that 
we can draw our men from the whole British Empire. -PP 
Against the odds, howe. ver, the Council made some valuable but 
limited progress in the Dominions and India, with the exception 
of South Africa. Here, the Council was advise'd by the High 
Commissioner t'o defer activities until the war was over. The 
most promising development was in Canada. 
The entry of the United States into the 'war in December 1941 
made possible more overt propaganda in the Continent. Massey 
had supported the Council's proposals before the war and had 
agreed to the subsidy of prominent speaKers to undertaKe lecture 
tours in 1939/40. The decisive factor, however, was the 
donation of E10,000 by Millington-DraKe in 1941 for the promotion 
81 
of Anglo-Canadian relations. As joint trustee of the fund 
with Massey, and encouraged by 'responsible unofficial opinion'. 
Robertson proposed to the Dominions Office that a Council 
82 
official should tour Canada. In 1942 Michael Huxley, who had 
been involved in the organisation of propaganda to enemy 
countries and in the United States, went to Canada on the Council's 
behalf. He 'was met by a mixture of sympathy and suspicion' but 
enjoyed the full approval and collaboration of the Canadian 
83, 
authorities. Huxley proposed the formation of a Canada Action 
Group to undertaKe the projection of Canada to Royal Air Force 
personnel stationed there in connection with the Commonwealth 
Air Training Scheme. In due course this group would form a 
ne'tional body devoted to the promotion of Canada at home and 
abroad. The Canadian Prime Minister's approval was secured and 
79. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 March 1943. BW69/8 
80. Parliamentary Debates (Commons) Vol. 385,26 November 1942, 
Richard Casey, Minister of State in the Middle East, felt 
also that the Council should represent the Dominions and 
Empire. See R. Casey, Personal Experience (London 1962)p. 161. 
81- See below p. 168 
82. Minate by Gillan, 19 March 1942. BW2/314 
83. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 10 . November 1942. BW69/8 
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the Council agreed to appoint a secretary to the planned Canada 
Foundation. Its chairman was Justice Thorsen, President of 
the Exchequer Court; the Executive Secretary was W. B. Herbert, 
former Assistant Director of Public Information, and representa- 
tives of the Department of External Affairs and the Wartime 
Information Board were included. Gillan hoped that this body 
would 'provide a useful prototype for worK in other Dominions 
later on' 
ý4 
However, the Foundation, which began worK an the 
15 November.. 1942, concentrated on the short range projection 
of Canada to British airmen and made little effort to form a 
body similar to the Council. The Foundationýwas 'suspicious 
of any form of Council intervention or patronage' and preoccupied 
with internal debates. 
85 
Canadian participation in the Council's woFK in Latin America 
was considered; British Missions in the area were anxious to 
present a united Empire viewpoint. The Foreign office and the 
Dominions Office agreed that Council Representatives in Latin 
America should help the Canada Committee, as it became Known, 
where possible. Some cooperation resulted, such as the opening 
of a Canadian section in the Council's reference library in 
Guatemala, but Canadian cultural activities in Latin America 
were minimal during the war. 
In Australia and New Zealand the Council mainly distributed 
material, particularly to the Press. In London E. W. McAlpine, 
London editor of the Australian Consolidated Press, took the 
Council's London Letter and other articles from the Press 
Department; in Australia the Council was in contact with the 
newspaper proprietor, Sir Keith Murdoch. Films, periodicals 
and travelling exhibitions were also distributed. The main 
obstacles to Council work in the two Dominions were lack of 
contacts and machinery through which demands could be assessed 
and material distributed. In March 1943, whilst in Cairo, 
Robertson raised the issue of Council operations directly with 
the New Zealand Minister of Defence and instructed Gillan, in 
the following month, to take up the matter with the New Zealand 
government. In May, to improve contacts, the Council 
entertained a Parliamentary Delegation from the two Dominions 
in London. The Council's tendency to consult Dominion officials 
and Governments directly, antagonised the Dominions office. 
84. Finance and Agend' ý Committee Minutes. 10 November 1942. BW69/8 
85. Gillan to McNab, 23 March 1943. BW12/1 
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A Dominions Office official minuted after hearing of Gillan's 
approach to the New Zealand Government, 
It is typical of the "imperialistic" attitude of 
the Council that they should try to occupy every 
position without consulting the proper authority 
..... it is for the U. K. Government to decide what 
form U. K. propaganda shall taKe in the Dominions 
and not for the Dominion Governments. *86 
Without an official invitation, the Council could do little. 
We Can not very well butt in without some ostensible 
invitation and though some people iný, Australia House 
are sympathetic, I cannot get an offi; pial interest 
expressed. The Dominions Office is sympathetic but, 87 
of course, cautious and won't taKe a line on its own. 
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London in May 
1944, on the eve of the Normandy invasion, provided the Council 
with the opportunity it needed. Good relations were established 
with the staffs of the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers, 
I 
especially with the former. The weight of opinion among the 
Prime Ministers was in favour of strengthening the unity of the 
Commonwealth through existing methods of cooperation rather than 
by the creation of new machinery. For the Council, the 
justification for its work in the Commonwealth was that it 
replaced political ties by the cultural links that united the 
Empire. The Council circumvented the Dominions Office in 
pursuing contacts made during the Conference and found an ally 
in P. Dawson of the Australian News and Information Bureau in 
Australia House. While the Dominions Office was deciding in 
August 1944 that there would be no increase in the Council's work 
in the forseeable future, Dawson secured a meeting for Gillan 
with Bruce in September. 
The Anza-c agreement of January had declared Australia's 
and New Zealand's interest in all preparations for peace in Asia 
and eapecially in the Pacific basin. The failure to consult the 
two Dominions over the 1943 Cairo Declaration on the future of 
the Japanese empire had been resented and America's growing 
influence in the Pacific was equally disliKed. Bruce may, 
th . erefore, have seen in the Council a means of reinforcing the 
Commonwealth viewpoint in south-east Asia, for not only did he 
urge Gillan to send an official to tour Australia, but he also 
86. Minute by Pugh, 11 May 1943. DO 35/1200 2509/15 
87. Minute by Gillan 13 April 1944. BW12/1 
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promised to discuss the matter with Cranborne and issue a 
personal invitation to the Council. As for the Dominions Office 
argument that the Council could operate adequately through the 
Public Relations Departments of the High Commissioners' Offices, 
1 88 
Bruce declared this to be 'quite fatal'. In Bruce's view, 
What was important at the moment was that we 
should help to give a British background to the 
functions which would fall to Australia after the 
war in the Pacific. Australia was just beginning 
to n ealise that she was a nation and also that 
she was very isolated and had no sort of cultural 
background. She wanted to remain Briltish and to 
portray and purvey British influencesýin the 89 
Pacific, but she must have help in doing so. 
In discussions with Cranborne it became clear that Bruce was 
more interested in Council collaboration 'in p, resenting the 
British point of view generally in the Pacific 
go 
than in the 
dissemination of British ideals in Australia. Nevertheless, by 
the end of 1944 it was agreed that Gillan should, visit Australia 
and New Zealand in the near future, althoughIthe precise purpose 
of his tour remained ambiguous. 
Before 1939 the Council had sent material, chiefly press 
articles and films, to the Government of India's InFormation 
Officer via the India Office. This material was distributed 
unofficially to editors and the Council received in return a 
summary of events in India for use in its press material. When 
the Viceroy declared war on India's behalf after Germany's 
invasion of Poland, considerable anger was felt by India's leaders 
and the Congress Party resigned from the Government. The Council 
continued to send material and in November 1939 extended its 
coverage to, Burma. J. Hennessy, Principal Information Officer 
in India, reported in February 1941 that 
All the British Council's material is invaluable. 
Their articles and photographs secure between 
ten and fifty, publications each in the pages of 
all the leadi6g Indian newspapers. 
91 
In the summer the Council doubled the quantity of material sent 
tR.. India and in discussions with A. H. Joyce, Information Officer 
88. Minute by Gillan, 7 September 1944. BW12/1 
89. Minute by Gillan, 9 September 1944. BW12/1 
go. Pugh to Gillan. 14 September 1944. BW12/1 
91. J. Hennessy to A. H. Joyce, 26 February 1941.10 L/l/l/64 
16/26A 993/41 
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at the India Office, it was agreed that although political 
conditions ruled out the foundation of a British Institute in 
India, there was still a considerable field for the Council, 
especially in providing facilities for Indian students and others 
in Britainý. On-being informed that the Council's activities 
were to be expanded Amery 'displayed a very great interest' and 
spoKe to RobertsonP2 In September the Council's Re . presentative 
in Iran visited India briefly and established contacts with 
academic and cultural',: Jodies. 
The outbreak of war in the Far East in December, and the 
rapid Japanese advance, signalled the start of a new era for 
Indian nationalism. The fall of Singapore in February 1942 and 
the loss of Burma in the following months brought the war to 
India's frontiers and intensified the political crisis. The 
failure of the Cripps Mission in March highlighted the deep 
division within Indian nationalism and Britain's difficulties 
mounted with the launch of Gandhi's Quit India campaign in the 
summer. The battle of Midway Island in June ended the run of 
Japanese victories and in August Gandhi and the Congress leaders 
were arrested. The crisis had passed in India and in the 
pacific the Japanese were beginning to lose the initiative. 
These events suspended the Council's plans and in January 
1942 Gillan reported that he had been 'warned off' India. 93 At 
the end of the year the India Office considered the establishment 
of an Advisory Committee an cultural relations with India and 
Amery wrote to Robertson recommending this course. 
It seems to me of prime importance at the stage 
which'the India question has now reached that 
there should be a much wider appreciation by 
Indians of what this country stands for in the 
world and what association with it in the British 
Commonwealth means. Educated Indians are, of 
course, already well versed in English classical 
literature, but I doubt if they have much appreciation 
of the extent to which our outlook has changed in 
recent times and of the trends of modern political 
thought in this country. 94 
Amery was confident that the Treasury could be persuaded to 
rel ease the necessary -funds if a good scheme was put to it. 
92. A. H. Joyce to White, 28 August 1941.10 L/1/1/70 103679/41 
93. Minute by Gillan, 31 January 1942. BW2/313 
94. Amery to Robertson, 28 November 1942.10 L/1/1/70 104662/41 
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In response, the Council proposed that the India Off ice should 
be represented on its Executive Committee and that a joint 
standing committee should be formed. 
, 
In January 1943 Lord 
Linlithgow, the Viceroy, was informed of these discussions and 
also of plans for the establishment of an Indian Institute in 
London and a body similar to the Council in India. Linlithgow 
was pessimistic about thd general situation in Indiaýand 
deprecated contacts with the Indian universities an the grounds 
that they wp-re staffed by nationalists and steeped in politics. 
95 
The formation of a committee was postponed wh, ile the Viceroy's 
views were studied but the Council and the Inýdia Office agreed 
that they were too gloomy. 
Linlithgow was replaced by General Wavell in 1943 and at the 
end of the year the Council received encouragib ,g messages 
from 
India. Joyce'. then visiting India, reported oý the 'splendid 
opportunity' for the Council in India? 
6 
There are pretty clear indications that 
the educated Indians who are clearly nationalistic 
0 ... U 
and in no sense pro-British, a feeling is being 
created by the trend of war events ..... that India's 
best interests are likely to be served by remaining 
in the Commonwealth of Nations and in close 
association with Britain ..... this feeling is capable 
of being nursed towards a conviction if we start now 
to develop relations in the cultural field. 97 
Amery wrote to Wavell in January 1944 proposing the despatch of 
a small British Council delegation to India. Wavell was cautious 
and suggested that the Council wait until after the hot weather 
and consult Sir John Sargent, Secretary to the Department of 
Education in India, who would be visiting London in the summer. 
Sargent opposed direct Council representation in India in view 
of the number of goodwill missions that were already swamping 
the country and because many, even moderate, Indians believed 
that the Council was a propaganda organisation becaus a of its 
association with Lloyd who was 'still regarded in India as the 
protagonist of British imperialism, Moreover, Sargent warned 
that 
rumours which have reached India in recent years 
of the British Council's activities in the Middle 
East and Near East, have lent some colour to the 99 impression that it is a British propagandist agency. 
95. Linlithgow to Amery, 23 March 1943.10 L/1/1/70 104662/41 
96. A'. H. Joyce to T. Morley, 16 October 1943.10 L/1/1/65 16/26A 
97. Ibid. 105296/43 
Memorandum by Sir John Sargent, July 1944.10 L/1/1/70 10790/4 
Ibid. 
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Sargent recommended that the Council concentrated on establishing 
informal contacts with Indian academic, scientific and artistic 
groups. 
Discussions between Robertson and Amery resulted in the I 
despatch of T. W. Morray, the Representative in Iran, to India for 
the second time. Wavell welcomed this Plan and in November, 
wrote privately to Amery, 
My own view has from the first been that the 
Coun, cil should begin by encouraging closer 
relations between the universities at home and 
out here. If attempts are made to establish 
anything like an office for British propaganda 
in this country there would of course be great 100 suspicion and the Council could do very little. 
Morray arrived in India early in 1945 and proposed that the 
Council appoint a Representative to supervise the distribution 
of material and the development of contacts between British and 
Indian cultural and academic bodies. Wavell was encouraged by 
Morray's progress and reported that if 'the Council can get 
started without active Government intervention it will probably 
101 
suceed ....... At the Simla Conference in June Morray discussed 
the resumption of Council activities in Burma with Government 
representatives. The fall of Rangoon in April ended a war that 
left Burma devastated and Burmese leaders determined to achieve 
independence more swiftly than had been envisaged in a White 102 
paper published in May. The Burma Office needed all the help 
it could find to re-establish British influence in Burma. The 
Council was invited to attend meetings in London to discuss the 
future of Burma. The general election at home, the Findlater 
Stewart enquiry, and the uncertain situation in India and Burma 
temporarily'halted the development of the Council's work in Asia. 
As the end of the war approached the Dominions Office 
considered the future of publicity in the Dominions and Dominion 
publicity in foreign countries. In a Memorandum on Imperial 
Relations, with special reference to education, prepared in 1943, 
Boyd Shannon commented 
With the Dominions grown to nationhood, and in 
times when so many of the ideals of Britain and 
the Commonwealth have been challenged by foreign 
powers, an increasing need is felt to maintain 
the essential unity of the Commonwealth. 103 
100. Wavell to Amery, 1 November 1944 . 10 L/1/1//O 1 07SO/44 
. 101 . 
Wavell to Amery, 6 March 1945.10 L/1 /117 01 07 90/4 5 
102. Cmd. 6655, London 1945 
103. Memorandum by Boyd -Shannon, 4 July 1943. Do 35/1191/2441/S 
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During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in London in 
1944 a conference was held at the Ministry of Information of 
representatives of the Dominions, the Indian High Commission 
and Whitehall Departments. This meeting decided that each 
Dominion must be responsible for its own publicity and that 
general Empire propaganda 'could not be properly continued after 
the Ministry of Information had come to an end by anýorganisation 
such . as the British Council' 
ý 0,4 The possibility of an Empire 
Information-Unit or Board of Commonwealth Publicity was tentativelS 
discussed but met with strong opposition from Canada 
ý05 
The 
Dominions Office argued for the retention of . the Ministry of 
Information until Japan had been defeated in view of the effect 
its prior dissolution would have on opinion in Australia and New 
Zealand, but was pessimistic about the future of publicity in 
Canada. Mackenzie King who had 
been prepared to stretchý a point in wartime ..... 
may be very anxious in peacetime not1to commit himself 
to any form of Government encouragement of publicity. 
106 
In October 1944, the Dominions Office decided to continue 
publicity in the Dominions after the war. The Ministry of 
Information had had no staff in the Dominions during the war but 
had a special section to prepare material for them. The Dominions 
office had two officers in London and staff attached to the United 
Kingdom High Commission overseas to deal with publicityl three 
in Canada, two in South Africa and one each in Australia and 
E ire. ' 07 These staff were to be kept to cover government 
publicity while the Council was to act as the Dominions Office's 
agent 'within the framework of a broad scheme for cultural 
interchanges within the British Commonwealth! 
1.08 
The Dominions 
office's attitude towards the Council was discouraging and 
Findlater Stewart, in his report, endorsed the Dominions Office's 
view that the Council had only a limited role in the Dominions. 
In the event of extensive Council operations in the Dominions, 
the Dominions Office wanted the same control over Council 
expenditure as the Foreign Office enjoyed and the right to comment 
164. Dominions Office Meeting Minutes, 20 November 1943. DO 35/1211 
WN201/6 
1(35. Ministry of In-formation Meeting Minutes, 15 May 1944 * 
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106. Minute by S. Stephenson, 27 April 1944. DO 35/1211 WN201/6 
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'about the suitability of the general character of the picture 
of Britain which the Council is presenting' in the Dominions ý 09 
The Dominions Office wished to ensure that Britain was portrayed 
no It merely as a repository of ancient traditions but as a nation qualified for leadership in a 
world of progress. 110 
The Council refused to accept the low priority accorded by the 
Dominions Office to cultural rýBlations and pressed ahead with its 
plans for ALLIstralia, New Zealand and India. 
Likewise, the Colonial Office asked Findl ater Stewart for 
greater controls over the Council's policy aný expenditure. In 
a draft demarcation document the Colonial Office argued. for the 
right to veto Council appointments, to control current expenditure 
as well as the budget estimates and to guide the Council's work 
in each Colony, by the issue of a 'charter'or 'directive'. 
Robertson described the draft agreement as 'a temporary Treaty 
112 1 
of peace between belligerents' and Gillan'agrqed that it was 
113 $unnecessarily restrictive . In the event the Council 
accepted a. less stringent document. affirming the Council's status 
as the Colonial Office's agent in the Colonies. In April 1945 
the Council's accountant described the Colonial Office's powers 
vis 6 vid the Council thus: 
The Colonial Office will be responsible for 
determining policy e. g. the territories in which 
activities are undertaken and the relative 
distribution of effort between the different 
territories. The Colonial Office will indicate 
to the Council the methods and channels to be 
used, though it may at its discretion delegate 
in particular instances to the Council. 114 
The Colonial Office's authority in relation to the Council was 
the envy of other Departments but it appeared greater on paper 
than it was in practice. More significant than the written 
agreement was the close relationship between Council and Colonial 
office officials in contrast to the generally poor relations 
between the Council and Dominions Office, that stemmed from the 
Dominions Office's hostility towards the development of Council 
6Aivities, in the Dominions and the steps the Council took to 
circumvent this opposition. 
Jog. Dominions Office Memorandum, January 194S, D035/1211 WN420/2 
110. Ibid *z -) 
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During the war, therefore, important steps were taken towards 
the establishment of publicity services in the Commonwealth and 
Empire. The Council adapted well to the varying conditions 
encountered and had to revise its ideas and methods. In the 
Middle Eas t its work followed the pattern established in foreign 
countries. In the West Indies and West Africa, too, Institutes 
had to be founded in the'absence of suitable indigenous bodies 
but they were principally adult education and social centres. 
The management of these Institutes by local committees went some 
way towards meeting the Council's first inten',, tion to operate 
indirectly in the Colonies. In the Dominion s the formation of 
a corresponding council in Canada had-failed to live up to the 
Council's expectations, but the decline of the British Empire in 
relation to her two major wartime Allies brought calls for the 
consolidation and solidarity of Commonwealth opinion. Australia 
welcomed the Council's help in presenting the Commonwealth case 
in the Pacific and Asia but the improvement q! f inter-Commonwealth 
ties remained a delicate issue. In India, too, the political 
situation militated against the initiation of direct Council 
operations but there was widespread recognition of the possible 
future importance of cultural relations. Likewise, in the 
Colonies, their progressive evolution towards self-government 
ensured that the development of cultural relations would become 
increasingly important. The Council's work in the Colonies was 
an integral part of the advancement of the Colonies towards 
independence whereas in the Dominions the Council sought to 
increase and improve existing cultural and educational links. 
Most importantly, Britain had accepted that cultural relations 
within the Commonwealth would be a permanent feature of future 
relations, %ýhilst in the Colonies it had taken, in Gillan's words, 
the Government and the Council all too long 
to appreciate that the interpretation of Britain 
within our own Empire is at least as strong a 
moral obligation as it is to foreign countries. 115 
115. Minute by Gillan, 27 October 1943. BW2/313 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE COMMERCE OF IDEAS I 
Britain's chief interest in Latin America was traditionally 
economic: a significant part of her total overseas investments 
lay in that continent wit1h Argentina possessing the lion's share. 
Propaganda, therefore, was designed to strengthen these trading 
links and, after the outbreak of war, to preserve the region for 
the Allied cýuse. The first steps had been taken at the end of 
the 1920's with the foundation of the first Anglophile society 
by Britain's ambassador in Buenos Aires, Sir Malcolm Robertson, 
in 1928 and the investigations of the D'Abernon Mission in 1929. 
These had been followed by the Prince of Wales' visit to Argentina 
in 1931, the Prince of Wales Scholarship Scheme and the establish- 
ment of the Ibero-American Institute in London in 1932, under the 
direction of Philip Guedalla. 
2 When the British Council was 
founded Guedalla placed the Institute at the,, Counýcills service 
and the Ibero-American Committee, formed with representatives 
from both organisations, became the Council's first regional 
committee. Additional Anglophile societies were soon founded 
at Montevideo and Rio de Janero in 1934, Sao Paulo in 1935 and 
Lima and Santiago in 1938. 
Britain's influence in Latin America had diminished steadily 
since the turn of the century. Her place had been taken by the 
United States and by Germany in the economic field. Culturally, 
France and then Spain and Portugal, remained the dominant powers. 
IncreaýSing, tension in Europe was reflected in growing rivalry in 
Latin America in all spheres. For Britain the main threat lay in 
German and Italian economic expansion and anti-British propaganda. 
The triumph of fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain augmented the 
challengej not only were there substantial Italian and German 
communities in South America mobilised to spread the fascist 
gospel, but there were also many, especially in the indigenous 
ruling elites, to whom such doctrines appealed. Britain's cultural 
propaganda, therefore, had a dual role. Firstly, to gain the 
coo peration of the Latin American Republics in the war and in 
this long-term themes were as important as immediate war propaganda. 
As one commentator predicted, 
1. Title of lecture given by Lord Macmillan in 1935 an a tour of 
South America for the Ibero-American Institute. See Lord 
Macmillan, A Man of Law's Tale (London 1952), p. 355 
2. For an early accourý-`_, of the work of the Ibero-Amer-icanInstituts 
See "Cultural Relations with South America", The Listener, V01.13 
, 44p. 
323, March 1935. 
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The South Americans prefer us to the Axis, but 
if we want their wholehearted support and 
confidence, we must convince them that the post- 
war world, as reconstructed by a triumphant 
Britain, would offer them a finer future than 
one reconstructed by a triumphant Germany. 3 
Secondly, the development of cultural relations would partly 
replace Britain's waning, commercial influence and was 'regarded 
as a Kind of A. R. P. protection for our severely shaken economic 
interests'. 
4 
With the outbreak of war in Europe the pr otection of Britain's 
interests in Latin America became vital. Thb South American 
Republics provided foodstuffs and raw materials essential to 
Britain's war effort and were strategically important to the 
safeguarding of the. shipping lanes on which these supplies 
depended. The meeting of Foreign Ministers at Panama in 
September 1939 had broadly agreed on the desirability of an Allied 
victor-y abroad and neutrality at home. As a result of this 
declared neutrality the Council was obliged to move cautiously 
as foreign schools and societies were open to attack as symbols 
of foreign interference. NeverthelessiGuedalla and White, on 
a tour of the Republics in, the same month, encountered a wide 
demand for the Council's services and representatives were 
appointed locally in Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Venezuela. 
Previously the Council had had no staff in the sub-continent and 
depended entirely on the enthusiasm and goodwill of Britain's 
diplomatic representatives in the area, whose duties, especially 
after the outbreak of war, limited the time that could be devoted 
to the promotion of cultural relations. The British communities 
in Latin America tended to remain tightly-Knit groups having 
little contact with the local populations and their clubs were 
exclusive, formed either for patriotic reasons or 'to provide an 
opportunity for the consumption of unadulterated impo rted liquor'. .5 
In his report White commented on the suspicion with which foreign 
organisations were regarded in Latin America. 
C; 
A wave of Nationalism has passed over South 
America in recent years and a determination 
to check foreign penetration makes it necessary 6 to proceed with the Council's work carefully. 
3, R. V. Peddar, 'British Propaganda in Sou"th America'The 
Contemporary Review, No. 932 August 1943, p. 97. 
4. Memorandum by Millington-Drake, March 1942,6 W2/ 10 
5. Minutes of the Ibero-American Committee, 30 April 1936 Bw2/12 
6. Report by White, November 1939 BW2/143 
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Financial considerations dictated that the development of 
the Council's activities would be gradual at first until funds 
were released by the. - German victory in the West in 1 940. 
Effective British propaganda was then doubly necessary as in 
Latin America 'few thought we had any chance of winning throughlý 
The possibility of Nazi victory in Europe dominated the Foreign 
Ministers' Conference at, Havana in July and resulted in a 
strengthening of regional defence arrangements. The defeat of 
France offered added incentive to the development of British 
cultural propaganda in Latin America: Britain could now try to 
establish itself 'in the place of France as týýhe distinctive 
interpreters of European views and European tradition'. 
8 
As a 
belligerent, Britain could increase legitimately her propaganda 
in Latin America in the expectation of long-term benefits. 
Inasmuch as war is a convenient excuse'for 
publicity we should deliberately trade upon that 
excuse and penetrate as far as we can, under its 
cover. 9 
Commercial motives directed the Council's work in Latin 
America. The Foreign Office and Department of Trade, as well 
as British firms with trading interests in the continent, were 
represented an the Ibero-American Committee which pressed for 
extensions of Council work in areas where itwas felt that 
Britain's economic interests stood in most peril. In 1938 the 
Foreign Office requested the Council to increase its work in 
Venezuela, Colombia, and later Peru, in view of their important 
oil supplies. 
10 Argentina and Brazil, however, as suppliers of 
vital foodstuffs and raw materials, headed the list. Moreover, 
it was believed that cultural propaganda might offset Britain's 
growing difficulties in the financial field. In 1939, in 
discussions surrounding a teachi ng mission to Colombia it was 
emphasised that such an offer should be made to balan. ce 'shortages 
of attractive promises of trade purchases by Britain' in the 
forthcoming Anglo-Colombian treaty. 11 Similarly, *the Board of 
Trade suggested, witha 'striKing faith' in cultural relations, 
that embarrassing favourable trade balances with Guatemala and 
a Salvador could S "n be relieved by the despatch of a cultural 
7. K. Grubb, Crypts of Power, (London 1971)p. 113 
a. Latin American Propaganda Policy Committee, 29 May 1941. BW2/17 
9. Ibid. 
11). White to F. Guedalla, 24 August 1939. BW2/14 
11. White to R. B. Stevens, 25 April 1939. BW2/10 
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mission-to those countries. 
12 
In justifying the Council's 
expenditure in Latin America for 1939/40, Guedalla 
explained that these proposals received the 
support of trading interests; the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce and Lord Bearsted (on behalf 
of Shell) having promised contributions. 13 
The correlation between trade and cultural propaganda meant that 
Britain's blocKade of Europe had adverse effects on the Council's 
worK. In 1 940 Lloyd wrote to Lord Davidson and Duff Cooper 
'pointing ou t that the efforts of the British Council and the 
Ministry, of Information would be rendered almýost nugatory if 
exports to that continent were handicapped'. 
14 
Kenneth Grubb, who took over the Latin American desk at the 
Ministry on the outbreak of war, soon found th, at it was the 
benefits to British trade that chiefly impressed the Treasury 
when it came to provicf-Ing funds for propaganda in Latin America. 
15 
Grubb preferred cooperation and close liaison' with the Council 
to rigid demarcation agreements. A former missionary with 
extensive knowledge of Latin America, Grubb understood the value 
of propaganda and also of less official contacts. Writing to 
O'Brien at the Council in October 1939, he outlined his view of 
the Ministry's role in Latin America: 
I am particularly anxious that the worK of the 
Council should not in any way suffer in Latin 
America through the activities of the Ministry, 
but rather that the former should be bacKed up 
and, if possible, expanded. 16 
The Council attended propaganda policy committees on Latin 
America at the Ministry and when Grubb toured South America in 
1940, Gueda, 11a tooK his place at the Ministry. In the field, 
too, the two organisations worKed together closely. 
The Council concentrated in the early part of the war in 
the economically and strategically important states of South 
America. In Argentina the Association of English Culture at 
Buenos Aires, under the direction of Leslie Mead, continued to 
flourish with five thousand students and nearly one thousand 
members by early 1941. A new cultural society was established 
at Cordoba and classes were expanded at the English School in 
12. Minute by R. B. Stevens, 11 April 1939. FO395/665A P1365/1365/150 
13. Executive Committee Minutes, 7 June 1939. BW68/3 
14. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 9 July 1940. BW69/6 
15. For a description of-Ministry of Information activities in 
South America during the war, see R. H. K. Marett, Through the 
Back Door (London 1968) 
16. Grubb to E. B. O'Brien, 1 Otcober 1939. BW2/15 
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Rosario. A BooK Exhibition organised by the Council in Buenos 
Aires was visited by fifteen thousand people in September 1940. 
In Brazil there were five societies under the general guidance 
of Eric Church in Rio. To the established societies at Rio and 
I 
Sao Paulo, Church added new ones at Belo Horizonte, Santos and 
Curitiba. At the latter the Governor of the state was the 
President and his Secretaries of Education, Finance'and Agriculturt 
were its directors. Francis. Toye, formerly director of the 
Florence Ins. titute, was transferred to Brazil in 1941 to direct 
the eight hundred students and seven hundredýlmembers of the Rio 
Society whose President was the Brazilian Minýister of State for 
Education. In Chile George Jones, an employee of a British 
firm, 
17 became honorary coordinator of the Council's work and 
larger premises for the Centro Anglo-Chileno were opened in 
Santiago in March 1940. A branch of the Centrg was established 
at Valparaiso in the same year and the Council maintained close 
links with the University of Chile and British schools in Chile. 
Following White's visit to Colombia in 1939, a five-year plan 
of expenditure and cultural agreement was concluded with the 
Colombian Government, under which a teaching mission of five 
qualified English teachers were appointed to Colombian schools,, 
their salaries being divided between the Colombian Government and 
the British Council. In addition, the Colombian Ministry of 
. 
Education provided premises for a Colombian-British Institute, 
which was opened in March 1940 in Bogota, with branches in four 
provincial cities. The'Council also secured contributions from 
fifteen British firms for fixed periods towards scholarships 
for Colombian students at British universities. The rapid 
development, of the Council's work in Colombia was due in part to 
the cooperation of the Colombian Government and to the energies 
of the British Minister. Likewise, I in Uruguay, British cultural 
propaganda flourished under the enthusiastic guidance of Britain's 
ambassador, Sir Eugen Millington-Orake, whose handling of the 
. 
Erj5. f 53aaB incident did much to raise British morale in the 
continent ýoeýow_ EVa_ cLLýeo-C-s oý- - -the summer of 1940. The Anglo- 
Urýuguayan Cultural Institute at Montevideo had more than one 
thousand students by 1941 and branches in five other cities. N 
small amount of worK was also undertaken in Peru, where the 
British-Peruvian Cultural Institute at Lima had to be rehoused 
following an earthquake. 
17. Buchanan Jones and Company Limited 
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Also in 1940 a British trade and cultural mission, under 
the chairmanship of Lord Willingdon, arrived in Latin America 
to explain British economic policy in the circumstances of war 
and to promote British exports. The Council had cooperated 
previously1with Lord Willingdon on his tour of South America in 
1938 and, in 1940, his group included Hugh MacKintosh, designated 
to survey British cultural activities. MacKintosh was in 
charge of a special unit of the Br, itish Information Services in 
New YorK to assist British publicity in Latin America. His report 
stron gly endorsed the importance of cultural propaganda and was 
regarded as a 'Key document' by the Council. eQtitled 'The 
i 
Political Importance and Potential Effect of Higher Propaganda' 
it defined cultural relations as 
exchanges on the plane of thought designed to 
promote international harmony and undeiýstanding 
and to'consolidate such a friendship between 
enlightened nations as will lead to a unanimous 18 front against retrograde and aggaressi, ve barbarism. 
Mackintosh's main criticism was that Britain's effort was 
insufficiently financed and supported. Mackintosh emphasised 
the importance of reciprocity in cultural relations with Latin 
America in view of a growing national spirit and stressed the 
necessity of appealing to the intellectual classes, whose 
influence was disproportionate to their numbers. The war, in 
his opinion, offered a unique opportunity for Britain to replace 
Germany economically and France culturally. In Latin America 
he recommended that 
the development of cultural relations be deemed 
no less a major war activity than our official 
British propaganda, and that the Institutes 
already formed be treated, in fact, as pivotal 
strategic points for development in relation 
both to our war and post-war policy. 19 
Mackintosh was informally appointed th 
liaison officer in New York in 1942 to 
the Cultural Relations Oivision of the 
cater for the entertainment of British 0 
arýd staff journeying to and from Latin 
e Council's honorary 
maintain contacts with 
State Oepartment and to 
Council guests, lecturers 
America. 
The growth in the CouQcil's work called for the appointment 
of a chief representative to coordinate operations. In Buenos 
Aires, relations between the Embassy and the Cultura were strained 
18. Report by H. S. Mackintosh, Otcober 1941. BW2/17 
19. Ibid. 
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as neither had the time to deal with the Council Is expanding 
activities. The Council had difficulty finding a suitable 
representative and the intervention of Alexander Oadogan 
increased its problems. Cadogan suggested that, as the Foreign 
office no longer had use for their ambassador in Montevideo, 
who had, in Cadogan's words, 'ceased to be an asset to His 
Majesty's Government in Uruguay', the Council might 'soften the 
blow' by offering Mill ington-Drake the post in Latin America. 
20 
Millington-D. rake was well-known to the Council as his enthusiasm 
for cultural propaganda had led to voluminous i 
correspondence. He 
had founded the Anglo-Uruguayan Cultural Instý, itute in Montevideo 
in 1934 and contributed a third of its running costs. He had 
served with Malcolm Robertson at the Buenos Aires Embassy in 1929 
before being transferred to Uruguay as British, Minister in 1934. 
Millington-Drakels reputation for independent action made the 
Council cautious and White declared that he 'would be definitely 
21, 
unsuitable' unless he could be restrained. iMillington-Drake 
appealed directly to the Council's chairman 'outlining ambitious 
schemes for the Council in Latin America. In the event, a lack 
of alternatives and the close personal friendship of Millington- 
Drake and Robertson secured the post for Millington-Drake. 
His appointment aroused concern in Britain's diplomatic . 
missions in Latin America who feared that his actions would be 
interpreted as those of the British Government. They argued 
that either Millington-Drake should be granted diplomatic status, 
and so be under their direct control, or that, as 
cultural work ..... impinges so much so often an 
political work the very closest touch must be 
maintained by the Superviser CMillington-Drakel 
with the Head of Mission concerned and the 
latter's opinion must, of course, prevail in 22 
connexion with any suggested cultural activities. 
These initial difficulties and misunderstandings were ironed out 
in time, with the arrival of a staff for Millington-Drake in 
Buenos Aires and an agreement that the last word lay with His 
Majesty's Missions in each Republic.. 
However, Millington-Drake was not easily restrained and 
immediately planned an extensive tour of the continent including 
Mexico, where he anticipated 'a triumph for the British Council 
if their delegate were to open up cultural relations even before 
20. Cadogan to Robertson, 17 June 1941. BW2/92 
21. White to Robertson, 20 June 1941. BW2/92 
22. s. Stevenson to Robertson, 17 December 1941. BW2/92 
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23 
diplomatic relations were. resumed'. The settlement of the 
dispute between Mexico and the United States in November and the 
subsequent resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain 
and Mexico, denied Millington-Drake this opportunity. Nevertheless, 
he proceeded across the Republics in September and November 1941 
producing 'wild schemes' for the furtherance of British cultural 
diplomacy. J. V. Perowne, head of the Latin American section at 
the Foreign Office, minuted drily, 
I hope the Costa Ricans won't attribute the 
Earthquake to Mr Drake's (sic) advent. 24 
Millington-Drake and. Guedalla had been cohtemporaries at 
oxford and it had been Millington-Drake's suggestion that 
Guedalla should lead the party of Oxford undergraduates to Buenos 
Aires in 1931. Millington-DraKe had acted as the Ibero-American 
Institute's man in the field, organising the Prince of Wales 
scholarships and looking after the Institute's lecturers. However, 
from this point onwards relations between the 
I two had deteriorated. 
Millington-Drake found Guedalla obstructive and ungrateful and 
alleged that Guedalla's 'pontifical and dictatorial attitude, had 
resulted in his exclusion from the affairs of the Ibero-American 
Institute. 
25 He maintained further that 
When the British Council was started, his [Guedalla's] 
attitude towards it was definitely hostile and 
there were major rows between him and Lloyd when 
the latter first took over. 26 
When war broKe out Guedalla was in Latin America and saw 
Millington-DraKe in Montevideo where a truce was declared and 
although clashes between the two continued, they did not affect 
seriously the Council's worK. Millington-DraKe stressed the 
thenies of English democracy and the development of social welfare 
in Britain. He believed that the alliance with the Soviet Union 
had enhanced Britain's image in Latin America and that America's 
entry as a, result of Japanese aggression had helped Britain's 
position, but't, 
kat 
it is. still necessary fully to convince the great 
part of the masses in Latin America that in throwing 
inýtheir lot with the British "Empire" (including 
specially Canada) and the United States, they have 
in, 'factimade common cause with the two great democracies 
from which they may even have something to learn. 27 
23s Millington-DraKe to Robertson, 7, July 1941. BW2/92 
24* Minute by, ýJ. V. Perowne, 810ecember 1941. FO70/636 L3668/2353/410 
25. Milli6gton'-DraKe to Sir F-Ogilvie, 2 December 1943. Millington- 
DraKe'; Papers, Misc. Corresp. 4/9 
26. Ibid. ý 
27. Memorandum by Millington-Orake, March 1942. BW2/10 
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In the same memorandum Millington-Drake stated 
It is no exagg. pration to say that apart from our 
fighting spirfi, the maintenance of our political 
liberties practically unimpaired under war 
conditions is gerhaps our greatest asset in Latin 
Aýerica today. 28 
In February 1942 Millington-Drake anonymously donated Z50,000 
to the British Government for the promotion of 'better mutual 
knowledge in regard to cultural and social welfare between this 
country and-the sovereign states of the American Continent'. 
Eden and Robertson were appointed co-trustees of the donation, 
which was divided as Z10,000 each for Canada and the United States 
and E30,000 for Latin America. Millington-Drake hoped, 
at a time when things were going so badly (Singapare 
etc. ), to give-an indication of confid"ence in the 
future. and of -Friendship..... towards the New World 
.... Played promptly at that moment it would have ýeen 
in its way a trump card of prop9ganda, not 
only cultural, but in a sense political,, in the 
situation as it then was. 29 I 
However, his plan for'a striking gesture'faded as disputes 
continued between the Council, the Foreign Office and the Treasury 
as to how the money could best be spent. Finally, E20,000 was 
set aside for the foundation of a Latin American centre in London; 
these were the Hispanic Council and the Luso-Brazilian Society, 
established after the war. 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, the third Foreign 
Ministers Conference was held at Rio in January 1942. Before 
the conference twelve Latin American states had severe d diplomatic 
relations with the Axis and nine of those had declared war. After 
the meeting, the remainder, except Argentina and Chile, broke 
relations and -four more declared war. For Britain this meant 
that a more aggressive publicity policy could be pursued and that 
Axis subversive activities would be countered more effectively 
by the new, Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defence. 
However , the Rio Conference foreshadowed also increased United 
States publicity in the continent and any expansion of the 
C6'uncills activities into Central America and the Caribbean would 
bring it into direct contact with American publicity agencies. ' 
The relationship between British and American publicity in Latin 
America was a subject of debate. With the appointment of Nelson 
Rockefeller in August 1940, as Coordinater of Inter-American 
28, Ibid., 
29. Millihgton-Orake to Sir F. Oglivie, 1 March 1944, Millington- 
Drake, Papers. Misc. Corresp. 4/9 
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Affairs to promote good hemispheric relations, the Council 
became aware of a grow'Ing American cultural effort. At the 
Buenos Aires Conference in 1936, the United States had signed 
multi-lateral cultural exchange conventions with the Latin 
American Republics and in 1938 the Department of State organised 
a Division of Cultural Relations to administer official activities 
and assist private agenci: es. Until 1941 the entire! United States 
cultural programme was concentrated in the western hemisphere, 
through the-twin agencies of the Cultural Relations Division and 
the Rockefeller Committee. There was little coordination 
between the two and the Cultural Relations Diýision regarded the 
Coordinater's Office 'with mingled alarm and contempt'. 
30 
The War Cabinet recognised the double threat posed to British 
economic interests in Latin America. In September 1940 it heard 
that 
The Americans were stealing our trade under cover 
of German propaganda which spread reports that 
this country was not in a position to send ships 
or deliver goods. 
31 
In March 1941 the Council's educational director, Evans, observed 
that Britain 'Must meet with American propaganda in South America 
32 
as well as German propaganda'. ý United States' publicity was 
seen as a challenge and as more-of a hindrance than a help. Both 
the Council and the Ministry of Information were at a disadvantage 
to their American rivals in terms of finance, manpower and 
materials and were forced to delegate much greater responsibility 
to their agents in the field. However, Britain did not suff-er 
from the unpopularity that the geographical proximity of the 
United States conferred. Indeed, British successes Reuters 
taKing over, from Havas - were a cause for concern as they were 
criticised in the United States and risKed the issue being pushed 
, to the headlines in the United States'. In South America, 
Britain's 'first consideration must be the avoidance of 
unnecessary offence to the United States' . 
33 
Political reasons for maintaining a low profile in Latin 
ArRprica in 1941 to avoid antagonising American opinion were 
obviously strong. One result was that the Council undertook 
only minimal activities in Cuba for fear that anything more 
30. R. Gallop to M-Bonham-Carter, 23 February 1943. FO371/33903 
A1488/348/51 
31. Memorandum on Willingdon Mission, 13 September 1940. CAB66, 
WM249(40)8 
32, Ibero-American Committee Minutes, 10 March 1941, BW2/16 
33. E. Sturt to K. T. Gurney, 20 February 1942. FO370/667 L141/17/410 
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'may filter through to the United States and create an adverse 
34 
opinion there'. Likewise, the United States was not informed 
of Millington-Drake's appointment so that it would not seem that 
a 'cultural offensive' had been launched or that Britain was 
undermining Allied disapproval of Argentina's refusa 1 to sever 
relations with the Axis. 
35 Relations between Council's staff 
and representatives of the Rockefeller Committee or the Cultural 
Relations Division were more often cordial than hostile. After 
America's entry into the war, Council representatives reported 
an increasing American publicity programme, a nd Bonham-Carter, 
head of the Latin American Division at the MiýniBtry of Information, 
stated, in January 1942, that C. ) 
There are cartain indications that the United States 
State Department wishes us to "lay off" doing any 
publicity or. propaganda in Latin America. We are 
not particularly surprised at this, knowing that our 
North American friends like to look upon Latin 36 America as a field for their own activities only. 
J. V. Perowne at the Foreign Office was less Charitable seeing in 
them 'more or less deliberate attempts by the United States to 
supplant us and make Latin America their own preserve,. 
37 He 
advised that Britain's cultural and political propaganda should 
be Kept separate and that Britain should only cooperate with the 
United States in the presentation of war news. 
However, by 1943 some of the Council's staff had come to 
regard American activities as a direct attack on their own work. 
No doubt personal antipathies played a part, but the brash and 
often amateur activities of the Rockefeller Committee hampered 
the Council and its staff resented the lavish funds at the 
disposal of American officials, which were sometimes used. tb take 
ove ran activity previously undertaken or contemplated'by the 
Council. These difficulties were augmented by t he fact that 
the Council did not operate in the United States, whe . re cultural 
relations were handled by the Ministry of information, and in 
Latin America, too, the distinction between the two organisations 
was vague. From Paraguay, Brazil and Colombia, in particular, 
t" Council received complaints, prompting R. Gallop at the 
Foreign Office to warn that 
34. Minute by R. B. Stevens, 3 August 1939-FO395/666 P3387/3387/150 
35. Cadogan to Robertson, I July 1942. Millington-Drake Papers, 
Misc. Corresp. 4/4 
36. M. Bonham-Carter to Dr. R. A. Humphreys, 10 January 1942. BW2/17 
37. J. V. Perowne to Bock, 4 March 1942. BW2/17 
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quite a few of Mr. Rockefeller's recruits seem 
to have a strong sense of salesmanship and to 
treat Anglo-American relations on a basis of 
commercial competition. 38 
Robertson and Millington-DraKe favoured cooperation with the 
I 
United States in Latin America for the mutual advantage of both 
countries and because Britain had little alternative. As 
Millington-DraKe explained: 
It seems the only course in view of the pressure 
whio, h America could bring on us in view of the 
present world situation if we gave them occasion 39 to resent our cultural activities in Latin America. 
Millington-Drake travelled to Washington in January 1942 and 
established contact with the Rockefeller Committee and the 
Cultural Relations Division. He assured Robertson that 
The upshot of these contacts was to confirm what 
I had gathered in December, viz. that Mr Berle 
as well as Mr. Sumner Welles and others agreed 
to the view that our cultural activiýiesjin Latin 
America on the restrained war-time scale'contemplated, 
as compared with the practically unlimited activities 
of the United States in the same direction, far from 
prejudicing the latter were in fact to their advantage 
psychologically, in view of the Latin American dislike 
of feeling under the excessive influence of the "big 
sister" republic and even in cultural matters; and 
that so long as our activities were conducted on 
parallel lines to those of the United States and with 
cordiality and frankness in regard to them whenever 
there was reason for consultation, we should not, 
even in Central America and the Caribbean zone, meet 
the opposition which the Council had reasonably enough 
feared. 40 
Millington-Drake was greatly impressed by the scale and thorough- 
ness of the American effort and stressed the role of the Council 
in reducing'psychological resistance in Latin America to United 
States publicity and suggested Joint institutes and libraries. 
He reported that Sumner Wellas reacted to the view that British 
cultural propaganda helped that bf the United States, by saying 
that 
not only do I agree with you but if you were 
not doing this work in Latin America we should 
have to ask you to do it. 41 
38. R. Gallop to M. Bonham-Carter, 23 February 1943. FO371/33903 
Al 488/348/51 
39. Millington-Drake to J. V. Perowne, 30 March 1942. FO370/667 
i 
Ll 270/17/410 
40. Millington-Drake to Robertson, 31 JulY 1942. Millington-Drake 
Papers, official Reports 4/1 
41. Memorandum by Millington-Drake, March 1942. BW2/1G 
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Millington-Drake's unauthorised discussions in Washington 
were described by the Foreign office aslunfortunatel especially 
as the United States Qivernment had not yet been officially 
in-Formed of his appointment. 
42 Furthermore, although the 
Foreign Office supported collaboration with the United States 
in war propaganda in Latin America, it preferred that Britain's 
cultural propaganda remain completely distinct. 
In the first place, British and American culture 
are., two totally different things, and if we were 
to derive any value from cultural pro 
' 
paganda in 
Latin America, where the United State S will 
inevitably become increasingly preponderent 
economically and politically, it is to our interest 
that this distinction should be maintained. 
Moreover, the closer our association with the 
United States, the less we shall be liked in Latin 
America, and although our political as'sociation 
with the United States must be increasingly close 
we have nothing to gain, and a great deal to lose 
by leading Latin America to believe that our 
cultural identities have been merged, 
' above all, 
anything which suggested that we were preparing a 
joint Anglo-American cultural drive in Latin America 
would alienate their sympathies. 43 
Millington-Drake was warned against identifying the British 
cultural programme with that of the United States in Latin America, 
although the Council was not to compete with the United States. 
Britain's long-term interests dictated that there shou ld be close 
understanding and cooperation with the United States but this 
did not extend to the field of cultural propaganda where Britain 
could make an independent showing. Britain aimed 
To preserve, and if possible intensify, by all 
suitable means, our existing good political, 
economic and cultural relations with these States, 
subject to the overwhelming necessities of the 
successful prosecution of the war and of the 
maintenance of the fullest comity and understanding 
with the United States. 44 
Linked to the problem of cooperation with the United States 
in Latin America was the issue of British Council operations in 
Central America. In discussions for the 1937/8 budget, Eustace 
PRFcy, the Council's chairman, had stated that 
42. Cadogan to Robertson, I July 1942-Millington-Drake Papers, 
Misc. Corresp. 4/4 
43. Ibid 
44. Minute by J. V. Perowne, 26 February 1943. F0371/33903 
A2230/348/51 
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There is something to be said for the view that 
we must leave the countries of the "Inner Monroe 
Ooctrine" to the United States, and that any 
English cultural work there will merel redound 
to the advantage of the Unitea States. 
X5 
Moreover, the Council's funds were limited and before the United 
States entered the war, British propaganda had to be careful 
not to arouse American suspicions and provide fuel Tor the 
isolationists. The Council, therefore, followed a policy of 
restraint irT. Central America, although the Ministry of Information 
did operate in that area, 
partly because of the dominant American interest 
which might resent too much forward policy on 
our part, and partly because we must necessarily 
apply our funds principally in those areas where 
British interests are most obvious. 46 
In addition, Guedalla was opposed to operations in a zone that 
he regarded as 'the Mediterranean of the United States'. 
However, by 1943 considerable. amounts of functional material 
were distributed on behalf of the Council in Central America by 
the Ministry of Information's agents and British Legations. On 
the suggestion of J. H. Leche, British Minister in Guatemala, an 
exploratory tour of the region Tor the Council was undertaken by 
Mrs Cheverton, an employee of the Ministry of Information. Mrs 
Cheverton recommended the cent-r6lisation and coordination of the 
Council's activities in the area by the appointment of staff at. 
a single centre. She was 'astounded' at the unpopularity of 
the United States in the area and 
impressed by an almost universal yearning to break 
the United States monopoly and to turn back to 
Europe and particularly..... Great Britain. 47 
Ecuador, Costa Rice, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama and San 
Salvador appeared for the first time in the Council's estimates 
in 1942/3. The Council founded an Institute, in Mexico in 1943 
which began English classes in February 1944 with over one thousand 
five hundred students. The formal opening of the Institute was 
at,, tended by the President of the Republic and the British 
Ambassador and the number of students had risen to nearly three 
thousand. After Mexico, San Salvador enjoyed the largest British 
cultural programme in Central America due partly to the energies 
45. E. Percy to E. Guedi, ýlla, 13 March 1937. OW2/13 
46. F. Ogilvie to J. H. Leche, 4 January 1944. BW2/99 
47. J. H. Leche to F. Ogilvie, 14 February 1943 BW2/99 
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of the British Minister. The Council's activities in Central 
America were reorganised in 1944 under the direction of Mrs' 
Cheverton based in Guatemala City and henceforth a greater amount 
of material was distributed more effectively. In Cuba the 
Council's 
I 
films were shown in 80% of the cinemas to an average 
weekly audience of two-hundred thousand. A wave of strikes and 
revolts in Central America in the first half of 1944' led to the 
suspension of Council actitivi. es, particularly in San Salvador 
where all op. erations were closed down for six months after the 
overthrow of the government in May. 
In South America the Council's work expanded steadily 
throughout the war. Despite Argentina's refusal to break off 
relations with the Axis the Council's work developed considerably 
after Millington-Drake's appointment. Argentýina's continued 
neutrality made the development of Anglo-Argentinian cultural 
relations both more desirable and more delicate. In April 1943 
there were six Culturas on the Buenos Aires rhodel and through 
Millington-Drake's office in the capital a large amount of 
functional material was distributed and a great many extra-mural 
activities promoted. Although Britain was obliged to follow the 
United States' hostile attitude to the seizure of power by 
-Generals Ramirez and Rawson in June 1943 the Council supported 
the establishment of eight new Anglophile societies in 1943 and 
seven in 1944. After a tour of the provinces in 1943 Millington- 
Drake explained the Council's success thus: 
It is clear to me that the bulk of the Argentinian 
people who incline to the democratic cause - and 
naturally this has increased recently - welcome 
these visits as an opportunity for demonstrating 
their sympathy for the democratic side and for 
Great Britain 
' 
in particular. This is especially 
the case with officials or civil servants of all 
grades who are naturally afraid of manifesting 
their sentiments in ordinary circumstances because 
of the meticulously neutral attitude of the Central 
Government ..... They thus find a most welcome outlet 
for their feelings in cultural relations, without 
risk of suffering any consequences. 48 
Argentina's relations with the Allies continued to deteriorate 
culminating in the susp, ension of diplomatic relations in June . 
1944. 
48. Millington-Drake to Robertson, 25 January 1943. F0370/722 
Ll 416/62/41 0 
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Britain had followed reluctantly America's example and withdrawn 
her ambassador but was unwilling to alienate Argentinian goodwill 
further in view of Britain's large capital investments in the 
country and her war-time dependence on imports from Argentina. 
Accordingly, although Millington-Drake was instructed to avoid 
contacts with the unrecognised Argentinian government, the 
development of cultural relations continued unchecked. In July 
1944 Millington-DraKe held a widely publicised congress of 
British Couricil staff in Latin America in Buenos Aires. The 
Council directly sponsored twelve provincial'jnstitutes with a 
total of more than five thousand students a4ýj indirectly, upwards 
of ten thousand English students at the numerous Argentina-Britain 
associations. Thus a substantial benefit was reaped from the 
Council's quasi-independent status. Millingt, on-DraKe's American. 
counterpart was forced to abandon all his projects until Argentina 
entered the war in March 1945 and diplomatic relations were 
restored the following month. Similarly, t6e C? uncil, s 
activities continued unhindered by the outspoKen hostility of the 
American Ambassador to the Argentinian military dictatorship. 
Indeed, the situation for the Council notably improved with the 
suppression of Axis newspapers and the appearance of more 
sympathetic officials in charge of the development of Argentina's 
cultural relations. 
C. hile, too, had refused to accept the Rio Conference resolution 
calling for the severance of relations with the Axis and declined 
to take firm action to supress Axis activities. Nevertheless, 
the Council's activities were extended and received a broad 
measure of official support. In 1941 a society was formed at 
Concepcion and one at Antofagasta in 1943. The fourth anniversary 
celebrations of the Chilean-British Institute at Santiago in 1943, 
soon after Chile had broken relations with the Axis, were attended 
by the former Chilean President and the Ministers of Education 
and Foreign Affairs. The societies functioned under the auspices 
of the Comision Chileno de Cooperacion Intelectual and the Council 
supplied them with fully-paid directors, financial grants and 
pb, olicity material. The Santiago Institute provided a gallery 
for Chilean artists, held musical recitals and organised broad-- 
cast-English lessons to an estimated six thousand listeners. In 
addition, the Council helped sixteen Anglo-Chilean schools, from 
presenting prizes to the Supply of trained staff. The Council 
also subsidised the South Pacific Mail, a weekly paper for 
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English speaking people, published in Valparaiso and distributed 
in Peru and Bolivia as well, as-Chile. 
In the other South American states, the Council could work 
more freely. In Brazil, Francis Toye succeeded Church, who 
returned to the London office, as Representative in April 1943. 
He had collaborated closely with the Ambassador, Sir Noel Charles 
when they had both been in Italy before that country had entered 
the war, and in Brazil again Toye found Charles ready 'to support 
us in every"wayl 
49 The Cultura in Rio was an entire floor of a 
modern office block and had a small teachingýstaff of six 
catering for seven hundred students. In the Council office Toye 
was helped by two young girls, an office boy and an old man. This 
lack of staff hindered the Council's work in Brazil but there 
were still over, two thousand students at the Rio society by the 
end of the war and a total of six thousand attending the five 
societies. Although Brazil entered the warion the Allied side 
in August 1942, the Council was not official.. ly r6cognised by the 
Brazilian government until 1944. 
Colombia was a major area of expansion for the Council during 
the war. Four additional institutes were opened in 1941 and the 
cultural agreement with the Colombian government was automatically 
renewed in 1942. By agreement between the two governments the 
contracts of the Teaching Mission were extended until 1947. 
Through the Teaching Mission and the English-teaching activities 
of the institutes, English overtook French in 1943 as the most 
widely taught foreign language. In the same year national 
examinations in English were inaugurated for the Colombian-British 
Institutes. Extra-mural activities in Bogota included the 
teaching of English in the Staff College, the Military School, 
the National School of Commerce and similar bodies. In Medellin 
the Institute took over the direction of the Departmdnt of English 
at the University and classes were given to the local military 
garrison. 
In Paraguay the Council was fortunate to secure the services 
of\. George Pendle as director of the Asunscion Institute and 
Council Representative. Pendle was energetic and ambitious for 
the Council and aimed to create a monopoly of English teaching 
for the Council and to maKe Britain the predominant cultural 
49. F. Toye, Truly Thankful, (London 1957) p. 97 
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influence in Paraguay. The Institute was opened in March 1942 
a nd attracted influential members from the ruling military 
dictatorship, including the Minister and Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Education, the Chief of the 
Military General Staff, judges, naval chiefs, officials from the 
Ministry of War and representatives from the Police and Army. 
In 1943 the Council started giving English classes at the Military 
General Staff Head Quarters, the Military School, the Naval Academý 
and the Workmen's Academy. From April 1943 English lessons were 
broadcast ov er the State Radio which, through a link with a 
commercial station, was transmitted on four w, avelengths, twice a 
day to all the neighbouring Republics. Examinations were 
dictated monthly and quarterly prizes were awarded for the best 
essays. In addition, cultural talks were broadcast three eveningi 
a week. Answering fan m'ail became a consider able problem for the 
Council's staf f. The Legation reporte d in 1943 that 
I In spite of the usual United States competition, 
it (the Council) is the most popular,, and'the 
most widely used of all the foreign educational 
bodies which now function here. 50 
The Anglo-Uruguayan Culturai Institute and its five provincial 
branches continued to flourish after Millington-Drake's departure. 
Two new branches were established in 1944 and the Institute at 
Montevideo also worked through seventeen extra-mural centres. The 
Director of the Montevideo Institute acted as Council Represent- 
ative and as such was largely concerned with the distribution of 
Council material as the Montevideo Institute was run entirely by 
local subscription and the provincial institutesýtoo were largely 
independent of the Council financially. 
The British-. Peruvian Association at Lima moved into new 
premises in 1943, ýwhich were opened at a special ceremony by the 
President of the Republic who was also Honorary President of the 
Association. 
,In 
1944 it h6 
,d 
six-hundred and fifty pupils and 
two hundred members. At Arequippa development was hampered by 
cramped 
. premises and there were only one-hundred and thirty pupils 
and two hundred members by 1945. In 1944 the Council secured a 
special grant of E10,000 from the Treasury. on the recommendation 
of the British Minister in Peru, for the foundation'of a British 
School in Lima, catering for both British and Peruvian children. 
50. O. F. H. BricKell to J. V. Perowne, 4 January 1943, FO371/38165 
AS1 273/96/410 
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In October 1941 an Institute was founded at Caracas, with 
the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs as President and the 
Director General of the Ministry of National Education as the 
chairman of the Executive Committee. The Institute flourished 
and attracited important Venezuelan lecturers and representatives 
from Venezuelan scientific and academic institutions. The 
Institute's bulletin was, 
'very 
popular and requestedýby the 
BrazilianýMinistry of Foreign Affairs and institutions as far 
afield asýthe New York Public Library. As well as film shows 
within the Institute, the Council's films were also lent to the 
Venezeula6 Ministries, to schools and to soc&ties such as the 
Workers' Centre. In 1945 the Institute had five hundred and 
fifty-seven students and one hundred and eighty-five members. 
The Council opened an Institute at La Pazýin 1943 after 
Bolivia had declared war on the Axis in April. Relatively small 
scale activities were undertaken by the Institute throughout the 
war but because of the inaccessability of the interior no attempt 
was made to found centres outside the capital. Likewise, in 
Ecuador an Institute was only established in Quito, providing the 
usual cultural and educational facilities. In 1945 it had two 
hundred students and one hundred members. 
With af ew notable exceptions, as, for example, in Buenos 
Aires, the Council rarely received the bacKing of the local 
British community. MacKintosh, after his tour of South America 
with the Willingdon Mission in 1941, recorded that 
we received t". impression that certain British 
Government circles on the one hand, and sections 
of the British communities on the other, regarded 
this vital sphere of operation as a rather faddish 
activity insisted upon by highbrows and blue-stocKings 
- to be regarded with tolerance and even mildly 
encouraged, but not to be taKen very seriouslý, let 
alone to justify any Kind of all-out support.. 1 
In 1943 the Ibero-American Committee discussed the 'imperfect 
understanding' of the Council's aims and work which it felt 
prevented British communities from giving their full support. 
Thus in more than one place where handsome financial 
bacKing is given to the local war funds collections 
and the Ministry of Information Press Offices, - 
objections have been raised to the support of the 
Institute or School on grounds that týe Community's 
funds are intended for war purposes. 
51. Report by H. S. Mackintosh, October 1941. BW2/17 
52. Ibero-American Committee Minutes, 7 February'43, BW2/10 
180 
By the end of the war the Council had representatives in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile,, Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay and 
Guatemala City. It directly supported thirteen societies in 
Argentina, nine in Uruguay, five in Brazil and Colombia, four 
in Chile, two in Peru and Paraguay and one in the capitals of 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. There were an estimated 
twenty-six thousand adult' students learning English u! nder the 
auspices of these societies. Cultural propaganda had begun in 
earnest afte_ýr DunKirK and the fall of France, when faith in 
Britain's ultimate victory had been dim. After the entry of 
the United States into the war, conditions for the development 
of propaganda improved considerably. However, Britain faced now 
0 
a massive American publicity campaign, supported by a growth in 
popularity of the Pan-American ideal, which was regarded as a 
hindrance to Britain's long-term interests. 'The defence of 
Britain's economic interests, against the r eturn of peace and 
against United States as much as Axis encroac. 
I hment, became the 
paramount consideration of British propagandý. And in this tasK 
cultural propaganda had a special and predominant role. Unable 
to match the United States in quantity) the Council hoped to win 
the hearts of the ruling classes in Latin America with the high 
quality and sophistication of British culture and political 
development and, by accident more than design, to appear as the 
foremost exponent of European culture and the counter-balance to 
the all-pervasiveness of 'YanKee' culture. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE BIG THREE 
The Council's presence in Britain's three major wartime 
allies was, by contrast to its work in other foreign countries, 
muted and distorted. Although relations with the U. nited States, 
the Soviet Union and China occupied much of the Foreign Office's 
attention, only in China did the cultural effort match the 
diplomatic. Special factors dictated that the Council could 
not operate normally in any of these countriý S. The perceived 
sensitivity of the American public to foreign propaganda, the 
nature of the Soviet system and the disintegration of China's 
social and economic structure presented insuperable barriers. 
At first g'lance, the United States would appeaý 
,r 
to offer the 
best opportunity in the world for the propagation of the British 
way of life. 
The benevolent neutrality and, after 1940, the active 
cooperation of the United States were vital to Britain's 
prospects for victory. However, it was agreed before war broke 
out that 'it was contrary to good policy to undertake propaganda 
in the United States', in view of the suspicion with which 
foreign publicity wasCtegarded and German warnings that the United 
States should pot allow itself to be tricked into a second war, 
as they had allegedly been brought into the firat by cunning 
British propaganda. 
1 
Even the Travel Association could not 
provide cover as there would be no tourist traffic to proýaote 
after war broke out and 'the disguise would be so obvious ..... 
as to indicate an unwarrantable contempt for American intelligence 
Moreover, it was believed that Americans would not understand 
the subtle distinction between the Council and an official Ministry 
of Information and therefore, 'anything which even looks like 
official or semi-official propaganda' should be avoided. 
3 
The 
MOI planners agreed that Britain would lose more than she would 
gain by establishing a propaganda machine in the United States. 
America will judge the European powers not by 
what they say about themselves, but by what they 
do. It is almost certain that American reaction 
in our favour will arise from the mistakes of 
enemy Powers, both in policy and propaganda, than 
from anything we say in justification of British 
action .4 
Minute by A. Dudley, 26 July 1939 F0395/6488 P3227/105/150 
2.1 bid. 
3. Leeper to A. Fletcher, 2 March 1939 F0395/641 P664/44/150 4. Minute by A. Dudley, 26 July 1939 F(3395/641, P664/44/150 
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The American Press in London, wireless communications and a small 
extension of the British Library in New York were considered 
sufficient in a country 'where there is always a fund of sympathy 
on which we can rely'. 
5 
These views were supported in Washington by the newly-arriv. ed 
British ambassador, Lord Lothian, who believbd that 
the American people overwhelmingly desired not 
to become involved, and, consequently that any 
efforts on our part to influence them to look 
favourably on Britain's war effort and war 
objectives, would be regarded as propaganda 
aimed at getting them into the war. 6 
ý 
The British Library, consisting of a small office in the Rockefellei 
Centre under the control of the Foreign Office, was the sole 
outpost for the presentation of the British cause and was under 
strict instruction not to engage in propaganda!.. 
7 
Ronald Tree, 
on a tour of the United States for the MOI shortly after the 
outbreak of war, recorded that 
If the British Government intended to prove to 
the world that it had no intention of propagandising 
its war effort in the United States, it could not 
have done a better job. 8 
This situation was mirrored in the MOI's American Division that 
at first acted chiefly as a press cutting service for the British 
Library in New York. 
The Council adhered faithfully to'the ban on publicity, but 
with increasing reluctance. Lloyd found an ally in John Reith, 
who arrived at the Ministry as Minister in January 1940. Lloyd 
had opposed the ban and feared that German propagahda had gained 
from Britain's absence. He explainedto Reith that he had 
urg ed the Foreign Office that just because the 
propaganda situation is p delicate one in the 
United States, that is not any reason why propaganda 
should not be done if vision and intelligence are 
used upon the problem. 9 
Reith agreed with Lloyd but met 'with striKing lacK of success' 
when he tried to raise the ban. 
10 
5. Ibid 
6. R. Tree, When the Moon was High, (London 1975)p. 95 
7. Alexander Korda, the film producer, returned to the United 
States after warý, broke out, on Churchill's instructions, to 
produce pro-British films. He established offices in the 
Rockefeller Centre that were used as a cover by British 
intelligence. M. Korda, Charmed Lives (London 1980) p. 146 
a. Tree, op-cit. p. 96-97 
9. Lloyd to Reith, 6 May 1940. BW 82/7 
10. Reith to Lloyd, 7 May 1940. BW 82/7 
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The events of the summer of 1940 forced Britain'to pursue . 
a more positive propaganda policy in the United States. Six days 
after the armistice had been signed at Compi6gne, the War Cabinet 
concluded, 
that the time had come when more active steps 
should be taken to make our point of view more 
widely known in the United States and to 
counteract German propaganda. 11 
Although ChLLrchill had stated firmly that the British Empire would 
continue the fight alone, gloomy prophets in', the United States 
forecast thatBritain would either sue for peaý, ce or be invaded and 
occupied by Germany. In her solitary position Britain could 
hope to survive but not to defeat the Axis, and even survival 
depended on material assistance from across the Atlantic. 
There is a real danger that American doubts as 
to our prospects of victory may lead to a slackening 
-of the will to help us. As in the long run we are 
dependent on America for victory, it'is a matter'of 
the highest importance that nothing'should be left 
undone to dispbl those doubts. 12 
The elimination of the French fleet at Oran in July underlined 
Britain's determination and Churchill's dire warnings of the 
dangers that would follow the triumph of fascism in Europe strucK 
home in a vulnerable America. Nevertheless, such events had to 
be clearly impressed upon the American consciousness to overcome 
a traditional isolationist viewpoint. 
The new Minister of Information had returned recently from a 
lecture tour of th. e United States and had reached the conclusion 
that Britain's publicity machine was 'totally inadequate' * 
13 
Duff Cooper revamped the American Division at the Ministry and 
appointed a Press Attach6 in Washington. Moreover, Lothian 
believed too that it was time to expand Britain's information 
services to show the American people 'the danger Britain faced 
and the implications of this for the United States'. 
14 
The 
lifting of the ban revealed new opportunities for the Council. 
Lloyd argued that as the Council was charged with-the sole 
rd. sponsibility for cultural propaganda, this activity in the 
United States was also its duty. 
15 
The Foreign office agreed that 
if the Ministry could operate in the United States, it was 'now 
11 . War Cabinet Conclusions. 28 June 1940, CABGS/5 WM(40)186 
12. Minute by D. Scott. 22 July 1940. F0371/24230 A3561/26/45 
13. Tree, op-cit., p. 118 
14. Tree, op. cit., p-14G 
15. Lloyd to F. Whyte. 29 July 1940. F0371/24230 A3561/26/45 
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permissible for the British Council to operate in the United 
States also'. 
16 The MOI, however, stated that existing arrange- 
ments should stand and the Counsil be barred from establishing an 
independent and parallel organisation in the United States. The 
Ministry's arguments, appealed to the Treasury, whose permission 
the Council needed toinitiate activities in the United States. 
This issue became immersed in the wider battle between Lloyd 
and Duff Cooper for the control of cultural propaganda and was 
overshadowed-by the Minster's growing difficulties with the Press, 
the Foreign Office and the Service Ministerie, s. However, although 
the Ministry so'ught to prevent direct Council work in America, it 
did not object to theltouncil distributing its material in the 
United States through the Ministry's organisation. Exhibitions 
assembled by the Council for the New York Worl. d Fair were 
subsequently exhibited at other centres and th6 Council offered 
book exporters a percentage of the losses incurred in the sale of 
British books in the United States. The M, inistry asked the 
I 
I Council's Periodicals Department to distribu te periodicalsto mai-lit 
lists compiled by the Council but vetted by the Ministry. 
Then when it is decided that we shall distribute any 
particular paper, we shall indicate to you (the Council) 
the types of people or institutions we wish to receive 
it or even perhaps the actual names on a particular list. 
The despatch will thereafter be arranged by the Council 
acting as the Ministry's agent, in conjunction with the 
paper concerned; the paper's own wrappers will be used 
and there will be nothing to indicate that it had not 
emanated from their Offices. 17 
Britain's desperate position in the summer of 1940 had 
motivated this flurry of activity and it was followed by actions 
that brought America more openly to Britain's side. In September, 
fifty American destroyers were transferred to Britain in exchange 
for bases in the West Indies in an agreement that 'Marked the 
passage of the United States from being neutral to being non- 
belligerant'. 
18 
In December 1940 Roosevelt was reelected and 
the United States was designated 'the most important single field 
for British publicity 'overseas'. 
19 The Ministry, ho . wever, 
1ý-. S. Gasel ee to M. Paterson, 26 November 1940. BW 63/2 
17. F. Whyte to A-J-S. White, 19 July 1940. FO371/24230 A3561/25/45 
18. Churchill, op. cit. Vol. 2, p. 356 
19. OEPEC Meeting, 17 December 1940. ýT162/858 E9140/10 
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argued that it would be dangerous if the Council were now allowed 
to start working there as it ha, d 'all along been regarded as a 
propaganda body' and such a step might be seen as #evidence of 
a new and 
i 
important British propaganda drive'. 
20 
In 1941 Sir Gerald Campbell was appointed head of the newly 
formed British Information Services, independent of the British 
Library, with Aubrey Morgan and John Wheeler-Bennet as his two 
assistants. Campbell was not-'very Keen on cultural propaganda 
in the StatETs as he thought they only wanted war news', 
21 
and it 
was agreed'that the Council should operate indirectly in the 
United States. With the arrival of Brendan Bracken at the 
Ministry of Information, the organisation o-f' British publicity 
in the United States was reshaped. The Foreign Office relinqui- 
shed control of the British Library to the British Information 
Services and Morgan replaced Campbell. However, Bracken treated 
Tree's proposals for a radical extension of,, and increase in, the 
activities of the British Information Servicis 1ýith some 
scepticism' and was inclined to rely once again on American 
journalists, who he believ'ed to be 'more effective advocates of 
the British cause than any official propaganda'. 
22 
As for the 
Council, Bracken had no desire to exclude it from the United 
States and 
stated that he was willing to give the British 
Council practically carte blanche in the United 
States - an cultural matters - and wanted to 
see them in closer relations with the British 
Library in New York. He even contemplated the 23 possibility of the British Council taking this over. I 
Partly because the Council's resources were already overstretched 
and because, the Ministry's senior officials were adamant in 
'retaining control of British propaganda in the United States, 
, nothing came of Bracken's proposals. Instead, the Council 
concentrated an increasing the supply of materials to the British 
Library and to commercial distributors in the United States. 
However, it was not British propaganda that brought America 
into the war but a direct attacK on the American fleet at Pearl 
Harbour by the Japanese. Until the United States was a full 
belligerent the British Information Services and the Council 
.. 
m. a, intained a low profile. After December 1941 the United States 
20. Ouff Cooper to Eden, 11 January 1941. T 101/1104 S35581/03/41 
21. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 29 July 1941. BW69/7 
22. C. E. Lysaght, Brendan BracKen (London 1979), p. 216 
23. Minute by E. Bamford, 13 September 1941. INFI/445 
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set up its own information service, known as the Office of War 
Information, and sought the cooperation Britain in presenting 
Allied policy to the American public. In 1943 the Council 
raised the possibility of establishing separate representation 
in the United States to conduct Britain's cultural publicity. 
Powerful arguments were raised against this course; the 
multiplicity of British organisations already in the United States, 
shortages of manpower and finance and the Foreign Office's view 
thatý there were objections to the British Council 
engaging in cultural activities in th, e United 
States of America, partly because thVp would be 
liKely to involve overlapping with the British 
Information Services and qjrtly because culture 
has a propaganda flavour. 
Moreover, the Washington Embassy reported thatýHalifax 
expressed definite view that British Information 
Services would be responsible in the United States 
of America for work falling to British Council in 
other countries so long as war lasted and said he 
had strong objection to any duality , being established. 
..... If the British Council is to operate in the United 
States it should be through British Information Services 
..... In this way they could build up connexions which 
they could take over after war. 25 
Therefore, the Council's role remained the supply of materials 
to the British Information Services but it was with great 
reluctance that it abandoned its claims to greater independence. 
This caused acrimonious. disputes between the two organisations 
and accusations' of treachery. For example, when the British 
Information Services took over the distribution of Britain Today 
it was circulated free to forty thousand addresses. The British 
Information Services demanded subscriptions, which reduced the 
circulation to three thousand and then produced its own magazine. 
Britain, to rival the Council's publication. The Council 
retaliated by arranging for Britain Today to be publi'shed in 
Canada and sent to their own mailing list in the United States, 
effectively by-passing the British Information Services. 
The distribution of films provided the most fertile ground 
fo'r disagreement. When the ban on publicity had been raised in 
1940 the Foreign Office had advised the Council that it could' 
24. Minute by R. A. Butler, 19 August 1943. FO 370/728 
L4509/115/410 
25. R. A. Butler to Eden, 24 September 1943. FO 370/728 
L4959/115/410 
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now distribute its own films in the United States 'in exactly 
the same way as they already despatch them for distribution in 
other countries'. 
26 However, the only point of reference for 
the distri 
I 
bution of British official films in the United States 
was a representative of the International Film Centre, employed 
by the Ministry and attached to the Library. Both Guedalla and 
Kearney regarded this Films Officer with great suspicion as a 
member of the documentary movement, which they despised, and as 
an employee-of the Ministry of Information, which they believed 
was dedicated to the destruction of the Councýlills film activities. 
Moreover, Kearney maintained that normal commýrcial channels were 
always more effective than official agencies. Accordingly, they 
were extremely reluctant to entrust the commercial distribution 
of the Council's films in the United States toý 
I 
the Ministry of 
Information, although they were content to leave non-commercial 
distribution in the hands of the British Library. In May 1941 
the Ministry produced plans for an organisation in New York to 
handle the commercial distribution of all films; a scheme that 
the Council vigorously opposed. In December 1942, however, the 
Council was forced to agree that the films of both organisations 
for theatrical and non-threatrical distribution, should be 
distributed through the British Information Services. Kearney's 
worst suspicions were confirmed when it was discovered towards 
the end of the war that not a single British Council film had 
been commercially distributed in the United States. The 
British Information Services maintained that there had been no 
demand for. them, but the Council saw more sinister reasons, 
especially as its films had been successfully commercially 
distrib uted 
, 
in Canada and were popular with the American troops 
in Britain. In January 1945 the Ministry relented and allowed 
the Council to find th, ', '; ir own commercial distributors in the 
United States, provided that all the Council's films were vetted 
by the Ministry first. This concession camp too late, however, 
as within a year the Council's Film Division was transferred to 
the embryonic COI. 
Therefore, although it would be inaccurate to say that the 
Council undertook no work in the United States during the war, 
such services as it was able to provide were strictly limited. 
26. A. W. G. Randall to P. Guedalla, 26 December 1940. BW63/2 
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In 1944 the Foreign Office mooted the possibility of attaching 
an educational and cultural adviser to the Washington Embassy 
or the formation of an Anglo-American, cultural collaboration 
committee. The Council believed that 'after the war, the 
United States will inevitably be one of the most important, most 
difficult and most fruitf ul fiel ds for cultural coop eration". 
27 
It proposed that it should act as a link between the many public 
and private bodies engaged in cultural and educational 
activities o-n both sides of the Atlantic, rather than attempt to 
initiate such work or compete with existing agencies. However, 
the Council had lost the battle for direct reýresentation in the 
United States and the decision would not be reversed for nearly 
thirty years. Ronnie Tree, speaking in a debate in the House 
of Commons in June 1944, argued that the Council should be 
confined to those countries where culture and art formed the 
main part of Britain's publicity, such as Italy or, Portugal, but 
that 
in countries like the United States and the 
Soviet Union, where a positive interpretation 
of, all aspects of our life must be attempted 
and the facts given, as well as the countering 
of actual misrepresentation which is always 
being made by our enemies, the British Council 
should be definitely excluded. 28 
The Council was equally unsuccessful in establishing an 
organisation in the Soviet Union. Fundamental differences between 
Britain and the Soviet Union had hampered collaboration before 
the war and the difficulties of penetrating a totalitarian 
society had'prevented the establishment of cultural contacts. 
The Ministry of Information planners had not recommended the 
foundation of a publicity bureau in the Soviet Union, at least 
in the early stages of the war even if it had been possible, 
although hospitality to Russians visiting Britain was considered 
29 
important. he Council provided facilities for Soviet merchant 
seamen arriving in Britain but no further action was taken until 
after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. 
27. Memorandum an the future development of the Council, 
March 1944. BW2/101 
28, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, Vol 401. 
June 1944, Cols. 887-8 
29. Ministry of Information Publicity Division Planning Section, 
Report No. 239, FO 395/648B P2958/105/150 
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In September a British delegation visited Moscow to discuss the 
provision of supplies for the Russian war effort 
'. 
Arising from 
this conference, BeaverbrooK, leader of the delegation, presented 
a memorandum prepared by Sir Charles Wilson to the War Cabinet 
on the exc 
I ange of scientific information with the Soviet Union. 
30 
The Council, to which all responsibility for medical and 
scientific propaganda, ý-ad passed, received these suggestions. 
The Finance and Agenda Committee was told in October that Eden 
had ruled 
that any general programme of 6ctivitlies would 
be premature. He promised, however, 
ýhat 
he would 
refer to Sir Stafford Cripps any concrete proposals 
that we care to submit and he suggested that we 
should take up the question of exchanging scientific 
information. 31 
In consultation with Sir John Anderson, Chairman of the Science 
Advisory Committee to the War Cabinet, the Council investigated 
ways of improving facilities for correspondence between British 
and Soviet scientists and the exchange of scientific publications. 
The Council was concerned only with non-military information and 
with private correspondence and exchanges. In addition, music 
scores were despatched to Moscow at Cripp's request. 
In February 1942 a Press Attach6, John Lawrence, was 
attached to the Embassy at Kuibyshev. The Ministry of Informatior 
suggested that the Council should use Lawrence as its contact in 
the Soviet Union and it was agreed that Lawrence should correspond 
with the Council on cultural matters. The Ministry argued that 
in the Soviet Union 'any political or war propaganda can only 
grow out of scientific and cultural exchanges'. 
32 Initially, 
at least, the Council's work would have to be the cloak for normal 
Ministry operations. Both Cripps and the Soviet bmbassador in 
London had advised the Ministry that only scientific and cultural 
publicity would be possible at first. In these circumstances 
the Council argued that 
all worK In the Soviet Union should be carried 
out by the Council and that the whole of the 
Ministry's worK is an encroachment. 33 
30. War Cabinet Minutes, 8 October 1941, CAB 66/19 WP(411238 
31. Finance and Agenda Committee Minutes, 7 October 1941. BW69/7 
32. E. Bamford to K-T-Gurney. 4 April 1942. F0370/674 
L1348/310/410 
33. R. Seymour to K. T. Gurney, 10 April 1942 . F) 370/674 
LI 348/310/410 
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Reluctant to begin another battle with the Ministry of InformationA 
the Council agreed to work through Lawrence on condition that all 
educational and cultural proposals be referred exclusively to 
itself. 
After the Anglo-Soviet Treaty in May, Lawrence was able to 
work more openly and bega 
'n 
producing a newspaper, Thp British Ally, 
and to distribute Ministry material. Incessant Soviet demands 
for the opening of a second front in Europe and misrepresentation 
I of the British war effort demanded the presentation of the British 
case but the establishment of informal and unofficial contacts 
was extremely difficult. The Soviet Government's reaction had 
been lukewarm to proposals for correspondence between British 
and Soviet scientists. The Council was told that all such 
contacts would have to be conducted through s&ientific institution., 
and would be n'early impossible due to the dispersal of Soviet 
scientists. 
Towards the end ofc: )1942 the Council considered the appointment 
of its own representative in the Soviet Union 
since Mr. Lawrence is carrying on political 
propaganda openly the Ministry can no longer 
maintain that a cultural umbrella is essential 
to them. 34 
Robertson was anxious that the Council should not be identified 
with the Ministry and that the development of scientific and 
cultural relations should not go by default in view of Lawrence's 
increasing Ministry worK. Housing and food shortages in the 
Soviet Union, however, militated against the expansion of British 
representation. In December 1942 after discussions between the 
Council, the Science Committee, the Foreign Office and ClarK Kerr, 
it was agreed that a prominent scientist should go to the Soviet 
Union to establish contacts and survey the field for the Council. 
Unfortunately, the Soviet Government objected to the visit of 
Professor Dirac, holder of the Isaac Newton Chair at Cambridge. 
on the grounds that the Soviet scientists are 
dispersed over the w, hole vast territory of the 35 
USSR and that no contacts would be possible. 
The question of Council representation fell into abeyance aftdr 
this setback. 
34, Minute by K. T. Gurney, 27 October 1942. F0370/675 
L3160/310/410 
35. Minute by K. T. Gurney, 21 May 1943. FO370/675 L3356/31 /410 
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Nevertheless, the Soviet Union became an important field 
for the Council's functional departments, especially the Science 
Department. In 1943 in an agreement with VOKS, the director of 
the Science Department, James Crowther, was entrusted with the 
provision of information on British science to the Soviet Union. 
An exchange of political and non-politi cal publications between 
the All Union Lenin Library and British academic and scientific 
institutions was organised and. booKs, periodicals, films, music 
scores and 11. hotographs were despatched. In April the Council 
jointly sponsored a delegation of British surgeons to the Soviet 
Union. In London Anglo-Soviet showings of scýlentific films were 
undertaKen and the Council assisted with exhibitions of Russian 
booKs. The Foreign Office supported the exchange of publications 
with the Soviet Union in view of the dearth of contemporary Soviet 
material in Britain. 1ý 
The difficulties the Council experienced in establishing 
contacts in the Soviet Union were a facet of! thejwide gulf that 
separated the-Western Allies from their Soviet counterpart. A 
member of the Council's staff was sent to Moscow at the end of 
1943 but only to supervise the exchange of publications. The 
suspicion that pervaded diplomatic relations extended to the 
cultural and scientific fields. E. L. Woodward wrote, on the 
attitude of the Soviet Union, 
They regarded their defence against Germany as 
an episode in a vaster and larger struggle. 
Unlike the British and the Americans, they did 
not look forward to victory over the Germans as 
the beginning of a new era. They were not fighting 
for the "freedom" of western civilisation, theq ., 
were hardly less concerned with protecting themselves 
aga, inst their "allies" than with winning the war 
against Germany. 36 
The story of the Councills, and indeed the Ministry's, activities 
in the Soýiet Union during the war bears out this observation. 
In China, before September 1941, the Council provided a 
s ýh all subsidy for a Brttish School in Tsingtao and grants, 
administered by the Embassy, to the English departments of some 
universities and to the Sino-British Cultural Association. 
36. Woodward op. cit. Vol II (London 1971) p. 4. 
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Proposals for a subsidy to Hong Kong University 'to show the 
Japanese that we intend to maintain our position in the Far East 
as far as possible' 
37 
were shelved on the outbreak of war in 
Europe. Japanese pressure in the Far East, and particularly on 
the Burma 
I 
Road, forestalled British help to China. After the 
entry of the United States into the war, the situa'tion was eased 
but there was no immediate prospect of Britain being'able to 
increase supplies considerably.. Moreover, although the 
involvement, of Britain and the United States in the war with 
Japan enhanced the chances of Chinese victorý,, the subsequent 
disputes over strategy, allocation of supplies and the choice of 
military commanders placed additional strains an Anglo-Chinese 
relations. General Chiang Kai-Shek made matters worse in 1942 
by attempting to interfere in the Indian polit 
I 
ical situation. 
Clearly a great deal of fence-mending of Anglo-'Chinese relations 
needed to be undertaKen. 
In January 1942 the British Ambassador 16 China, Clark Kerr, 
suggested that English teaching and cultural facilities could be 
extended under the auspices of the British Council. 
38 Dr. E. R. 
Hughes, Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy at Oxford 
University, travelled to China in 1942 under the joint sponsorship 
of the Council and the University, and arrived in Chungking in 
April, as the Japanese were overrunning Burma rendering access to 
China almost impossible. Future contacts and supplies could 
henceforth only be maintained by air transport from bases in 
Assam over the "Hump" of intervening mountains to Kunming and 
Chungking. Furthermore British prestige in the Far East was 
severely undermined by Japan's victories in 1942. Hughes spent 
two and a half years in China establishing contacts with Chinese 
scholars at a number of centres, but mainly at Kunming. Hughes' 
range of contacts was inevitably limited and the Foreign Office 
and the Council were anxious that they should be exte nded. 
Sir H. Seymour, the British Ambassador, advised in September 
1942, that 
Owing to the peculiar status enjoyed by university 
students and professors in China, anything which 
we can do to alleviate the difficulties under which 
they are WDrKing cannot fail to react favourably on 
Chinese opinion of Britain and should, in the long 
run, produce very considerable results. 39 
37. Minute byýH. P. Croom-Johnson, 2 February 1939. BW23/3 
38. Telegram from ClarK-Kerr, 5 January' 1942. FO370/668 L77/77/410 
39. R-Seymour to Eden, 9 September 1942. FO370/670 L3771/77/410 
193 
After a visit to China in May 1942 Sir John Sargent, Education 
Commissioner with the Government of India, had reached a similar 
conclusion and recommended that 
To do this now when there are obvious difficulties 
to be overcome would be more effective than to do 
it after the war when it will no doubt be interpreted 
as part of the us 
, 
ual scramble to extend western 
spheres of political and commercial interest. 40 
In the summer of 1942 Seymour appointed John Blofeld, Press 
Attach6 at Chungking, as his adviser on cultural relations. The 
Cou ncil, meanwhile, after discussions with th e Foreign Office, 
had decided to sponsor the visit of an eminent scientist and an 
academic to China. Dr. Joseph Needham, Reader in Bio-Chemistry 
at Cambridge since 1933, who described himself as a 'Christian 
Marxist', and Professor E. R. Dodds, Regius proýfessor of Greek at 
Oxford, arrive d in China in February 1943. In the previous 
month an Anglo-Chinese Treaty had been signeo to bolster Chinese 
morale by the abrogation of Britain's extra-. 
ierrit0rial 
rights 
in China. The selection of Do-dds and Needham aroused comment 
inside and outside the Council. The Council's Science Advisory. 
Committee protested at not being consulted and Stephen Gaselee 
at the Foreigp. Office described Dodds as 'an extreme pacifist' 
and Needham'as 'a "pink" if not quite "red" 'I' The Science 
Advisory Committee to the War Cabinet, too, was incensed at being 
by-passed and the Lord President, Anderson, drew Eden's attention 
to the left-wing. sympathies of both men and alleged that Needham 
had been a pacifist until the Soviet Union had been attacked by 
Germany. 
42 
Before setting out for China, Needham was invited by the 
American Ambassador in London, to visit the United States on his 
way. Such a stop-over was considered highly desirable by the 
Foreign Office 'in the interests of Anglo-American cooperation 
more particularly in the Far East' and was approved by Eden. 
43 
The Council was acutely aware of the extensive American cultural 
and educational programme in China. In July 1943 Sir Henry Dale 
rqmarked that 
China would be an important field later an and 
unless British influence was introduced at the 
start it would come exclusively under the 
influence of the United States. 44 
40. Report on a visit to China by J. Sargent. May 1942. FO370/669 
L2278/77/410 
41 Minute by S-Gaselee, 7 October 1942. FO370/670 L3503/77/410 * 
42. Sir John Anderson tcýDEden, 5 October 1942. FO 370/670 L3694/77/410 
43. Minute by J. Ashley-ClarKe, 17 September 1942. FO370/669 L3161/77/410 
44. Finance and Agonda Committee Minutes. 13 Julv*1943. BW69/9 
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Needham's visit to the United States, was a great success and he 
established good relations with a large number of official and 
unofficial organisations. 
The intellectual isolation and perso;, nal and material 
deprivations suffered by the Chinese academic world since the 
Japanese attacK in 1937 meant that this small effort by Britain 
was welcomed more enthusiastically than could have b'een 
anticipated. Britain's abili-ty to fulfill the expectations 
aroused by t-he arrival of Dodds and Needham was enhanced by the 
Government's decision at the end of 1942 to allow the. Chinese 
Government to draw on its-1941 export credit of ES million 'for 
45 the purpose of training students in this country, ' In 
cooperation with the Chinese Government and British industry the 
Council arranged for the placing of nearly sevýenty Chinese 
students a year with British universities and 
"firms. 
Dodds, 
Needham and Blofeld were unanimous in recommending that the 
Council should concentrate on improving contactsiwith Chinese 
academic and s6ientific circles and expandin , 'g the Sino-British 
Cultural Association. Through the Council Britain aimed to 
influence these classes in three ways; firstly, by gaining 
their gratitude for the help offered in China's hour of need; 
secondly, by 
the putting into operation of some of the more 
far-reaching schemes ýwhichl will show them 
that we are convinced that this war will not be 
lost by the Allies, 
and thirdly, by 
establishing channels through which British 
culture and British ideals can be 
, 
brought home 
to,. and caused to flourish inthe minds of China's 
future leaderý"46 
Dodds returned to England in-the summer of 1943 and 
recommended that Chinese 'universities should be helped by the 
supply of booKs *and the exchange of students and academic 
personnel. Four Chinese professors were invited to Oxfoed and 
Cambridge to taKe up residence. for a year and Dr. Hughes returned 
to-oxford in 1944 as assistant to the Professor-elect of Chinese, 
Dr. Chen Yin-Chiao. Also in 1944 Dr. W. L. RenwicK, Professor'of 
4 5. K. T. Gurney to W. Bridges-Adams, 23 November 1942. FO370/671 L3939/77/410 
46. R. Seymour to Eden, 9 September 1942. F0370/670 L3771/77/4111 
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English Literature and Language at Newcastle travelled to China 
as a visiting lecturer and Dr. Dorothey Needham,, Needham's wife 
and a lecturer in Bio-Chemistry, Dr. L. E. R. Picken, a Research 
Fellow at Cambridge, and Dr. Sanders, an expert on penicillin, 
joined Nee 
I 
dham. 
Needham established a remarkable organisation at Chungking 
known as the Sino-Britisk Scientific Cooperation Off 
I ice. 47 In 
the first seven months of 1943-Needham undertook a 8,000 kilometre 
tour of uniVersities, research institutes and technical colleges 
in the north and west of Chi. na. In August 
ý, 
eedham developed the 
Office in Chungking which he described as 
part of an allied attempt to break the Japanese 
intellectual and technical blockade around China. 
It was our aim to bring help to the Chinese 
scientists and technologists isolatedýeven in the 
biggest cities of "Free China", and mu , ch more so 
in the remoter locations where war factories had 
grown up and exiled universities established 
themselves. 48 
Needham likened the work of the Office to that of a clearing 
house for scientific information or as 'intellectual lend-lease 
in both directions'. 
49 It was the link between t. he Chinese 
Ministry of Health and the Medical Research Council in England, 
between the Chinese Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and many 
more. In its first year the office was wholly associated with, 
and fully financed by, the Council but the exigencies of war 
necessitated closer relations with the Ministry of Production, 
which created'a special China office to deal with this worK. 
WorKing closely with the Military, Naval and Air Attach6s at the 
Embassy ih-Chungking, Needham provided the Ministry of Production 
with-information on war science and technology in China collected 
from his many contacts with the Chinese Army and Air Force as 
well as'civilian research bodies. In return the Ministry of 
Production, as far as possible, met Needham's requests for 
information and materials. All information collected by Needham 
o. n post-war Chinese commerce and industry was passed to the Board 
of Trade. - In addition, the fruits of Needham's discoveries ware 
47. J. Needham, Science Outpost, (London 1948) p. 13- 
48. Ibid., p. 17 
49. Ibid., p. 75 
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relayed to scientific institutions in Washington, such as the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development, the. Committee for 
Medical Research and the Department of Agriculture. In China 
the Science Cooperation Office was officially associated, after 
consultations with the Generalissimo, with an organisation known 
as the 'Council for the Promotion of Science in the National 
Defence' and. had special'liaison officers with the p'rincipal 
Chinese ministries - War, Economics, Education, Agriculture - 
and the Natiýinal Health Administration of the Academia Sinica. 
Needham's office was more often known as the'British Scientific 
Mission in China than as the Council's Sciencý Office. 
r 
The main features of the Office were the maintenance of . 
contacts between British and Chinese scientists, the supply of 
scientific information and materials to the CK I 
inese, the 
facilitation of the output of scientific literature from China, 
the provision of advice to Chinese scientific and technical bodies 
and assistance with the exchange of scientific personnel. , 
Under 
these five headings a multitude of activities was undertaken 
over an astonishingly wide field. In addition, in three years 
from 1943 to 1946, Needham and his staff undertook journeys 
covering 25,000 kilometres in extremely hazardous conditions, 
visited three-hundred Chinese scientific and technical institutione 
in ten of the eighteen classical provinces of China, including the 
communist strongholds of Shensi, Kansu and Ningshai. As well as 
being joined by eminent British scientists, Needham also recruited 
distinguished Chinese scientists to work in the Office. A full 
description of its work cannot be given here but a few statistics 
may convey some impression of the vast range of work undertaken. 
Despite the, very considerable difficulties of supplying China, 
the Council was able to secure room for cultural and scientific 
material in the infrequent air transports from India. In 1943 
both aircraft and supplies were limited by the demands of other. 
theatres; in 1944 China came nearer to collapse than at any other 
time in her seven-year struggle. Nevertheless, by the end of 
the war one hundred and sixty-nine scientific, technical and 
mE Mical journals were reaching China regularly. in microfilm form 
and one hundred and eighty-eight in print form, the Council had 
spent 160,000 on research chemicals and apparatus for China and 
nearly 7,000 volumes had been presented. The Office-also answered 
individual requests, such as a list of the edible and poisonous 
plants of North Burma and the Shan States for the Chinese Surgeon- 
General. 
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Much of the credit for the office's success must go to 
Needham himself and the enthusiasm of his British and Chinese 
staff. Needham paid tribute to the help of the British 
embassy staff and especially that of Sir Horace and Lady Seymour 
and commented, 
Such understanding was not unremarkable for it is 
a comparatively new thing in international relations 
that science and technology should take a prominent 
place. 49 
The. devd'lopment of this office was largely out of the CouncillE 
hands and the Council was not directly repres ented in China 
during the war; Hug, hes was engaged mainly in his own research, 
Blofeld belonged to the MOI and Dodds returned soon after his 
tour for health reasons. The Council did not find a representati\ 
until 1945, by which time the foundations of A6glo-Chinese cultural 
relations had been laid. The Foreign Office commented on the 
Council's work in China, 
It has made an excelient start, and -it represents 
almost the only constructive work which it is 
possible for us, for. the time. -being, to carry on 
in China. It is potentially, for the future, of 
the very highest importance. 50 
In January 1945 Needham 6nd. the Council's new Representative, 
Professor P. M. Roxby, Professor of Geography at Liverpool University 
were giveh diplomatic status to improve their standing in 
negotiations with the Chinese authorities. 
The most striking feature-of the Council's operations in 
China during the war is the contrast between the diplomatic and 
the cultural effort. After the Cairo Declaration of. December 
1943, the United States had assumed responsibility for relations 
between China and the Allies-and the Foreign Office's chief 
interest lay 
. 
'in ensuring that the intricacies of the Chinese 
situation did not damage Anglo-American relations. The Foreign 
Office'saw no opportunity. for mediation between the Kuomintang 
and the. Communists and was aware of American distrust of British 
motives in the Far East. The Foreign office did not believe 
thýt China would be a great power in the near future or that she 
would play a stabilising role in Asia but, nevertheless, urged 
the Council to expand its activities as much as possiblbý. t. Moreover, 
unlike almost every other field of Anglo-American relations in 
China, Needham worked closely with American government agencies. 
I November 1944 F0924/50 
LCI334/160/452 
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SUMMARY 
At the end of the war the Council had thirty-one RepresentativEG 
overseas i, n as many foreign countries and British colonies. There 
were ninety-nine British institutes and like centres catering for 
a total of nearly twenty-five thousand students. The forty- 
six cultural societies of Latin America had over thirty-three 
thousand students and social *members. In theýlast year of 
the war the Council spent E3 million, roughly half overseas. The 
most striking feature of its work during the ar-was this dramatic 
rise in expenditure from government sources. This fact-alone 
suggests that the Council's work was regarded as a direct 
contribution to the war effort and that the value of long term 
cultural publicity had been recognised. The Foreign Office and 
the Treasury were under constant pressure from British political 
and military personnel overseas to increase t, he Council's work. 
The Foreign Office encouraged the Council to, 
i 
expý nd widely and 
kept only a distant watch on its prot6g6. Relations with the 
MOI settled into wary coperation after 1941 and both had large 
and often overlapping organisations overseas and both proclaimed 
the same message by the end of the war. 
The Council's activities spread as opportunity and finance 
allowed. In Europe, its efforts met with little success after 
the failure of Britain's diplomatic and military policies. In 
the Middle East, however, Britain's case reached large numbers 
through the agency of the Council and expenditure in this area 
exceeded that in any other area. Turkey was the biggest single 
consumer of the Council's budget and the Council estimated in 
March 1945 that i't was"'-teaching English to ten thousand pupils - 
there. Although overall expenditure was considerably less in 
Latin America, significant numbers were reached by working through 
ingigenous organisations. The Council's work in Latin America 
was dominated by the long term priority of protecting British 
economic interests but in the Middle East, it also served-a 
short term purpose, for example in Iraq after the Rashid Ali episod 
and in Iran after the Joint Occupation. The work of the Allied: 
Liaison Division was chiefly short term and designed to ease the 
problems of the service authorities in the Middle East. The 
Council achieved comparatively little in the Commonwealth and 
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Empire during the war, although the Colonial Office had accepted 
the desirability of cultural and educational activities in the 
Colonies. The Dominions Office, its staff overseas and the 
Dominion Governments proved much more reluctant to concede that 
the cultural links of the Empire required strengthening and that 
the Council was the right body to conduct such work. In the 
neutral countries, the Council reinforced British foreign policy, 
for example, by reassuring Franco of British support if he 
remained neu-tral. The failure of the Council to operate in the 
United States reflected an early MOI victory and its lack of 
activities in the Soviet Union was a measure of the difficulties 
of penetrating the Soviet system. 
It is not surprising that the Council's administrative 
machine did not develop as quickly as its grant and there was 
unanimous agreement at the end of the war that a radical overhaul 
was necessary. The Council's wide range of, functions, the 
number of countries in which it operated and. theisize of its 
grant raised fundamental questions about the role of cultural 
publicity and the Council in Britain's relations with other 
countries. 
0 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
TEMPORARY LEASE 
With the approach ýJf Allied victory the future of the wartime 
departments fell under scrutiny. The Machinery of Government 
Official, Committee on the MOI did not examine the Council and 
took no account of the Findlater Stewart enquiry. Indeed, Stewart 
was unaware of the review of the information services that was 
ta king. place. 
I Bracken had re commended the disappearance of the 
Ministry at 
1ý 
the earliest poss ible moment, the defeat of Germanyý 
but the committee concluded that the Ministryýwould have to be 
maintained for the conduct of propaganda in the Far. East. When 
Japan had been defeated, the committee recommended that the 
Ministry should be wound up, leaving each department to decide the 
publicity that was required in its own sphere on its own 
responsibility. 
3 
The end of the war meant the termination! of the Ministry's 
censorship and security duties and the retur In of its policy 
functions to the departments concerned. Stripped of these 
activitie_s the rump could not function effectively. A central 
government publicity unit was rejected in the belief that it would 
be open to political objections which, Radcliffe argued, would 
not be the case with departmental publicity. However, the 
desirability of retaining the accumulated sKills and expertise 
of the Ministry's creative and production divisions-was recognised. 
Alan Barlow, the chairman of the committee, favou'red a central 
body to perform technical and producing functions and specialist 
services as a common agency for all departments. As well as being 
a more efficient and economic utilisation of resources, it would 
ensure cohesion in publicity output and allow the employment of 
creative and media experts who would not fit easily into existing 
departmental st, ructures. The committee put forward three options 
in March 19441: 1 a joint organisation of the Foreign, Colonialý, India 
and Dominions Offices operating independentlyl the same body 
acting as partý, of the Foreign Office; the four overseas departments 
wo, Pking separatley with suitable arrangements for cooperation. 
The first was rejected by the Foriegn Office which declared 
1. Minute by D. Ormiston, 12 February 1950 F0924/782 CRA 20/1 
2. Machinery of Government Committee Meeting, 8 February 1944 
CAB 87/71 GIS(44)1 
3-. Repor 0 Ithe Machinery of Government Committee, 31 August 
1944 CAB 66/54 WP(44)482 
4. Machinery of Government Committee Meeting, 8 February 1944 
Cab 87/71 GIS(44)1 
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We regard as our own special responsibility the 
presentation of all British news and activities 
to foreign countries and the presentation every- 
where of our policy and our views on international 
affairs, and we would, therfore. wish to have the 
requisite machinery 5 
in our hands and as part of 
the Foreign Office. 
The second. option was unlikely to appeal to the other departments 
and, in view of the commitee's low opinion of the Foreign Office's 
creative abilities, unlikely to be recommended. Reluctantly, 
the committe-e plumped for the third choice 
because we are greatly impressed by t'he value 
after the war of a vigorous policy ofýpublicity 
in foreign countries and there is a danger that 
if this is left to the Foreign Office, initiative 
will wither and-the organisation go stale, or 
perhaps be staffed from inappropriate sources. 6 
Therefore,. partly in order to preserve the standards of 
propaganda output, a scheme for a central technical agency was 
pursued. The final meeting of the committe 
Ie 
iniJune concluded 
that, despite political objections, there was'a strong case for 
maintaining a MOI with decision-maKing powers. 
7 
In'March 1945, 
however, the abolition of the Ministry when the war in the Far 
East had ended was announced. Responsibility for overseas 
publicity would return to the four departments concerned and 
inter-departmental cooperation would coordinate the needs of other 
departments. 
Parallel to these discussions, Stewart investigated the 
workings of the Council in London. The Council's senior officials 
advocated the replacement of the existing Executive and Finance 
and Agenda comittees by a small board, meeting regularly. They 
recommended-also that the chairmanship should be a full-tiMB, post 
and combine the post of managing-director of the new board. 
Moreover, it was suggested to Stewart that the Lord President's 
off ice would be a more suitable parent body than the Foreign Office. 
It seems inadvisable that one of the departments 
responsible for regional political guidance of 
the British Council should be exclusively 
responsible for its whole machinery. 8 
The Foreign Office, preoccupied by the diplomacy of the coming 
peace, and the absorption of the MOI*s organisation overseas, gave 
5. ýý Cadoganto Barlow, 
. 
23 March 19443 222/68 -IIf 
6. Barlow to Radcliffes 28'March 1944"T 222/68 1 
7. ' Macirfbry of Government Meeting, 2 June 1944 CAB. 67Z71 GIS(44). 6 
8. Undated Minute by White, BW2/151 
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scant attention to Stewart's enquiry. Sir David Scott from the 
administrative side of the Foreign Office was con'sulted but the 
British Council section of the Library Dppartment was not. The 
Foreign Office wanted tighter controls over the Council and the 
elimination: of overlapping with the official information services, 
which was estimated at being nearly complete? From his interview 
with Stewart, Scott conciuded that 
Sir Findlater ýIad taken the Council 
own-valuation, and has accepted too 
assumption of wider functions and d 
I don't think the Council should be 
organisation in the proper sense at 
too much at its 
readily its 
iv, erse methods. 
al public 
all. 10 
Scott complained, with some justice, that the Council was inclined 
to do everything itself instead of using existing interested bodies 
He was opposed to the Council taking over tourýlst publicity from 
the Travel Association and undertaking broadcasting that was 
properly the responsibility of the BBC. Scqtt was scathing of 
Stewart's plans for the reform of the Councii s administration 
and regarded as 'shear nonsense' Stewart's proposal that the Counci 
should draw up a five year plan of expenditure of up to E5 million 
per annum. Scott did not 'see how the Council could possibly 
have as much as a million a year'. 
11 
MOI officials advised Stewart that only the restriction of the 
Council to purely educational and cultural activities would end 
overlapping. The Treasury made detailed recommendations for the 
reform of financial prodedures'within the Council, that were 
accepted by Stewart, and urged the strengthening of Foreign Office 
control. The chief interest of the Dominions, Colonial and India 
Offices was in the maintenance of adequate controls over Council 
operations in their respective territories. 
The first drafts of Stewart's report reached the Foreign Office 
and Treasury in December 1944 and copies were sent to interested 
departments in March, as the decision to abolish the Ministry 
was announced. The Council did not see the report-until June, 
despite repeated requests and growing indignation among the 
me; Pbers of the Executive Committee. Stewart's report concerned 
exclusively,. the structure of the Council! headquarters; he did 
not examine the Council's work overseas or its efficiency at lower 
and middle levels. He recommended the replacement of . the Executiv 
9. Minute by W. H. Montagu-Pollack, 3 August 1944 FO 924/120 LC3370/1699/451 
10. Minute by A-Oudley, 15 November 1944 F0924/112 LC024/19/451 
11. Ibid. 
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Committee by a Governing Board of six or seven administrators, 
appointed by the Foreign Secretary, meeting at least weekly. 
Advisory Committees were to be retained but have no government 
representatives and have no right to membership of the Governing 
Board. Membership of the Council was to be enlarged and regional 
interests in the United Kingdom were to be included. Foreign 
Office interests would be protected by a right of direct access 
to the Board on major issues and by close contacts at the official 
level. -Stewart proposed that'an. Under Secretary of State in the 
Foreign Offf'ce should deal with the Council's affairs. The 
Foreign Office would provide the broad strata gic plan and the 
Council the method of execution, although a veto was reserved for 
the Foreign Office for proposals likely to be embarrassing to its 
overall responsibilities. Overseas, the Council's staff should 
remain unofficial and Stewart noted that Britiý, sh Missions should 
not ask the Council to undertake activities beyond its sphere. 
Finally,. Stewart recommended a radical improyement in staffing 
arrangements and the appointment of an Esitabiishmýents Officer. 
The Stewart enquiry and the'Imminent general election posed 
a dilemma for Robertson. He was prepared to serve as a full- 
time chairman for three years, renouncing his political and 
business interests in-the meantime. However, Eden proved 'vague 
in the extreme' about his future with the Council and so, in order 
to fulfill his obligations to his constituents, Robertson resigned 
in May 1945.12 Robertson had not. endeared himself to his senior 
officials by-his frequent absences and h*aphazard direction of the 
Council's affairs. Robertson believed fervently in the Counc-il's 
mission-but did not have the administrative skill or patience to 
pursue its goals. He was unpopular with the Foreign Office and,, 
the Treasurý and later complained that 
Unfortunately neither the Cabinet, Tory,. Coalition, 
or Labour, nor the Foreign Office itself, nor our 
great newspapers, have yet had the time., or, apparently 
the inclination, to take a living interest in the 
organisation which can, and indeed should be made into 
a living example to the world. 13 
Under Robertson's chairmanship the Council expanded dramatically 
and reached its zenith. Before resigning Robertson protested 
angrily at the cuts imposed-on the Council's 194 5/6 budget and 
12. Eden to Robertson, 31 May 1945. Robertson Papers. 
14. Final chapter, draft autobiography, Robertson Papers. 
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would have found the post-war economies very difficult to accept.. 
His successor was not appointed until the future of the Council 
had been decided. Lord Riverdale became acting Chairman for 
the second time. 
Consideration of Stewart's report by the Foreign Office was 
delayed pending the return of Eden and George Hall, Parliamentary 
Under Secretary, from the San Francisco Conference and by', the 
necessity of obtaining the views of Missions. overseas. The head 
of the newiý-created Cultural Relations Department of the Foreign 
office,, W. H. Montagu-Pollack, had ample opportunity to study the 
in, and knowl ge of, cultural report and had more interest ed 
relations than his predecessors at the Libra . ry-Department.. As 
Counsellor at the Legation in Stockholm during the war, Montagu- 
Pollack, had been instrumental in the spread of Council 
activities and in the foundation of numerous Anglophile societies. 
In'April 1945 he undertook with Hall a tour of the Council's 
establishments in the Middle East and the Me'dite'rranean. So th 
returned impressed With tha value of cultural publicity and 
, toying with the idea of taking it over as a direct Foreign Office 
service'. 
14 In May, Montagu-Pollack drafted alternatives to the 
Stewart proposals. Cultural propaganda, he. argued, was the 
essential prerequisite of political publicity and inextricably 
linked to, and concerned with, the direct pursuit of Foreign 
Office ends. 
The Council is an instrument of long-term foreign 
policy and long-term as well as short-term foreign 
policy is the province of the Foreign Office. 15 
Effective coordination was only possible in a single body and 
it was 
basically illogical and unsatisfactory for an 
organisation -ýdnanced entir. ely from public funds 
not to be subject to effective governmental ' 
supervision, and supervision can never be really 
effective without control. 16 
Montague-PollacK proposed that the Council should be-absorbed 
into the future Foreign Publicity Department of the Foreign Office 
which would include a Director of Cultural Publicity. Likewise, 
15. The Case for Cultural Publicity, drafted by the Cultural Relations 
Department, May 1945. T 219/3 
16. Ibid. 
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the Council's worK in the Commonwealth and Empire would be taKen 
over by the Departments concerned. In the field the Council 
would retain the facade of unofficial status. 
Britain's Embassies and Legations, especially in the Middle 
East, supported the retention of the Council's semi-autonomous 
position. In Latin America and Europe opinion was divided but 
on balance favourable. Foreign governments were deemed more 
likely to allow activities by the Council that might not be 
permitted td-an official organisation and the Council could be 
more experimental and flexible by virtue of being able to make 
more mistakes than an official body. This m eant that British 
Missions had less control over the Council's activities, but 
twenty-two out of thirty-five replies were content, with existing 
arrangements. Local relationships between th e Council and the 
Foreign Service depended greatly on personal factors and only 
eight Missions declared in favour of complete control for widely 
differing reasons. 
17 
If Montagu-PollacK's radical proposals were not accepted, 
the Foreign Office demanded closer control over Council policy 
than envisaged by Stewart, including Foreign Office representation 
on t he Governing Board and any committees it wished, and joint 
standing committees for each region to plan production schedules 
for all media. The Foreign Office was supported by the Dominion! 
Office which, in a-ddition to control over and information about 
the Council's plans, wanted 'a general control of the type of 
picture of this country which the British Council presents in 
ti he Dominions . 
18 
The Treasury and the Colonial. Office accepted Stewart's 
report as it had included their views. on relevant issues. For 
, example, 
the Colonial Office position, that the Council's work in 
the Colonies 'is in essence an agency service on behalf of the 
Colonial Office carried out by the Council for reasons of 
convenience and-economy, l was included in the report despite 
'Stewart's suppor. t for a. more independent role for the Council in 
fq. reign countries. 
19 The Treasury was prepared to accept Montagu- 
pollacK's plan if the Foreign Office pressed the issue but 
considered the delay in reaching a decision deplorable. As a 
17. Minute. by H. Hedley, 16 April 1945. FO 924/113 IC1947/19/451 
18. Pugh t6 W. H. Montagu-Pollack, 30 June 194S. FO 924/114 LC210/19/45i 
19. Stanley to Eden, 29 March 1945. T 219/3 
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'result, 
the Council's finances were in disarray and, as Anderson 
wrote to Eden, 
I should have thought that in the present state 
of world politics it was most desirable that we 
should at the earliest opportunity get a reall 
effective body to handle cultural propaganda. 
H 
Moreover., the Treasury was sceptical of the Foreign Office's 
ability to manage the Council's operations better than the 
Council had done and senior officials believed that there was 
a strong cas-6 for leaving the peculiar needs of cultural 
propaganda outside the confines of the govern ent. 
This Kind of business is much better done at 
one remove from Whitehall. 21 
Bamford and Grubb at the MOI also favoured compromise, arguing 
that in certain circumstances the Council's apparent independence 
was valuable and that the Council was 'in itself an example of 
the British way of approach to the management of such affairs... ' 
22 
An inter-departmental meeting at the Foreign Office in June 
decided to reject the ý; lan for the Council's abolition on the 
advice of Lord Dunglass, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, who declared that it would be unacceptable to 
the House of Commons. He was supported by Richard Law, Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office, and Hall who predicted trouble 
from the Labour benches. Law and Dunglass proposed that the 
Council should remain as it was but have 'infused' into it such 
representives of interested departments 'as are necessary to guide 
23 
policy and secure efficiency' . In addition, the return of 
Kirkpatrick to the Foreign Office in the summer of 1945 as 
Assistant Under Secretary of the Information Department resulted 
in a modification of the Foreign Office stand. Drawing on his 
experience at the BBC, Kirkpatrick insisted that the chairman and 
Governing Board should be independent and that the Council should 
be allowed to continue its day-to-day activities with the minimum 
of interference from the Foreign Office. But Kirkpatrick argued 
that the Foreign Office. should have a veto over policy and 
ap, pointments at home and abroad. 
A Cabinet Committee of the new Government met to consider'the 
future of the information services in September 1945. Attlee 
outlined the situation: ta. retain the MOI meant reversing the 
2G.. Anderson to Eden, 26 May 1945. FO 924/114 LC2237/19/451 
21. J. Beighton to E. Bridges. 20 June 1945. T 219/4 
22. Minute by K-Grubb, 16. January 1945. INF 1/961 
23. R. Law to J. Anderson, 16 June 1945. F0924/114 LC2391/19/451 
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announced decision of the previous government, risked the 
allegation that the government would use it as 'a. medium for 
party propaganda' and required legislation. Conversely, there 
was a need for publicity at home and overseas, and for a unified 
organisation to coordinate policy and output. The four overseas 
departments demanded control of policy overseas and Bevin argued 
for the integration o-P all the bodies involved in overseas 
publicity-with the Foreign Ser. vice, including commercial, tourist 
and cultural publicity. This meant the 'transformation of the 
British Council into a branch of the public service under the 
control of the Foreign Secretary ..... 124 Fc , kr publicity material 
and technical advice the Foreign Office was prepared to rely on 
a Government Information Agency. 
E. J. Williams, however, the Minister of In formation, advocated 
the retention of the Ministry as the most efficient and economic 
means of meeting the requirements of post-war publicity. He 
challenged the view that the production of propaganda material 
could be separated from regional Knowledge and argued that 
governmental publicity differed from departmental public 
relations and 
that British publicity addressed to foreign 
countries and to the Empire and to the public 
is a unity and in modern conditions a necessary 
instrument of the Government as a whole. 25 
Williams did not comment on the Council except to state that 
'firstly by a clear understanding and observance of respective 
responsibility, and secondly by a full and free exchange and 
discussion of projects', the two could coexist peacefully. 
26 He 
was supported by Addison-who favou, red at least the creation of 
a Ministry of Public-Relations from the ashes of the MOI and the 
Council, with a trained Public Relations Service that would be 
seconded to departments. 
Nevertheless, at a Ministerial meeting on 3 October the Lord 
President, Herbert Morrison, was instructed to prepare a report 
an the assumption that the MOI would disappear. Bevin was 
d 6. signated to devise a plan -For the coordination of propaganda 
oversea. In his report, Morrison endorsed the decision's of the 
24.. The Future of British Publicity in Foreign Countries, Memorandum by the 
Foreign Office, 1j September, 1945. CAB 129/4 CP(45)168 
25. Memorandum by the MOI, 17 September 1945. T222/66 Gen. 85/3 
26. Ibid. 
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previous Government and agreed with Foreign Office proposals for 
the creation of two ministerial committees, under a'common 
chairman and supported by committees of officials, to ensure the 
presentation of a common line. Morrison recommended that 
expenditure on all forms of publicity should be reduced1for 
political as well as financial reasons'. 
27 Williams and Addison 
were the only dissentiants. On 6 December the Cabinet decided 
that the MOI should disappear 9s, in Attlee's view, it was ý 
Opolitically,. dangerous that there should be a Minister with no 
other responpibility than the conduct of prop I agandal. 
28 
With Bevin's bacKing, the Foreign Office continued to maintain 
a strong line on the Council's future. In explaining to Dalton 
why the Stewart proposals were unacceptable, Bevin wrote 
I can not help feeling that a large am ; punt of the 
worK done by the British Council during the war 
ought to be incorporated in a thoroughly efficient 
Consular Department. With regard tolthe proposal 
of *a 
small Board of Management and a'6 independent 
Chairman, I am really not enamoured 'of this. I 
thinK the Foreign Office ou§ht really to be 
responsible for this work. 2 
Bevin's desire to re-establish Foreign Office control over 
all forms of propaganda overseas divided opinion-in the official 
committee. Although it was agreed thcýt the Foreign Office should 
chair the Overseas Publicity Committee, the absorption of the 
Council's staff into the public service was not supported. 
Moreover, the Foreign Office anticipated that the transfer of the 
Council's production divisions to the proposed CO'I-would enable 
a ceiling of E2 million for 1946/7 to be imposed on the Council, 
to be reduced to EI million therafter. Barlow outlined the 
implications of these proposals. 
In effect, if the Foreign Secretary has his way 
the British Council as an independent chartered 
body is dead, although the name might be retained 
for its goodwill in certain fields. 30 
His committee, however, felt that 
While subject to ultimate Foreign Office control, 
it Ethe, Councill-. should be given a considerable 
degree of autonomy in the field ..... because its 
worK-A's liKely to be done more effectively if it 
is not done by officialt but by persons more 
closely connected with the academic world. 31 
27. Report by the Lord President, 30 November 1945 CAB 129/5 CP(4153316 
28. Cabinet Minutes, 6 December 1945 CAB 129/5 CP(45)60 
29. E3ovin to Dalton, 25 August 1946 T 219/3 
30. Minute by Barlow, 8 January 1946 T 222/66 
31. Government Information Services Committee Minutes, 20 December 1945 T219/3 
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The Cabinet approved the establishment of a COI in February 
1946-and committees of Ministers and officials to coordinate 
policy. Departments had the right to contract out of the COI 
on, specific occasions, if the Treasury were satisfied that the 
Departmený oould perform the task better. This applied 
especially to departments such as the, Ministry of Food and its 
publicity in connection with rationing. The MOI wa's wound up 
in March 1946 and the COI was born on I April. 
The outstanding questions of ministerial responsibility for 
the BBC and the future of the Council, were presented to the Cabi 
, 
net, 
It had to decide whether educational and cultýural work was 'work 
proper to the Government itselfland if it was 'possible to achieve 
the required degree of efficiency and economy if such'work is not 
performed direct by the Government'. 
32 The Foreign Office advanced 
two alternatives with regard to the Council. The advantages of 
Plan A, as it was know-i, providing for tighter controls over 
expenditure and policy, were that it involved the least change and, 
therefore, the least controversy and that 'the facade of a body 
ind ependent of the Government and the goodwill created by the 
British Council would b. e maintained'. 
33 Plan B provided for the 
abolition of the Council, but not only would it inflict increased 
administrative burdens on the overseas departments, it would also 
require legislation to revoke the Council's Charter and so 
provoke controversy. This plan had a further disadvantage in 
that it 
pre*supposes either that the Council ought never to 
have been set up at all or that it ought not to 
have been allowed to develop so far with Government 
financial asistance, since its activities have all 
bee 
,n 
proper to the Government itself. (this is the 
view favoured by the Foreign Office. )34 
Plan B, however, ' promised considerable economies and ensured the 
coordination of overseas information policy. A third course 
open to the Cabinet was to adopt Plan A as an interim measure, 
35 
while preparations were made to abolish the Council. 
The Cabinet decided on 21 February to continue the Council 
for five years 
on the understanding that there would be closer 
scrutiny of its projected activities, that it 
should no longer have authority to do its own 
32. Report of the Official Committee on Government Information 
Services, 9 February 1946, para. 42 CAB 129/7 CP(46)54 
33. Jbi. d. para. 33 
34. Minute by E. M. Nicholson, undated T 222/6 
3 5. The Cabinet also considered the abolition. of the Council and the transfer 
of its functions to a new Office. 
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production and-procurement work, and that its scope 
should be restricted to educational and cultural 
work and that it should not overlap with the 
Government Information Services. 36 
Bevin had b. een persuaded to accept this compromise on condition 
that the i position would be reviewed after five years. 
He believed that in time it might be possible for 
the Consular Service to take over many of the 
functions now discharged by the British Council. 
Meanwhile he must be kept fully informed in advance 
of, the policy which the Council is pursuing. 37 
Addison and Hall supported the restriction of the Council's role 
and independence but Bevan 
stressed the importance of not subjecting the 
British Council to rigid Foreign Office control. 
The work whichit was set up to do could not be 
carried out by a Government Department, and if 
its agents were subordinated to Foreign Office 
representatives abroad they would be unable to 38 do work of any value. 
For coordination with other publicity services, the Council would 
38 
'be considered as one of the Government's information services'. 
The Council accepted the Cabinet decision with equanimity, 
relieved that the long period of uncertainty was over and 
claiming that it affected the Council's work 
to a far smaller extent than might be supposed, 
for the greater. part of its work is already 
educational and cultural, and this restriction 
permits of concentration on what are in fact 
the edsentials. 39 
However, it wa's'far from satisfactory' for cultural propaganda 
demanded forward planning and its effects could only be measured 
in the long, term. Moreover, it perpetuated doubts about its future 
and hampered recruitment, Nevertheless, the Council was confident. 
that 
five years was a sufficient period in which to 
demonstrate finally the folly of closing it 
Dr. paring it dDwn. 41 
With the. Council's fu. ture temporarily settled, the appointment 
of a chairman became urgently necessary. Amongst nominations 
recorded at the Foreign Office were Sir Ronald Storrs, Sir Charles 
36. Cabinet Conclusions, 21 Pebruary 1946'CAB 128/5 CM(46)17 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Bevin to Riverdale, 20 March 1946 Fo 030/483, 
40. British Council Annual Report, 1945/6 p. 7 
41. White, ap. cit. p. 62 
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Jeffries, Sir Kenneth Clark, Lord Keynes, Lord Harlech, Malcolm 
MacDonald, Harold, Nicolson 
42 
and Richard Crossman. The Foreign* 
Office sought-'an energetic man to clean up the mess' who 
combined leadership and drive wit-h academic interests and had 
i 43. 
. associations with the Labour Party. - The post'was almost 
offered, to Patrick Gordon-WalKer in March 1946, -but-the Foreign 
Office legal department advised that as a Member of Parliament, 
he was-debarred from holding an office of profit under the Crown 
(although th,, is had not prevented Robertson's appointment in 1941). 
In May a Council sub-committee nominated General Six Ronald Adam 
44 
and, from the Council of Foreign Ministers inýParis in June, it 
was reported that Bevin concurred. Gordon-WalKer replaced 
J. J. Lawson as vice-chairman. 
In addition to hislong and distinguished military career, 
Adam had many contacts with the academic world. His father had 
been a founder of Manchester University and,, as Adjutant-General 
from 1941 to'1946, Adam had sponsored the foundation of the Bureau 
of Current Affairs and the extension of Army education. During 
the war he had worked closely with Bevin and other Labour leaders 
on the home front and with the Council's Home Division. Adam- 
confirmed the primacy of education in the Council's work and his 
enthusiasm for cultural relations endeared him to the staff and 
restored a sense of purpose to their activities. Adam had three 
overriding tasks: the reorganisation of the Council's central 
machinei the establishment of a Council service; the completion 
of the transfer of the Council's production departments to the 
COI. The Economist diagnosed the root of the problem. 
Like a child that has had its main growth on an 
unsuitable diet, its muscles are weak and'its 
shape distorted, owing to the abnormalities of 
1939 -1945 . 
4S 
When Adam became chairman, the Council had a budget of just over 
E3 million and nearly three thousand staff operating in every 
continent. Educational activities remained the mainspring. of 
42. Nicolson recorded that he had been rejected for the post by 
Bevin. N. Nicolson, Diairies and Letters 1945-1962, (New York)1968)Vol. 3 
p. 43 
43. - Minute by I. Kirkpatrick, 3 January 1946. FO924/266 LC47755/146/ * 
4Sl* 
44. Stanley Unwin claims responsibility for Adam's nomination. 
See, S. Unwin, The Truth About a Publisher, (London 1960) p. 432 
45. The Economist, 20 November 1946, p. 862 
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the Council's work and Adam was interested particularly in the 
welfare of foreign stLfJents in Britain and in the investigation 
of 'methods of teaching English as a foreign language. 
46 
The Stewart and Foreign Office proposals for the Council's 
reorganisation were abandoned, leaving Adam a free hand. To 
assist him he brought G. H. Shreeve from the War Office and invited 
the Treasury Method and Control Department to examine the structure 
The retirement of Lord Derby and Lord Riverdale enabled Adam to 
appoint Sir'Philip Morris as vice-chairman to improve contacts 
with universities and educational institution s. Morris*had worked 
closely with Adam as Director-General of Army §ducation from 1944 
to 1946 and as. Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University. Arthur 
Howard, Conservative Member of Parliament, filled the remaining 
vacancy on the recommendation of Eden. The Executive Committee 
remained and was reformed at Bevin's suggestion to include more 
representatives from the left. New appointments included 
H. V. Tews . on, General-Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, Mrs 
Ayrton Gould, a Labour Member of Parliament, F. Abbots from the 
educational side of the Cooperative movement. and W. E. Williams, 
Director of the Bureau of CurrentAffairs. 
Two new sub-committees were created in September 1946. The 
Finance and Agenda and Budget Committees became the Finance. 
Committee and a Policy Committee was established1to deal with 
matters of general cultural and educational policy'. 
47 
Issues 
of fundamental policy remained the prerogative of-the Executive 
Committee and its meetingswere combined with those of the Policy 
Committee when they coincided. Following recommendations from 
the-Treasury, the Council's structure was reorganised in 1947. 
Adam became-Chairman and Director-General, the Secretary-Gen . eral 
was replaced by two Assistant Directors-General and the departments 
were arranged into eight divisions. The divisions. were divided 
equally between the two Assistant Directors-General and four 
were regional under. one, and the other. four dealt. withý arts and 
sciences, education, finance and", establishments. A central 
Se I cretariat was created responsible directly to the chairman. 
48 
In 1946 the Council had Home and Overseas Services and a 
Permanent Overseas Service, each with different gradings and pay 
46. Interview with Genural Adam, 15 December 1980. Adam was 
instrumental in persuading the University of London to 
found the first. Chair in English language teaching. 
47 Minute by White, 10 September 1946 BW 2/332 
48. see Appendix B 
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scales. Adam wanted an integrated Council service with provision 
for the short term secondment of staff. from educational bodies. 
The Council's staff did not enjoy the same privileges and 
conditions as members of-the Civil Service and salaries were 
lower. generally. - Half of the Council's budget in 1946 was 
absorbed by, salaries, for two thouSarid eight. hundred and seventy- 
, seven staff, 
half of which were overseas. ProposaIs for the 
rationalisation of the staffing structure were presented annually 
to the Treasury with the support of the Foreign Office and the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on the Estimates, but with no result 
Staff in the Council's home service remained ýIdisestablished and 
turnover was high; between April and December 1947 there were 
49 
three hundred resignations at home. During the war vetting of 
applicants for Council posts had become lax, but with the return 
of peace normal vetting procedures were reintroduced. Defections 
in 1948 to the eastern bloc and marriages between Council staff 
and nationals from Eastern European countries, forced changes in 
50 i the rules. Retrospective vetting was undertaKeh and the Council 
no longer negotiated directly with the security services, but 
through the Foreign Office. In addition, a Cabinet ruling was 
obtained forbidding Council employees married to Eautern European 
nationals from worKing in other satellite states or other foreign 
51 
countries without prior reference to the Foreign Office. 
Complicated and lengthy discussions before Adam's appointment 
had settled the fate of most of the production departments but 
the Council fought to retain its own technical experts. it 
argued that the COI's concentration on mass production at an 
e conomic rate would lead to a fall in the standard of specialist 
cultural material. The Council had relinquished reluctantly 
itr, films, photographs, overseas press, book export promotion, 
visual publicity, publications and copyright divisions to the COI. 
In future the Council would be in the same posiitan asa Governmen-t 
department, commissioning material from the COI. thirtY-five 
senior and sixty-five junior posts were suppressed on the transfer 
of functions to the COI, but the Council did keep some advisory 
ex. pert staff and some of its publications. On these losses 
White commented, 
49. Third Report of the Select ComOnittee on Estimates, 1947/48, 
The British Council, HMSO, March 1948 
50. - See Chapter Nino, p. 250 
51. J. P. Finch to M. Waugh, 27 April 1950 F0924/779 CRA 18/31G 
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Lord Lloyd must have turned in his grave for 
he had wished the Council to be broadly based 
and had fought for the retention of these 
subjebts at the outbreak of war. 52 
In agreement withthe Board of Trade, the Council undertooK to 
hold exhibitions abroad to promote British exports, an condition 
that the trade provided the displays and the advance publicity. 
At the request of the Publishers' Association, the Council agreed 
tp organise booK sections at International Trade Fairs, and 
became respo-nsible for virtually all exhibitions of British booKs 
abroad. The Policy Committee decided that a, lthough the Council 
should not become an advertsing agency for British firms, within 
certain limitt the display of material issued by reputable firms 
and public utility corporations was permissable. 
The fields 6f music, drama and the fine arts were broadly 
entrusted to the Council but their relative cost, in the financial 
stringency of the post-war years, limited their utility. In 
reducing the Council's 1946/7 budget, Bevin . 
'-referred specificalky 
to the worK of the Drama, Fine Art and Music'Departments, whose 
expenditure he wishes to see drastically reduced'. 
53 
It was 
suggested that the Council- could maKe these activities self- 
supporting and in April 1948, the Council was instructed that the 
Secretary of State-wished 
to concentrate as much as possible on those 
activities which were most likely to produce 
quick returns in the political field -. for 
example, visits, courses, lectures and English 
lessons, rather than longer-term pro ects such 
as exhibitions of modern paintings. Sý 
Britain's economic problems encouraged expenditure at home. 
The students committee was reconstituted in 1946 and t he regional 
net, work developed by the Home Division during the war was expanded 
to provide support for foreign students in Britain. From 1945 
to. 19SO the Council provided, on'average, two hundred and fifty 
newscholarships annually as well as. short term bursaries and 
apprenticeships. In addition, the Council's hostels were open 
to other foreign students, merchant seaman and overseas-visitors. 
Frqm January 1950 the Council tooK responsibility for the welfare 
of all. Colonial students in Brita in, then apprnximately four 
thousand. The Council also gave educational advice and 
information and-assisted the recruitment of dtaff from Britain 
52. White, op. cit. p. 62 
53. W. H. Mdntagu-PollacK to White, 17 January 1946 BW 1/4 
5_4. Minute by C. Mayhew, 19 April 1948 F0924/615 LC1556/16/451 
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for schools and universities overseas. By 1948 there were forty- 
two posts in foreign universities subsidised and filled by. the 
Council. The Council continued to produce the publications 
started during the war and to commission films and distribute 
British Ndws. - In 1946 a new journal, English Language Teaching, 
was introduced with great success. Britain Today continued but 
only in the English edition and was no longer distrLbuted free 
except in the Colonies. The'promotion of British books abroad 
remained important and the Council sought to establish comprehen- 
sive English libraries in every country that it worked in. The 
work of the Science Department grew considerd,, bly and scientific 
officers were attached to the Council's officesi their work was 
complementary to that of the Scientific Attach6s employed by the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. In the field 
of medicine the Council. dealt only with research andin 
agriculture, worked closely with the Agricultural Research Council. 
The problem of defining functions, that kad plagued relations 
with the MOI, remained to be, settled with the Foreign Office 
Information Department. In the Foreign Office's view the Council 
should be restricted to specialist audiences while the information 
services would deal with the general public: 
In the vast no-man's land of subjects which are 
neither wholly political nor wholly cultural, 
the Council tackles the expert and the Information 
Services the plebs. 55 
The Council's role as seen by the Foreign Office. was to influence 
in the long-. term specific, educated, often already receptive, 
groups in foreign countries. This delimitation was anathema to 
the Council which argued that the audiences found in Council 
centres and Anglophile societies were the least profitable. Adam 
in particular wished to widen the Council's audience and to reach 
the non-academic as well as the expect. 
In strictly cultural subjects, which are defined 
as the English language, British Drama, Fine Arts, 
Literature and Music, the Council will undertake 
publicity and education directed towards any category 
of people and will use any medium for this purpose. 
In all other subjects the Council will undertake 
education rather -than publicity and its operations 
will be directed not to the general public, but to 
certain defined groups. 56 
55. Minute by A. Dudley, 3 March 1946. Bw 2/342 
56. Annex. to Evidence presented to Sub-committee D of the Select 
Committee on Estimates, 16 October 1946, p. 469, Memorandum by the 
British Council. 
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The wide range of the Council's functions rendered the definition 
of precise groups almost impossible. In 1947 the Council's 
Representatives in f oreign countries 'were asked to' place targets 
and themes in order of priority. Education authorities,, 
universities, schools and teachers came top in all areas. In 
Latin America and the Middle East technical specialists and 
government officials came next in-importance with iýntellectUals, 
and working class organisatio'ns placed last. In Europe the 
latter two. groups were placed above technical and scientific 
groups. Only in Latin America were'Anglophile societies given 
a high priority; in Europe they were being d 'escribed as either 
snobbish, run for political and personal ends and out of touch 
with modern Britain'. 
57 In Europe visits and exchanges were the 
most favoured activities whereas Engli. th language teaching, 
libraries and the training of teachers came first in the Middle 
East and Latin America. On the question of themes the replies were 
almost unanimous iý stressing that modernitrealist 
a* nd practical aspects of British civilisation are 
most likely to appeal today. 58 
The Council's most serious disagreement with the Foreign Office 
in the post-war period arose'from the reorientation of its 
educational policy by the new Education Director,. Or A. E. Morgan, 
with the support of Adam. Morgan argued that the Council should 
relinquish direct. teaching of elementary English and the support 
of British schools and transfer these responsibilities to the 
countries concerned. Instead, the Council should reach beyond 
political and intellectual elites through the use of discussion 
group techniques. Financial necessity forced the Council to 
reduce subsidies to British schools in the Middle East and Latin 
America but the attempt to move towards a wider adult audience 
fai led to attract much support and was vigorously opposed by the 
Foreign office's representatives overseaso The Foreign Office 
protested that discussion groups were no substitute for English 
teaching and British schools and might be regarded with suspicion 
by foreign governments. Particularly in educationally undevel- 
oýed areas the Foreign Office warned that Morgan's policies were 
'a grave mistake' 
?9 These views found considerable sympathy. 
within the Council and educational policy reverted to traditional 
lines at the end of the decade. 
57. Repreaentativea Conference Report, September 1947. DW 1/28 
58. Ibid. 
59. Minute by J. P. Finch, 6 July 1949. FO924/771 LC2291/71/452 
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Attempts to lay down rigid lines of demarcation with the 
Information Services in each medi. um were abandoned in favour of 
consultations when difficulties arose, as had been the outsome 
of similar discussions with the MOI. Likewise, differences were 
frequent. 1 Considerable confusion existed in the field of 
libraries which were the cornerstone of the Council's work in 
post-war Europe and the mainstay of its Institutes a. nd Anglophile 
societies. The Information Services also wished to establish 
libraries but the Council insisted that libraries fell within its 
purview. Local conditions dictated the outcome of this dispute; 
in Europe joint libraries were entirely Cound il-administered 
whereas in the Far East they were exclusively run by the 
Information Services, although the Council supplied the educationa' 
and'cultural books. Similarly,. in the fields of enquiries, 
lectures, books and press articles the distincýýtion between the two 
bodies was nebulous. The Council was only allowed to distribute 
articles on cultural subjects and on its ownlactivities to the 
overseas press, - but where it was uneconomic, for it to maintain 
its own press officer,, the Information Officer placbd such 
articles. In 1947 the Council assumed sole responsibility for 
lecture tours in foreign countries, except the United States. 
A more complex and somewhat ludicrous arrangement was arrived 
at for the provision of books overseas. 
60 
The division of functions was resolved locally. To improve 
coordination joint committees of the Council. and the Information 
Services were encouraged. In Cairo there were two such bodies 
dealing with*books and with films and photographs. In Prag ue 
a committee consisting of the Press Attach6, the Council 
Representative and Embassy staff examined the aims and require- 
ments of British., propaganda in Czechoslovakia. In Poland the 
Council's Representative was treated as head of the Cultural 
Depqrtment of the Embassy, and attended morning staff meetings. 
ý60. 
Note an overlapping between the Council and the Inforination Services. 
FO 924/664. The Council was permitted to supply'to libraries its, own 
publications and books on English language and literature, drama, music, 
fine arts, specialist interests in fields of science medicine, argiculture 
and technology, bibliographical works, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, non- 
political geography, social, economic and constitutional history and- 
biography up to 1939 (but not diplomatic or international history) law, 
British social and ec 
, 
6nomic organisation, education, town planning, 
reco nstructi6n, religion, naval and military history up to 1939, the 
Colonies and Dominions, philosophy and the non-parli. aMentary 
publications of Government. departments. 
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In Iraq the problem was solved in a novel fashion with the Council 
covering the towns and the Information Services, the provinces. As 
had been the case-in relations between the Council and the MOI, 
it was impossible to separate cultural and political publicity. 
The area of overlap was large and each brganisation 
complemented and reinforced the other, requiring close and careful 
liaison. Cultural publicity does not operate in a vacuum and is 
augmented by s uccessful, simul. taneous political explanation. 
Likewise, th. e interpretation of official policies is facilitated 
by an understanding of their background. 
Liai son with the Foreign Office in London was. conducted 
through regular joint regional conferences. The allocat . ion of 
Council expenditure overseas took account of the level of 
expenditure of the Information Services in a g`, ýiven country. An 
internal Foreign Office memorandum instructed that the Council 
should be treated more or less as an adjunct of the Foreign Office. 
Just as we wish Council officials in., foreign 
countries to regard themselves as part of official 
British representation abroad so we should like 
their. administrative staff at home to be treated, 
as far as their lack of official status permits, 
as if they were part of the Foreign qTfice, or at 
any rate closely associated with it. 
Nevertheless, although the Foreign Office wanted to give 'positive 
guidance' to the Council, 'which it need s as an instrument of 
British policy abroad'. this did not extend to accepting cultural 
relations as a conventional activity of government. 
62 The 
Council was told that- 
His Majesty's Government. does not consider that 
"cultural" WorK, consisting in such activities 
as those of the British Council, forms part of 63 
the normal functions of a diplomatic mission. 
Following the Council's reorganisation in 1947 and in-response 
to economies demanded by the Tressury, the Foreign Office decided 
that detailed interference in the Council's affairs was no longer 
necessary and Bevin pronounced himself satisfied that the Council 
64 
could be entrusted to manage its funds properly. The Cultural 
Relations Department was run down and Missions abroad were 
ins tructed, to settle issues locally with the Council. 
61. Foreign Office Circular No. 144,28 December 1946. 
62. Ibid. FO 924/253 LC4940/113/45 
63. Minutes of a Policy Committee Meeting, 11 February 1947. BW69/1 
64. Minute by W-H-Montagu-PollocK .7 January 
'1947.. FO924/594C LC208/208/451 
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In Iraq the problem was solved in a novel fashion with the Council 
covering the towns and the Information Services, the provinces. As 
had been the case in relations between the Council and the MOI, 
it was impossible to separate cultural and political publicity. 
The area of overlap was large and each drganisation 
complemented and reinforced the other, requiring close and careful 
liaison. Cultural publicity does not operate in a vacuum and is 
augmented by s uccessful, simul: taneous political explanation. 
Likewise, tb. e interpretation of official policies is facilitated 
by an understanding of their background. 
Liaison with the Foreign Office in London was. conducted 
through regular joint regional conferences. The allocat'ion of 
Council expenditure overseas took account of the level of 
expenditure of the Information Services in a g'-. I 
iven country. An 
internal Foreign Office memorandum instructed that the Council 
should be treated more or less as an adjunct of the Foreign Office. 
Just as we wish Council officials in,, foreign 
countries to regard themselves as part of official 
British representation abroad so we should like 
theirýadministrative staff at home to be treated, 
as far as their lack of official status permits, 
as if they were. part of the Foreign RTfice, or at 
any rate closely associated with it. 
Nevertheless, although the Foreign Office wanted to give 'positive 
guidance' to the Council, 'Which it need s as an instrument of 
British policy abroad'. this did not extend to accepting cultural 
relations as a oonventional activity of government. 
62 The 
Council was told that* 
His Majesty's Government. does not consider that 
"cultural" WorK, consisting in such activities 
as those of the British Council, forms part of 63 the normal functions of a diplomatic mission. 
Following the Council's reorganisation in 1947 and in-response 
to economies demanded by. the Treasury, the Foreign Office decided 
that detailed interference in the Council's affairs was no longer 
necessary and Bevin pronounced himself satisfied that the Council 
64 
could be entrusted to manage its funds properly. The Cultural 
Relations Department was run down and Missions abroad were 
instructed, to'settle issues locally with the Council. 
61. Foreign Office Circular No. 144,28 December 1946. 
62. Ibid. FO 924/253 LC4940/113/45 
63. Minutes of a Policy Committee Meeting, 11 February 1947. BW69/1 
64. Minute by W. H. Montagu -Po Iloc k .7 January 
'1947.. FO924/594C LC208/208/45'i 
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After the war the Council entered a period of rationalisation 
and consolidation dictated by Britain's economic difficulties 
which ended the rapid rise in expenditure that had occurred 
during the war. The 1946/7 estimates were cut by E800,000 and 
pegged atýthe previous year's level. A considerable under- 
spending of the 1945/6 budget of E900,000 offset the reduction 
enabling the Council to bring forward expenditure on capital 
projects for 1946. The deman. ds of liberated Europe and the 
rising cost. of living, however, resulted in a contraction in 
services in the Middle East and Latin America. The Council at 
first tried to spread the cuts thinly but coHýtinuing financial 
stringency forced withdrawAl from some countries. Decreases in 
the Council's budget were a measure of the Government's economic 
problems rather than of a desire to restrict c ultural publicity. 
White reported that 
Mr. Bevin and the Chancellor are sympathetic 
with our worK but declare that the c6untry simply 
can not afford to give us what we need. 65 
The pattern continued with a cut of E541,000 in 1947/8 and 
a 10% overall reduction in expenditure on overseas publicity in 
1948/9. In the search for economies in 1947) the Foreign Office 
considered whether the abolition of the Council and its incorpor- 
ation into the Foreign Office was a preferrable 'alternative to 
wholesale liquidation of the Council in a considepable number of 
countries'.. 
66 Net expenditure in 1947/8 totalled E3,161,000 
whereas in 1948/9 only Z2,853,000 was available. In 194B/9 the 
grant of E3,232.000 was hit by the devaluation of sterling in 
September-which meant that savings had to be found to cover the 
additional cost of expenditure abroad. The impossibility of 
planning-long-term activities on a short-term financial basis 
caused frustration and dismay within the Council. Referring to 
the 1947/8 cuts)Tunnard-Moore, Director of the Domini'ons and India 
Division, complained that the Government ' 
thought that by fixing our ceiling we could quickly 
redistribute our finances 7a lunatic mathematical 
outlook, which leaves out human nature, past commit - 
ments and the deplorable political effect on the 
aborigionals of Ruritania when the nice British Council 
which has been teaching them English free of chargefor. 
the past six years, walK out with their umbrellas and 67 their English grammars. Poor, little, cultural Chamberlains 
65. White, to Riverdale, 19 Janu. ary 1946. BW 1/4 
66. Minute by I KirKpatricK, 29 April 1947. CAB 124/1019 
67. T. P. ýunnard-Moore to Wilmo't, 1.9'March 1947, BW 12/1 
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The Government's economic difficulties focused attention on 
public spending and in 1948 a review of the cost of the home 
information services was set up by Cripps who suggested that the 
overseas information services also should be investigated. The 
Foreign Office warned'ý, Lhe Council as it prepared its 1948/9 budget 
that its expenditure might be attacked in Cabinet as social 
welfare was more easily defensible at that time.. At the end of 
1948 a committee of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries was formed 
to plan over, seas publicity expenditure, including the Council's, 
for three years, assuming progressive budgetý reductions. In 
1649 the Council suspended recruitment and by,, 19S2 its staff had 
beep reduced by 43% and expenditure in many countries halved. 
From 1947 to 1952, because of rising costs and falling grants, 
the activities of the overseas information services were reduced 
by approximate 
, 
ly 50%. To judge priorities in, reducing the 
Council's work overseas three tests were applied: how far good 
relations with the country concerned were imoort 
; 
ant politically 
to the British Commonwealth; the influence of the country . 
concerne. d.;, the commercial and economic advantages to be gained 
by the Council's work. 68 The Council also had to consider the 
extent to which a country was amenable to influence, the level 
of the information services and whether Britain had obligations, 
such as a cultural convention, to a country. 
The Council became Britain's agent for the fulfillment of a 
number of its international and bilateral obligations.. Through 
its work wit. h the Allied Ministers of Education Conferences 
during the war the Council had been instrumental in the 
foundation of UNESCO. 
69 It was a member of numerous agencies 
in Britain dealing with UNESCO and of the British delegations to 
UNESCO general conferences. In addition, the Council was the 
agent for the administration of fellowships granted in Britain 
by UN bodies such as the World Health Organisation and the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation. Furthermore, the Council 
represented-Britain on Council of Europe and Brussels Treaty 
cultural committees. It was appointed, Britain's principal 
aý. ent-to carry out reciprocal arrangements contai'ned in bilateral 
cultural conventions; by 1950 conventions had been concluded. 
68. Finance Committee Minutes, 
69. See chapter 9 P. 225 
15 April 1947. Paper C 
, FO 924/594C LC1798/208/451 
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with France, Belgium; the Netherlands, Norway, CzechoslovaKia 
and Brazil. The conventions were administered by Mixed 
Commissions for which the Council provided the secretariat in 
England and some members of the British section. At home the 
Council worked with a number of official and private bodies 
including the Arts Council, the Workers Educational Association 
and the BBC. 
In 1950 the Council prepared for the investigation that would 
accompany the end of the five year lease granted in 1946. Foreign 
Office and Treasury criticisms echoed those of 1945: the need for 
closer scrutiny and tighter controls over expýenditure and 
appointments. In a draft Cabinet Paper the Foreign Office 
argued that the Council's independence was an, asset overseas and 
that cultural propaganda would be less effective if it was 
conducted officially. This arrangement also relieved the 
Foreign Office of responsibility for statements made by Council 
lecturers or in Council publications. More-impprtantly, the 
Foreign Office concluded that if the Council did not exist its 
functions would have to be carried out by Government Departments 
or othe-r bodies with grants from public funds an'd 
That the Council performs a task which is 
recognised by leading countries of the world 
as an essential feature of international 
relationships and is an important aid to the 
maintenance and development of British political 
and trading influence in the widest sense. 70 
The Treasury, too, concluded that existing arrangements were the 
most suitable. The absorption of the Council's functions by 
the Gov. ernment would not lead to savings, would increase the 
administrat, ive burdens of the departments concerned, would, require 
a central, coordinating machinery and 
it'would reduce the effectiveness of Government 
policy control and make it more difficult to dnsure 
that Government policy was be'ing correctly interpreted. 71 
Ih December 1950 an interdepartmdntal Working Party, of representa'-. 
atives of, the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
t'he Ministry of Defence, the Treasury i and the COI, was formed to 
examine the Council's work and to evaluate its importance in 
terms of the cold, warýand trade. ý It's terms of referance indicate 
how far tý6 Council was still from being recognised ai a 
, permanent 
institution. 
! 70. Draft Cabinet Paper, undated. F0924/782 CRA 20/6 
ý71. Final Report of Organisation and Methods Division, November 
1950 T21 9/68 
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To examine whether the British Council should 
continue*its activities and, if so, what economies 
might be secured either by re-def ining its 
activities or by cutting its expenditure by a 
reduction in the Kinds of work it did or in the 
countrieý in which it operated. 72 I 
0 
72. WorKing Party Minutes, -First Meeting, 20 December 1950 
FO 924/784 CRA 20/37 
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CHAPTER'NINE 
ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN EUROPE 
Britain's red uced status was the dominating feature of her 
world position atý the end of the Second World War. With her 
Commonwealth part ners, Britain was the only country to have fought 
throughout, with the exceptibn of Germany, but the outcome had 
been decided by- t 
: 
he United States and the Soviet Union. British 
propaganda in tur, ope had the dual task of rebuilding the morale 
of western Europe and, from January 1948, un8, ermining the spread 
of communism in E urope. The resumption of links with western 
Europe and the re'storation of its economy was vital to Britain 
as the junior partner in the p ost-war coalitio n. 
I The only conclusion for Britain was th I at every- 
thing must be done to rouse western Europe from 
its stateý of shock and depression if, the shape 
of the post-war world was not to be-Aecided in 
Washingto n or Moscow. 1 
Morýover, as 'the sole remaining repository' of western civilisatic 
Britain had a spe cial responsibility to present an alternative to 
'the golden charm of Washington and the drum-fire of Kremlin 
2 
ideology'. 
In central and south-eastern Europe the opportunities for the 
exercise of direc, t political influence were limit ed, whilst in bhe 
west, Britain was, bound to attempt to overcome the political 
vacuum, as long as there was no effective balance to Soviet- 
domination in the east. The former meant the development of less 
overt means of in: f luence, and the latter implied the improvement 
of contacts-at ev ery level to encourage concerte'd action in the 
face of an emerging monolithic eastern bloc Greece and Italy 
lay in a special category as outposts of liberal democracy in the 
Mediterranean and so, important targets for British publicity. 
For different reasons, Germany and Austria alao. were treated 
separately; their long isolation and then occupation created new 
problems. Finally, there were the neutral countries of Europe. 
iý-which the Council had established large organi . sations during 
the war. In each area, the Foreign Office anticipated,, that-the 
Council would have a valuable role to play. 
1. F. S. Northedgo, Doscon 
't 
From Power (London 1974)p. 21 
2. Memorandum on the Council in Europe by W. R. L. Wickham, July 1944 
FO 924/192 LC3151/188/452 
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It 
, 
is considered by the Foreign Office that the 
indirect influence which the long term work of 
the. British Council may-exert will be of particular 
value in post-war Europe, in circumstances which 
have changed violently-since 1939, and which may 
al 
I 
low of less direct political influence'being 
exerted by this country than in the past. 3 
The planned rapid extension of the Council's work in Europe caused 
some misgivings to senior Colincil staff, such as R. Seymour and 
W. Wickham, who feared. that the-continuity of these activities 
could not bET'guaranteed. Adam and K. Johnstone, however, amongst 
others, favoured expansion against tne time w, hen economies would 
force a more, cautious appuoach. By the end of 1945 there were 
forty-seven Council staff in France and her colonies, ten in Italy 
and Belgium, nine in Greece, s ight in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
and a single officer in Denmark and Finland. 
As an instrument of long term prop. aganda, the Council began 
preparations for its return to Europe duringithe darkest days of 
the war. The twin problems of reconstruction and re-education 
were identified as those to which. the Co, uncil could bring the most 
expertise. Discussions within the Council centred on the 
provision of material'designed to. supplant the doctrines of fascism, 
with those of western democracy at 'the right psychological moment' 
Such actions werelesential if the coming peace is to endure'. 
5 
In March 1941 the Council approached Sir George Chrystal, secretary 
to the Greenwood Committee on reconstruction problems. The 
Comthittee proved impotentý however, and the Council's most 
promising lead was.. through the Home Division and its contacts 
with the education braaches of the Allied Governments and Free 
French in London. The Czech, Norwegian and Belgian Governments 
had invited'the Council to resume operations in their countries 
as soon as circumstances allowed. The Home Division had started 
a training scheme. 'with a view to equipping them for education 
work in their own countries after the war' and courses in social 
problems, economics. and*welfare for foreign nationals in Britain. 
7 
In addition, a proportion of scholarships was al I oted on. the basis 
of an applicant's potentialvalue to the reconstruction of his 
country. 
3. Draft Memorandum to H. M. Representatives in Liberated Europe 
13: March 104S DW 2/9 
4. Minute by B. Fernald, 31 March 1941 BW 2/94 
5. Ibid. 
6. The Committee could only coordinate the work of other depart- 
ments and met only three times. before Greenwood's dismis'sal. 
7. N. ParKinson to S. Wood, 6 March 1942 BW 2/94 
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The possibility of joint exploratory talks on educational 
and cultural reconstruction was mooted in October 1941 and a 
forthcoming meeting between the Allied Ministers of Education and 
the Boa'rd of Education, at the suggestion of th e Council, offered 
an ideal opportunity. From this meeting evolved the Conference 
of Allied Ministers of 'Education, established in the autumn of 1942, 
meeting bi-monthly udder, the chairmanship.. of the'Minister of. 
Education. 6 The Council. provided the, secretariat and chaired many 
of'the commissions through which the-Conference worked. These 
were appointed to consider the, negotiation of bilateral cultural 
conventions,. the supply of books and periodic I als to liberated 
Europe, the re-stocking of national and university. libraries and 
the provision of textbooks. At its sixth meeting the Conference 
decided that it would not examine the reform of education in Axis 
countries of the education systems of member states. Parallel 
discussions between the Council and the Board of Education 
established that re-education in Germany wasýoutside the Councills- 
sphere, being largely a political undertaking. Observers from 
the United States and the Soviet Union joined the Conference in 
May 1943 and were joined subsequently by representatives from 
China, India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. 
Regular delegates were appointed to form an inter-Allied bureau 
of education in December, that might become a permanent inter- 
national agency. It emerged that a cultural and educational 
organisation, beyond immediate post-war needs would be welcomed. 
At San Francisco in April 194S UNESCO was established as a direct 
result of these wartime discussions. Reconstructionwhich had 
motivated the Conference originally, was confined to an annex of 
UNESCO's constitution and taken over by UNRRA. 
In the fibld of films, the Council was represented on the 
Educational Films Commission of the Conference and the Film Sub- 
ýD 10 
Committee of the Inter Allied Committee on Post-war Requirements, 
and, in September 1943, joined the MOI-PWE Coordinating Committee 
on films. The Council had supplied films to east Africa and 
Libya from its Cairo offic'e in cooperation with the MOI. Following 
th)e invasion of North Africa, the Council operated*with the PWB 
8. See A. Haigh. Cultural Diplomacy in Europe, (Strassburg 1974) 
9. Cmd. 6963, HMSO Novemer 1945 
10. This Committee was formed in September 1941 under the chair- 
manship of Sir Fýederick Leith-Ross. It prepared estimates 
of post-war requirements and priorities for the Allied 
Governments and authorities represented on the Committee. 
its report was completed in June 1943. 
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in the distribution of f ilms and other material., in Algeria and 
initially entered Italy as part of the PWB, attached to the 
Military Missions. The closure of cinemas for any length of 
time in northern Europe was ruled'out as likbly to depress morale 
and so. alternatives to Axis films, that would be immediately 
banned, had to be prepared. The Council was instructed to 
produce additional prints and to increase the number of languages 
into which they were dubbýed to cater for Europe. Following 
Operation, Overlord, the PWD was to be the sole organisation for 
the distribution of films in Europe and all British films were 
seleoted by the PWE's regional specialists. Scripts for the 
C ouncil's films were submitted to the regional specialists before 
and after translation. 
, The Council's film department embarked on an extensive dubbing 
programme; to, the ten languages 
12 
already used by the Council 
were added Italian, Norwegian, Greek, Slovak and Danish. Davies 
queried whether this work for short, term poýitical ends was 
proper to the Council but Kearney, ýGu edalla ý. and 
I 
Kennedy-Cooke 
argued that if the Council did not do this work, the MOI would 
have a monopoly and renew its calls to take over the Council's 
filmlactivities. By the end of 1943,, the PWE had requested one 
hundred and fifty films from the Council at a cost of E22,129 
and nearly two hundred prints, mainly for Italy and Germany. The 
Council demanded and received an extra grant for this work. By 
May 1944 anucleus of two hundred Council films had been assembled, 
mostly dubbed into Polish, French, Belgian and Dutch. 
As with films, the Allies planned to replace rapidly and 
restock libraries and bookshops. The Council undertook a large 
number of t. ranslations but was forbidden to stockpile by the 
Treasury, in view of the Council's own uncertain future... 
Shortages of manpower, paper, books and finance. also prevented 
the accumulation of reserves or the servicing of reading rooms 
run by the PWB, as had been planned. However, after the final 
defeat of Germany, the Council played a significant role in the 
revival of the Europea-h book trade by retaining the Book Export 
s6heme Limited for some countries, such as Austria. Czechd, slovakia 
Hungary, Poland, Italy and Greece, until normal channels were, 
re-established. 
The Anglo-American Psychological Bureau(PWB) was established in Algiers 
in 1943 to handle all propaganda- combat, strategic, consolidation - in the Mediterranean and included represetatives off the PWE, MOLOSS 
and OWI. A psychological warfare coordinating Almi5ion was set up 
in London for the invasion of Europe, which becamethe PWD- 
12. Frencý, Spanish, Portuguese, Brazilian, South American Spanish, Persian Arabic, Chinese, Dutch, Afrikaans. 
227 
The timing of the Council's return to a country was decided 
by the Foreign Office and the military authorities. In Cairo, 
the Council's Representative, Professor Boase, discussed with 
Leeper and Stevenson the future of the Counc-il16 work in Greece 
and Yug. oslavia respectively. After the invasion of North Africa, 
Leeper advised Boase also on the development of Council operations 
in Algeria, Sicily and Iýaly. In addition, the preparation of 
supplies and the training of Adlied personnel, had brought the 
Council intor-contact with the Civil Affairs Directorate of the 
War Office, which was responsible for the adýinistration of 
liberated territories. Different methods of managing civilian 
affairs in the immediate post-hostilities period had emerged. In 
east Africa, Sicily and southern Italy, authority was vested in 
a formally established military administration,, although a separatE 
civil affairs chain of-command had developed i Italy. However, 
these methods were considered inappropriate to northern Europe 
where friendly or Allied, and not enemy, territories were to be 
invaded. Negotiations with the Allied Governments in London 
prior to invasion prepared the ground for the revival of civilian 
administrations. Local control was to be established as soon 
as possible. These factors affectbd the development of the 
Council's worK in different countries. 
The Council did not want to be associated directly with Allied 
administrations but initially h. ad to distribute supplies through 
Civil Affairs officers and the PWD. In Robertson's opinion, 
the Council should be chary of entering a country 
overtly until the natiýe government is more or 
less stabilised and it would be undesirable to 
identify ourselves too openly with British or 
Ang-lo-American military administra tý ons or with 
a returning exiled government..... 
It was anticippted that internal upheavals and civil war in post- 
war Europe would prevent the foundation of stable governments, 
but the overwhelming demand for material encountered when the 
Allies landed in Sicily and the relatively peaceful transttion to 
to normal conditions in many areas, forced the Foreign Office to 
re . vise ýhis estimate and sanction the resumption of : Council 
work in Eurdpe sooner than had been expected. Likewise, although 
there was some opposition within the Council to operations in 
ex-enemy countries, the demand was to great that the Council 
agreed to work in all areas except Germany in January 1945. By 
the end of the year, the South-east European states, Italy and 
13. Robertson to M. Palairet, 26 July 1943, BW 2/95 
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Finland had been given priority over northern Europe. 
14 
In the 
Council's overall budget, Europe, with the exception of the 
former neutrals, enjoyed the largest share. 
The extraordinary conditions pertaining to many*parts of 
Europe forced the Council to compromise. Where necessary, for 
example, in Italy, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece, the PWD restored 
initial cultural and educational contacts on the Council's behalf. 
The PWD and the PWB proved fr6itful recruiting grounds for the 
Council; in' many areas the Council tooK over the staff and 
activittes of these bodies. W. WicKham report d in October 1944, 
All PWB officials with whom I spoKe in Italy 
are of the opinion th'at their functions have 
changed and are changing to. sucha degree that 
they may be taKen over by -the British-Council 
because the need in ItalyAnot now forý, military 
or political propaganda but for educational 
and cultural activity-15 
I Nevertheless, the Council was anxiousthat i-ts peacetime work 
should not be sullied by association with wartime and political 
propaganda and wherevar possible, and in the majority of countries 
operated from the start through diplomatic missions and its own 
representatives. 
However, even where the Council did have its own staff, 
circumstances often dictated that it should forfeit much of its 
independence. Shortages of food, fuel and acconrodation forced 
reliance on the British Mission for supplies and the four-power 
control commission in Austria and, the armistice agreements in 
Hungary, Roumania and Bulgatia circumscribed severely the Council's 
freedom. In Austria the Councill, s staff worKed as members of 
the British Political Representative's staff andin Hungary, 
Roumania and Bulgaria, where the terms of the armistice placed 
the control of propaganda in Soviet hands, the Council functioned 
as part of the British Political Mistion. As Johnstone explained, 
A very short acquaintance with conditions under 
the Russian occupation is sufficient to convince 
an enquirer that this is, in fact, the only 
possible cover under which the Council can worK. 16 
The Soviet monopoly was guarded jealously and dictated caution; 
additional problems were created by the difficulty of securing 
entry and exit-visas. 
1'4. Minute by H. Hedley, 31 August 1945 F0924/117 LC4369/111/451 
15. W. Wickham to K. T. Gurney, 24 October 1944 F0924/48 LC1375/148/45. ' 
16. Executive Committee Minutes, 9 July 1946 BW69/12 
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In Decmber 1942, a month after the Allied invasion of North 
Africa, the Council was alerted to the possibilities for cultural 
propaganda in the French territories I by Major Ian Greenless, a 
former Council employee engaged with the PWB at Allied Forces 
Headquarters. Greenlees suggested the establishment of a 
Representative in North Africa to counter the effects of Axis 
propaganda and widespread ignorance about Britain. 
ý In London, 
Johnstone, recently returned from Noirth Africa,, told White 
that the inhabita-nts of North Africa have been 
soaked with German ideas, that their'ýi rance 
of Britain is appalling and that in ,e 
interests 
of the Allied cause it is important that this 
should be corrected as soon as possible. 17 
i 
'The Foreign Office endorsed these proposals and the Council 
supplemented the'worK of the Press Attach6s that were appointed 
to North Africa. R. L. Speaight of the French Oepartment noted, 
There-are strong political arguments, in favour of 
an infative there. The country is fu'll of men who 
may playlan important role in the France of the 
future and we ought. to start enlightening them 
about ourselves Also we do not want to leave the 
field entirely 
;o 
the Americans. " 
Harold Macmillan, Resident Minister in North Africa, approved the 
appointment of a Council Representative in January 1943. 
Austin Gill arrived in North Africa in July, after the 
continent had been cleared of Axis forces and the invasion of 
It-aly had begun. A former lecturer in French at Edinbugh 
University and member of the Homo Division, Gill opened an office 
and English Librýry , that also served as a reading room and a 
lecture hall, in Algiers. He was concerned mainly with the 
distrib(itibn ofýbooks and periodicals and moved to France at the 
end of 1944 as acting Representattve. An office was founded at 
Casablanca in May 1945 but financial, cutbacks forced-the closure 
of the Algiers office and the suppression of. the post of Repres- 
entative later in the year. The Library in Algiers continued 
to function and the Casablanca office became the centre for the 
distribution of material in Algeria and Morocco. Further economie 
in . 1947 forced the Council to withdraw completely from North Afric 
01 
17. White to K. T. Gurney, 15 January 1943 F0370/738 L338/338/410 
18. Minute by R. L. Speaight, 20 January 1943 FO 370/738 
L338/338/410 
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The fi 
! 
rst. European repreg--ntatives were appdnted to France, 
Italy, Grb I ece: and Yugolslavia in 1944/5 and in Jul 1945, the y 
Council was instructed to give top priority to Italy and Greece. 
These two countries were to be Britain's 'bastions of democracy' 
in the Mediterranean against the encroachments of communism to the 
19 Middle East and Africa . To preserve Italy for. -the democratic 
i 
fold, fascist influence had to be expurgated and anýalternative 
presented to the lure of commu. ni'sm. Anglo-American victory and 
economic assistance provided part of the answer but an extensive 
re-education and propaganda programme was necessary. Rear Admira' 
E. W. Stone, 
' 
Chief Commissioner on the Allied 
Lntrol 
Commission 
from June: 1944, stressed that 
A further safeguard to preserve Italy among the 
free nations 6f democracy, and indeedýa duty of 
the Allies, is the-education of the mi. nds of the 
Italiains towards a democratic way of life. 20 
Admiral Stone went on to recommend that-'much can be done in this 
# 21 way by institutions such as-the British Council. The 
Foreign Office asked the Council to pay special attention to this 
aspect of its work in Italy.. 
If the Italians are to. become partners with the 
Allies, they must, be prepared to assimilate their 
national characteristics with the principles of 
democracy, and after twenty'years of fascism they 
will need advice on its interpretation. 22 
The Council worKed closely with the PWB and the MOI in Italy 
and Greenlees was assiduous in safeguarding its interests and 
property in the waKe of the advancing Allied armies. He was 
joined by R. McNab, C. G. Bidwell and I. Himbury, former Council 
employees, who acted on the Council's behalf in the, PWB, until 
October 1944, when they returned to the Council's service. 
Greenlees urged the Foreign Office to reopen the British Institute! 
in Italy as soon as possible, arguing that the Council's activitie 
would be more valuable to the Allies in the long term than those 
of the PWB. 
Although political propaganda is enormously valuable 
it must be supported and complemented by cultural 
propaganda of the Kind carried out by the Council. 
In the long run, Italy, where the people have been 
subjected to an excess of propaganda, cultural 
propaganda will be the most effective. 23 
19. Minutes of Meeting at the Foreign Office, 17 July 1945 EW40/! 
20. Memorandum by Admiral Stone, 23 June 1945 W0220/512 CA 318/3 
21. Ibid. 
22. H. O. Bryan to R-Seymour, 10 August 1945 F0924/181LC3027/82/452 
23.1. Greenlees to M-Palairet, 16 August 1943 BW40/9 
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In the armistice agreement signed with Badoglio in the following 
month, the Press, radio, cinema and theatre were placed under 
Allied control and the suppressLon of fascist ideology was 
proclaimed. In October, Italy declared war on Germany and 
became a co-belligerent. 
Greenleesl request was forwarded to Macmillan in Algiers in 
February 1944 and he 'advised that no action be taken until after 
Rome was in Allied hands'. 
24 
Rome fell in June but the physical 
difficulties of living in Italy in this period foresbLlled Council 
activities until the end of the year. Italian desire for 
Knowledge of developments in the world outside the Axis was intensf 
and the demand for material, overwhelming. In November, Sir 
Noel Charles, the British ambassador, who took an active interest 
in the Council, approved the resumption of Council activities in 
Rome and then Naples and Palermo. The reoppning of the Florence 
and northern institutes had to wait until th, e Allied victory in 
Italy in June 194S. Meanwhile, it was important that the Council 
should begin worK in order not. to leave the Americans a clear 
field. 
Italians do not necessarily want to go either 
towards Russia or America, but in default of 
any initiative from our side, they are likely 
to eat from any hand that feeds-them. 25 
In the spring of 1945, Kennedy-CooKe toured Italy and in April, 
Ronald Bottrall arrived from Sweden to taKe up his new post as 
Represent6tive in Italy. 26 In-discussions with Charles an order 
of priority for the opening of institutes in 1945/6 was agreed: 
Rome, Milan, Florence and then Palermo at an estimated cost of 
over E90,000. It was planned to open institutes in the north 
at Turin, Genoa, Naples and Venice in the following year 
An office was opened in Rome to supervise the distribution 
of material, the RomecInstitute was reactiv--ated and the British 
School reopened, Contacts were established with official and 
unofficial educational and cultural bodies in Italy and an Anglo- 
Italian Association was formed under the presidency of the British 
ambassador. Francis Toye returned from Brazil to resume his 
duties as director of the Florence Institute, which had been 
preserved by its staff during the war. In addition, the Council 
worked in Palermo and Naples as scheduled, but only Turin in the 
24. Minute by H. Hodley, 18 August 1944 F0924/48 LC148/148/452 
25. Charles to Robertson, 11 January 1945 F0924/181 LC263/82/452 
26. Charles opposod Groonlans reappointment as Representative 
because. of his inv4lvement in Italian politics. 
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north. Whem the peace treaty with Italy was signed in February 
1947, the combined membership of the Council's four institutes 
and the Florence Institute totalled four thousand five hundred. 
However, this pace of expansion could not be maintained and even 
the consolidation of existing activities demanded painful decision! 
The Council was bombarded by Leeper in Greece with de, mands 
for the immediate resumption of large scale activities as soon as 
he arrived with the Papandreou Government in October 1944. In 
the same month, Churchill agreed with Stalin in Moscow that Greece 
should be a British sphere of influence, an agreement that ratifie( 
existing facts. Kenneth Johnstone, then Co'nimanding Officer of 
the Anglo-Greek Information Services, as the political warfare 
teams under his control were known,,. was appointed acting 
Representative and the difficulties of finding staff in Britain 
forced the Council to rely initially on Jo hnstýone's men. As a 
result, considerable commitments were undertaken by Leeper and 
Johnstone on the Council's behalf against the Co. uncil's be, tter 
judgement, in particular, the teaching of elementary English on 
a wide scale. 
The uprising of December 1944 called a temporary halt to 
Leeper's concern with the Council's worK. However, the revolt 
and the events that followed, highlighted the danger of a communis 
taKeover in Greece, aided by dire economic conditions that made 
extremist ideologies more acceptable. After the Varzike agree- 
ment in February 1945, Leeper urged again that extensive measures 
should be undertaken to strengthen the moderate viewpoint. He 
was anxious to establish British influence in the Greek educationa 
system and amongst Greek youth. 
ýD 
It-is for this reason that I attach so much 
importance. to the worK of the British Council 
here. -If this worK is well done..... they can 
tap various strata of society especially younger 
people, who may soon have a role to play and who, 
under the influence of British ideas, may form 
the nucleus of that Centre party whose absence 
at present is a serious weaKness to stability 
and to our own influence here. 27 
I'n'1945 the Council subsidised two chairs at Athens and one at 
Salonike University, granted a disproportionate number of 
sbholarships to Greece and appointed an Educational Adviser to 
the Greek Government. In July, it took over the teaching 
activities of the Anglo-GrneK Information Services in Athens, 
providing seventy-three classes a month to over two thousand. 
27. Leeper to Eden,,, 21 November 1944 FO 371/43735 R18967/745/19 
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The introduction of English teaching to Greek schools in January 
1948 removed part of this burden but,, the numbers of local English 
teachers that needed to be trained overwhelmed the Council and 
American help was sought. Johnstone's request, to the Council 
for the re-equipment of Geeek schools were referred toýthe 
Conference of Allied Ministers of Education andýthe physical 
rehabilitation of Greek educational institutions was undertaken 
eventually by UNRRA, although. the, responsibility for the supply 
of reading mate. rial remained with the Council. 
Professor Ruhciman was appointed Representative in October 
1945 and Johnstone returned t. o London. Regiondl directorates 
had been established in-Piraeus, Kavalla, Corfu, Crete and 
Mitylene. In each area English st: ýhools were organised, as far 
as possible on a self supporting ba. sis, whichý, doubled as 
cultural centres. The possibility of a directorate at Rhodes 
under Lawrence-Durrell was discussed with thp Foreign Office and 
the British military authorities who had beg'un giving English 
lessons, but no firm decision was reached. The. Council-took 
over the Anglo-Greek Review from the Anglo-Greek Information 
Services and continued sub 54. dising the Anglo Hellenic League. In 
1946 Institutes of English Studies were opened in Athens and 
Salonika, with over three thousand pupils each, to continue the 
English teaching initiated by the Anglo-Greek Information Services 
A British institute of Higher English Studies was founded in 
Athens to cater for more advanced students and to provide a 
cultural centre and a library. Financial restraints in 1947 led 
to the abandonment of the proposed Rhodes directorate and the 
Anglo-Greek Review 
The Coincil's successes, however, could not hide Britain's 
inability to provide the Greek Government with any further 
military or political aid. The renewal of the guerilla war in 
1946 and the referral of the problem to the United Nations in 
December, foreshadowed the announcement of what became known as 
the Trumaný Doctrine in March 1947. In that month Runciman 
wanned that 
The popularity of Britain in Greece is waning 
fast and unless we are prepared to assist those 
Greeks whose belief in British culture a' nd the 
British way of life is unshaken, we must not be 
surprised if, at any rate in the provinces, we 
find the Greeks turniný in other directions for 
guidance and sympathy. 8 
28. S. Runciman to I. Hayter, 6 March 1947 BW 34/11 
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To fill the political vacuum in western Europe, Britain 
advocated the restoration of F. rench pGwer and the strengthening 
of Anglo-French relations. The Council was entrusted with the 
0 
chief responsibility in the sphere of cultural relations and 
I 
the atmosphere in post-war France was encouraging. 
Never has the name of England been so much 
respected in France, never have Frenchmen been 
so ready to stretch out their hands in friend- 
ship across the Channe . 1.29 
A meeting to coordinate Anglo-French cultural relations was held 
at the Council in March 1944 with representat,, ives from the 
Institut Francais, 
30 the Foreign Office, the Board of Educat ion, 
the BBC, the Board of Trade and the Vice-Chancellors' Committee. 
Reciprocal arrangements for the exchange of school and university 
teachers and occupational and professional gro'ups were approved. 
The multiplicity of organisations that emerged later in Paris- 
the Information Office, the British Institutb and the British 
'Council - led to acrimonious disputes i-oachi, ng to the British 
Embassy and the French Government. 
A Council office was opened in Paris in October 1944 In the 
former premises of the Travel Association and the British Institutf 
returned to its pre-war home, under its former director, Hugh 
Sellon. The Institute had provided English correspondence 
courses throughout the German occupation and its library had 
been preserved intact. Austin Gill, the Council's Representative, 
concentrated on the resu(nottlon of Council work in Paris and of 
contacts with French eduactional and cultural bodies through 
specialist, liaison officers. One of his first initiatives was 
English lessons for French railway workers 'appropriately enough 
having regard to their record in the Resistance'. This was 
the only direct English teaching undertaken, as English classes 
were the province of the British Institute, which was indBDandent 
of the Council. The exploration of the provinces walted on the 
return of Britain's Consular offices to France. 
The Council planned initially for five regional directorates 
alý Lyons, Liale, Nancy, Rennes and Strassburg, the first two to 
i be founded in t! he autumn of 194S and the remainder in 1946. 
Cuts in the Council estimates forced a reduction to. three centres 
at Grenoble, Toulouse and Nancy. In 1947 a fourth was established 
2ý. Duff'CooP'6r, Old Men Forget(London'1953) p. 353 
110, English 
lessons given by the, Institut Francais to the Frpe 
f, onch duri a -r 119. Ulu War were 'he Subsidised by t Cauncýl the grant to tho British Institute was suspended. 
31. "Executiv6ýCommittee Minutes, 20 Decomber, 1944 BW 69/10 
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at Lille and the Grenoble O-F-Fice was trans-Forred to larger 
premises at Lyons. Bach centre had a library and held concerts 
lectures, exhibitions and film shows. In Paris and London the 
Council supervised the exchange of students and development of 
contacts between British and French universities. A large 
numbe. r of French visitors were brought to Britain and ambitious 
projects, such as exchange visits between the Old Vic Theatre 
Company and the Comedie Francaise, were undertaken. 
The Foreign Office considered it 'politically important' that 
I 
the Council should operate in all northern Europe as soon as 
32 i 
circumstances allowed. The demand for the 
6ouncills 
services 
was enormous and the PWD was anxious that the Council should resumf 
worK as quicKly as possible to taKe, advantage of the high prestige 
Britain enjoyed immediately after the war. Representatives 
were sent to Norway, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1945 
to establish 'cultural contacts at the highest level and contacts 
with the educational movements of the massest". 
33 
ýThe structure 
of the Council's worK in northern Europe was not uniform. In 
DenmarK the Council worKed closely with the Danish Council, a 
body similar to itself, and the Oanish-British Society, which had 
twenty-three branches by 1947 and four thousand six hundred 
members. In Belgium and the Netherlands centres were founded 
at Brussels, Antwerp, Liege, The Hague and Amsterdam, attended 
mainly by academic and professional groups. 
34 The Council's 
officer in Norway enjoyed close relations with the Minister of 
Education and had weeKly meeting with the Permanent Under Secretar: 
in charge of cultural affairs and with the Norwegian State 
Broadcasting Organisation on schools broadcasts. After visiting 
Norway in 1,947 Adam returned impressed with the pattern of the 
Council's worK there and described the Representative as 'an 
unofficial adviser to the Ministry of Education', with the result 
that the Norwegian Government paid for most of the Council's 
services. 
35 
Finland lay on the fringe of northern Europe, an ex-enemy 
country in: the Soviet sphere of in-Fluence. Despite this 
32. Minute by A. Haigh, 26 October 1944 F0924/79 LC1471/147/452 
33. H. Ki6g to M. BlaKe, 6 July 1946 BW 14/2 
34. . From 
1941 the Council provided some facilities for Belgian 
exiles in the Belgian Congo-.! These activities'ceased at the 
and of the war, and tho Library and Institute were taken 
over by the British Consul-General. and run by a local 
committee nominated by the Governor-General. In December 1946 
the British House, as it became, passed to the Information Offim 
35. Minute by W. H. Montagu-pollack, 10 June 1947 F0924/596 
LC2684/611/451 
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unpromising scenario, however, Finland became an important field 
for the Council. Activi 
, 
ties there had been suspended in 
Septamber 1941 but the British Library had stayed open throughout 
the war, run by the daughter of the President of the Finnish- 
British society, who had himself fled to England and joined PWE. 
The Council heard in November 1944 that there was a considerable 
demand for British material in Finland, and thatýthe. Soviet Union 
was surprised that the Council had not yet returned. 
: Jb There was 
no provision in the budget for work in Finland in 1945/6, although 
some supplies and lecturers were sent from StocKholm. The 
Foreign Office pressed the Council to expand'ýits work. 
We consider that she offers, at the moment, more 
fruitful ground for British cultural penetration 
than many other European countries, and that she 
should therefore be given higher priority than 37 
she would otherwise receive as an ex-enemy country. 
A Representative arrived in Helsinki in October 1945 and opened 
an office and re-established contacts with the Finnish-British 
society. The Council's work flourished and English replaced 
German in 1946 as the first foreign language taught in schools. 
A series of broadcasts entitled Britain Today were organised and 
by 1947 there were forty-seven Anglo-Finnish groups, some attached 
to factories, workers' associations and student bodies. It was 
estimated that 
In one way or another, but principally through 
its films, the Council is now in some kind of 
38 contact with perhaps 10.000 people here. 
The relaxed attitude of the Soviet Union to Finland's internal 
political and social development was reflected. in the development 
of foreign cultural organisations in Finland. The Soviet, French, 
American and British diplomatic and cultural representatives 
attended each others' functions. Open collaboration with the 
United States, however, was avoided in order not to give the 
appearance. of a western cultural bloc and because it was feared 
that the qounc. il would be a Junior partner in a joint venture. 
Moreover, Britain and the United States shared only a common 
language and not a common culture. 
An Anglo-American institution is an awkward and 
doubtful vehicle for forwarding our purpose and 
it prevents ths founding of a more valuable(from 
our point of view)purely Anglophile body. 39 
36. Minute by R. Dottrall, 30 Novombor 1944 BW 30/1 
37. Montagu-Pollack to R. Seymour, 5 May 1945 BW 3VI 
38. P. Grundy. Annual Report, 10 April 1947 BW 30/3 
39. Minuto by K-Johnatono, 21 March 1040 DW 30/1 
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The return oT the Council to central and south-oastern Europe 
formed part of Britain's struggle to retain some influence in 
those areas that had been occupied by the Red Army. Britain 
lacked military, political and economic influence in this region 
and was forced to rely on less tangible instruments to bolster 
her position. 
Our opportunities for exercising direct political 
influence in most of the countries of Eastern 
Europe are likely to be limited. Indirect means 
of influence, such as the long term work of the 
British Councdl, will therefore be very valuable. 40 
The weakness of Britain's position was recognised by the Cabinet 
in 1946 when it approved increased expenditure on the Information 
Services and the Council in eastern Europe. 
The Foreign Secretary said that the best means 
of preventing the countries of South Eastern 
Europe from being absorbed into an exclusive Soviet 
sphere of influence was to provide alsteady stream 
of information about British life and c6lture. 41 
Moreover, it was vital that Britain did notrelax her opposition 
to the Soviet domination of. eastern Europe for 
I 
a policy of appeasing Russia by abandoning in 
Eastern Europe our advocacy of the parliamentary 
form of social democracy would alienate our friends 
in Europe, would undermine our posiiton in the 
Middle East and, in particular, it would be likely 
to shock American opinion ..... 
42 
Above all, Britain must not appear to have forsaken her friend 
incentral and south-eastern Europe and pro-Western affiliations 
had to be nurtured by maintaining links wherever possible and 
by distributing propaganda material. Even though the task 
might seem'fruitless in the short term, 
It would be disastrous if we did not keep a foot 
in the door, to be able to exploit that chance 
(of an improvement in relations], instead of having 
to build up afresh from nothing. 43 
The Foreign Office and the Council were optimistic initially 
that cultural propaganda might highlight the deficiencies of 
, communismýand 
undermine its omnipotence. British political and 
ýcultural, 6ublicity in eastern Europe had a positive and a neg6tive 
, _aspect. 
On the one hand, it was designed 'to spread a knowledge 
of the Government's social programme and the achievements of the 
western way of life', and, on the other, to counteract 'the 
40. Cadogan to Robertson, 9 January 1945 BW 69/10 
41. Cabinet Conclusions, 15 January T946 CAB 128/3 CM(46)5 
42. Heads of Division Meeting, 14 January 1947 F0953/4E File. 
43. I. Tathan to K. Johnstone, I June 1947 BW 66/4. 
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falsification of news on international affairs' and the anti- 
British propaganda disseminated'by the Communists'. 
44 Moreover, 
Britain had a duty to undertake this task as the only victorious 
exponent of western civilisation. In the first two years of 
peace it seemed that something might be achieved along these lines 
From Poland Britain's ambassador reported in August 1945 
thata-Council officer 'would find himself almost embarassingly 
popular. His problem will be to feed a starving and eager public'! 
' 
In September, the Foreign Office reminded the Council that 'it 
attached the highest importance to as speedy. ýa development as 
46 
possible of the British Council's work in Polland'. Cavendish- 
Bentinck, the British ambassador, urged that 
It is essential to capitalise this cultural 
enthusiasm before it in dissipated inýother 
directions and leads to disillusion and British 
Council representative would gain far more 
respect by beginning now when. conditions are 
difficult ..... 
47 
Bevin minuted on this telegram, 'Try to send "some oneli 
48 The Soviet 
Union, France and even Italy had already reopened their institutes 
in Poland. Bowing to this pressure, the Council accorded 
Poland the highest priority and hastily transferred C. G. Bidwell 
from its Middle East office to act as a temporary Representative. 
Bidwell arrived in January 1946 and established close 
relations with the Minister of Education who wanted the'Council's 
help in training Polish English teachers. The Council's work 
in Poland was on a grand scale and flourished with official and 
unofficial support. Much of-its success was due to Bidwell, 
who became Representative at the end of the year on the advice 
of the Embassy. The only cloud in the picturawas an attack on' 
the Council's building in Warsaw in October 1946 by Polish 
youths claiming that it was a centre for reactionary forces. 
Conditions for-the development of Council activities in 
post-war -Cze6hoslovakia initially appeared favourable. The 
Council'had had close contacts with the Czech Government in' exile 
in London during the war and there was a widespread demand for 
týe Council's services. As 'the Slav state most familiar with 
aind most.. open to western ideas', Czech. calovakia was the key tb 
44. Meeting of Heads'nf Missions in Eastern Europe, 14 January 
1947 F0953/4E File 
4 5. Cavendish-Bentinck to Bevin, 16 September 1946 F0924/210 LC3547/1695/452 
46. W. H. Montagu-Pollack to K. Johnstone, 5 September 1.9.45 BW51/3 
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49 
a successful cultural penetration of the eastern bloc. 
Johnstone was advised by the Czech Ministers of Education and 
Information in June 1946 to 
st, ake our claim and lay our foundations in 
the ground we mean to cover, since the situation 
is still fluid and the elemen 
' 
ts unfriendly to 
western cultural penetration have not yet begun 
to ýexploit their new advantage. 50 a 
Sir Philip Nichols, the British ambas'sador, while admitting the 
influence of-, the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia, argued that the 
Council could ensure 
that the leading Western influence was English, 
and we should receive encouragement in this from 
Dr Benes, who was extremely anxious that his country 
should not be swallowed up by Russian influence. 51 
The first Council staff arrived in Jul-y 1945 and in November 
the Kaunicky Palace was rented as the Council's institute and 
office. It was officially opened in June 19,46 i, n the presence 
of President and Madame Benes, the Czech Prime Minister and Vice 
Premier, four Government ministers and over four hundred other 
distinguished guests. The Embassy reported on the occasion that 
the part which could be played by the British 
Council and the Institute is cementiný Anglo-Czech 
friendship can hardly be exaggerated. 2 
A regional office was opened in the capital of Slovakia, Bratislava 
in March 1946, The Council's work expanded rapidly with additional 
centres established in Bohemia and Moravia, increased contacts 
with the Czech universities and a cultural convention signed in 
1947.53 The number of Anglophile societies, all supported by the 
Council, rose from two in 1945 to thirty-five in 1947, with a 
membership df six thousand seven hundred. 
The Council planned to return with Britain's diplomatic mission 
to Yugoslavia. David Shillan, the Council's officer in 
Belgrade before the war, visited Bari and Egypt in December 1944 
to inspect the work of the Allied Liaison Division with Yugoslav 
military and civilian personnel. Following the formation of a 
goV. ernment in the spring of 1945, Shillan returned to Belgrade 
and proposed the formation o(F an institute in the capital and 
49. Executive Committee Minutes, 9 July 1945 BW 69/12 
50. Ibid. 
51. Minute by Montagu-Pollack, 26 April 1945 F0924/202 
LC 1659/1028/452 
52. C. A. E. Shuckesburg to Sargent, 21 June 1945 F0924/458 
LC3119/234/452 
53. Cmd. 7236 HMSO 1947. 
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offices in the regional capitals, 
but-warned that it would be 
inadvisable to encourage the formation of Anglophile societibs. 
54 
An office was opened in Belgrade in July 1945 and in April 1946 
the Counci 
iI 
tooK over the English Reading Room from the MOI. The 
Council had 'to be content with doing the services the Yugoslav 
Government wishes' 
55, 
which were largely 'applied culture, or the 
provision of educational, technical, scientific and medical advicev 
By supplying what was needed, the Council hoped to become 
if not indispensable, at least so useful to a 
large number of institutions that any'jattempt 
to destroy or curtail our work will m6et with 
opposition from many official Yugoslav circles. 56 
Nevertheless, the Council's requests for permision to open reading 
rooms in the provinces and for entry and exit visas were refused 
frequently and linKed at first to Yugoslav grievances with the 
British occupying authorities in Slovenia and Croatia, and later 
to the Venezia Giulia issue. Britain's ambalssador attributed 
the Yugoslav attitude to the 'grave suspicions of the activities 
of our consulates, and indeed of this Embassy, ' harboured by the 
internal security authorities. The Committees for Culture and 
Art and for Education also regarded the Council with hostility 
and rejected its offers of help with English teaching. The 
Council's difficulties were compounded by the improper behaviour 
of its first representative, who was replaced by W. 'G. Tatham in 194 
97 
Despite these problems, the Council's offices in Belgrade 
and Zagreb (opened in 1947) were beseiged by students and the 
libraries were very popular and taken on tours of the provinces. 
In January 1947, Britain's ambassador secured a promise from Tito 
to facilitate the development of the Council's work and, in the 
same month, Tito and the Minister of Education attended the 
58 
opening of a Council book exhibition in Belgrade. Tatham and 
his assistants were allowed to undertake limited tours of the 
provinces, bLL4-- any real expansion of. the Council's work depended 
on a change of heart by the Yugoslav Government and on the extent 
of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia. 
59 Hungary, as the 'holder o-F the middle Danube' and western 
54. D. Shillan to White, 15 August 1945 BW 66/4 
55. Report by W. G. Tatham, 23 November 1945 BW 66/4 
56. W. G. Tatham to K. Johnstone, 15 March 1947 BW 66/4 
57. The Council's first Representative contravened Yugoslav 
laws regarding the, disposal of property and appeared in court. 
58. Minute by P. Noel-Ba'Ker, 3 July 1947 BW 66/4 
59. Executive Committee Minutes, 9 July 1946 BW 69/12 
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in tradition, at first appeared a more promisin6ý field, despite 
the Soviet occupation. Churchill had anticipated a fiftY per 
cent share in influence in Hungary, and in January 1945, as 
Budapest fell to the Red Army, the Treasury authorised Council 
expenditur 
ia there. In June, J. Gascoigne of the British Political 
Mission in Budapest, reported the view of a leading Hungarian that 
If Great Britain and the United States did not 
soon do something to tpach Hungarians what was 
happening in the West, arrd about their particular 
brarfd of democracy, he feared that it would slip. 
more and more into the Russian orbit. '60 
Gasciogne favoured publicity among a small and selected group 
to help us spread the gospel and to change this 
trend of thought which. is now permeating all 
classes - that Hungary's future is bound up with 
the Soviet Union alone. 61 11, 
R. G. C. McNab for the Council met Gasciogne in December in Naples 
and agreed that the Council's staff should be 
I attached to 
Gascoigne's section to avoid raising the quebtion of the Council's 
presence with the Soviet authorities; the foundation of an office 
would have to waitý until a peace treaty had been signed and the 
Soviet troops withdrawn. Gascoigne hoped to use the Council 
to offset Britain's lack of options in Hungary. 
Owing to our inability at present to offer anything 
very concrete to. Hungary in either the political 
or economic fields, I feel that it is especially 
important that we should press on ývith our cultural 
relations. 62 
McNab went to Budapest in December 1945 and was entirely 
dependent' initially on whatever faciltiies the British Political 
and Miltiary Missions could spare. The demand for English lessons 
and changes in the school curriculum, dictated that McNab's chief 
concern was with English teaching and the training of teachers. 
Contacts with academic, professional and business groups we re 
established and British Council Weeks ware organised in provincial' 
centres. 
Bulgaria and Roumania were the least promising areas of south- 
eas .t Europej the overwhelming Soviet prnsence and the terms of 
tFie occupation, w5ich placed thecontrol of, propaganda. in- 
60. J. Gascoigne to T. Howard, 6 Jufie 1945 BW 36/2 - 
61. Ibid. I 
62. J. Gasciogne to the Foreign Office, 21 January 1946 F0924/418 
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Soviet hands-, militated against the penetration Of western influenc( 
At Moscow, Curchill had conceded the major proportion of interest 
to the Soviet Union in these two countries. In Roumania the 
British Mission took over the English reading rooms and the library 
of the Anglo-Roumanian Society, which was suppressed by the 
Roumanian authorities. The Council was unable to work directly' 
and only supplied small amounts of material. 
The. Americans and the Frendh were quick to develop their 
educational a'nd cultural activities in Bulgaria after the war. The- 
Alliance Francaisp- had functioned throughout the war and the 
American College and a reading room were reopened. Britain was 
more cautious, in spite of many requests for material 
received by the Sofia Embassy.. Colonel L. G. Barbrook undertook 
an exploratory tour for the Council in April Ib46 and recommended 
that 'only a modest beginning, should be contemplated and serious 
long term commitments should be avoided'. 
63 
A, campaign against 
western influences in the summer forestalled, ýctivities until the 
following year. The Bulgarian Government agreed in January 1947 
to the opening of a Council office on condition that Bulgaria 
should have reciprocal facilities in Britain and that the Council 
was responsible to the Embassy in Sofia. A Council Representative 
arrived in April and normal diplomatic relations were established 
in September after the peace treaty had been signed. An office 
was opened in the quarters of the British Military Mission and 
the Council was able to carry out all its normal functions. 
Relations with the Bulgarian authorities alternated between 
indifference and hostility, depending on the internal political 
climate. 
Austria 'was a special case in Allied Post-war plans as, althougl 
she had been jointly o ccupied, she could only be identified 
partially with the policies of Nazi Germany. Austria had been 
isolated from the West for eight years and the desire for news of 
events outside the Third Reich was overwhelming. The four 
occupying powers vied with one another to flood with propaganda 
a country that was 'still the cultural focus of south-east'Europe'. 
61 
The Council's task was to help fill the ideological vacuum in 
Austria with British ideas. In January 1945, before the final 
63. Report by L. G. Barbrook, May 1946 BW 18/3 
64. Executive Committee Minutes, 9 July 1946 BW 69/12 
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expulsion of German forces, the Council consulted W. H. B. MacK, 
Deputy Commissioner(Civil) of the British Element of the Allied 
Commission for. Austria (AC(BE)). Mack insisted that the Council 
would have to operate under his authority and in September, a 
month after the British headquarters had officially moved to 
Vienna, the Council was notified that a Council Representative 
would be welcome, attached, to the Information Service branch of the 
Political Division. Following an exploratory visit by senior 
Council officials in November, the first Council staff arrived in 
December. In November, also, elections had been held throughout 
Austria for both the central and provincial pd-, rliaments, which 
were established in December. In January 1946, the Allied Council 
formally recognised the Austrian Republic and Mack was appointed 
British Representative to the Austrian government. C. R. HiscocKs, 
the Council's Representative, was sent out 'in 'a great hurry' in 
February, after six months with the British Military Government 
in Germany. 
65 
Working closely with the Education Division of the A. C. (BE), 
the Council initially concentrated on meeting the demand for 
English lessons and books. HiscocKs stressed the positive. aspect 
of the Council's involvement with education in Austria in contrast 
to the negative requirements of denazification. Instead of 
proscribing books and ideas, the Council put 'a healthy and more 
positive outlook into the minds of the Austrians., 
66 
More 
spectacular cultural events were organised to compete with those 
of the United States and the Soviet Union and especially the 
French. 
67 
Most notably, the Council sponsored a visit by Malcolm 
Sargent and Leon Goossens to the Graz Music Festival in 1945 and 
tours by the Sadler's Wells Ballet and the Arts Theatre Company 
in 1946. An office was opened by the chairman in November 1946 
and further centres were founded at Graz, to cover Styria, and at 
Klagenfurt, to cover Carinthia, both in the British zone. In 
1946 ths Council was invited to open an office in the French zone 
and in Oecemberthe Klagenfurt staff were transferred to Innsbruck. 
. 65. Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on 
Estimates(Sub-Committee F)9 September 1946, evidence given by 
Hiscocks at the British. Council Headquarters in Vienna. Para. 443 
66. Ibid. Para. 443 
67. Ibid. Para. 450. The French had occupied the 80-roomed Palais 
LobKowits for their cultural headquarters. Hiscocks described 
the publicity for their Autumn Exhibition as hav'ýng 'the French 
equivalent of the Royal Engineers behind it', The Council, on the 
other hand, lhad small placards' and had to charge for admission 
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The Klagenfurt centre w as kept open by local staff and visited 
regularly by the Council's specialist officers from Vienna and 
by the director at Inns bruck. Hiscocks' plans to open an office 
at Salzburg in the Amer, ican zone had to be abandoned for lack of 
funds. No attempt was'imade to breach the Soviet zone, although 
the Council was very aware of extensive Soviet cultural activities 
in the British zone. Austria remained a high priority, being on 
the borderline between ! two spheres of interest in which 'it would 
be of-the greatest possible importance to us to maintain Western 
influence'. 
68 
The problems encountered in post-war Germany prevented the 
development of Council activities. The overwhelming demands of 
physical and economic rehabilitation eclipsed less immediately 
apparent intellectual and emotional needs. Moreover, in Germany 
educational and'social reform was placed more squarely in the handsý 
of the Allied Control Commission than in AustFia. Many of the 
services that the Council would normally have'performed were 
undertaken by Education and Information Offic ers in the British 
zone. In (December 1945 THE Council asked to be represented by an 
observer or an adviser on the staff of the British authorities in 
order to make known the activities of the Council and to safeguard 
its future operations. Although the Council was barred from 
working directly in the British zone and had no budget for Germany, 
it received a great many requests from the Control Commission for 
material. These requests were met from the Council's stocks and 
paid for by the Control Office. 
A meeting at Norfolk House in August 1946 discussed the 
possibility of the Council taking over some of the educational work 
of the Control Office. ' The Council was concerned chiefly with 
higher education, the exchange of students and the teaching of 
English in German univ6ýý7sities. 
The universities had been permeated by Nazism, 
and the first tasK facing the Allies was to 
eradicate this influence. 69 
This was attempted in two stages, firstly, by dismissing universitj 
teachers with Nazi associations and installing suitable lecturers 
in key posts; secondly, by organising exchanges in the educational 
field. The Council had considerable experience to offer in both 
these areas. 
68. Minutes of Meeting between Council, Foreign Office and Control 
Commission, 18 April 1947. FO924/596 LC1899/611/451 
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A small reconnaissance team of two senior Council staff 
tcuredthe British zone in September and recommended that the Council 
operate as far as possible through existing organisations and 
have only a distribubion office aý Hamburg. The Foreign Office 
and the Control Commission approved thisp-lan and the Council was 
asked formally in February 1947 to begin working in Germany. 
However, the Council had no funds for activities in Germany and 
a new re-education programme had been initiated in 1947 with strong 
financial backing. The Treasury was reluctant to give the 
Council a special grant arguing that 'enough of the British 
1 70 taxpayers' money was already being spent on Ge'rmany . 
Nevertheless, the numerous demands received by the Council for 
material and information and for assistance in filling posts in 
German universities, demonstrated that there was room for the 
Council in Germany. The publicity section of'-the Food and 
Agriculture Oivision in Hamburg, amongst others, regretted the lack 
of Council action. 
It is unfortunate that the British Council is not 
going to be able to function here this year as the 
Americans and the Russians are beginning to get 
into their stride and forging ahead, and of course 
our popularity with the Germans is rapidly declining. 71 
However, the Council did re-establish lectureships in English 
in 1947 at the universities of Bonn, Gottingen and Mainz and the 
Berlin Technical University and secured the appointment of 
Ernest Barker to the chair of political science at Cologne 
University. On behalf of the German section of the Foreign Office, 
programmes were arranged for educational groups from the French 
and German occupying authorities in Berlin and for a party of 
German publishers from the British zone. In addition, ninety- 
five German students were brought to Britain, a total only exceeded 
by French and Swedish students on Council scholarships. 72 
The former neutral countries in Europe were given a lower 
priority than the newly-liberated, partly because activities were 
already well developed in three of them. The Council had not 
-operated in Switzerland during the war, but in 194S an office was 
ope hed in Berne. To emphasise the Council's unofficial status 
70. - J. Beighton to W. H. Montagu-Pollack, undated BW 32/3 
71. R. Bunbury to N. Symonds, 12 March 1947 BW 32/3 
72. Work on a large scale in the German Federal Republic started 
in 1959, with a headquarters at Cologne and offices at Berlin, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich and Stuttgart. 
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the office was moved to Zurich, away from 
1946 and the British Minister was advised 
Anglo-Swiss society. 
73 
The Council worked 
and didnot teach English. By 1947 there 
4 
Swiss clubý and a wide range of material 
Council's office. 
the British legation, in 
against joining the 
through existing bodies 
were thirty-two Anglo- 
was distributed by the 
In Sweden and Portugal, the Council consolidated the gains 
of the war years and sought no further expansion. From an office 
in Stockholm, -, the Council arranged exhibitions, tours and concerts 
and serviced the Anglo-'Swedish societies, numbering seventy-six 
in 1947, with a total membership of almost ten thousand. In 
Portugal, the Council concentrated on its institutes at Lisbon, 
Opporto and Coimbra where elementary English classes were reduced 
gradually and fees were charged for advanced students to lower 
costs. 
The Council's work in Spain followed the same pattern as in 
Portugal, with institutes at Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville 
and Valencia. However, the Council was forced to be more 
circumspect than in the past by the increasing isolation of the 
Franco regime and the hostility towards it in Britain, especially 
in the new Labour Government. Britain's dilemma was to reconcile 
opposing concerns. 
We'have a long term interest in developing close 
and friendly relations with Spain. In conflict with 
this long term interest, we have a short term 
interest in maintaining a reserved and even ftigid 
attitude towards the Spanish Government pending a 
change of g, overnment to a more liberal regime. 74 
This resulted in a confused policy towards contacts with Spain; 
cultural and-business exchanges were permissible, las they help 
our long term interest', but military, naval and official contacts 
were discouraged. The Council had to decide whether to offer 
Starkie permanent employment as their Representative to prevent 
him returning to Dublin University, even though his pro-Franco 
views were well-: Known. Sir Victor Mallet, British ambassador at 
Madrid, supported StarKie's appointment describing him as 'quite 
75 
a national figure in Spain', but the Foreign Office opposed this 
course, on the grounds that it might prejudice relations with a 
future, liberal government in Spain. Mallet's opinion prevailed, 
in view Of the'greatest importance' that he attached to the Council' 
73. Report by'H. King, I January 1946 F0924/438 LC454/130/452 
74. ' Minute by R. Garner. 10 November 1945 F0924/187 LC2009/124/451 
75. Mallet to Montagu-Pollock, 15 April 1946 F0924/256 
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work and because 
The Institutes had done excellent work and had 
established contacts with circles not easily 
reached by the Embassy staff ..... The Council 
should endeavour to convert to the British way 
of'thinking those foreign countries whose . political 
thought was hostile to our own; to preach to nations 
already converted was not enough. Spain offered an 
excellent opportunity for the development of 
effective cultural propaganda. 
76 
Mallet saw a-more combative role for cultural propaganda than that 
envisaged by the Council or the Foreign Office,. 
Franco, too, admired the Council's work anýd wished to learn 
from its example. In an interview with Starkie in January 1946, 
he praised the value of cultural diplomacy to the preservation 
of international peace and possib saw a way to. lessen his own ly 
isolation. Franco 
welcomed the possibility of strengthening the 
cultural bond between nations: "we need toi, know 
one another" he said, "not just to speak one 
anothers' languages but to know how we live, 
what our general masses think, what each of us 
has to offer in the way of science, technical 
equipment, literature, art and ideas. 77 
Considerable. controversy was generated by the agreement 
78 
concluded with Franco in 1940 , especially the condition that the 
Council should employ only Roman Catholics. Under pressure from 
79 
Parliament and the Press, the Foreign Office asked the Cabinet 
fur a decision in February 1946. TheForeign Office explained 
that no other gov. ernment imposed a similar restriction and that it 
was contrary to Article I of the United Nations Charter. 
Conversely, the rule had not been enforced strictly and eight of 
the Council'ý twenty-eight staff in Spain were not Catholic. 
However, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1946 was an 
ardent Catholic, the Spanish Government was hostile to revision 
and it would require legislation to permit the employment of non- 
Catholics in British institutes. Furthermore, it might provide 
an excuse to expel the Council from Spain. Nevertheless, and 
des, pite Mallet's advice 'that the ag reement should be allowed to 
stand until the present regime comes to an end'ýo the Cabinet 
76. Minutes of a meeting at the Foreign Office. 9 January 1947 
BW 56/7 
77. Starkie to Mallet, 11 January 1946 BW 56/7 
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resolved to withdraw from the agreement. 
81 
In the event, due to 
Mallet's protests, the agreement stood, on condition that it would 
not be enforced. 
82 The five institutes and the school in Madrid 
continued to flourish under Starkie's direction, with a total of 
four thousand six hundred students and nearly four thousand members 
by Oecember 1947. It was decided 'that the expansion of the 
Council's activities in Spain should be reserved for the moment 
when a democratic government waý finally established'. 
83 Two of 
the five in4itutes were closed as an economy measure in 1950, 
in spite of protests from the Embassy. 
With the exceptions of Albania, Germany aný Roumania, therefore, 
the Council was operating in every European country by 1947. it 
could not escape, however, the consequences of the final collapse 
on the wartime alliance in that year after the breakdown of-the 
Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in April. In Bevin's opinion, 
'in the light of recent international developments ..... the British 
Council had a particularly important part to playiin coming months'ý 
The rejection of the Marshall Plan by the Soviet Union in July 
drew publicly the dividing line in Europe. West of the line, the 
Marshall Plan was accompanied by other attempts, led by Britain, 
to unite and revive western Europe. In the east, the grip of 
the Soviet Union and of the communist parties was tightened rapidly 
The line of the Iron Curtain perpetuated the old cultural and social 
divide of Europe, with the exceptions of Greece and southern Italy 
in the western sphere and Finland and Czechoslovakia in the east. 
The Council's position in eastern Europe deteriorated steadily 
in the next three years, whilst in the west, it. sought to 
underline the concept of Western Union. Kenneth Johnstone outlinet 
the Council's priorities in Europe; the highest priority was given 
to those countries where the ideological struggle was the keenest, 
namely. countries under Russian domination or targets of a communist 
85 
campaign. In the first rank were France, Greece, Italy, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, which, with Spain and Turkey, enjoyed 
budgets of over E40,000. Next came Austria, Hungary, Portugal 
and Sweden with budgets of between E20,000 and E30,000. Belgium, 
81. Mallet to Bevin, 15 May 1946. FO924/426 LC2419/100/452 
82. Minutes of a Meeting at the Foreign Office, 9 January 1*946-BW56/ 
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Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Roumania 
and Yugoslavia had budgets of less than E20,000. Bulgaria and 
Roumania were new in the estimates and severe cuts had been 
imposed in the budgets of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia. 
Despite official hostility and worsening conditions in eastern 
Europe, the Council was determined to continue activities as long 
as possible. As Pierson Dixon, Britain's ambassador in Prague, 
explained, 
If the Council were to curtail its act,, ivities very 
drastically or to retire from the scený altogether 
it would be interpreted by our friends as meaning 
that we no longer cared what happened to them and 
such inclinations as they might have to resist the 
regime would be correspondingly discouraged. 
Secondly, by remaining as a shop window in which 
to display attractions and advantages of the Western 
way of life, the Council can help to stimulate amongst 
the Czechs (Communists among them) feelings of regret 
for what they have lost and a longing: to regain it. 
Thirdly, there is the long-term consi I deration in the 
years to come that the friendahip of the Czechs may 
again be of positive value to us and that the Council 
can help to maintain this. 86 
Increasing tension and the harassment of foreign organisations 
and those who supported them rendered this course not only difficult 
but also dangerous for the Council's employees. The consolidation 
of Soviet dominance in eastern Europe began to take its toll in 1948, 
In that year many functions of the Ministries of Education in 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Roumania were removed to 'National Committees' 
and staff sympathetic to the West in official and academic 
organisations were replaced. The Council became progressively an 
object of suspicion and hostility. Attendance at the Council's 
institutes became dangerous for the citizens of eastern Europe: in 
Bulgaria-the ability to speak English was regarded 'as a true sign 
of Fascist tendencies ....... 
87 
From Hungary in April 1949 the 
Council's Representativg wrote, 
the policy of the Government in cultural matters is 
fundamentally opposed to anything more than a 
superficial connection with the West; the Council 
itself is regarded as a centre of espionage; and it 
has now become the tasK of the new officials to find 
a way, not of maKing use of the Council's services, 
but of avoiding the responsibility of giving 
encouragment without committing their departments 
to a downright refusal. 88 
86. P. Oixon to C. Warner, 22 May 1948. FO924/712 LC2034/127/452 
87. Representatives Annual Report for 1947/8. BW18/9 
88. Annual Report by E-DuKe, 21 April 1949. BW36/10 
250 
The Council was an obvious target for charges of spying and 
subversion; and staff were implicated in Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
ai nd Poland. 'Most damaging was the Vogeler-Sanders trial in 
Hungary in which lone ofithe accused claimed to have passed political 
and economic reports to a Council employee. As a direct result 
the Hungarian government demanded the closure of the Council in 
March 1950. In addition; locally appointed staff and members and 
students of Council institut-es in all Iron Curtain countries were 
persecuted aQ. d imprisoned. Sterndale-Bennet, reporting on 
clandestine visitors to the Council's premises. surmised that 
their puspose seems merely to intimida te and 
unnerve the staff who a're always asked why they 
work for the British and told they will suffer 
for it. 89 
i 
In CzechoslovaKia, the director of the Council' s institute at 
Bratislava, Or Brander, was shot by a man the Foreign Office 
believed to be a police agent. 
90 
The Council's problems were 
compounded by the defection of a -few of its s,. taff'in eastern Europe. 
Most serious and harmful was the defection of Bidwell in June 1949. 
Bidwell had joined the Council in 1943 and had risen to be *. 
Representative in Poland. He was followed in February 1950 by 
another senior official, Or Anna Rides, who had been head of the 
Council's medical relations department in CzechoslavaKia for three 
and a hal-F years. 
The Council, however, refused to be forced into withdrawal and 
embarked instead upon a war of nerves with the communist authorities 
One cardinal point of our policy has been not to 
quit of our own accord ..... it is probably the one 
course which our bitterest opponents hope and pray 
we will take, since it spares them all the trouble 
and bnpleasantness of having to make a case against 
us in the eyes of the world. It also lends itself 91 to ready interpretation as an admission of guilt. , 
In 1948, in a search for cuts in the Council's budget, the 
effectiveness of the Council's work in eastern Europe was examined. 
Britain's missions behind the Iron Curtain strongly s4jpported the 
continuance of the Council's activities. Some doubts were 
expressed about the utility of student exchanges where the 
candidates were selected by the authorities, but all praised the 
89. Memorandum by Sterndale Bennet. 29 July 1948. FO924/708C 
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Council's institutes. A cultural toe in the door was considered 
valuable, despite the otherwise inauspicious conditiona for the 
development of British influence. 
The past year's changes have greatly limited the 
In-Formation Department's access to public opinion 
here, and have, in my view, correspondingly enhanced 
the value of the contacts which the Council can 
maintain under the flag of culture. The Institute 
is now, in fact, the one place where a number of 
Czechs can still meet a number of Englishmen. 92 
Likewise, in Poland the Council provided a valuable meeting place 
for east and west and offset Britain's politid, al weakness: 
I do not think there can be any doubt that. it 
(the Ccunci13 enables a great many Poles to keep 
in touch with English modes of thought in spite 
of the dictatorship. If we were to taK ,e 
it away 
I certainly think that the Poles would', feel that 
we were losing interest in t, hem and that it would 
have a bad effect politically. 93 
In Hungary routine activities, although confined to the capital 
were continued after the communist victory in the elections in 
August 1947 butj. 1a gradual freezing out' process began at the end 
of 1948 with restrictions on the issue of visas a nd residence 
permits. 
94 English teaching declined and closer controls were 
imposed on the appointment of Hungarian delegate$, scholars and 
visitors to Britain and on the distribution of periodicals and 
films. McNab reported in November 1948 that the Cultural Section 
of the Ministry of Education was 'still convinced that the British 
Council is a secret service intelligence agency ..... 0.95 In 1949, 
despite protestations of friendship by the Minister of Education 
and the Under-Secretaries for Press and Culture, English-language 
te : aching was, drastically reduced, placed third behind Russian and 
French as an optional extra, and the Hungarian-British Society 
was supressed. 
96 The gathering pace of Russianisation in Hungary 
restricted the Council to largely distributive functions by 1950. 
In March the Council was expelled. 
Prior to the Prague coup in February 1948 the Council had 
prospered in Czechoslovakia, with three well-attended Institutes 
and a wide range of contacts and activities. Following the 
92. P. Dixon to C. Warner, 14 June 1949, FO924/773 LCI924/102/452 
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communist take-over, however, Dixon sought to emphasise Britain's 
disapproval by cultural as well as political and economic measures. 
There remains the field of culture which the 
new Government is showing signs of trying to 
exbloit in order to demonstrate that in spite 
of certain differences of opinion on political 
matters Anglq-Czech relations are still fundamentally 
unaltered. 
7 r,, 
I 
On Dixon's advice a visit of the HalI6 Orchestra, sponsored by 
the Council, was cancelled, British universities were discouraged 
from taKing part in the 600th anniversary of the Caroline Universitý 
and a football match between the two countriesý was postponed 
indefinitely. Student, exchanges and the entertainment of Czech 
visitors to Britain were reduced 'since they cannot any longer 
contribute very much and they might be harmful',. 
98 Mounting 
pressure against the Council, including the shobting of Or Brander, 
the defection of Or Rides and a propaganda campaign, persuaded 
Dixon to recommend the Council's withdrawal in February 1950. 
Adam opposed this course and a note of protest instead was 
presented to the Czech government in April. 
Poland shared with CzechoslovaKia the largest buoget in eastern 
Europe and the Council's programme was extensive. Following 
Bidwell's defection, however, in June 1949, the Council's position 
progressively deteriorated. In November English teaching in 
Polish schools and universities was considerably reduced and the 
Council's educational activities virtually eliminated. In March 
1950 it was rumoured that the security forces were planning to : 
raid the Council's offices and the atmosphere grew tense. Never- 
theless, the Council resolved to continue and the Ambassador was 
confident that all was not yet lost: 
In my view Council's prospects in Poland have not 
yet deteriorated sufficiently to justify our 
voluntarily leaving the field to new barbarians 
in contradiction to our long-term policy of returning 
to the offensive in Eastern Europe..... Vast Majority 
of people in this country are still determined as 
far as possible to preserve their Western habits of 
mind and spiritual affiliations with the civilised 
world. 99 
The Council was refused permission to resume its activitieg 
in Roumania butjit was able to operate with some degree of success 
in Bulgaria unti. 1 the latter half of 1948. In September 1948 
97. P. Dixon to C-Warner, 10 March 1948. FO924/710 LC1132/127/452 
98. P. Dixon to C-Warner, 22 May 1948. F0924/712 LC2034/127/452 
99. . 
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foreign schools were closed and a general anti-British drive 
reduced visitors to the institute to thirty a day. In 1949 exit 
visýs for Council scholars were refused, student leaders passed 
a resolution forbidding attendance at Council functions and a 
hostile Press campaign was inaugurated. Visitors fell to a daily 
average of seventeen. The withdrawal of privileges from the 
Council's Representative, including his ration booK and identity 
card, at the and of 1949, left. him with 'less status and facilities 
than, for example, a guard at the Legation'. 
100 
In April 1950, the Cabinet considered whe her the Council 
should withdraw voluntarily from the satellite countries or wait 
to be expelled. In a memorandum presented to the Cabinet in 
March, theýForeign Office had argued against volLmtary withdrawal. 
Although it seems clear that all satel1ite 
countries are intended sooner or later to 
taKe their culture exclusively from the USSR 
the Council can still do valuable worK 
and has prestige value. 
By voluntary withdrawal we shall be doing 
the Kremlin's worK for it..... We should thinK 
twice before abandonihg our friends after 
encouraging them. A withdrawal forced an us 
would, on the other hand, be understood. 101 
The Cabinet approved the Foreign Officees line. 102 In the event, 
the Council and the information services were expelled from 
Czechoslovakia in May, the Council charged with giving 'moral 
and ideological support to local reactionary forces', 103 and from 
Bulgaria in June. The United States had already left Bulgaria 
and the Alliance Francaise followed in August. In Poland the 
Council survived, but under the threat of summary expulsion. 
104 
The Council's fortunes followed an exactly opposite course 
in Yugoslavia. Its activities were restricted until Tito's break 
with Stalin in June 1948. In October, Yugoslavia severed all 
cultural ties with the Soviet Union and its satellites offering 
western cultural bodies a wide, new scope. The Council's worK 
expanded rapidly and functions at the Belgrade and Zagreb offices 
were regularly attended by more than two hundred members. Its 
ne ýworK was extended t6lCroatia and Slovenia in 1949 and further 
expansion was planned in 1950. 
100. J. A. Cayton,. to G--Shreeve, -Z: J--Octobeiý 1949 BW 18/7 
101. Cabinet Minutes, 20 March 1950 CAB 129/39 CP950)19 
102. Cabinet Conclusions, 6 May 1950 CAB 128/17 CM(50)51. 
103. Note by the CzechoslovaK Ministry of Foreigq Affairs 12rv-6. v'50. 
104. Cultural contacts with the eastern bloc were""'rLe4l-"ecs-, ItL*a"ý'lished 
in the late 1960's. 
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Finland remained a case apart. The number of Finnish- 
British societies increased and a Teachers of English Society was 
formed. Films continued to form an important part of the Council'! 
programme and a British Documentary Film WeeK held in HelsinKi in 
1948 attracted seven thousand viewers. Despite the signature of 
the Russo-Finnish Treaty in April 1948, providing for the 
strengthenirigof cultural ties among other things, the Council's 
worK was considered worthwhile . 
becadse the issue has not yet been decided and 
our efforts may help to strengthen Finnish resistance 
to the Russians without and the communi, ists within. 105 
Parallel to these developments in eastern Europe, western 
Europe sought greater security in closer relationships. The 
Treaty of DunKirK of March 1947, General Marsha, 11's speech at 
Harvard in June, leading to the creation of the Organsiation 
for European Economic Cooperation, and the Brussels Treaty of March 
1948, signalled a new course in British foreign p9licy. These 
events also had implications for British publicity. The Brussels 
Treaty called on the five powers to 
make every effort in common to lead their peoples 
towards a better understanding of the principles 
which form the basis of their common civilisation 
and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions 
between themselves or by other means. 106 
Publicity for the concept of western union was to be accompanied 
by a campaign against communist propaganda. 
British propaganda in western Europe had two objectives: 
firstly, to convince Europeans that Britain was serious in its 
commitment to Europe; secondly, to promote the spiritual union 
of, western Europe to enhance cooperation in other spheres. Sevin 
told the House of Commons in January 1948, 
If we are to preserve peace and our own safety at 
the same time we can only do so by the mobilisation 
of such a material and moral force as will create 
confidence and energy in the West and inspire respect 
elsewhere, and this means that Britain cannot stand 
outside Europe and regard her problems as quite 
separate from those of her European neighbours. 107 
105. Minute by R. Etherington-Smith, 18 April 1948 F0924/705 
LC2057/57/452 
106. Cmd. 1702 HMSO 1947 
107. Parliamentary Oebates(Commons) Fi-Fth Series, 21 January 1948, 
Vol. 446, col397 
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The identification of Britain's interests with those of western 
Europe was a departure from traditiona. 1 conceptions and required 
underlininý if it was to be believed. Attlee told the Cabinet' that 
In, spite of all the evidence ..... there is a 
strong feeling in Western Europe that we are 
not serious in support of the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation. This takes two 
forms: that we are half-hearted about our contribution 
to Western Europe's recovery and that we Work more 
enthusiastically with the Commonwealth. 108 
British publi city had to correct these misapprehensions 'at every 
possible opportunity". 
The Brussels Treaty provided for the conclusion of cultural 
conventions between member states, 
109 
and a Committee of Cultural 
Experts was formed which held its first meeting in London in 
August 1948. It produced agreements on visitS'lof school 
inspectors to member states, courses for teachers on the theme 
of western union and for government officials, 
lon the administrative 
machinery of member states. Sub-committees were appointed to 
deal with issues of common concern. The Council awarded special 
scholarships to students from western Europe and in 1948/9, brought 
more visitors to Britain from northern Europe than any other 
part of . the world. - 
Within the five Brussels Treaty powers, the 
Council sought to stimulate 'the sense of cultural community' 
and then to proclaim this unity to the outer world in the hope of 
attracting recruits by exposing the def , ects of the Soviet 
alternative. 
although the Five Power Union does not exist 
for any aggressive purpose, that is to say, for the 
purpose of direct attack on another cultural 
outlook, it is deliberately intended to act as a 
challenge and a contrast to another, and, as the 
pive Powers feel, a lower conception of civilisation 
in all its branches ..... 
110 
In January 1948 Bevin presented a paper to the Cabinet on 
Britain's 'Future Foreign Publicity Policy,, which was both a 
response to the creation of the Cominform in September 1947 and 
the inauguration of an anti-communist propaganda campaign. A 
m 
\*isterial committee on anti-communist propaganda appointed a in 
committee of officials to review existing policy and machinery for 
108. Cabinet Minutes, 30 July 1948 CAB 129/29 CP(49)193 
log. 'Cultural conventions were signed with Belgium (Cmd. 7002) 
in 1946; France (Cmd-7450) and the Netherland (Cmd. 7984) 
in 1948; with Norway (Cmd. 7748)in 1949; and with Luxembourg 
(Cmd. 8982) in 1950. 
110. K. Johnstone to Macdermot, 10 May 19.48 BW14/6 
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offensive and defensive action against Soviet and commwnist 
propaganda at home and abroad. The Soviet Union and the Cominform 
appeared to threaten not only the security but also the fabric Of 
western civilisation. French and Italian delegates had attended 
the foundation of Cominform and a campaign of disruptive action had 
been initiated, most notably strikes in Francq and Italy in November 
1947. The crisis had been overcome in France but the issue was 
undecided in Italy. Bevin was-anxious 'to mobilise spiritual 
forces, as wel--l as material and political' for the defence of 
western European ideals. This task could not be left to the 
United States. 
It is for us as Europeans and as a Social Democratic 
Government, and not the Americans, to give the lead 
in spiritual, moeal and political spheres to all the 
democratic elements in Western Europe wýhich are anti- 
communist and, at the same time, genuin6ly progressive 
and reforming, believing in freedom, planning and 
social justice - what one might call the "Third Force". 111 
Britain and western Europe offered 'Vital and progressive' ideas 
that where Preferable to both 'totalitarian communism and laissez- 
faire capitalism'. 
112 
Britain's publicity in Europe had been confined hitherto, to 
extolling the virtues of British policy and the British way of 
life. It had not attempted 'systematically to expose the myths 
of the Soviet paradise'. The official committee on anti-communist 
propaganda reported in May 1948 and recommended the lifting of 
restrictions on subversive propaganda in or to communist-controlled 
countries and on propaganda in other countries designed to stimulate 
subversive activities in the Soviet orbit. 
113 
The committee advised 
that the Government should be less secretive about the conduct of 
anti-communist activities in foreign countries through official 
channels. Particular proposals for action in any of these spheres, 
however, required ministerial approval. Liaison between the 
Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff was considered adequate 
for black propaganda, but for white propaganda, the committee 
. advocated 
the revival of the machinery devised by PWE during the 
wai\, which would ensure also coordination with the United States. 
114 
A small section was created in the Foreign Office to collect 
material on communist policy, tactics and propaganda and to provide 
information for anti-communist propaganda; this included evidence 
111. Cabinet Minutes, 4J nuary 1948,, CAB 129/23 CP(49)3 
112. Ibid. 
113. Report of Official Committee an Anti-Communist Propaganda 
114. Ibid. CAB 130/231 GEN231/2 
May 1948 CAB 130/231'GEN231/1 
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of low standards of living and lack of civil liberties and human 
rigbts behine the Iron Curtain. Communist foreign policy was 
to be portrayed as a threat to world peace and 'Communism 
represented as the stalking-horse of Russian imperialism'. 
115 The 
Cold War was intensified in 1948 by the Prague cau in the spring 
and the blockade of Berlin in June. 
The battle lines had been drawn in Europe and the Council's 
continuing financial restrictions forced concentration on those 
areas where f-he threat to Britain's interests was greatest and 
where the ideological war was still undecided. As a result, 
operations in Scandinavia and northern Europe were reduced. No 
European country, except Germany, escaped the cuts, but Italy 
and Greece remained top in order of priority, followed by France 
and Spain. Three new centres were opened in I, taly ih 1948, at 
Naples, Genoa and Venice, and the Council's work was coordinated 
with the Information Services by the foundation of joint libraries 
and reading rooms. The communist party was defeated decisively 
in the generaL elections in April and the Brussels Treaty powers 
resolved in November to invite Italy to Join their deliberations 
on the formation of a Council of Europe. Thus, Italy was ranged 
firmly with the West and Britain could afford to reduce its 
extensive publicity programme. 
Activities in Greece continued on a surprisingly large scale 
in spite of the civil war. However, the Council's plans were 
disrupted by soaring prices, problems of travel, the inability of 
the Greek Government to begin comprehensive English teaching and 
the call up of many of those eligible for Council scholarships. 
Greece was regarded as a special case, not only because of the 
communist threat but also because Britain had 'a traditional 
responsibility' to maintain cultural ties between the two countries. 
Surely there can never have been a time when it 
was more necessary to encourage the Greeks to 
feel that western civilisation was worth belonging 
to and worth any sacrifice to continue to belong 
to; and to the GreeKs, whRther we like it or not, 
we and not the Americans nor the French are 
Western Civilisation. 116 
Following the formal establishment of the German Federal 
Republic in May 1949, the Council was notified that the Military 
Governor of the British zone welcomed the appointment of a Council 
115. Cabinet Minutes, 4 January 1848 CAB 129/23 CP(48)3 
116. Minute by K. Johnstone, 13 January 1948 BW 34/19 
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liaison officer, attached to the Executive Board of the Zonal 
British Relations Board., The Treasury refused again to sanction 
expenditure in Germany and it was not until 1950 that the Council 
was able to open an office to take over the cultural work of the 
High Commission. 
After 1948 Germany and Yugoslavia. were the Council's only 
areas of growth in Europe and substantial cuts were made elsewhere. 
The Council explained that 'the, general resumption of contacts had 
reached its l7imit and the pendulum had begun to swing back the 
117 
other way'. Europe's priority was short-lived because of the 
speed with which links had been re-established with the outside 
world. Britain's other partners in the Commonwealth and Empire 
had greater'educational and cultural needs and a special claim 
on Britain's attention. The'Council's limitadý resources had to 
be deployed where they could secure the best return on expenditure. 
In Europe there was considerable unofficial cultural cross- 
fertilisation and the dividing line was clear cutýby the end of 
the decade. In Africa and Asia, however, the situation was more 
fluid and successful cultural propaganda might become a decisive. 
factor in Britain's favour. 
C3 
117. British Council Annual Report, 1951/2 p. 9 
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CHAPTER TEN 
_DEVELOPING 
ROLE 
The projection of the Empire to itself was a wartime 
development which continued into peacetime. In 1946, with the 
establishment of the Central Office of Information, the publicity 
machines of the Dominions and Colonial Offices were overhauled to 
undertake larger publiPity programmes than had been comtemplated 
during the war. There had been no information officers in the 
Colonies before the war, but by 1950 nineteen Colonial governments 
had full-time publicity staffs, and in the remainder special 
responsibility for information was delegated to other government 
officers. 
1 These developments were symptomatic of a realisation 
that the goodwill of the Commonwealth and Empire could no longer be 
assumed and that Britain had to explain and jiustify her actions. 
The war had accelerated the development of nationalism in the 
Colonies, increased the confidence of the Dominions and revealed 
Britain's inability to remain in the first rank of powers except 
by virtue of her overseas possessions and influence in the 
Commonwealth. Britain's future position therefore rested partly 
on the solidarity of Commonwealth opinion and the replacement of 
constitutional ties with nebulous cultural and linguistic links. 
Britain was unable to maintain the territories of her Empire in a 
relationship of dependence if they were bent on becoming free and 
the new Labour Government was markedly less committed to its 
preservation than it predecessors had been. There were four main 
areas of publicity: in the Commonwealth and Empire about Britain; 
"development" publicity in the Colonies; after 1948, anti-communist 
propaganda; publicity about the British Empire in foreign 
countries. The Council was concerned with the first, three. 
An internal Dominions Office memorandum in 1943 outlined the 
general picture of Britain to be projected in the Commonwealth. 
the Britain to p6rtray to the young nations of 
the Commonwealth is not so much the land of winding 
lanes, Tudor cottages, rustic accents, venerable 
shrines and beefeaters at the Tower - these they 
will taKe for granted - as the country of modern 
inventions, up to date classrooms and canteens, new 
factories, broad highways, great airfields, the 
2 home of an energetic and enterprising race. 
1. The Colonial Territories 1949-50, Cmd-7959, * HMSO, 1950. 
2. Memorandum by Boyd Shannon, 26 July 1943. DO35/1911/2441/5 
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The Colonial Office, for its part-, advocated concentration on a 
few broad themes 'designed to show the advantages of the British 
connection'. 
3 In relation to colonial policy it wished to 
highlight plans for development and welfare and political advance 
4 
and the Colonial peoples' 'faith in the British connection'. 
01 
In projecting the Empire to itself, our object is 
the promotion of Empire solidarity and pride, and 
our means are those which encourage the group 
spirit and group consciousness. 5 
These were the symbols of Empire, usually those of the Mother 
Country and especially the Union Jack and the monarchy. 
In 1947 an Empire Publicity Committee, including representat- 
ives from the Council, was established to prepare a detailed scheme 
of Empire publicity at home and abroad. In February it recommended 
that publicity in the Dominions should portray the Commonwealth 
as a mutually-beneficial association working for peace and 
stability in the world. It should also 
stimulate and strengthen Commonwealth links by 
presenting the Commonwealth as an association 
of free nations and of dependent territories being 6 
led to higher cultural, economic and social standards. 
In the Colonies the committee recommended that British publicity 
should 
develop understanding of the ultimate purpose 
of British colonial policy, a sense of self-interest 
in the well-being of the Empire and pride in member- 
ship of it and confidence in its future. 7 
In the Colonies the Council was also used 'not only as a means of 
"putting across" Britain but also as a powerful instrument in the 
improvement of race relations'. 
8 This was especially necessary 
in Africa, particularly East and Central Africa which, unlike West 
Africa, had large unofficial European populations. But even 19 
West Africa this work was important and in 1948 the Governor of 
Nigeria explained-how the Council helped. 
Hospitality offered by the Council staff both at 
official parties held on the Council's premises 
and on unofficial occasions in their own homes 
is maKing a significant contribution to the 
development of inter-racial harmony. 9 
3. overseas Information Official Meeting Minutes, 19 July 1946. 
CAB 124/1007 01(0)(46)12 
4. Ibid. 
S. Minute'by R. Fraser, 11 November 1946. CAB 124/1018 
G. Report of the Empire Publicity Sub-Committee, 20 February 1947 
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8. Minute by K. W. Blackburne, 17 January 1949. CO 878/48/1 
9. J. Macpherson to Creech-jones, 30 November 1948. CO 878/45/6 
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The attitudes of the Colonial and Dominions Offices to 
cultural propaganda followed precedents established during the 
war. The Dominions Office remained cautious and unwilling to 
delegate responsibility for cultural publicity to the Council, 
while the Colonial Office encouraged the Council to work to the 
limit of its resources. In August 1947 Ivor Thomas informed Adam 
that 
01 Mr Creech-Jones feels strongly that the British 
Counpil's work in the Colonies should be maintained 
in order that, as the Colonies themselves progress 
towards greater self-consciousness and selfsufficiency. 
their culture and institutions may reýain a British 
flavour and cultural ties may supplement or take the 
place of political ties on which less reliance can be 
placed than in the past. 10 
Opposition to the activities of the Council inýthe Dominions came 
from within the Dominions Office and from Unite Id Kingdom High 
Commissions. As a result the Dominions, contrary to the Council's 
wishes, received a low priority in its budget'ingiand were the most 
seriously affected by the financial cutbacks at the end of the 
decade. In the Colonies, on the other hand, the Council's work 
was regarded as a valuable supplement to that of the Colonial 
Governments and was warmly supported by senior officials within 
the Colonial Office and Sir Charles Jeffries in particular. The 
Colonial Office, of course, had secured a greater measure of 
control over, and a clearer definition of functions with# the 
Council and this may have partly accounted for its enthusiasm for 
cultural publicity. Moreover, the needs of the Colonies were 
more immediately apparent and in the Dominions there was evidence 
to show that the deliberate projection of Britain might cause 
offence either as a new weapon of imperialism or because the 
Dominions believed that they did not need tuition in the British 
way of life. In 1948 the Council's task in the Colonies was 
clarified and its status as an agent of the Colonial Office 
confirmed. 
The aim of the Council is to carry an in the 
Colonies any activity in the cultural and educational 
sphere of which the chief purpose is the "projection" 
of the British way of life and the. promotion of closer 
relations between the people of the Colonies. It is 
not concerned with normal educational worK..... 11 
10. I. Thomas to Adam, 9 August 1947. BW26/4 
11. The Colonial Territories 1948-49_, Cmd. 7715, HMSO 1949. 
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Increasing tension in Europe in 1948 led to a growing concern 
with the loyalty and strength of the Commonwealth and Empire. An 
official committee on anti-communist propaganda recommended in May 
1948 the formation of committees to coordinate Colonial propaganda, 
to develop 
i broadcasting in the Empire, to examine the welfare of 
overseas students in Britain and to review policy and machinery 
for action against Soviet'. and communist propaganda at home and 
abroad. In June, a committee. of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries 
for Foreign ýffairs, the Colonies and Commonwealth Relations 
recommended 
a propaganda campaign to play up our own treatment 
of native peoples in the Commonwealth and to 
debunk Russian treatment of their backward peoples 
and minorities and Russian treatment of her 
satellites. 12 
This line was broadly approved by the ministerial committee on 
anti-communist propaganda and in July, commit I 
tees were established 
to manage publicity in the Colonies and arran ; gements for foreign 
students in Britain. 
13 
Bevin proposed to Creech-Jones in September 1948 that t here 
should be an immediate increase in the funds available for 
publicity in the Colonies. 
I have no doubt that we are menaced by an immediate 
and most powerful campaign to subvert our influence 
wherever possible, but perhaps especially in the 
Colonies and India and Pakistan. It is therefore 
of the greatest importance to the position of this 
country that we should do all we can, urgently to 
bind these areas to us by the development of 
educational and cultural ties and by spreading widely 
and vigorously among their peoples the kno, wledge of 
the benefits which association with us confers and 14 
of the realities of Communism in all its horror. 
Bevin suggested that the Colonial Information Policy Committee 
should examine I 
urgently what extension of the British Council's 
worK in the Colonies, India and PaKistan will be 
necessary over the next three years in order 
effectively to cement cultural, and particularly 
educational, ties with them. 15 
12. Ministerial Committee on Anti-Communist Propaganda Minutes, 
16 June 1948. CAB 130/37 GEN 231/4 
13. The first became the Colonial Information Policy Committee 
14. Bevin to Creech-Jones, 22 September 1948. CAB 124/1029 
15. Ibid. 
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The Colonial In-formation Policy Committee submitted a three- 
year plan in July 1949, costing an additional E1.6 million, of 
16 
which the largest single share was for the Council. In presenting 
these figures to the Treasury, the Colonial Office argued that 
The British Council is doing valuable work in 
the presentation of, the British way of life to 
the Colonial peoples, and its work is of particular 
value in the field of race relations, In both 
respects it provides a. valuable weapon of anti- 
communist propaganda. 17 
It was proposed in November 1949 that the entire responsibility 
for the welfare of overseas students in Britaýn should be 
transferred to the Council. The Colonial Office believed that 
such work was better undertaken by an unofficial body. The 
Council took over this work in January 1951. 
The draft papers prepared by the Colonial Office and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office in 1950 for the, Cabinet's review 
of the Council's future, revealed interesting developments in 
their attitudes. In marKed. contrast with its earlier pronounce- 
ments, the Commonwealth Relations Office declared that the Council' 
work could not be undertaken officially as its value lay in its 
close links with the educational and cultural worlds and that it 
was 'indispensable' 
if cultural re'ýations within the Commonwealth 
are to be developed. This is not something 
that can be done by voluntary effort. 18 
The Colonial Office's memorandum reaffirmed the Council's three 
long-term aims, the strengthening of cultural ties, the improve- 
ment of race relations and the promotion of friendship by 
activities outside the scope of official organisations. In addition 
in the short-term, 
The Council can do valuable positive work in 
countering Communist propaganda by showing that 
Britain and the Western tradition for which 
Britain stands has something better to offer 
than the Communist way of life. 19 
\ 
The foundations of the Council's worK in the Commonwealth and 
Emp ire had been laid during the war. The most pressing issue in 
1945 was the proposed visit of Gillan to Australia and New Zealand 
16. This figure was later reduced considerably by the Treasury. 
17. K. W. BlacKburne to Crombie, 15 December 1948 C0875/-48/1 
18. J. Hope to M. Ormiston, 14 April 1950, F0924/ý82 CRA 20/6 
19. K. W. BlarKburne to M-Ormiston, 12 April 1950. FO 924/782 
CRA 20/6 
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and the related questions of activities in Canada and South Africa. 
Soon after returning from Australia and New Zealand, Gillan 
embarked on a tour of South East Asia which encompassed not only 
Britain's possessions in the region but also those of the other 
I 
European powers and Siam, Burma and India. These two tours 
opened up a wide new field for the Council which demanded resources 
that could only be found at the expense of areas where the Council' 
work was already well-developed - Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus, 
Palestine, Aqen, West Africa and the West Indies. The development 
of the Council's activities will be examined in this sequence. 
In 1945 the Dominions Office remained unconvinced of the need 
for British cultural propaganda in the Dominions and the United 
Kingdom High Commissioners' Offices proved reluctant to concede 
any authority over publicity to the Council. 
"The Dominions 
Office allowed the Foreign Office to place the Dominions in the 
lowest category in the priority list that was'presented to the 
Council for planning in 1946/7. However, inFebruary 1945 Gillan 
set out to examine a dual role for the Council in presenting 
Britain to Australia and New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the 
countries of the Pacific basin in cooperation with the two 
Dominions. 
Unfortunately, when Gillan arrived in Australia he met 'very 
considerable misconceptions' concerning the Council and the 
purposes of his visit in official circles. 
20 This was partly 
due to the Council's failure to being the Dominions Office fully 
into its deliberations and partly to the lukewarm attitude of the 
Dominions Office which meant that Britain's High Commissioner, 
Sir Ronald Cross, and the Australian authorities had been briefed 
inadequately. Cro'ss maintained that Gillan was unaware 'of the 
extreme delicacy of his mission' and 'lacked appreciation of local. 
political feeling and in particular of the necessity of working 
only with the full agrPement of the Commonwealth authorities'. 
21 
Gillan's interview with the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, 
on 6th March, 'did not carry matters very far' and was described 
by . \Cross as a 'failure'. 
22 However, although Curtin was 
initially suspicious and regarded the Council as 'dangerous and 
unnecessary', he agreed that Gillan should meet his other Ministers 
20. A. Gillan, Report on a tour of Australia and New Zealand, 
May 1945, Gillan Papers. 
21. R. Cross to G. Hall, 10 March 1945. Do 35 1212/WN420/12 
22. Ibid. 
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Dr. Evatt (External Affairs), Mr Calwell (Information) and Mr 
Dedman (Post-War Reconstruction). 
23 Gillan found them 'fully 
appreciative of Council possibilities and most helpful in their 
24 
advice on immediate procedure!. Gillan was 'careful to avoid 
press publýicity' until the Council received official blessing for 
its work and Cross was fearful lest Gillan's visit might appear 
as the launch of a British propaganda drive. The Dominions 
Office and Cross felt justified in their cautious attitude by the 
first reactions of the Australian authorities and were agreed that 
6 
the establishment of a Council office would be impossible. Cross 
concluded prematurely that the tour'should enoble Gillan to gain 
valuable knowledge but otherwise will only fill in time and save 
appearances. ' 
25 Sir Eric Machtig, Permanent Under-Secretary, 
minuted on Cross's account of Gillan's visit 'very disappointing' 
to which the Secretary of State, George Hall, added, 'It is more 
p26 than disappointing. It is intolerable. Hall referred to 
Cross's view that Gillan had aroused Australilan suspicion and 
hostility by failing to be as unobtrusive as,, the? Dominions Office 
had wished. 
Gillan's account of the same events was more optimistic, he 
had been embairassed by the demands he had encountered as he was 
forced to avoid commitments until the principle of Council 
C. ) operations in Australia had been settled. He reported that 
The whole attitude, expressed in different ways 
but all to the same effect, was, "This is what we've 
been waiting for for years. Thank God, the Old 
Country is at last waking up. " 27 
On the official level contacts were established successfully with 
the Ministries of Reconstruction and Information, which in turn 
convinced the Prime Minister 'that Council representation in 
Australia would be to her considerable advantage, in the cultural 
aspects of reconstruction and in the projection of Australia in 
Britain and foreign countries. 
28 On the 27 April, the Council 
was asked to establish an office in Australia which would also 
cover the South West Pacific basin. 
23\# Gillan to White, 5 March 1945. BW 12/1 
24. A. Gillan, Report on a tour of Australia and New Zealand, 
May 1945. Gillan Papers. 
25. R. Cross to G-Hall, 10 March 1945.0035 1212WN420/12 
26. Minute by G-Hall, 14 March 1945.0035 1212 WN420/12 
27. A. Gillan, Report an a tour of Australia and New Zealand', 
May 1945, Gillan Papers. 
28. Ibid. 
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Gillan's sojourn in Australia was interrupted by a visit to 
New Zealand where the High Commissioner, Sir Harry Batterbee, was 
sympathetic and 'had done much to prepare the ground'. On 2 May 
Gillan had an interview with Mr. Nash who was acting as Prim e 
Minister in Mr Fraser's abserce at the San Franisco Conference. 
He reported that 
Mr Nash naturally'did not commit himself at this 
first interview but he showed a keen interest in, 
and knowledge of, the Council's aims and activities, 
and be proposed that I should discuss matters in 
more detail at a departmental level with a view to 
putting up concrete proposals to him. 'ý I gained the 
impression that it had indeed been virtually decided 29 to invite the Council's active cooperation..... 
A departmental meeting at which Gillan was present drafted a letter 
for Nash to address to the Council welcoming the establishment of 
I 
a Council office and Representative in New Zeal I -and and the co- 
operation of the Council in the presentation of New Zealand abroad, 
particularly in the South Pacific. The letter b, egan 
Although it is probably true to say that the 
people of New Zealand have a knowledge and under- 
standing of Britain as full as that of the people 
in any other overseas country, I consider that any 
activity which will widen and deeped mutual appreciation3O 
of the people in our two countries should be encouraged. 
The successful outcome of Gillan's visit seemed to validate 
the Council's view that only as an independent organisation could 
it work effectively in the Dominions. Moreover, the Council's 
educational and cultural activities required specialist staff that 
the High Commission did not possess and the authorities in both 
Dominions had stressed that it was the Council's 'independent 
representation' that they approved. Nevertheless, caution was 
still urged; Batterbee recommended that the Council 'should start 
circumspectly and in a modest way' painting to the 'boomerang 
effect, of lavish United States propaganda. 
31 The Dominions 
office received Gillan's report in July 1945 but took no action 
an it until 1946 by which time the interest generated by Gillan's 
visit had been disippated. The Council's first Representative in 
AuRtralia arrived in Sidney in January 1947 and founded an office 
in Canberra-with branches in Sidney and Melbourne. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Nash to Gillan, 7 May 1945. BW 2/149 
31. H. Batterbee to G. Hall, 12 May 1945.00 35 1212 WN420/12 
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The greater sophistication of audiences in Australia and New 
Zealand meant that cultural events had to be of a high standard. 
In 1947 the Boyd Neel Orchestra toured the two Dominions and in 
1948 the Ballet Rambert and the Old Vic Company, headed by 
Laurence Olivier, visited at the Council's expense. In 1949 the 
Council sponsored a tour of the Stratford Festival Company and 
mounted important fine art exhibitions. In the same year Gillan 
left the London office to become Representative in Australia. The 
second part of the Council's role, the presentation of Commonwealth 
opinion in the Pacific, did not materialise. It opened a small 
distribution office in Fiji in 1949 but thereýwere no comparable 
organisations in Australia or New! Zealand with which it could plan 
the projection of the Commonwealth in the Pacific. Gillan urged 
repeatedly the formation of bodies on. the lines of the Council and 
the desirability of Australia and New Zealand ýecognising their 
cultural responsibilities in the region. Britain, he insisted, 
could not cover the field alone and on his retirement in 1951 he 
appealed over Australian radio, 
Is it not for us, together, to work to give the 
fruits of this heritage to others who are today 
serrching feverishly, uncertainly for the good life ? 
There is another competitor in the field, strong, 
ruthless and plausible, who seeks, whether by force 
or fraud, to enmesh them body and soul in the toils 
of slavery. If we who bear the flag of freedom do 32 
not march breast forward it may soon be too late. 
In January 1946, Machtig suggested that the Council should 
explore the ground in Canada again, but with caution in view of the 
prejudice againstithe. Council 'largely on the groundsýthat it was 
designed for projecting British culture to foreign and Colonial 
33 
peopl. es'. However, financial stringency and the continuing 
obstruction of Britain's High Commission in Canada, which 
maintained that it' already had the 
1: 
field well-covered, prevented 
the Council from acting on this suggestion. Sir Shuldham Redfern, 
director of the'Councills Dominions Department, received an 
encouraging letter from Vincent Massey in August 1947 in which he 
stated 
I am one of those people who feel that-the British 
Council should operate in Canada - not, of course 
in any way suggesting Empire propaganda, but as an 
organisation existing to keep the Canadian public 
in touch with the "cultural"... life in Great Britain. 
32. Australian Broadcasting Commission "Guest of Honour" 
1 July 1051, Gillan Papers 
33. A ClutterbucK to S-Redfern, 23 June 1947, BW20/2 
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I gather that there is no official objection to 
this in Ottawa, and I would hope that before . long 
a representative of the BC(sic) might be established 
there. He could do a most useful job in restoring 
and strengthening contacts between this country and 
Great Britain..... 34 
1 
In the summer of 1947 the Council was forced to abandon plans 
for an exploratory tour of Canada and planned instead to send 
officers to supervise the distribution of Council material. 
However, because of the dollar crisis, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, 
High Commissioner in Canada, advised the postponement of all plans 
until 1948. Redfern put Clutterbuck's objections to the Canadian 
Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, in November who declared that 
they were'without substance'. He was'entirely sympathetic and 
said he thought that nothing but good would come from an extension 
of the Council's activities to Canada. 'ýS Macý, enzie King 
emphasised that the Federal Government could not be associated 
with the Council because of the delicate relationship between the 
Federal and provincial governments and becau se 
! g'overnmental 
control of an organisation like the Council 'meant red tape'. 
bureacracy, a stifling of initiative and a waste. of public funds' 
ý6 
One result of King's opposition to public funding of semi-offipial 
bodies was that the Canadian Foundation, established on the 
Council's initiative during the war, nearly collapsed due to lack 
of funds. 
In August 1948 the Council received Clutterbuck's blessing for 
a visit by Redfern and in October and November he visited every 
province, except New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. Redfern 
recommended a low-key operation, the attachment of staff to the 
High Commission and periodic tours by senior Council staff. His 
conclusions were supported by King and the Canadian authorities 
and by Clutterbuck. Nevertheless, because of other calls, on the 
council's budget, activities were restricted to the distribution 
of material through thcDHigh Commission. 
37 
Likewise, in South Africa, partly because it was the last call 
. on-the Council's Commonwealth budget, the Council only distributed 
material through the Higk Commission. The delicate political 
situation and the introduction os a strict system of apartheid-in 
1948, also militated against the development of cultural relations. 
34. V. Massey to S. Redfern, 18 August 1947. BW 20/2 
35. Minute by S. Redforn, 25 November 1047. BW20/2 
36. Ibid. 
37. A Council officer was appointed to the U. K. High Commission 
in Canada in 1958. 
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In 1945 F. D. Gray, deputy director of the Empire Division, minuted 
that the Council's resources were already overstretched in the 
Commonwealth and could not accommodate South Africa as well. He 
continued, 
My personal opinion is that South Africa is a 
country which is so permanently inflamed by political 
passions that the , 
kind of worK which the Council 
_-could 
undertaKe would have no effect on the future 
relations of the Union. and the United Kingdom. 38 
Further minutes supported this view. A tentative provision for 
South Africa was made in the Council's estimates for 1948/9 but 
it was eliminated in the following year. 
For the British Empire in the Far East there could be no 
return to the status quo ante bellum. Japan'sýyictorious advance 
had revealed shortcomings of British rule. Britain had been 
unable to defend her peoples against external a ession and those 
peoples had shown little inclination to rally'tolthe cause of the 
Empire. The neglect of Britain's naval and military position was 
mirrored in the field of propaganda. Nationalism in the Far East 
was fuelled by Japan's victories and fostered by the Allies and 
by Communists. Britain, France and Holland; faced opposition 
from the United States and the Soviet Union in attempting to 
re-establish their Empires in the Far East, but the Colonial Office 
insisted that colonial government would have to be restored before 
self-government within the Commonwealth would be possible. 
The end of the war found the Council over-stretched by 
existing commitments. The functional departments were able to 
supply some material to the Far Eastern Publicity Division of the 
political Intelligence Department for Indo-China and the Dutch 
East Indies and to the Colonial Office for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Lord Killearn, Special Commissioner for South East Asia, urged a 
greatly increased role for the Council and not only within ' 
Britain's own territories. In March 1946 Killearn telegraphed to 
the Foreign Office, 
As regards Thailand surely it is essential that 
something should be done immediately and effectively 
to counteract American infiltration, to build up 
Britain's position which has always been traditional 
and is in danger of being undermined ..... As regards Thailand and French Indo-China, I recommend most 
strongly the British-Council should be directed to 
give immediate and pressing attention to take all 
available measures in both countries. 39 
38. Minute by F. D. Gray, 26 February 1945. BW 2/314 
39. Killearn to Bevin, 17 March 1946. FO930/483 P284/1/907 
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On the strength of this 
a supplementary grant s 
these two territories. 
that the Council should 
I 
unless sufficient funds 
telegram, Kirkpatrick recommended that 
hould be provided for Council work in 
However, in May, the Foreign Office ruled 
not open up new ground in South East Asia 
were guaranteed to ensure continuity. 
40 
In December 1946, although no funds had been guaranteed, Gillan 
set out on a tour of S6-Uth East Asia at the request of Killearn 
and MacDonald, Governor-General of Malaya and British Borneo. In 
his report Gillan observed that 
Not only political but educational asý, ira'tions .... 
have developed enormously in volume and clamour. 
There has been a toughening in fibre and an increased 
sense of independence. At the same time a long period 
of isolation has intensified a desire to renew old 
ties with the west, though on a different basis of 
human relationship. 41 
Gillan encountered an intense demand for books, periodicals and 
educational equipment to replace that destroyed d, uring the war 
and a desire for greater educational opportunities in Britain for 
students from the Far East. He was also struck by the pre- 
eminence of the United States, especially in the field of films. 
Power, wealth and the "conqueror Kudos" impress 
many types of mind, whilst others are attracted 
by the excellent and none too blatant show rooms 
of the United States Information Services. 42 
Gillan recommended that the Council establish a regional 
headquarters at Singapore to cover the whole region except for 
Burma and Hong Kong, with offices in the larger territories 
including Malaya. He. anticipated that Singapore might become 
an educational and research, as well as a commercial, centre and 
Killearn stressed the importance of Singapore 'as an essential. 
43 British.... bastion in the Far East, both defensively and culturally 
National sentiment in Malaya dictated that the Council have a 
separate office and Representative at Kuala Lumpar, although final 
authority would rest with the Singapore office. Commenting on the 
Malayan national movement Gillan wrote, 
It is not at present in any way separatist. Its 
aims are equally of social and administrative 
equality within, and not separation from, British 
Empire. But it is watchful. 44 
40. Minute by E. H. Moss, 6 May 1946. FO924/417 LC55/55/452 
41. A. Gillan, Report on a tour of South East Asia, December 1946. 
42. Ibid. Gillan Papers 
43. Ibid. 
44. A. Gillan, "A Council Field in South East Asia" Council Review, 
April 1946 
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In Brunei, British North Borneo, Siam, French Indo-China and 
the Philippines, Gillan advised against direct activities, 
recommending only the supply of material to the British authorities 
and Press officers. A Press Attach6's Office had been opened 
recently at Bangkok, one was soon to be opened in Manila and there 
was a British Information Office at Saigon. In Brunei and British 
North Borneo, the scope was so limited that a Representative was 
not justified. In Sarawak there was no Public Relations 
Department oý Information Service and only an embryonic Education 
Department and so, with the support of the Goýernor, Gillan propose, 
the foundation of a centre and a library. Sarawak's transition 
to Crown Colony status required 
every possible concrete evidence of the advantages 
of the latter, and in its present impoverished and 
devasted condition such evidence may no', t spring 
readily to the native eye. 45 
Siam had been the largest area of Counciliexpenditure in the 
Far East before the war and there was a greatl'des 
I ire to renew 
traditional cultural linKs, - especially among the older generation. 
The standard of English among Siamese youth was poor and they 
looKed to the United States. Gillan recommended that the Council 
subsidised a Chair of English Language and Literature at 
ChulalongKorn University and assist in the provision of British 
teachers for schools. 
At Killearn's prompting, Gillan proposed the establishment of 
a Council organisation in Indonesia in view of its potential 
influence on British Colonies in the region. 
Indonesian pan-nationalist tendencies may in 
any case have an effect on certain British-Malay 
schools of thought. An unfriendly Indonesia 
would be a menace to imperial interests in British 46 Malay and Borneo. 
For Hong Kong, Gillan recommended an office and the improvement 
of library facilities. With the development of the university, 
the Council could offer scholarships in China, and possi bly to the 
Malayan Chinese, and encourage the training of Chinese English 
tea\chers within the university. These proposals were supported 
strongly by Britain's ambassador at Nanking and by the Council's 
Representative in China. 
45. A. Gillan, Report on a tour of South East Asia, December 1946 
Gillan Papers. 
46. Ibid. 
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Gillan's report 'wasýbacked by Killearn and by Malcolm MacDonald 
who 
emphasised the critical natur e of the peri'od through 
which the region is passing and, in the case of the 
dependencies his belief that the outcome might 
largely depend an an adequate presentation of the 
cuitural advantages to be ýained by a maintenance 
of the British connection. 7 
The South East Asia Department of the Foreign Office reported that 
the Secretary of State 
regarded publicity work in South EastýAsia, 
including cultural publicity, as of Al priority 
and that he would go to an h lengths to ensure 
that funds were available. 
Gillan was told that the Foreign Office was 'keen for you to start 
with the least possiblý, delayl. 
49 
However, drastic cuts in the Council's budget forced the 
ab andonment of Gillen's carefully-laid plans'. The proposed 
regional office at Singapore, with centres in other territories, 
was replaced by two offices at Singapore and Kuala Lumpar. In 
1948 an office was opened in Hont Kong and in 1949 staff were 
established in Sarawak and North Borneo. Activities flourished 
in Singapore but in the Malayan Federation they were confined to 
the capital by the disturbances. An office was opened in 
Indonesia in September 1948 but the republican war against the 
Dutch restricted work until the Dutch withdrawal. Material was 
supplied also to Saigon, Hanoi and Bangkok. 
India was one of the most intractable problem. s facing the new 
Labour government. The Labour Party had been pledged to Indian 
independence since 1919 and Pethick-Lawrence, appointed Secretary 
of State by Attlee, had declared in an election address that 
India must attain full self-government in friendly association 
with Britain and the Oominions at the earliest possible date'. 
50 
However, at the Simla Conference in June 1945 the Moslem League 
had insisted irrevocably on the formation of two separate states. 
. In 
January 1946 the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, announced his intention 
to\. form a new Executive Council and to summon a Constituent 
Assembly to draw up a form of government for India to which BrAtain 
47 Ibid 
48. Minute by W. H. Montagu-PollacK, 11 February 1947 F0924/603A 
LC653/16/452 
49. Ibid. 
50. N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 
(London 1950)p. 210 
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could transfer power. In the following month, a Cabinet Mission 
led by Pethick-Lawrence travelled to India. One member of the 
Mission was A. H. Joyce, Publicity Adviser at the India Office, who 
took with him details ci the Council which he discussed with Sir 
John Sargent, Educational Adviser to the Government of India and 
C. King, Chief Publicity Officer. King advised that the political 
situation would have to be clarified before cultural'relations 
could be developed. On his re. turn in July, Joyce held a meeting 
at the India_Office to discuss the Council's future in India. 
The meeting agreed that Gillan and his assistant should tour 
India if the India Office could secure the apP'Toval of the Treasury 
and the Government of India to this proposal. Adam wrote to 
Pethick-Lawrence that both he and Wavell felt 'that the time is 
now ripe for certain kinds of our work specially adapted for India' 
The India Office approached the Treasury in August, arguingjý 
But at a time when in our relations with India we 
are having to substitute new linKs foiý' old, we are 
concerned to bring to bear other mean, s... '.. Of 
presenting the United Kingdom to India, and it 
would, we feel, be neglecting a considerable 
opportunity if we failed to do everything in our 
power to extend British cultural relations with 
India. For this purpose there is no doubt in our 
minds that the British Council is the appropriate 
instrument. 52 
On Wavell's advice, Gillan's visit was postponed pending the 
arrival of Sir Terence Shone, High Commissioner Designate, who 
would approach the Interim Government for permission for the 
Council to send agents to India. Shone was strongly in favour 
of the initiation of Council activities in India and was an old 
ally of the Council from 
, 
Egypt and Syria. His deputy reported 
in November 1946 that Nehru and the Education Minister and the 
Commonwealth Relations Department of the Interim Government, had 
agreed to the Council's proposal. At the London Conference in 
December, T. P. Tunnard-Moore, Gillan's assistant, met Nehru and 
explained the Council's plans tbhis secretary. The Conference 
failed to find a solution to India's constitutional problem and 
the situation remained deadlocked. 
Gillan arrived in Delhi in December 1946 after his tour of 
South East Asia but had no instructions as to the scale on which 
the Council could operate in India and so confined himself to 
Delhi and Bombay in order not to arouse expectations too much. 
51. Adam to PethicK-Lawrence, 24 Jul"y 1946 BW 38/5 
52. J. Patrick to J. L. O. Winnifrith, 28 August 1946 10 Papers 
L/I/1/79 16/26H 
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Gillan had 'to walk veý-y delicately$ as, although there was 
general support for the development of cultural relations, plans 
for direct representation excited suspicion. 
53 
On 16 January 1947, 
through th, e good off ices of Shone, Gillan had an interview with 
Nehru. Throughout the meeting Gillan had the impression that 
Nehru 'was wondering where the catch lay'. Nehru asked a number 
of questions, including the source of the Council's funds, and, 
as Shone reported 
his attitude was wary rather than enthusiastic. 
It appeared that India would have som , ething to 
gain from the Council's work and thatýit would 
therefore be welcome. 54 
After consultations with the Interim Government, Gillan proposed 
offices in Oelhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and., Lahore. 
Gillan's report received powerful support from Wavell and 
Shone. In February 1947 the British Governm, ent announced its 
intention to transfer power by June 1948 and, 'Wavell was replaced 
by Mountbatten. Shortly before Wavell's departure, his secretary 
wrote to the India Office with his reactions to Gillan's recommend- 
ations. 
He thinKs it most important that there should be 
an adequate and expanding vote for the activities 
of the British Council in India and that cheeseparing 
about this would be the worst possible economy from 
the point of view of Britain..... Vie do not need to 
be extravagant and vulgar, but we must do things well 
and looK as though we appreciated the value of cultural 
contacts with India. 55 
Wavell warned that insufficient expenditure would be more damaging. 
than none at all and would invite unfavourable comparison with the 
American effort. Shone argued that the Council would be preservine 
old relationships in a new form. 
It seems: to me that on this score there is a very 
strong case for a large subvention of the Council's 
activities from the very outset in order that no 
chance may be lost during the transitional period 
of assessing and exploiting the goodwill which we 
have accumulated in India during the past and of 
which, I believe, much remains. 56 
53. A. Gillan, Report on a visit to India, January 1947. Gillan Pape, 
54. T. Shone to Cabinet Secretary, 17 January 1946. BW38/5 
55. S. Abell to J. Patrick. 28 February 1947.10 L/1/1/79 16/26H 
56. T. Shone to J-PatricK, 8 March 1947.10 L/1/1/79 16/26H 
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C) 
As heir to such goodwill as would remain, the High Commissioner 
was naturally anxious to maintain it and it was the unofficial 
and semi-official contacts, Shone argued, that would suffer most 
from the withdrawal of British interests in India. 
Nevertheless, however rapidly or extensively 
proposals for expanding our official representation 
may be implemented, it will never be possible to 
fill the gap created in India by the withdrawal of 
Englishmen from the many services thay have manned 
in the past and by the'consequent winding up of the 
institutions and associations they have maintained. 
The loss of popular contact will be great and. largely 
irrecoverable; but I feel that the Býitish Council, 
if it appears early in the field and is really well 
equipped, could do a great deal to mitigate the 
consequent loss of goodwill. 57 
Mountbatten agreed with Shone that it was 'Most important that 
there should be plenty of money for financing the work of the 
British Council in India'. 
58 
However, the Council's plans suffered two, sev ere blows; 
firstly, the partition of India in August and secondly, a fifty 
per cent cut in the Council's budget for India in 1947-8. As a 
result of partition the Council had to provide two separate 
establishments and the cuts meant that it could afford little more 
than a single office in each country. In January 1948, Sir John 
Sargent, former education adviser to the Government of India, 
visited London for discussions with the Council before returning 
to India as its first Representative. At the end of the year 
Sargent retired to London to direct operations in Asia, and 
W. R. L. Wickham, formerly Representative in Malta and Brazil, took 
over in Delhi and W. R. Owain Jones moved from Aden to Karachi. 
In May, a report agreed by all three was presented to the Council, 
estimating minimum expenditure in 1948/9 of E90,000 rising to 
E200,000 by 1950/1 for three years. The report warned that if 
the Council did not meet the great demand for its services in 
India other countries would readily step in. They had found that 
English was not as widely used as had been assumed, that British 
. 
ideals were only superficially understood by a small minority and 
tha, t British influence would only survive for one generation 
unless steps were taken immediately to reinforce it, 
57. Ibid. 
58. Mountbatten to Pethick-Lawrence, 9 April 1947. L/1/1/79 16/261 
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In our view the opportunity for th*e creation 
through the British Council of long-term British 
cultural influence in India is not likely to recur 
in so favourable a manner. In the course of only 
a few years the generation, now in influential 
po, sitions and able to direct opinion towards us, 
which has, despite its record of political hostility 
to Britain, been largely British-trained and British- 
educated, will die out and be replaced by men and 
women at least le'ss well-informed and at worst hostile. 
It is in the interests of Britain to capitalise now 
the considerable goodwill remaining to her in this 
coun. try and in the sphere allocated to the Council 
lies a major portion of that goodwill'. 59 
Despite the support of the High Commissioner, the India 
Office and the Viceroy, now Governor-General of India, the Council 
was unable to persuade the Treasury to release sufficient funds. 
In September 1948, Noel-Baker, the Secretary of, State for 
Commonwealth relations, told the Chancellor of'ýthe Exchequer that 
the development of the Council's work in India and Pakistan could 
not wait for the outcome of a general enquirý, into the cost-of 
the Overseas Information Services and that the principle of 
Council operations in the sub-continent had to be decided: 
whether as a matter of high policy we should 
further the Council's work in the new Dominions, 
or whether our economic position is such that for 
the sake of such a comparatively small sum of 
money we must abandon the project altogether. 
This, of course, would mean leaving the field wide 
open to, the Soviet Union, who are increasing their 
propaganda activities, under the guise of cultural 
relations, with every month that passes., 60 
The Treasury was. unmoved, and suggested that funds' could be fo'und 
from the Foreign Office's share of the Councillsýbudget. Operations 
in the sub-continent began modestly with officesý6t Delhi 6ndý 
Karýchi in 1948. ý'The following year additional'offices were 
opened in Madraý Cýlcutta and Lahore. 'ý 
t Britain'q, positioný; in, Burma atii he end of the war was even 
more u 'nstable t6nit was in' India. ýA theoretiýQal independence, 
had. been grantedi by ljap6ný t a' Burmaýand Britain ha'A pIedg e'd in 
1931 that elf- BurmaýýJWould not lag' behind ýIndia' 'on the, road to S 61 
government. National'i'st'oppositid; n to-the, re-es'tablishment'of 
br'iiish rulel'hadl been 'ýqulick ýt; O mahst itself' an! the return olf e 
59'. lý Repori b hamlýý'Sar d Oýaj y Wiokl gent an_ n-Jones, 17 Mayý1948. BW38/5 
60. j P. Noel, -Paker, 
'i S! ýtq Cripps, 10 1948ý ýII"O L/1/`1/80., 1: 6/26M 6 V. Cmd. 4004 HMSO 19,31 . 
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peace. The Governor of Burma feared that many senior Burmese, 
impressed by American wartime efficiency, looked to the United 
States, while Burmese youth looked admiringly to the Soviet Union 
ý2 
There was a great need and scope for pro-British publicity in 
Burma and the Burma Office had recommended to Findlater Stewart 
that the British Council 
by reflecting in its cultural activities British life 
and British ideals, should be able to give valuable 
subsidiary help to the pro-British publicity which it 
is clonsidered to be so important to develop on our 
return to Burma. 63 
The Burma Office also envisaged a vital role for the Council 
in the care of Burmese students and cadets in Britain. B. R. Pearn, 
Director of Public Relations, was concerned particularly the 
view in Burma that American troops had won theýBurmese campaign 
should be dispelled and that propaganda 'with a view to encouraging 
a favourable disposition towards the principle of Dominion status' 
6+ 
should be undertaken by the Council. The Council, faced new 
organisation problems in Burma as there were neither British 
Missions or High Commissions to offer guidance. Although the 
Governor was to have overriding authority, the delicate political 
situation meant that he could have no overt connection with British 
publicity. In February 1946, the Treasury agreed reluctantly to 
Council expenditure in Burma but'doubted 
the propriety of the British Council undertaking 
work which on the face of it would not be cultural 
but straight political propaganda. 65 
In March J. S. Bingley, formerly Representive in Gibraltar and 
Persia, travelled to. Burma and reported in June that: 'future 
prospects Council work definitely encouraging'. 
66 
However, the physical difficulties of living and working in 
Burma after. the war, made Bingley's task trying although the demand 
for his services rapidly increased. Gillan visited Rangoon in 
6ctober and reported that 
Looking back on it we should have been well 
advised to resist an. improvised and too hasty 
entry. We should have carried out the normal 
exploratory survey. made a plan and then put it 
into operation with an assurance of sufficient 
staff and material 67 
62. C. Thorne, 
' 
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65. J. Winnifrith to P-Smith, 16 February 1946. BW. 19/. l 
66. Bingley to Tunnard-Moore, 3 June 1946. BW19/1 
67. A. Gillan, Report on,. a tOur of South East Asia-Decembbr 1946. 
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Gillan saw a number of Burma's political leaders, including 
U Aung San, founder of Burma's biggest party and deputy chairman 
of the Executive Council, who was 
more concerned to give me a lecture on his 
particular brand of controlled democracy than 
to listen to mine about the Council; but he 
was in no way antagonistic ..... 
68 
Gillan also discussed the Council with U Tin Tut and U Saw, both 
members of the Executive Council, who were 'genuinely interested 
and anxious to cooperate'. 
69 Nevertheless, he was wary of 
developing the Council's worK too rapidly. 
To start now would be a gamble. In another year 
we shall Know more about the development both of 
the constitutional relations between Britain and 
Burma and of social relationships between Britains 
and Burmese. 
70 
Events were to justify Gillan's caution. U Aung San, U Saw 
and U Tin Tut were all members of the Burmeseldelegation to London 
in January 1947, that reached an agreement wi th Bi ritain whereby 
elections would be held in April for a Constituent Assembly. In 
September, the Assembly approved a constitution designating Burma 
as an independentsovereign republic outside the Commonwealth and 
in January 1948, Burma became independent. The factions within 
Burma were not reconciled by this event and civil war broKe out 
in April. Gillan's three contacts all perished; U Tin Tut was 
assassinated in Spptember 1948 and U. Saw was hanged in 1949 for 
the instigation of the murder of U Aung San and his colleagues 
in July 1947. The Council would not escape the repercussions of 
these events. Bingley continued to distribute a small amount of 
material but was forced to leave as a result of'his alleged 
association'with the assassins of U Aung San. By the middle of 
1948 all trace of Council activity in Burma had disappeared. 
Ceylon's transition to Dominion status was smooth and 
uneventful. It was the most advanced democracy in Asia before 
the war and there had been no'repatition of the violence seen in 
India. Ceylonese Ministers had remained in office throughout the 
we ý-. In February 1945, Gillan spent five days in Colombo an 
route to Perth and took the opportunity to discuss Council 
operations with the Governor and senior British officials. 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid. 
70. Ibid. 
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Gillan recommended that the Council should begin work in Ceylon 
for, 'as the constitutional links with any Empire country looýsen 
the more important it is that we should strengthen the culturýal 
71 
ones'. Sir Henry Moore, the Governor, wrote to the Colonial 
Office in June arguing that Ceylon's needs were greater than'ý 
those of East Africa:, or Kenya 'since rthe East African governments 
ought to be able without any politicalfdifficulties to push 
English culture through their Departments of Education'. 
72 
The 
Governor o6l-y wantedýmateriaj fromithe, Council and advised i 
against the establishment of direct representation in view of the 
oppositionýof tlhe'Sinhalleýse and Tamil movemenýs to the spread of 
British culture. At the end of 1645 the Council proposed modest' 
increases in the material it sent to Ceylon but received no reply 
from the ColonialýOffice. Political advance in Ceylon was 
hardly interrupted by the war and, a new constitution was published 
in 1946 providing for Cabinet government on the British model. A 
general election was held in 1947 and Ceylon, ýbeca, me a Dominion in 
February 1948. At the beginning of 1949, the Council was 
invited to start worK in Ceylon and a staff and office were 
eI stablished in that year, mainly concerned with improving the 
standards of English teaching and maintaining linKs between 
Ceylonese and British universities. 
Britain's colonies in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
were the first to receive the Council's services before the war 
and bare the brunt of the post-war economies. In Malta and Cozo, 
the institutes continued to flourish, the ValLetta institute 
receiving amongst its distinguished visitors in 1948, the Shah of 
Iran, Lord Mountbatten and the Lord Chancellor. The Gozo 
institute escaped the cuts in 1948 but only at the expense of the 
withdrawal of subsidies from the local Boy Scouts and Girl Guides 
movements, the cancellation of exhibitions and the raising of 
membership fees. In Gibraltar, the Council was forced to consider 
the closure of the Calpe Institute in 1947 but, happily, 
negotiations with the Governor and leading public-figures resulted 
in raising sufficient +-bnds by local subscription to enable it to 
function until 1950 without financial support from the Council. 
A Council Representative remained to help with the administration 
of tho Institute, which was renowned for its orchestra. 
71. Gillan to White, 21 March 1945. BW 2/315 
72. Minutes of Joint Standing Committee, 24 July 1945. BW 7711 
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In Cyprus, too, the Council was forced to re-evaluate its 
pattern of actvitiies. In pprticular, it wished to withdraw 
from elementary English teaching which consumed a major part of 
the Cyprus budget. This, meant cutbacks in the English School, 
the Junior 
ji 
School and the v illage evening classes, which gave 
lessons in twenty-three villages, and in the English taught in 
the Council's five institutes. This reorientation was achieved 
gradually in the face of opposition from the Colonial Government 
and the Council turned to adult education and cultural activities. 
Some savings were found in the Council's modest budget for 
Aden. The institute continued to attract a wide range of members 
and was described as 
the one meeting place in Aden for all communities, 
Arab, Italian and Jewish with members of the 
British colony assisting as lecturers and 
instructors. 73 
In addition, the Council looked to Palest. ine ýfor economies 
expecting that the hostile situation would render activities 
nearly impossible. After the report of the Anglo-American 
Commission in 1946, there were widescals resignations from its 
in'stitutes in Arab areas. However, work continued in spite of 
Zionist terrorist activities, until February 1947 when all British 
subjects . were moved into the Protected Zones. The situation 
deteriorated markedly in November after the United Nations General 
Assembly accepted the partition of Palestine. The Council's 
staff were restricted increasingly to the main cities and, in, 
consultation with the Colonial Office, the Council budgeted for 
the maintenance only of an office at Jerusalem, with a skeleton 
st af f, after Britain 
*had withdrawn on 15 May 1948 Sir Alan 
Cunningham, British High Commissioner in Palestine, resisted this 
pr oposal, pointing out that the Counciýl would have to take over 
many of the educational activities undertaken previously by the 
British administration, particularly in the Arab'area. The 
School of Higher Studies in Jerusalem supported b'y the Council, 
was the only'place where Arabs could study, with Jews, for British 
de ees. Referring to thelCouncills club in Jaffa, Cunningham 
wrote, 
If the Arab connection is of any signific : ance 
to Britain, then this institute is of real' 
importance and its future should not be 
jeopardis6d at this stage. 74 
730: British Council Annual Report 4946/7 p. 44 
74. Cunningham to Creech-Jones, 13 December 1947 BW 47/7 
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In the propoaed Jewish state, Cunningham looked forward to the 
Council meeting the demand for technical advice and instruction. 
Cunningham concIluded, 
It seems paradoxical that at a time when the British 
adminstration is withdrawing, the only British agency, 
remaining should be weakened rather that strengthened 
This is not to imply that the Council will be the 
only British agency at work in Palestine, but that 
itlis recognised that the approach through the field 
ofýculture and human relations is, to put it at its 
lowest, a valuable adýunct to the political or 
diplbmatic approach. 7 
The Council's Representative, J,. Jardine, agreed that the 
Council's long term aims should not be endangered by short term 
considerations. Concentration in Jerusalem would isolate it 
from the two new governments and break links that had been built 
up carefully in the Arab and Jewish communities, Moreover, 
Jardine had been assured by Arab and Jewish leaders that the Counci'. 
would be welcome; Or Weizman had placed 'a high value on the 
Council's work in the Jewish community!. 
76 
Cunningham recommended the expansion rather than the contractial 
of the Council's work, but his appeals fell on deaf ears at the 
Colonial Office and the Council. Adam replied that the Council's 
work in Palestine had been exceptional and that) 
With regard to function, the Council is not 
required or designed to fill gaps in a country's 
education system, nor to provide liaison between 
disparate racial or political groups ..... At 
present effective work has almost ceased outside 
Jerusalem and I have no desire t ? 71 eave 
hostages 
around the country indefinitely. 
The Foreign Office, however, whose responsibility Palestine became 
after 15 May-, agreed with the High Commissioner 'that it would be 
unwise to let our political withdrawal be followed by a cultural 
one'. 
78 Increasing violence in the spring of 1948 forced the 
Council to take precautionary measures. The Representative's 
office was transferred to Amman at the end of April, theinstitutes 
were entrusted lo Arab and Jewish caretakers and the School of 
Higher Studies and the Haifa and Jaffa institutes were closed. 
Dur, ing the civil war that followed the termination of the British 
mandate, Jardine was able to mairtain contacts in the Arab state 
from his office in Transjordan but he was unable to rescue Council 
property in Israel, which was largely lost. The Council's 
75. Ibid. 
76. Jardine to Adam, 20 January 1948 BW 47/7 
77. Adam to Cunningham, 29 December 1947 BW 47/7 
78. C. Warner to G. Dudley, 7 February 1948FO924/629 LC491/34/451 
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1949/50 budget for this area was slashed, although increased 
I 
services were provided in Jordan and the Council's library in 
Jerusalem was preserved'. 
The war had hastened the development of nationalism in the 
Colonies and particularly in the Gold Coast and Nigeria where 
constitutions, published in 1946 and 1945 respectively, were rejected 
by nationalist leaders. 'The Council's worK fall into two 
categories, both of which were, hampered by shortages of staff; 
the developmpnt of libraries and Council centres. Macmillan 
perceived the new mood of impatient nationali'sm in West Africa: 
Confined to the capital cities and Government 
circles, he had met it face to face only among 
the large groups of teachers and students whom 
he had addressed; but he sensed the unrest. 
There were riches from cocoa but very insufficient 
education . 
79 
By restricting membership of the Council's institutes to the 
, nearly highbrow', Macmillan hoped to provide an outlet for the 
educated African and slýrroundings in which black and white could 
meet on equal terms. He did not wish to exclude the less 
educated but believed that the black intelligentsia stood most 
in need of cultural Tacilities and that the Colonial Governments 
should provide these services for the masses. Institutes were 
opened at Bathurst and Lagos in 1946, completing the Council's 
coverage of the four colonies. In the development of libraries, 
Macmillan advocated the foundation of central libraries, with 
cultural adjuncts, in each colony. A second tier of reading 
rooms, organised locally and supported by the Government, could 
cater for the less advanced. Macmillan returned to England 
suffering from malaria in 1946 and his post was not refilled. Each 
colony in future had its own representative. Macmillan had 
fought consistently for the Council's independence from the 
colonial authorities and was displeased at the outcome of the 
Findlater Stewart enquiry and the demarcation of functions with 
the Colonial Office which, in his view, had restricted the Council 
severely. He 
began to feel very ditilliusioned with the policy- 
maKers at home, and suspected that the weaK front 
shown to the Colonial Office had to do with finance. 
and that Gillan might even be pleased that the 
Government's"Development" Department should save the 
Council by going direct to the Treasury. He began 
to thinK it was time for him to go. 80 
79. Mona Macmillan, Draft Biography of W. M. Macmillan. 
chapter 6, p. 158 
80. Ibid. The "Development"Department was the Colonial Oevblopmenlý 
and Welfare Fund. -For Findlater Stewart report see above pM, 
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After Macmillan's departure, the Council tried to broaden the 
base of its work in West Africa as Gillan believed 'that the time 
has come when we must open the door a little wider if we are not 
to be accused of snobbery'. 
81 National libraries were founded 
by the Council in Nigeria and the Gold Coast in 1947 and travelling 
library services were organised elsewhere. In the institutes a 
range of activities was I undertaken; a typical, prog q ramme of 
group events was that of the. Ac. cra Institute in 
ý949: 
Monday Accra Choral Society 
Tuesday Table Tennis Match, Ballroom Dance classes, 
Play Reading, Drama Group. ýý 
Wednesday Meeting of Readers and Writ', ers Group, 
Open Night(Film Show, quiz or recital). 
Thursday Orchestra Group, Gramophone recital. 
Friday Meeting of Operatic Society, P16y 
Reading, Drama Group. 
Saturday Hockey Matches (and Wednesd&ys). 82 
During the riot s in the Gold Coast in 1948, the Institute was 
visited by a mob but no damage was done. IntI947 the Council's 
work was extended to Nigeria's Eastern Provin, ce. and in 1948 to 
the Northern Provinces. The Council gave up direct responsibility 
for the development of libraries in 1948 and this work was 
transferred to the governments concerned with the Council offering 
only expert guidance. 
A Representative was not sent to East Africa until 1947. 
R. A. Frost established his headquarters at Nairobi in Kenya and 
founded the multi-racial Kenya Institute in 1948, with the help 
of a grant of E50,000 from the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Fund. The Governor of Kenya reported in June 1948 that the 
Council was 'a really important influence in the life of the 
Colony'. 
83 K. W. Blackburne, director of Information Services at the 
Coloni-al Office, visited East and Central Africa in May 1949 to 
discuss the development of Council operations. He told the 
Colonial authorities that the Colonial Office expected 
that the Council could serve a most valuable purpose 
particularly in improving relationships between the 
various communities and in taking an interest in the 
African "intelligentsia". 84 
Blackburne recommended that the Council should concentrate on 
advanced Africans and the urban black populations in Uganda, 
81. Gillan to C. Jeffries, 25 January 1946 BW 8/3 
82. Accra Institute Group Notices, June 1949 BW 8/6 
83. F. S. Mitchell to L-Cohen, 30 June 1948 CO 875/45/1 
84. Report by K. W. Blackburne, May 1949 CO 875/47/1 
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Tanganyka and Nyasaland. The Council's efforts to promote 
contacts between Europeans and Africans in Kenya had prov6ked 
considerable criticism from official and unofficial sections of 
the white population. In Northern Rhodesia Colonial officials 
argued that the Council should work mainly with the European 
populations as the African was less advanced than elsewhere in 
East Africa and the strong South African influence made whites 
suspicious of anything British., Indee-d, it was recommended 
that a Council officer in Northern Rhodesia should speak Afrikaans 
and preferrably be a South African. Blackburne suggested 
that it is of equal importance to give the Afrikaans 
population of Norther6 Rhodesia a better understanding 
of Britain as it is to improve race relations in 85 other colonies. 
In 1949 the Council' made plans to expand its op, erations in Uganda, 
Tanganyka, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland but in the event could 
afford only one new centre at Mombasa. 
The pattern of the Council's worK in the West Indies was well 
established by the end of the war. In 1944 the Council had taKen 
over the administration of the regional library scheme and it had 
been told in October 1945 that 
the. most important single contribution which the 
British Council could MaKe to the spread of BritiElh 
culture in the West Indies lay in the development of 
public libraries... 86 
This became the central f eature of the Council Is work in the islands 
but in 1948 this responsibility was transferred to the local 
authorities. However, the West Indian Governors argued that 
their colonies could not afford the scheme and that it should not 
have been started without sufficient funds to guarantee its 
completion. At the expense of other projects and to preserve 
the work already done, the Colonial Office asked the Council to 
finance this scheme until 1953 when it would be returned to the 
colonial governments. Over the same period the Council also 
supported a rural library scheme. 
\, The Commonwealth and Empire had bj these stages become an 
increasingly important field for the Council. In 1950 Sir Charles 
Jeffries called for a'drastic reassessment' of the Council's 
priorities towards the new Commonwealth and Britain's African 
and Asian possessions 'where the link of blood-relations with us 
8S. Ibid. 
86. Joint Standing Committee Minutes, BW77/1 2 October 1945 
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is absent'. 
I can say with,, jabsolute certainty that if we could 
treble the Council's present actvities in the more 
important Colonies it would have a really significant 
effect and would have a good chance of turning a tide 
which otherwise may go against us for all the 
excellence of our official administration. 87 
The growth of nationalism and the relative decline in Britain's 
power undermin 
. 
ed traditional Political, economic and strategic ties 
and placed greater reliance on a 'different-form of' imperialism - 
that is to say, of expansion which brings material benefits and 
extends the influence of culture'. 
88 
With theýaccession of the 
the Asian Dominions, the Commonwealth had to adjust to acco date 
national republics and concentrate on strengthening its unity. 
The English language and the cultural traditions of the departing 
imperial power were symbols of that unity. 
6ritain's 
policy 
of eventual self-government for the colonies was 
coupled to the hope that they may oftheiýr own 
volition remain within the British Commonwealth 
of Nations. It is to this end that the British 
Council may be able to do some of its most valuable 
work in promoting an appreciation of the cultural 
values of the British connection and of a mutual 
understanding. " 
The projection of Britain and the development of cultural 
relations within the Empire could not be left to chance. The' 
Council regarded both the United States and the Soviet Union as 
threats to British cultural influence in the Empire. Deterioratinj 
relations between the West and the Soviet Union in Europe called 
for a re-examiniation and reinforcement of the unity of the 
Commonwealth and Empire to give Britain some independence of 
action and to combat the lure of communism. As Jeffries explained, 
It is obvious enough that it is vital for us, 
and not only for us but for Western civilisation, 
and, I believe, for the best interests of the 
"backward peoples" themselves, that they should 
90 be with us and not with those who are against us. 
87. C. Jeffries to W. Strang, 17 June 1950 F0924/843 CRL 160/40 
88. T. S. Eliot, Notes on a Definition of Cultura, (London 1963)p. 92 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
FIRM FRIENDS, DANGEROUS ENEMIES, WAVERING ALLIES. I 
To f in I ance the expansion of the Council's work in Europe and 
the Commonwealth and Empire, savings had to be found in the areas 
of high expenditure during the war - the Middle East' and Latin 
America. In addition, the Council received unwelcome economies 
from its faijure to become permanently established in the Soviet 
Union, the United States and China., The Uni'ted States and the 
Soviet Union emerged from the war as the predominant powers on 
the world stage and it was vital that Britain's case should be 
presented well in both. The Council looked forward to expanding 
its work in both: 
There is no doubt that if the political connection 
between Britain and 1ýhe Soviet Union is to endure, 
it must be supported by greater under7standing between 
the two peoples. Substantially, there is no other 
method of approach to the Soviet people than through 
cultural relations and the high esteem in which 
scientific, technical and scholarly achievement is 
held by the Russian governing classes makes the 
Council quite obviously the appropriate channel of 
communication. 
In normal times the development of social cultural 
relations is the best if not the only means of 
stimulating close understanding between the people 
of Great Britain and the United States. 2 
However, for many reasons, some of which were apparent during the 
war, the two super-powers slipped almost entirely from the 
Council's field. 
In the Soviet Union increasing tension in Europe was-reflected 
in the decline of the Council's work. The Council continued to 
work closely with the Moscow Embassy's Press-Department but 
accorfdation problems and official restrictions prevented the 
establishment of a large staff. A drive against-western tendencies 
in culture and art in 1946 and the difficulties of finding 
visitors acceptable to the Soviet authorities reduced considerably 
the Council's scope and at the end of the year it was forced to 
abandon all its activities in the Soviet Union. The suppression 
of the Council at the centre of the Soviet empire foreshadowed 
its expulsion from the satellites and the continuing worsening 
of relations at the diplomatic level. Britain's ambassador 
1. Title taKen from the Drogheda Report, Cmd. 9138 1954 para. 7 
2. Memorandum on Future Development, March 1944 BW 2/101 
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noted that 
Nowhere was the change that came over the Soviet 
scsne after the breakdown of the Foreign Ministers 
Conference in 1947 more apparent than in the 
attitude of VOKS. 3 
Through the Home Division the Council had 'established contacts 
with American servicemen based in Britain during the war. Nancy 
Parkinson, head of the Home Division, pressed for an early review 
of the ban on the Council's representation in'the United States 
to preserve' these links. In New York the Council's various 
affairs were transferred to the appropriate division of the British 
Information Services and consisted mainly of the exchange of 
information with the Cultural Division of the Department of State, 
purchases from the United States, the distribution of Council 
material and travel arrangements for Council students, and guests 
journeying to and from Latin America. The British Information 
Services passed to Foreign Office control and preserved their 
monopoly on publicity in the United States. The Foreign Office 
argued that a distaste for foreign propaganda organisations 
persisted in the United States and that ties an cultural, linguistic 
and educational levels were already strong and needed no encourage- 
ment. Parkinson described the latter argument as 'so pathetic as 
to make one despair' for it implied a level of understanding 
between the two nations that did not exist. 
4 Richard Casey, when 
Minister of State in the Middle East,. had written to Churchill on 
the subject of Anglo-American relations. As a former Australian 
Minister in the United States, Casey was well placed to offer an 
objective view. Many Americans, he argued, believed the British 
to be 'old-fashioned, class conscious, supercilious, patronising 
and imperialistic'. Casey continued 
I do not believe in the sentimental approach, 
common blood, culture, language, "only the Atlantic 
divides us", etc. The British and the Americans 
are different people and we do not naturally 
understand one another ..... partnership has got to 
- be worked for; it will not happen by itself. 5 
"A more compelling argument against the Council operating 
directly in. the United States was that of finance. The Council 
had no budgetary provision for the United States in its post-war 
3. Peterson, op. cit. p. 283 
4. Minute by Nancy ParKinson, 15 October 1945. BW 63/7 
5. Casey, OP-cit. p. 153 
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estimates that weie already squeezed by cuts and the demands of 
Europe and the Commonwealth and Empire. The Foreign Office 
argued that the development of organised cultural relations with 
the United States would require vast dollar expenditure that the 
Treasury would never sanction. The Council believed that this 
need not be the case if its role was restricted to coordinating 
and encouraging existing organisations. The Foreign Office's 
view, however, prevailed. The Council did not operate directly 
in the United States, although the distribution of material, 
preparation df art exhibitions and arrangements for theatrical 
and musical touring companies were undertaKen, where the United 
States met most of the cost. 
6 
Japan's surrender in August 1945 did not bring peace to China 
and before the end of the year the Kuomintang and the Communists 
had clashed in Manchuria. Britain maintained a policy of 
neutrality in line with the Moscow declaration of 1945. The 
Nationalist Government was recognised but proý)ided with little aid 
there were few official contacts with the Communists. General 
Marshall's attempts to reconcile the two sides in 1946 failed and 
by the beginning of 1947 general civil war had broken out, 
exacerbated by a grave financial and economic crisis. The Council's 
work, however, continued unhampered except in so far as inflation 
and material shortages affected the planning of activities and the 
working conditions of staff. On the conclusion of hostilities 
in the Far East, the Chinese Government and the evacuated univer- 
sities returned to eastern China, followed by the Council, which 
transferred its headquarters-to Nangking, keeping the Chungking 
office as a regional centre. An office was opened in Shanghai in 
March 1946 and grants were given to the Henry Lister Institute and 
Schools and the Sino-British Cultural Association in Kunming, 
Chungking, Shanghai and Nangking. The Council also assisted the 
re-stocking of Chinese universities. 
Under Professor Roxby's guidance the balance was restored 
between cultural and the humanities and science and technology 
aspects of the Council's worK in China. Much of Needham's worK 
had \ 'been outside the Council's field and, although the Council 
continued to be associated with the Scientific Cooperation Office, 
with Needham's departure in 1946 its involvement decreased. 
Needham's successor jointly represented the Council and the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and worKed 
6. Two officers were appointed to the Washington Embassy in 1972/3 
to dool with educational and cultural liaison. 
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independently of the Council's Representative in China. Roxby 
planned regional centres at Peking in the north, Nangking and 
Shanghai in the east, Hankow and Wuchang in central China, Canton 
or Hong Kong in the south-east and Kunming in the west. The 
Foreign Office vetoed the use of Hong Kong as a regional centre 
on political grounds. 
7 The major features of the Council's work 
in China were the granting of scholarships and fellowships for 
study in Britain, invitations to distinguished Chinese to visit 
Britain, Eng; ish-teaching in Chinese colleges and universities 
and the maintenance of libraries and reading 'rooms. No institutes 
were established in deferrence to Chinese senýitivity concerning 
foreign organisations but a large amount of material was 
distributed through the Council's offices, which also served as 
cultural centres holding film shows, musical recitals and public 
lecture s. Roxby commented on the Council's future in China that 
There is a general recognition that the British- 
trained returned students are, as a whole, reliable 
and anxious to give disinterested serviceý and are 
one of the most valuable elements in'-this country. 
At present they are small in number but many of 
them occupy important and responsible positions and 
nearly all..... retain warm feelings of friendship 
and regard for Great Britain. 8 
. 
Before his departure Needham entered a strong plea for the 
continuation of scientific work in China, arguing that scientific 
and techhical aid rather than Shakespeare was what the country 
urgently required and that the provision of such, information 
offered Britain the means to compete with American plans for the 
rapid industrialisation of China. Ne, edham maintained that 
If our efforts1have been welcomed unbelievably 
warmly it has been because it has been clearýthat 
we stood for the England of Newton and Darwin, of 
Rutherford andiFleming, and no t for 
9 
the classical 
learýning of the squirearchy... ý.. 
Roxby died 
' 
suddenly in February 1947 and was replaced by Linda 
Grier. In 1947 a regional office was opened at Peking and a centrE 
and library at Nanking. The work of the Shanghai office was 
. expanded and Grier visited six other cities to encourage the 
es"blishment of branches of the Sino-British Cultural Association. 
7.. Minute by H. Prideaux-B'rune, 10 December 1945, FO 924/176 
11 LC5832/40/452 
8. Memorandum by Roxby, 20 September 194S. BW 23/6 
9. Supplementary Recommendations by Needham, 7 November 1945. 
BW 23/6 
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C 
The Scientific Office was reorganised and moved to Shanghai where 
its normal activities were continued. In 1947 twenty post- 
graduateýand five fellowships were awarded and by 1948 the Council 
was subsidising eight posts at Chinese universities. The 
Representative and the regional directors undertook substantial 
tours-of China establishing contacts with educational institutions 
and finding new outlets for the Council's material. - 
In September and October 1947 the Nationalist armies were 
defeated in Manchuria and northern China. In November the, 
Council's staff were advised by the Embassy to leave Peking and 
work in Communist-controlled areas was abandoýed in order to 
preserve relations with the Nationalist Government. The Foreign 
office took a more pessimistic view than the Council of its 
prospects in China in the event of a Communistý victory. The Council 
had provided material to Communist areas and tHere is s record of 
a consignment of books for the Communist leaders being sent to 
1 10 
Chou-en-Lails secretary on a personal basis i, n No. vember 1946. 
In the meantime, the Council followed a holding policy until the 
outcome of the civil war had been decided. In November and 
January 1949 the Communist scored decisive victories and Tientsin 
and Peking were occupied in January, Nanking in April, Shanghai 
in'May and Canton in October. A member of the Council's staff 
recorded the events that followed the downfall of the Kuomintang 
in Nanking. The Council's centre was closed over the weekend of 
21/22 April as a precautionary measure but the staff went to the 
office on the Sunday morning. 
The Communist troops were coming in, order was 
restored in the city and there were no incidents 
Nobody came to see us and we were not interfered 
with in any way. We opened. our centre on the 
Monday..... we have carried on in just the same 
way and no one has said anything about us at all. 
The Chinese People's Republic was formally proclaimed in Peking 
on I October 1949. In January 1950 Britain recognised the new 
Communist Government in China and the Council's headquarters moved 
to Peking. The Council's activities continued in an anonymous 
lim. bo of non-recognition and attracted both communist and non- 
communist participants. The official British and American 
10. Despatch note in FO 924/423 LC4581/69/452 
11. A. C. Scott, 'Work for the British Council at Nanking in 19491, 
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 38,1950, p. 137. 
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information services were closed by the new regime. The Council, 
however, resumed contacts with colleges and universities, 
including those that were now wholly communist institutions. Its 
centres, especially at Shanghai, were well attended and, at Nanking 
the centre 
I 
was busier than befor e the Communist take-over, with 
monthly attendances totalling twelve thousand. Although the 
Communist authorities were not actively hostile towards the 
Council, their attitude became, increasingly negative., The Council's 
unrecognised-, status meant that shows and lectures could no longer 
be held in public buildings and articles could not be placed in 
the Press in the Council's name. Movement oý, staff within China 
was restricted, entry visas for new staff were not provided and 
it became difficult to import material. By 1951 the Council had 
been forced to close all three centres and to suspend the bringing 
of Chinese scholars and visitors to Britain an8 the despatch Of 
le cturers to China. Its unofficial status had enabled it to 
remain after the Communist victory but it could n. ot continue 
without official cooperation. Nevertheless, ` it remained optimis- 
tic that it would eventually return to the fruitful field it had 
discovered in China. - 
The popularity of the Council's Centres in China 
to the last is a measure of the eagerness of the 
Chinese for cultural relations with Britain. This 
gives hope that the present withdrawal of the 
Council's activities if temporary and that cultural 
contact between the two countries, whose peoples 
have so much to give and to gain, will be resumed 
at some not very distant time. 12 
With the return of peace Britain was confronted in the Middle 
Ea 
: 
st with a wide range of problems that had lain in abeyance 
during the war. Above all, the question of. Palestine dominated 
and complicated Britain's relations with the Arab states. There 
was also the renegotiation of Britain's treaty rights'in Egypt ý 
and Iraq, the dangers posed by Soviet pressure in Iran and Turkey, 
the safeguarding of commercial interests in the Arabian peninsula 
and the growth of an Arab nationalism hostile. to Britain and her 
imRerial history. Britain had neither the military or the 
eco nomic means or the political will to retain her pre-war posAtion 
in the area and sought to use instead new weapons to fight a 
rearguard action in defence of essential interests. By encouraging 
12. British Council Annual Report, 1951/52, p. 24. The Council 
resumed work in China in 1973. 
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the political and economic development of the Middle Eastern 
countries and their cooperation in areas of mutual concern, Britain 
hoped to increase the security and stability of the area and 
thereby sa, feguard her own interests. 
I 
But Britain lacked the economic resources to 
give such aid herself and the time had long gone 
when she could force reforms on reactionary 
Governments against their will. We had to deal 
with those in possession, hoping by a process of 
influence and persuasion to make them more liberal 
withýi'n a framework of treaties which, would regularise 
Britain's relations with the Arab countries while 
ending the old and increasingly distaýteful system 
of British suzerainty. 13 
Education had a vital role to play in raising standards of living 
and political practice and there was considera ' 
ble scope for the 
improvement of facilities. The wartime activities of the British 
Council were expected to pay dividends in this field'. 
The prospect for Britain was not entirely bleak. British 
prestige stood high and there was a great demand for English 
teaching, for information about Britain and for technical and 
scientific assistance that Arab countries looked to Brita in to 
provide. However, severe financial difficulties, that placed 
Britain in the position of being a debtor country to Egypt, 
prevented. not only the maintenance of the diplomatic and military 
position but also, the exploitation of the interest in Britain 
that had been generated by the war. As the area of highest 
expenditure and most rapid growth for the Council during the war, 
the Middle East offered the greatest opportunities for cutbacks. 
After a cost-cutting tour of the area in the spring of 1946 Gillan 
reported informed British opinionito be asking, ý'ýý 
Britain has won the greatest war in history at 
the cost of thousands of millions of pounds of 
money and hundreds of thousands of lives. Her 
prestige stands higher than it has ever stood 
before. The whole world wants to learn English, 
and most of it looks to Britain for leadership 
culturally as well as morally and materially. 
And yet you come here just at this moment to 
throw your opportunities away for the sake of 
a few thousand pounds. Why ? 14 
The Council's Middle Eastern estimates -For 1946/7 were reduced by 
50% and this trend continued. 
13. F. Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, (London 1961) p. 176-7 
14. A-Gillan, Reýort on a tour in the Middle East, April 1946. 
Gillan Papers. 
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A conference-of the Middle Eastern Information Officers held 
in Cairo in September 1946, attended by senior British military 
and diplomatic representatives, concluded, that public opinion was 
turning ag ainst Britain and that Britain's difficulties were 
being exploited by Soviet and communist propaganda. Sir R. Campoell 
Britain's ambassador in Egypt, argued for a publicity machine 
geared 
to counter communist propaganda and at the same 
time 
, 
bring home to the Egyptian masses the 15 
character and virtues of the British system. 
The conference agreed that such measures wereýnecessary to show 
that Britain and the United States could bar a Soviet advance in 
the Middle East which would in turn persuade the ruling classes 
to undertake the social reforms advocated by Britain. Concerning 
the Council there was 'a general consensus of opinion that its 
16 
work is of great importance and should be developed'. The 
conference recommended that the Council's gra'nt should be increased 
and explained that 
The British Council enjoys one great advantage in 
the Middle East. Its representatives are outside 
the political arena and their relations with the 
natives do not suffer in the same way from current 
events. .... We can use the Council within the limits 
of their educational work, to promote knowledge and 
sympathy with our institutions. 17 
This appeal -fell on deaf ears at the Treasury, faced, as it was, 
with considerable economic problems at home. 
. 
The drastic reduction of the Middle East budget forced a 
radical revision of priorities. Under the influence of its new 
Education Director, Dr A. E. Morgan, the Council tried to eliminate 
as far as pdssible elementary English teaching. and subsidies to' 
British schools, mainstays of the Council's wartime activities 
in the Middle East, in favour of the training of foreign English 
teachers and adult education through the application of the 
discussion group techniques developed by th Army Bureau of Current 
Affairs during the war. Morgan argued that it was not the 
council's responsibility to alleviate the deficiencies of the Arab 
edu cation or to provide a British education for all British 
subjects abroad. Support for primary schools should be withdrawn 
15. Minute by I. Kirkpatrick, 30 September 1946. FO 924/516 
16. Ibid. 
LC5189/914/452 
17. Ibid. 
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and retained only for good secondary schools, such as Victoria 
College. The institutes should abandon elementary English 
teaching and coaching for university courses and become instead 
C 
centres of 
; 
adult and pedagogic instruction. 
In 1947 the Council withdrew completely from the direct 
administration of British'schools in Egypt and its responsibilities 
were transferred to a Schools Governing Bodies Committee, founded 
in November and including representatives of the Embassy and the 
Council. The 1948/9 annual report contained, a strong plea for 
the maintenance of schools run on British lines in the Middle East. 
There can be no doubt of the value to the political 
stability of these countries of the British type of 
education, which recognises the importance of the 
development of character and a sense of social 
responsibility. Indeed it has been argued with 
reference to certain countries that educational 
development is a prerequisite for the sound 
development and stability of their po, litical and 
economic life. 18 
Morgan's views challenged the foundations of the Council's worK 
in the Middle East as they had been built by Lloyd. They were 
briefly adopted but strong opposition from diplomatic and Council 
personnel overseas forced the Council to revert to established 
methods. 
A meeting at the Foreign Office in July 1949 urged the Council 
to revise its educational policy in the Middle East in order to 
combat the lure of communism. The failure of the Middle Eastern 
governments to reform their political systems and to raise 
standards of living was attributed to the lack of an educated, 
liberal elite. 
Our fundamental difficulty is that, while we are 
determined that these independent countries shall 
themselves be responsible for putting their own 
houses in order, none possess the leaders to do 
it. An educated nucleus, capable of honest leader- 
ship and genuinely anxious to raise the moral, 
intellectual and material standards is needed, or 
all reforms will break down under corruption ý 19 inertia and the desire to avoid responsibili y. 
Britain, the meeting agreed, was admirably placed to meet the 
educational needs of the Middle East but the real issue was 
whether the Government was prepared to provide enough money for 
18. British Council Annual Report, 1948/9, p. 90 
19. Minutes of a meeting on Education in the Middle East, 
F0924/771 LC2315/71/452 
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this and 'whether indeed we should not rpgard education as our 
primary mission in the Middle East'. 
20 The question was undecided. 
In Egypt, negotiations for the revision of the 1936 Treaty 
aroused co, nsiderable hostility towards Britain. The issues of 
the evacuation of British troops, the future status of the Sudan 
and provisions for, defenc 
, 
e, provoked much bitterness, which was 
reflected in attendance at the Council's institutes, particularly 
in the provinces. In the spring of 1946 the Council's work came 
briefly to a"'standstill and in 1947 a bomb wa's planted at the 
Alexandria Institute and disturbances occurred at Zagazig. In 
January 1947 membership of the Anglo-Egyptian Union stood at over 
one thousand, approximately two-thirds Egyptian, but continuihg 
political differences resulted in its closure at the end of the 
year. 
More important, however, was the fact that most of the 
Council's activities continued unhindered. During the rioting 
of February 1946 the Council's institutes were the only British- 
occupied buildings that did not need military guards and students 
sometimes formed escorts to take British members of 9taff home on 
troubled nights. In Cairo and Alexandria the Institutes 
maintained a fairly constant number of students from 1946-1950, 
approximately one thousand at the former and six hundred at the 
latter. Due to the financial cuts, the three Delta Institutes 
had to abandon English teaching and become purely cultural centres. 
They were run on a skeleton basis by local staff supervised from 
Cairo. The Institute at Minia was closed. Efforts to limit the 
Council's commitments to British schools in Egypt and within the 
Egyptian education system met with strong resistance from the 
Embassy. In July 1945 Killearn argued that this work was 'the 
most solid element in our position here'. Killearn explained that 
the days of which I might call..... the "gunboat 
diplomacy" are past. And we now have to rely on 
other means - and indeed better means to maintain 
our position in Egypt. Education stands in this 
in the first rank. It costs us comparatively 21 little; the returns are incalculably great. 
Cuts in the Council's budget in 1946/7 the Embassy warned were 
all too likelycto be interpreted locally both by 
Egyptians and Britons, as a sign that we are 
abandoning our traditional position here. 22 
20. Ibid * 
21. Killearn to Eden, 13 July 194S. FO924/169 LC3063/31/45 
22. J. Bowker to Bevin, 20 February 1946. FO924/244 Lr-73-1/47. /ACA 
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There was some restoration of Ithe budget in the following iI 
year, mainly to 
i 
provide new premises for Victoria College in 
Cairo, to increasc subsidies to schools-and to extend facilities 
at the Delta Institutes. But the'downward trend continuedin 
1949 and 1950;, withjncreasing emphasis being placed on the 
improvement ofieducational facilities, in Egypt at the expense of 
the Council's cultural and socialliactivities. In July 1949 the 
tapering off of subsidies to British', schools was I halted, a decision 
that was stronglyýsUpported by Campbeill in a despatch to the 
Foreign Office inýJa 
I 
nuary 1950. If necessary' Campbell argued, 
funds should be diverted from information work for education. 
The evidence of, the need is all around us in 
the lamentable absence of leadership and moral 
responsibility which maKes us despair of advancement 
in the Middle East and which increases-ýthe sense of 
frustration and creates only communismi-s opportunity. 
! If 1t; is wise economy to spend where the yield 
will be greatest, is it too much to say that the 
expenditure which may reasonably be elxpected to 
contribute most effectively to raising the moral, 
intellectual and material standards of the Middle East 
and to saving it from falling under communist domination 
will be those spent on schools. 23 
In 1950 the Institute at Mehalla was closed and most functional 
activities reduced. 
The future status of the Sudan was one of the issues at stake 
in the renegotiation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 
question on which talks broke down in 1947. Attlee was not 
prepared 'to hand them over to the ruling classes in Egypt' 
24 
After 
a visit in 1946 Gillan reported that 
Ever since the 1936 Treaty, Egypt had been blatantly 
propagandising her wares - political, material and 
cult'ural - in the Sudan while Britain, . preoccupied 
by war, had let many opportunities slide. 25 
0 
Despite the delicacy of the negotiations with Egypt the Council 
was encouraged to develop its work in the Sudan. A Representative 
arrived in 1947 and a centre was opened at Omdurman in January 1948 
run by a committee of twelve Sudanese advised by the Council's 
Re resentative. It received over three hundred applications for 
membership but was only able to take half of them. In addition, 
the Council worked through, and subsidised, the Khartoum Cultural 
23. R Campbell to C-Warner, 28 January 1950, FO 924/790 CRL 22/8 
24. F. Williams, op. cit. p. 177 
25. A. Gillan., Report on a tour of the Middle East, April 1946. 
Gillan Papers. 
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Centre and the Unity High School It aimed to Provide staff for 
schools and colleges in a deliberate move to compete with Egyptian 
influence. Unfortuately, this effort was wasted when the Foreign 
office decided in 1950 that the Council would have to withdraw 
from the Sýudan in order to maintain its activities in Ethiopia. 
26 
Ethiopia suffered most severely in the post-war cuts, having Y. 
its budget for 1946/7 reduced by two -thirds to Z15,000. This 
meant that major projects had to be abandoned de spite the 
Emperor's pe-rsonal involvement inisome of them; ; Haile Selassie 
27 
'was not amused'. In 1946 the institute at Deýsie and a community 
centres project,. started by the Emperor, wereýa6andoned and in 
1947 the Harar Institute disappeared", leaving only one at Addis 
Ababa. Ethiopia was eager for British help iný'the development 
of education and was willing to share expenditure equallyj many 
of the Council's staff received half their salaries from the 
Ethiopian Government. However, limited resources and the low 
I 
priority given by the Foreign Office to Ethi, opiai forced the 
Council to reduce its work there. In 1946 it was 
pointed out that the Foreign Office have a low 
priotity interest in this country and it was 
considered whether the Council's activities 
should be dropped entirely. 28 
The Council opposed this course but the Foreign Office's view 
prevailed in the long run and the Council's organisation in 
Ehtippia was run down gradually. The Council's work in Eritrea 
was allowed to lapse completely after the war. 
29 
Turkey, too, suffered heavily, beginning with a thirty per 
cent reduction in 1946/7, and the main lines of work established 
during the war were continued. Soviet pressure for bases and 
a'revision of the Montreaux Convention, underlined Turkey's 
strategic significance. Britain was unable to help Turkey 
resist Soviet demands leading to the announcement of substantial 
American'aid for Turkey in March 1947. Through the Council, 
however, she could preserve some of her traditional influence and 
interests. Britain's ambassador justified his demands. that the 
Cc)\pncil's grant should not be reduced thus: 
The fostering of close political relations between 
the United Kingdom and TurKey during the years ahead 
rnust be a paramount feature of British foreign policy. 
26. A centre was reopened at Omdurman in 1958 
27. A. Gillan, Report an a tour of the Middle East, April 1946 
28. Ibid. 
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298 
Such relations are best founded on a frieIndship 
based3on mutual understandin&`,, and I regard the 
work of theiBrit. ish Council a, s, really important 
contribution: 'to this understanding..... we can 
afford, t'o neglect no meansýof, fostering our own 
ideology' inýthis I country which lies on the 
30 boUndaryý betweenlithe two camps. 
f Apart rOm e, lementary English: tea'ching in the Halkele-vis, the 
Council concentrated on encouraging the trainingý: of Turkish 
English teachers andicontinued'tollsup1part the Boys and Girls High 
Schools in Výfainbblýl Weekly English`ýbroadcasts were compiled 
for Ankara Radio and the translation of Engli h books continued. 
A Turkish StatleýBallet School withitwo British instructors in 
charge was'foonded in 1947 after a visit by Ninette de Valais 
sponsored by the Council. In 1948 the Council organised a very 
popular festiv al of Anglo -Turkish Music in Ankara that was 
attended by President Ionu. A member of the Council's staff was 
appointed Adviser in English Teaching to the Director of Training 
of the Turkish General Staff and the Council"s pupils included 
General Orbay, Chief of the General Staff, who wanted all Turkish 
officers to learn English. Britain also replaced her rivals in 
the field of technical education through the activities of the 
Council. Two! Technical Advisors were provided to organise the 
development of Ankara Polytechnic, the Council nominated the 
Professor of Aeronautics to the Technical University at Istanbul 
and the WorksýManager of the Ankara Industrial School. British 
teachers and material were sent to Turkish technical institutions) 
Turkey agreed to recognise English science degrees and over forty 
technical students were brought to Britain. The Council's Ankara 
. office 
had a special Engineering Adviser. In February 1947 the 
British Consul-General at Izmir reported on the pervasive 
influence olf the Council in Turkey. 
In my endeavours to foster good relations with 
the Turks I have been made aware of the strong 
influence that has been subtly exerted here by 
the British Council under Mr Postlethwaite, 
whom I without hesitation acknowledge as the mqTt 
valued collaborator I have had at any post .... 
\1 
Attempts to renegotiate the 1930 Treaty with Iraq failed, but 
fear of Soviet designs in eastern Turkey and northern Iran broughl 
Iraq to the side of the West. However, the issue of Palestine 
hindered efforts to improve relations between Iraq and Britain. 
30. O. Kelly to Bevin, 6 September 1946. FO924/247 LC4250/17/451 
31. D. V. Cusden to D. L. BusK, 5 February 1947. BW 61/3 
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The Council's activities were concentrated onýthe four institutes 
at Baghdad, -Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk. An Education. Officer was 
appointed to the Baghdad Office in 1948 to liaise with the 
Ministry of Education and supervise the teaching of English in 
Iraqi scho , ols. The Council's activities were extended to military 
and technical colleges and a fortnightly film programme was shown 
to King Feisal at the Palace. In 1948-the Kirkuk centre had to 
be abandoned because of financial shortages and1the outbreak of 
war in Palestine in that year, in which Iraqi troops were involved, 
curtailed the Council's work. 
British propaganda in Iran had the dual tdsk of combating 
strong Soviet influence in the north, which served as a centre: for 
the dissemination of communist propaganda, and deep nationalistic 
resentment of Britain's commercial position. Iin the spring ofý 
1946, after a. visit to Iran, Morgan described Britain's unpopular- 
ity as stemming from a view that saw Britain 'as the buttressýof 
i 32 the hated oligarchy and, Russia as the light of r'i; sing freedoml, '. 
The Information; Department at the Tehran Embassy was strengthened 
and strong pleas were entered for the rapid extension of the 
Council's work. 
The British Council in. Persia must therefore be 
regarded as in the, 'frontline and it should not 
be stinted. 33 
However, pla: ns for the foundation, of threeýnew institutes. had to 
be abandoned due to financial stringency, although the Ambassador 
pressed vig orously for one at Mershedin the Soviet zone where 
only small-scale activities were undertaken. In'ýOctober 1945 
Bullard had argued that it would 
be : ýa. serious error to include the British'Councilýý 
in the campaign of "axing" ..... The Council here is 
popular and influential both with the public. and the' 
Per'sian Government, ýand, I amIthankful to; say, has 
avoided being suspected of political activities, at 
any, rate, by the Persians. 34 
The thr: ee existing institutes'at Tehran, Isfahan, 'and Shiraz 
had an average monthly attendance in 1947 of nine hundred twoý, 
hun, dred andý two hundred and fiftyýrespectively. They conceni'a'ted 
on courses for, 1ranian teachers and advanced classes. In. 1948 
they were reorganised and transformed intolgroups'of centres in! 
32. Finance, and Agenda Committee Minutes, 14 May 1946. BW 69/12 
33. J. le Ro, utegel to C. Warner, 17 September 1946. Fp 
L4449/17/451 J 
34. R. Bullaýrd to Bevin, 24 October 1945. BW49/3 
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each city with reduced staff to allow expansion elsewhere. New 
i li 1: 11 
centres were opened in the communist stronghold of Tabriz and at 
Resht and Meshed in the. former Soviet zone. The Embassy at 
Tehran attached: ', great importancel to the foundation of these 
I. iIi3 
ceýtres in'the north 'as a means of offsetting Soviet propaganda'. 
In Iran asia whole in May 1949, there was a Tass representative in 
Tehran, a 
ýoviet7Iranian 
cultural society and regular Soviet 
broadcasts. ý Economies in 1950 forced the closure of the Resht 
and Shiraz centres. 
As a result of the Franco-Syrian crisis in May and June 1945, 
all French schools and educational activitiesýin Syria were 
suspended. French culture had not penetrated as deeply in Syria 
as in the Lebanon and four years of British military occupation 
had made English a popular foreign language. jhe Syrian Minister 
of Education in 194S was a graduate of the American University in 
Beirut and sought British and American help in replacing French 
dominance of the Syrian education system. The Council was advised 
to advance cautiously by the Foreign Office in view of French 
susceptibilities, Syria's low priority and the high cost of living 
in the Levant. Even he modest activities the Council had 
embarked upon during the war, evoked a warning from Britain's 
ambassador in Paris. 
So long as these activities continue I trust I 
shall not be instructed to continue to assure 
the French Government that we have no intention 
oT taKing over the position hitherto occupied 
by the French in the Levant. 36 
The Legation in Beirut advocated a more -Forward policy arguing that 
the encouragement of the teaching of English by 
qual, ified and reliable staff must clearly be of 
benefit to British interests, not only from the 
point of view of our political influence in Syria 
and therefore the Middle East generally, but, what 
is perhaps more important, as a factor in the 
development of trade between the British Empire 
and the Levant States. 37 
The Foreign Office was more cautious, but 
at the same time, if we let the Americans set the 
pace, for the moment, we should be able to meet 
French objections; so th at we need not be over- 
modest. 38 
35. J. le Routegel to C. Warner, 28 September 1948 F0924/624 
LC3795/34/451 
36. D. Cooper to Bevin, 25 July 1945 F0924/172 LC3 132/32/452 
37. T. Shone to Bevin, 31 July 1945 BW 59/1 
38. W. H. Montagu-Pol. lnck to E. 1-108say, 20 00COMber 1945 BW 59/1 
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The Council mcýintained offices at Beirut and Damascus, a 
hos. tel at Beirut linked to the American University, and organised 
English classes for teachers and pr, ofessional groups. Separate 
representation was established at Damascus in 1947 to avoid 
offending Syrian sensibilities. A new centre was opened at 
Aleppo in 1948 after grave warnings from the British Minister on 
the infiltration of Soviet influence in northern Syria. 
-There is no doubt that Communist activities are 
growing rapidly and a Council centre should be 
able-to influence an important section of the 
community which is particularly susceptible to 
Communist propý, ganda. 
39 
In both Syria and the Lebanon the Council worýed closely with 
local educational bodies providing educational advice and supplies 
and distributing a wide range of material. 
Transjordan. became independent in 1946 and ýthe Council's work 
was expanded on the grounds that Britain needed 'all the help we 
can get to retain Arab good will'. 
40 
It coopera, ýed with the King 
Hussein Club in Amman and distributed films and periodicals to 
government departments, schools and other institutions. The 
level of expenditure was comparatively modest because of Jordan's 
low priority in relation to other Middle East countries. 
There was little change in the Council's work in Saudi Arabia 
-from year to year. A small budget was spent mainly on students 
selected by the Saudi Government. The British Minister 
explained that 
British Council activities like all other 
foreign manifestations have to be most gently 
and tactfully developed in this country. We 41 
can only take such opportunities as seem to offer. 
The Persian Gulf similarly received a low priority and the Council' 
work did not develop there at all. I 
The constitutional changes in India after the war greatly 
enhanced Afghanistan's significance in the eyes of the F. oreign 
Office. In 1946 the Council was advised 'that the Secretary of 
State now attaches great importance to this country' 
42 
and that 
eve . ry effort should be made to improve cultural 
, 
ties. However, 
the Council's options were limited; financial problems, the 
cautious attitude of the Afghan aut horities and the difficulty 
39. T. Shone to Bevin, 16 August 1946 F0924/246 LC4007/17/651 
40. Minute by DiN.. Greenhill, 7 November IM46 F0924/554 LC5072/3/45 
41. P. Gafferty-Smith to Bevin, 10 August 1946 F0924Z24 LC3763/17/4E 
42. Minutes of a meeting at the Poreign Office, 21 October 1946 
BW 117 
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of finding staffýwilling to serve in Kabul, hindered the start 
of Council work. A third post at Ghazi College was filled 
eventually but the Council was unableýto rival the influx of 
American teachers. In October 1947 a' member of the Council's 
staff in Ir 
t an visited Kabul and concluded that the foundation of 
a British Council office or institute 
can not be entertained yet in this country 
where the narrowest Muslim ideas are all too 
prevalent, and suspicion, even mistrust, of 
the B-ritish is not yet dead. 43 
In the absence of guidance from the Foreign Office until 
the end of the decade and under pressure from the Treasury to 
find savings, the Council tried social and cultural work at the 
expense of more costly educational provision in the Middle East. 
By 1950 it had reverted to itt earlier practice's in an effort to 
influence the Arab world in a pro-British direction through 
education rather than information work that suffered from the 
lack of an appealing text. 
We no longer had any message which coul d conceivably 
appeal to an Arab. With our involvement ih the 
Israel/Arab dispute and our need to protect the Suez 
Ca'nal and the oil fields, our interests came slap up 
against those of the Arab nationalists, and no amount 
of propaganda about our good intentions or our fine 
record of colonial emancipation in ýýher parts of the 
world, could do the slightest good. 
Latin America was a prime target for retrenchment after the 
war. Although the economic and commercial rationale for publicity 
work remain'ed, the Council's staff was advised in March 1946 that 
The period of rapid expansion has now, however, 
come to a close, and though, o-fi course, we hope 
that'our scope and influence may steadily grow, 
our task during the next few years will be mainly 
one of consolidation. 45 
Even this forecast proved optimistic. The retirement of 
Millington-Drake in April 1946 signalled the end of an era of 
expansion in Latin America and withdrawals and closures would 
become the common feature of the future. The Foreign Office 
deplored these measures an political grounds, fearing that the 
United States would exploit Britain's absence and that it would 
induce alarm and despondency among Britain's friends- 
43. Report by O. Blomfield, 1 October 1947 F0924/699 LC145/47/452 
44. R. H. K. Marett, Through the Back Door, (London 1968)P-94 
45. British Council circular, March 1946, BW 15/1 
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It is our general policy to avoid action which 
might look like a loss of interest in any Latin 
American country (they are all members of UNO), 
and S. A. Dept. (sic) can not be assumed to be agreeing 
to withdrawal from anywhere the Council is now 
ope rating. 
46 
However, the Foreign Office assigned a low overall priority 
to the Latin American Republics, with the exception of Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico. Next in importance came Chile, Peru, Venezuela 
47 
and Colombia, followed by Uruguay and Cuba. 
The Council's work 
was reduced a7nd expanded along these lines. A new office was 
opened in Lima in 1946 and two new ce, ntres wer'e 
founded in 
Uruguay. The post of Representative in CentAl America was 
abolished leaving the development of cultural relations in the 
hands of the newly created British Ministries in Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador. No direct activities were 
undertaken in Cuba, Costa Rica, Haiti, 
Santo Domingo or Panama. 
In 1947 the Council was forced to withdraw from Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Paraguay and reduce its work elsewhere. 
In Colombia, two of 
the four institutes were closed 
48 
and in 1948 
1 'the Council's 
offices were merged with those of the cultural associations 
in 
Colombia and Peru to save money. The Council considered with- 
drawing from Venezuela in 1949, but a donation of E3,000 from the 
Shell Company Limited enabled it to support a British- Venezuelan 
Institute at Caracas. 
In Argentina, the Council supported institutes in Buenos Aires 
and thirteen provincial centres; of the latter, seven became 
financially independent of the Council by 1949 and four new onels 
we re founded. In addition, extra-mural classes were organised 
at a further eight centres. An Argentine- British Medical centre 
was opened i'n Buenos Aires and a British medical library was 
signed with Brazil in 1948 started. A cultural convention was 
49 
which it was hoped would atone for British shortcomings in other 
areas. 
. 
It will be a matter of considerable difficulty to 
satisfy Brazilian eagerness for increased commercial 
relations with the United Kingdom after the war, and 
there is on this account eveything to be said for 
making progress in the field of cultural relations. 50 
46. Minute by J. V. Perowne, 17 August 1946 F0924/493 LC3821/497/452 
47. W. H. Montagu-PollacK to White, 16 June 1945 BW 15/1 
48. The two institutes that were closed were at Cali and Barranqui 
leaving one at Bogota and one at Medellin. 
49. Cmd. 7606 1949 
50. Minute by E. L. N. Sturt, 14 March 1945 F0924/178 
LC494/58/452 
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In Chile, the Coincil concentrated on two institutes at Santiago 
and Valparaiso and an the subsidy o-F British schools. A thriving 
institute was supported in Mexico City which had over -Fi-Fteen 
hundred students and branches in nine other cities. 
The Council Annual Report for 1948/9 contained a special plea 
for its work in Latin America and underlined the historical and 
commercial significance of the Republics to Britain and their 
desire for greater knowledge about Britain. 
The. political and economic importance of Latin 
America i. s great and growing. It mayl,, well be 
vital to British prosperity ..... The reductions 
made have hampered worK and naturally\reduced 
effectiveness, Further reductions would be 
disastrous, for they could only be made by 
coming away from more countries. 
51 
In January 1951, in a letter tb the Ministry of Defence, the 
Information Policy Department of the Foreign Dffice stated, in 
relation to Latin America that 
Even in Latin America, which may look reýote and safe, 
the Council's work it of value to defence. Latin 
America suffers from poverty and chronic bad government, 
and Communism is always round the corner. By educating 
the leaders of tomorrow in British institutions. and 
standards of good government, the Council will make 
a'real contribution to political stability in this 
rich source of strategic raw materials. 
52 
However, Latin America was not as vital to Britain in the 
Cold War as Europe or the Commonwealth and Empir e. Moreover, 
the interest and influence of the United States in South America, 
could be relied upon to combat the appearance ofihostile regimes. 
The Council concentrated on the southern Republi , cs, abandoning 
central America, with the exception of Mexico, and the Caribbean 
islands to the dominant American interest. Its organisation 
increasingly became integrated with the Anglophile societies, 
as this was the most cost-effective method of operation, although 
the Council did have to surrender some independence of action. 
The post-war years were disheartening times for the Council. 
-The da ys of expansion were over and in the search for economies 
mu&h was sacrificed that could not be replaced easily. These 
contractions affected those countries that had been formerly 
51. British Council Annual Report 1948/9 p. 105 
52. A. C. Malcolm to A, MODrehead, 5 January 1951 F0924/782 CRA 20/E 
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the Council's major areas of oper I 6tion- the Middle East and Latin 
America. They''ý ýref lect, ed a shift in British di plomacy towa. rds 
the alliance with western Europe and the presorvation of the unity J: ý 
of the Commonwealth and Empire. Britain's influence in the 
Middle East and Latin America was replaced increasingly by that 
of the United States and the Counci ,1 
lost a significant field 
by its failure to establi , sh itself in the United States. The 
intensification of the global ideolog&cal conflict led to its 
expulsion fr43ý the Soviet Union and China, the two leading 
communist powers. 
0 
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CONCLUSION 
By 1950 cultural relations were established as a permanent 
feature of international affairs and British diplomacy, but the 
British Council had not proved beyond doubt that it was the best 
body to conduct them. The Council was not to blame entirely 
for this situation. It, had been founded with no precise definitic 
of aims or methods and had become a repository for functions that 
did not belong to any other body. Fortunately, the Council was 
a flexible organisation and was able to adapt to Britain's 
declining fortunes and changing world condit' ons. It believed 
that it should serve Eý-ritish foreign policy and rarely perceived 
a conflict of interest between its own and the Foreign office's 
needs overseas. Established in the hostile and uncertain world 
of 1934, the Council was asserting by 1950 'tHat the successful 
prosecution of cultural relations should be the foundation of 
of cold war strategy'. 
Cultural relations account for a conside, rabl6 proportion of 
Britain's overseas relations and unofficial cultural contacts 
outnumber officially-sponsored activities. The Council's work 
was designed to give a particular direction or , emphasis, to 
aspects of this exchange. In some cases, for example in Spain 
and China, the cultural effort dominated the diplomatic and it 
was only through the Council that Britain was able to maintain 
significant links with these countries. The level and form of 
British cultural diplomacy can offer fresh insights into the aims 
of its foreign policy. Immediately before, and in the first 
year of, the war, Britain's and the Council's chief concern was 
with Europe and the containment of German influence. The 
Council's work was 'a desperate last hope, one more expediency in 
the Bi-itish struggle to mainta. in the European balance of power 
withput war'. 
2 Its rapid expansion during the war, especially in 
the Middle East, showed a recognition of the fact that British 
influence in the future would have to rest on less tangible 
foundations and that, even in the Empire, former loyalties 
could not be guaranteed. The threat to British intbrests 
d: ýd not come only from her avowed enemies; cooperation 
with the United States was desirable in all but the cultural 
field. The contraction of Council operations in the Middle East 
1. The British Council and the Cold War, 2 January 1951 T219/83 
2. Minute by F. C. Hawley, 1 June 1944 B7 2/95 
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and Latin America after the war, foreshadowed the demise of British 
influence on a wider scale. Its concentration in Europe reflected 
a change of direction for Britain and a new and 'deeper commitment 
to Europe. HoweVer although western and central Europe remained 
the areas 
of 
most direct political and military importance to 
Britain, the Council had different priorities. The eastern bloc 
was impenetrable for the time being, while western Burope shared 
a common cultural heritage witý Britain and was tied to her by 
political, m4litary and economic factors. The cultural dividing 
line had been drawn and there was little room', for manopuvre. The 
Commonwealth and Empire offered cwltural propaganda greater 
dividends. The situation was more fluid outside Europe and there 
were still converts to be won. It was an important challenge for 
the advocates of cultural propaganda, althoughthe timespan allowed 
was less than one generation. The swift expansion of the Council! g 
work In the Colonies and the Asian Dominions, beginning after the 
war from foundations laid during the conflictl, heralded a realisatioN 
of the speed of change in the develop. 1hg world and of the fragility 
of imperial bonds; cultural propaganda was a means of extending 
imperial influence. 
The exact level of official control over the Council is 
difficult to establish. Foreý_gn Office supervision fluctuated, 
from quite distant relations during the war to a keen interest in 
the immediate post-war period. However the desirability of 
cultural relations was recognised and British Missions overseas 
generally welcomed the Council and saw its work as av aluable 
extension of their own. The Council's staff enjoyed a closer 
dialogue with communities overseas and worked with groups that did 
not normally meet members of Embassies or Legations, but who were 
as important to the successfOl reception of British policy. as 
government officials. 
The Council's achievements can be measured by reference to 
its methods and aims. Effective propaganda requires continuity, 
concentration of resources and the careful sel. ection of targets. 
Moreover, the Council could do no more than portray Britain as 
sh,, e existed and 'the projection of England would be fruitless 
3 
unless there be in. England material worth projecting'. The system 
of annual grants with arbitrarily imposed ceilings, prevented 
long term planning and resulted in sudden withdrawals from countries 
and suspensions of projects. Under Lloyd and Adam the Council 
3. S. Tallents, The PrOJE3, ction of England (London 1932)p. 47 
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expanded to entrench the organisation against future cuts. The 
attempt to restrict the Council to cultural and educational elites 
proved difficult in practice as those groups were changing 
constantly, especially in the emergent nations, and were often 
too diffused to provide an easy target. The Council solved this 
problem by offering to each country the services that it desired 
or needed; scientific information and supplies in China, technical 
education in Turkey and libraries in the Colonies. However, 
at the end of the war, Britain; s image was perceived to be that 
of an old-fashioned, outmoded power and her traditional virtues 
of pragmat---ism and evolutionary politics were unattractive in 
the harsh realities of the post-war world. Britain had to portray 
herself as a dynamic, progressive democracy at the centre of a 
world-wide association of peoples, providing a viable alternative 
to communism and free-market capitalism. Britain's political 
and economic decline was coupled to a growing ideological gap 
between Britain and the developing world whicfi it was hoped the 
Council might close. 
The Council aimed 'to induce in the people of other countries 
a state of mind favourable to this countrylý to secure economic 
advantages for Britain and to contribute towards international 
harmony and world peace. Its success was dependent on the support 
of effective political, economic and military polioies, as 
demonstrated by the Council's work in South-eastern Europe after 
the outbreak of war. Cultural propaganda-is a lubricant for 
for6ign policy, not a substitute. Therefore, it is difficult to 
evaluate the contribution of cultural diplomacy to British foreign 
policy as that policy has to have some basis of support before 
the Council can operate. It is likely that cultural propaganda 
can only have an effect at the margin. It it no more easy to 
prove economic or commercial advantages arisingýfrom the Council's 
work. The relationship between the sponsorship of chairs at 
Egyptian universities and that country's attitude towards Briti'sh 
policy in Israel in unclear. It is impossible to show conclusivel3 
that a tour of Japan by the Royal Opera Company will improve 
Britain's balance of trade with that country, although there is 
more evidonce to show tbat technical students trained in Britain 
t. end to buy British goods on their return home. It is not 
possible to measure the cont-ibution of cultural propaganda to world 
peace and harmony for it is not axiomatic that international 
understanding generates international goodwill. This criterion 
'4-. -Second Meeting of Working Party, 2 January 1951 T. 219/84 
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presumes that mutual understanding'will eliminate the roots of 
hostility; France and Germany were not comforted by their close 
Knowledge of eachi other before the Second World War. Moreover, 
to promote intar-6ational harmony,; cuitural relations must be 
reciprocal as the Council stressed ri epeatedly, for the absence 
of a return traffic merely reinforces the dominance of those 
nations that can afford t'o practice it. Cultural relations 
between the developed and the undeveloped world tends to be a 
one-way traf-fic' from the former to the latter, between developed 
nations it is a bilate. nal activity% The developed have the 
added advantage of a see6ingly more successful culture, rendering 
the penetration of ideas fromweaKer or declining nations more 
difficult. 
The review of the Council's future due in 1951 was absorbed 
in a general enquiry into the overseas information services, 
set up in 1952 under the chairmanship of Lord Drogheda. The 
commission reported in 1954 and recommended t'he largest increase 
in expenditure for the Council over the official information 
services, particularly for its work in the developing world. 
5 
The Drogheda report endorsed the Council19 semi-official status 
and its exclusion from the United States and advocated the 
contraction of its operations in-Europe. The Council resisted 
the cuts proposed in Europe and rapidly increased its work in the 
developing world. 
6 
In the 1960's it took over the administration 
of educational aid overseas, an activity that now dominates all 
others. In 1969, the Duncan Committee, at the time of Britain's 
application to join the European Economic Community, recommended 
an increase in t'he Council's work in Europe and additional f6nds 
71 
were provided for this purpose. In the mid-1970': s, after the oil 
crisis, The Coun cil began charging, for its educational services, 
especially! in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East and; 'in' 
Venezuela., The report oT the Central Policy', ReviewýStaff iný1977 
suggested the Council's abolition and the tr; anýsfer, 0' 'work 
to the Department'of Education and Sclýenceiand the ! Ministr 0 Y 
Overseas De, vel6pmE3nt or the abolitionýlof its separate Organisation 
ovýrseas Only. ! lIt is a measure of. the change I in t he: Council's- 
t functions ýthat It s worK coul& be, aKen over, by theseýl two 
departmentil. 
5. Cmd. 9138, _London 1954 
19ý0 80%ý 6.1 By f the Council'sý'grant went Ci t ýtheý developing 
world. ' 
7 Cmd 07 Lo n'd 0n 11 969 
8 Report of, the Central POlicy'Review Stafý, ,. London 197ý7, j 
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In Britain's hands cultural propaganda was a barricade and 
not a weapon. The Council's future and Britain's commitment 
to cultural diplomacy w--e- uncertain in the period studied here 
and remains vague. The impossibility of submitting this work 
to cost-be; nefit analypis augments the critics' case and the 
Council's position on ýt_he p--eriphery of the government machine 
leaves it vulnerable to attack. Such activities are not designed 
to influence today's or even next year's governments, but the 
next generation 
I 
s. and, therefore, involve a considerable gamble. 
Cultural propaganda can not be judged by the same standards that 
apply to daily diplomatic activity and information work. The 
prosecution of cultural propaganda depends to a large extent on 
faith in its value. Appropriately, the last word belongs to 
Rex Leeper, the Council's father. 
When all is said and done, we-are the ýepresentatives 
and guardians of a national culture which has been 
one of the great creative forces of human history and 
which still has much to contribute to the solution of 
the world's difficulties., We shallýbe shirking our 
duties, as well as disregarding our interests, if we 
fail to make available to those who wish to benefit 
by them, the fruits of our long experience. 9 
9. \. R. A. Leeper, The British Council and the Maintenance of British 
Influence Abroad, July 1939 FO 395/647A 
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APPENDIX A 
PRINCIPAL BRITISH COUNCIL PERSONNEL 1939-1950 
ADAM, General Sir Deputy Chief Imperial General Staff, 
Ronald Forbes. 1938-1939; Commander, 3rd Army Corps; 
Commanding Officer, Northern Command, 
1940-41; Adjutant-General 1941-1946; 
CHAIRMAN & DIRECTOR-GENERAL, British Counci 
1946-1955; PRESIDENT, British Council, 1950- 
1954. 
BIDWELL, D. G. Released from army tý join Allied Liaison, 
Division Middle East, 1943-1945; 
REPRESENTATIVE, 1946-1949j June 1949 
resigned, renounced British nationality 
and became a Polish citizen. 
BINGLEY, T. S. REPRESENTATIVE, Persia, 1943-1944; 
REPRESENTATIVE, Gibraltar 1944-1946; 
REPRESENTATIVE, Burma, 1946-1948 
BLAKE, M. DIRECTOR, Foreign Division A 1941-1945; 
REPRESENTATIVE, Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947 
BOASE, Professor Professor, History of Art, & Director, 
T. S. R. Courtauld Institute, 1937-1947; Temporary 
CiVil Servant, Air Ministry London & Cairo, 
1939-1943; CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE, Middle East 
1943-1945 
BOTTRALL, F. J. R. Assistant Director and Professor of Englisk, 
British Institute, Florence, 1937-1938; 
Temporary adminstrative officer, Air 
Ministry, 1940; REPRESENTATIVE, Sweden, 1941-44-ýi 
Assistant Director, Foreign Division C, 
1944-1945; REPRESENTATIVE. Italy, 1945-1950 
CHURCH, E. E. R. Reader in English, Rio University, & Oirector- 
Anglo-Brazilian Cultural Society, 1938-1940 
REPRESENTATIVE, Brazil, 1940-1943; DIRECTOR, 
Latin-American Department, London. 1943-1949 
cR, ýOM-JOHNSON, H. P. Regional Officer for the Balkans and the 
Middle East and DIRECTOR of Lecturers and 
Teaching Appointments, 1935-1939, serve'd 
1939-1945 war; OIRECTOR, Appointments 
Department 1945-1946; DIRECTOR, East Uq 
European Section, Overseas Division C, 1946- !, 
CROWTHER, J. G. DIRECTOR, Science Department, 1941-1946 
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DAVIES, R. Principal Publicity Officer for Egypt, 
1939-1942; DIRECTOR, Finance Division 1942-:, 
1947; ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL, 1-947- 
DUNDAS, C. A. F. Principal, Matriculation School, Baghdad, 
1936-1938; CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE, Middle East 
1938-1943 
EVANS, Professor 
Ifor Ministry of Information, 1940; 
DIRECTOR, Education Division, 1940-1944; 
Acting Representative, Middle East 1943 
FURNESS, R. A. Professor of English Literature, Faud I 
University, Cairo 1936-1939; Deputy Chief 
Censor of Publications, Egypt, 1939-1944; 
REPRESENTATIVE, Egypt, 1945-1950 
GILLAN, Sir Sudan Political Service, 1909-1939; 
Angus Principal Officer, North Midlands Civil 
Defence Region, 1940-41; DIRECTOR, Empire 
Division, 1941-1946; CONTROLLER, Commonwealthý 
& Empire Division, 1947-1949; REPRESENTATIVE 
Australia, 1949-1951. 
GRANT, M. Assistant Representative, Middle East 1939j: 
REPRESENTATIVE, Turkey. 1940-1945; Deputy 
Director, Eurapean Oivision, 1945-1947 
GUEDALLA, P. DIRECTOR, Ibero-American Institute, 1932- 
1944; CHAIRMAN, Ibero-American & Films 
Committees 1934-1944 
HUSSEY, E. R. J. DIRECTOR, Middle East department, 1945-1949.; 
Deputy Director, Empire Division, 1945-1946 
JOHNSTONE, K. SECRETARY-GENERAL, 1937-1939; served 1939- 
1945 war; DIRECTOR, Eurapean Division, 1945- 
1950 
KENNEDY-COOKE, B. DIRECTOR, Production Divis ion, 1943-1947# 
CONTROLLER, Arts & Science Division, 1947-49 
LLOYD, Lord, Chairman, Near East Committee, 1935-1939; 
of Oolobran CHAIRMAN, British Council, 1937-1941; 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and 
Leader of the House of Lords, May 1940 
February 1941; President of the Navy LeaguE 
from 1930 1 
LUKE, Sir High 00mmissioner for the Western Pacific, 
Harry 1938-19,4-2, CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE, Caribbean, 
r-l-A 11 ------ AL-t-- 
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MACMILLAN, Professor Member, Advisory Committee on Education in 
W. M. the Colonies, 1938-1941; Empire Intelligencý_, 
Section, BBC, 1941-1943; CHIEF 
REPRESENTATIVE, West Africa, 1943-1946 
MILLINGTON-DRAKE, Sir British Minister, Uruguay:, 193, ý--1941; CHIEF 
Eugen REPRESENTATIVE, Latin America, 1941-1946 
MORGAN, Doctor Assistant Secretary, Minister of Labour and 
A. E. National Service, 1941-1945: DIRECTOR, 
Education Division, 1946-19SI. 
MORRAY, T. W. REPRESENTATIVE, Iraqi 1942-19451 
REPRESENTATIVE, Sweden, 1947-1949 
NEEDHAM, Doctor Reader in Biochemistry, Cambridge, 1933-1942 
J. Head of British Scientific Mission in 
China and British Council SCIENTIFIC 
OFFICER, 1942-1946. 
OGILVIE, Sir, Director-General, BB'C, 1 938-1942; DIRECTOR, 
F. Foreign Division B. 1942-1944 
RIVERDALE, Lord VICE-CHAIRMAN, British Council, 1939-1946; 
Chairman, Advisory Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research 1937-1946; 
Negotiated Commonwealth Air Training Scheme- 
Canada, 1939. 
ROBERTSON, Sir, Foreign Service 1903-1929IAmbassador, 
M. Argentina 1927-1929; Chairman, Spillers Ltd 
1930-1947; CHAIRMAN, British Council, 1941-4S 
Member of Parliament (C. )1940-1945 
ROXBY, Professor Professor of Geography, Liverpool Universi 
R. M. REPRESENTATIVE, China, 1945-1947 
SEYMOUR, R. S. DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL, 1940-1947; 
SECRETARY, 1947-1953; DIRECTOR, General 
Division 1940-1943; Council Represehtative 
on JointýStanding Committ with Colonial 
Office, at Confe. rence of Allied Ministers 
of Education, 1942-1945, -'and on Overseas 
Information Ser i es Com6ittee, 1946-1 949 , 
SHILLAN, D. DIRECTOR, Belgrade Instit ute, 1940-1941; 
Assistant Representative, Portugal, 1941-194+ 
Assistant Director, Foreign Division Cý, 
1944-1945 
SHREEVIE, G. H. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL (Regionall), 
194/-1951 
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STARKIE, Professor REPRESENTATIVE, Spain, 1940-1950. 
W. Professor of English Literature, Madrid 
University, 1940-1950 
TOYE, F. Director, British Institute, Florence, 
1940-1941; Director, Anglo-Brazilian 
Cultural Society, 1941-1943; REPRESENTATIVE, 
Brazil, 1943-194S. 
TUNNARD-MOORE, T. P. DIRECTOR, Appointments Department, 1941-45; 
DIRECTOR, Dominions and India section, 
Empire Division, 1945-1947 
WARD PRICE, R. Assistant Director, Colonies Section, 
Empire Division, 1941-1945, DIRECTOR, 
Colonies Section, 1945-1947 
WEST, S. G. REPRESENTATIVE, Portugal, 1940-1947; 
REPRESENTATIVE, Brazil, 1947-1950 
WHITE, A. J. S. SECRETARY GENERAL 1940-1 
' 
947; CONTROLLER 
Overseas oivision B. 1947-1962. 
WICKHAM, W. R. L. REPRESENTATIVE, Malta, 1940-1944jAssistant 
Direct, Foreign Oivision C, 1944-1945, 
REPRESENTATIVE, India, 1947-1949; 
REPRESENTATIVE, Austria, 1950 
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APPENDIX B 
1. BRITISH COUNCIL ORGANISATION - APRIL 1939 
Fine Arts - Maj. Wickham 
Mr Willcoxf 
Deputy 
Secretary-General 
Mr White 
Finapce & Administration 
Mr: Croom Ja 
a 
Secretary-General 
Col. Bridge 
CHAIRMAN 
Lord Lloyd 
Deputy 
Secretary-General 
Mr Johnstone 
Liaison with F. D. 
L Books &) Mr Sawdon & 
Periodicals) Mr Symonds 
Distribution - Mr Read 
Secretarial - Mrs Webb 
Accounts - Mr Jesty 
Western Europe 
U. S. A. 
Canada )-Mr Russell 
West Indies 
A-Frica 
Northern Europe - Mr Lloyd 
Latin America - Mr Symonds 
Central Europe - Mr. Sawdon 
Mr. Croom-Johnson- 
Teaching 
Appointments 
Lectures' Mr Lewes 
Press 
Broadcasting Mr. O'Brien 
Britain Today Mr Woodward 
Receptions Mr C. Russell 
Students Capt. Sullivan 
Educational 
Enquiries 
Prize Visits 
Music - Miss Henn-Collins 
Drama - Mr. Russell 
Films 
Visual 
Propaganda Mr Branch 
Greece 
Cyprus 
Spain 3 
_ Portugal Mr Jennings 
Far East 
India )-Mr. Russell 
Afghanistan 
Middle East 
North Africa Mr. Simon 
Balkans 
Italy Mr. Everett 
Malta 
316 
2. BRITISH COUNCIL ORGANISATION - FEBRUARY 1943 
GENERAL DIVISION 
R, Seymour 
CHAIRMAN 
M. Robertson 
Film - Mr Kearney 
Fine Arts - Maj. Longden 
BooKs &) 
Periodicals ) _ Mr Hampden 
Britain Today Mr Scott-James 
Appointments Mr Tunnard-Moore 
Lectures Mr Bridges-Adams Drama 
Music Mis ? Henn-Collins Visual Miss Sands Publicity 
Communications Mr Read 
Administrat-ion Mr Wilcox 
Science - Mr Crowther 
EDUCATION DIVISION Medicine - Dr. Howard Jones 
Ifor Evans Students - Mrs Boys Smit Administration - Mr Lane 
Deputy Director - Mr Orton 
i 
General - Mr Fisher 
Receptions - Mr Pinder-Wilso 
PRESS DIVISION_ 
Photographs - Mr ForsdicK 
E. O'Brien 
Articles - Mrs Gaskin 
Press Library 
Miss Beiseige & Information 
_Peputy 
Director Mr Lindsay 
Secretary-General 
A, J. S. White 
l-. 
FOREIGN DIVISIO 
W. M. BlaKe 
Ethiopia. & 
Turkey )-Mr Everett 
North Africa 
Egypt, Sudan 
Palestine 9 )-Miss Seton- 
Syria Williams 
Persia, Iraq 
Afghanistan Mr Thompson 
Iceland, Spain 
Portugal & 
Sweden )-Mr Braden 
Switzerland 
U. S. A. & China Mr Bridges-Adam 
Latin America Mr Ogilvie & 
Mr. Sturt 
U. S. S. R. - Mr Seymour 
- EMPIRE DIVISION-Deputy Director - Mr. Gray 
A. Gillan 
FINANCE DIVISION__rccountant - Mr Jesty 
G R. Davies General - Mr Rose 
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3. BRITISH COUNCIL ORGANISATION - NOVEMBER 1950 
Accounts 
Finance Audit 
Budget & Control 
Pay & Records 
Personnel 
Estimates Premises 
Sir A. Waugh Office Registry 
Services Reproduction/Distributit 
E. O. Springfield( Supplies & Despatch 
Education , General 
F. J. R. Bottrall 
F 
Lecturers 
Science- Md, dical 
Agriculture 
Assistant Combined Sciences 
Director-General 
R Davies Aids & Displays . Presentation-( Films 
F E, Bolton King Publications L Recorded Sound' 
Arts & Science s Book Exhibitions 
K. Loch Books 
British Book News 
Literature- ( Periodicals 
J. Hampden ( Requests & Textbooks 
Reviews 
Britain 
CHAIRMAN 9 Art 
Drama 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL K Loch 
Fine Arts 
Gen. Sir R. Adam . 
music 
Information 
Central Law 
R. Seymour Secretariat 
E. Evans U. K. Regions 
London Residencies 
Home Division H. F. Oxbury-I Residencies & Catering 
N. Parkinson r Student Welfare 
Assistant Courses 
Director-General I-R. A. Phi I lips-( Students 
H. Shroeve Visitors 
East & Central Europe 
-Overseas C North West Europe 
K. Johnstone South West Europe 
Latin America 
-Overseas B Middle East 
A. J. S. White Far East 
Commonwealth (1) 
-Overseas A Commonwealth (2) 
Sir John Darg ent, Colonies 
DIVISIONS GROUPS DEPARTMENTS 
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APPENDIX C 
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 1934/5 - 1949/511 
Net Expenditure Year out of 
Government 
Grants 
(1) 
1934/5 - 
1935/6 S, 000 
1936/7 15,000 
1937/8 60,000 
1938/9 130,500 
1939/40 330,249 
1940/1 433,099 
1941/2 611 728 
1942/3 966,705 
1943/4 1,573,958 
1944/5 2,108,122 
194S/6 2,522,370 
1946/7 2,877,802 
1947/8 3,161,413 
1948/9 2,853,757 
1949/50 3,045,321 
Council's Agency 
General Expenditure 
R ev en u e_ 
(2) (3) 
881 - 
8,947 
12,922 T1,609 
6,095 1,048 
45,965 2,001 
21,110 1,874 
16,712 30,862 
5,994 71,101 
9,146 3ý, 258 
60,773 11,590 
120,778 8.160 
267,646 24,609 
257,646 5,508 
274,601 3,500 
417,984 3,414 
326,088 3,540 
Total 
Expenditure 
881 
13,947 
29,531 
67,143 
178,466 
353,233 
480,673 
688,773 
1 1011 1109 
1 646,321 
2,237,060 
2,814,625 
3,140,956 
3,439,514 
3,275,155 
3,374,949 
(1) Actual expenditure from Government grants was usually 
less than the total amount allotted. 
(2) This includes receipts from teaching, the sale of 
publications, etc. and general donations. 
(33 This includes donations for special purposes, for 
example by industry for apprenticeships, and expenditure 
on behalf of and financed by other agencies, such as 
the work of the Home Division and the Allied Liaison 
Division during the war for the Service Department. 
**** 
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APPENDIX D 
M 
FOREIGN OFFICE PRIORITY LISTS 
1939/40 
(ii) 
A. Egypt, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Poland, Roumania, Turkey 
Yugoslavia, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, Finland 
Dominions & Malta, Cyprus, Canada, Palestine, Transjordan 
Co1onies 
B. Chilp, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Belgium, France, Hungary, Denmark, Norway, Iran, 
Holland, ATghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Uruguay 
C. Albania, Ecuador, Panama, Bolivia, Tudisia 
D. Central America, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Liberia, Morocco, Syria, Paraguay 
1943/44 
(iii) 
A. China, Russia, United States 
B. Spain, North Africa, Argentina, Persia 
C. Sweden, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, 
Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico 
D. Portugal, Egypt, Palestine, Cyprus, Transjordan, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay 
1946/7 
Al. Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Greece, 
Holland, Italy, Poland, Russia 
A2. Austria, Bulgaria, OenmarK, Finland, Hungary, Iraq, 
Persia, Norway, Roumania, Turkey, Yugoslavia 
Bl. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, Spain 
62. Ethiopia, Levant States, Sweden, Sudan 
Cl. Chile, Colombia, Peru, Cuba Venezuela 
C2. Iceland, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Dominions 
Dl. Albania, Luxembourg, French North Africa, Portuguese 
West Africa, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Persian Gulf, Bolivia 
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Salvador, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Santo Domingo, Tangier, 
(Dutch East Indies, Belgium Congo) 
D2. Cyrenanica, Kuwait, Tripolitania 
These lists were provided -for the Council's guidance in 
planning expenditure. 
Minute by C. Warner, 26 January 1939. FO395/641 P74/44/150 
(iii) Both 1943/4 and 1946/7 Foreign Office Priority Lists, BW2/98 
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APPENDIX E 
BRITISH COUNCIL EXPENDITURE ON NEWSPAPERS OVERSEAS 
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 Total 
1939, 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1 
Cyprus Post 161 4,627 3,662 1,124 2,108 23S 11,877 
, Warsaw Weekly 
191 176 376 
Budapest Daily 40 40 
Anglo-Po. Etuguese 275 685 1,786 I, Sý77 1,895 6,218 
News 
Bulgar-British ISO 150 
Review 
South Pacific 650 1,050 500 2,200 
Mail (Chile] 
Scandinavian 934 1,000 1,934 
Review 
Tangiers 324 637 487 812 2,261 
Gazette 
Cheftoo Daily 6 36 18 so 
News (China) 
Central China 440 160 600 
Post 
Do You'SpeaK English? 1,295 1,128 2,423 
(Turkey) 
Chamber of Commerce 104 104 
Journal (Turkey) ** 
Review (Turkey) ++ 1,178 1,178 
++ Widely circulated and closely associated with the Council's 
work in Turkey 
Publishad indopondontly but qupportod by Council subsidy 
to secure publication of articles about the Council. 
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